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Jurisdictional Statement

This court has jurisdiction under section 78A-3-102(3)G) of the Utah Code.
Introduction

In 1964, Congress passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act, which
allowed the federal government to provide federal funds to local public transit
districts to enable those public transit districts to take over then-failing private
transit systems. Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302 (1964) (now codified at 49 U.S.C.
§§ 5301 to -5340). Because federal labor laws concerning collective bargaining
applied only to private employees -e.g., the employees of private transit
systems-Congress required states, as a condition of receiving federal funds, to
enact legislation to preserve "existing collective bargaining agreements," and
continue "collective bargaining rights" to protect" individual employees against
a worsening of their positions related to employment." 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(2).
In 1969, Utah enacted the Utah Public Transit District Act to satisfy the
Urban Mass Transportation Act's precondition for receiving federal funding to
create a public transit district, such as UTA. 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 § 30 (now
codified at Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(1)). To satisfy the precondition, the Utah
Public Transit District Act allows the "employees" of a public transit system to
join labor organizations and bargain collectively. Utah Code § 17B-2a-813(2)(a).
The issue here is whether the term "employee" in the Utah Public Transit
District Act includes supervisors, even though the term "employee" under
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federal labor laws in 1964 did not. Put differently, the issue is whether the Utah
Public Transit District Act provided more collective bargaining rights - i.e., to
supervisors - than the Urban Mass Transportation Act required, even though the
Utah Public Transit District Act expressly states that it was establishing only
those "rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of
Section 13(c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, ... as determined by
the Secretary of Labor." Id. § 17B-2a-813(1).
Because the Utah Public Transit District Act used the term "employee" as
it was used in the Urban Mass Transportation Act, UT A supervisors do not have
collective bargaining rights. The district court erred in ruling otherwise, even
while recognizing the result as anomalous because UTA supervisors "may very
well be the only supervisors in the United States with the right to organize and
collectively bargain." [R.287 at n.2.] This court should reverse on the ground that
the Utah Public Transit District Act does not provide collective bargaining rights
to supervisors because federal law did not require Utah to create such rights.
The result is no different if, as the district court ruled, the term "employee"
in the Utah Public Transit District Act has the same meaning as it does in the

Utah Labor Relations Act ("ULRA"). Utah enacted the ULRA in 1937. 1937 Utah
Laws ch. 55 §§ 1-18 (current version at Utah Code§§ 34-20-1 to -14). The relevant
language is copied almost verbatim from the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"). Utah Code § 34-20-2(4).
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The NLRA was enacted in 1935 through legislation known as the "Wagner
Act." Pub. L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (Supp. 1
(1935)). It guaranteed private sector employees, but not public employees, the
right to organize into unions and engage in collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2) (Supp. 1 (1935)).
In 1947, after a series of inconsistent decisions by the National Labor
Relations Board ("NLRB") and the courts, Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley
Amendments to clarify and amend the NLRA. Pub. L. No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136
(amendments originally codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 167 (Supp. 1 (1947)).
Relevant here, Congress clarified that supervisors were never employees for
purposes of collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 152(2), (3) (Supp. 1 (1947)).
Utah did not amend its ULRA definition of" employee" or" employer,"
but instead kept the original language that Congress clarified had never included
supervisors. In fact, the ULRA today is nearly identical to its 1937 version.

Compare Utah Code§ 34-20-2, with 1937 Utah Laws ch. 55 § 2.
The district court here nonetheless interpreted the term "employees" to
include supervisors under the ULRA, and, therefore, under the Utah Public
Transit District Act. But if the Taft-Hartley Amendments clarified that supervisors
were never included in the definition of "employees" under the NLRA, then
Utah did not need to amend the ULRA to clarify that issue because its definition
was copied from the same federal law clarified to exclude supervisors.
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For these reasons, whether the term" employee" in the Utah Public Transit
District Act has the same definition as was required by the Urban Mass
Transportation Act or has the same definition as that term has in the ULRA, the
result is the same: UTA supervisors cannot bargain collectively.
Issue: Whether the term "employee" used in section 17B-2a-813 of the

Utah Code, Utah Public Transit District Act, includes supervisors and thereby
allows supervisors to bargain collectively with UTA.
Standard of Review: This court reviews a district court's interpretation of

a statute for correctness. State v. Robertson, 2017 UT 27,

~

14, - P.3d - .

Preservation: This issue is preserved. [R.277,284,287,290,1008.]
Determinative Provisions

The following determinative provisions are attached at Addenda D-J:
Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964: 49 U.S.C. § 1609 (1964)
Urban Mass Transportation Act: 49 U.S.C. § 5333 (2017)
Utah Public Transit District Act of 1969: 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 §§ 30, 31
Utah Public Transit District Act: Utah Code § 17B-2a-813 (2017)
National Labor Relations Act: 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157 (1964)
National Labor Relations Act: 29 U.S.C. §§ 152, 157 (2017)
Utah Labor Relations Act: Utah Code §§ 34-20-2, -7, -8 (2017)
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Statement of the Case
1.

Nature of the Case and Course of Proceedings

This case stems from a labor dispute between Teamsters Local 222 and
UTA. The Teamsters sought to organize and represent UTA's rail operations
supervisors for purposes of collective bargaining. UTA declined to recognize the
union, asserting that rail operations supervisors are not "employees" for
collective bargaining under the Utah Public Transit District Act.
The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the Teamsters.
Because the Utah Public Transit District Act does not define the term
"employees," the district court looked to Utah's labor statutes. The court ruled
that UTA' s rail operations supervisors are "employees" as that term is used in
Utah's labor statutes, and, accordingly, could organize and collectively bargain.
The district court ordered a secret ballot election of the rail operations
supervisors to determine whether they wanted to unionize. The rail operations
supervisors voted not to unionize. Following the election, the district court
entered Final Judgment.
UTA moved for a new trial, asking the court to amend its decision
regarding the interpretation of the terms "employer" and "employee" to make
clear that rail operations supervisors are not employees under the Utah Public
Transit District Act. The court denied UTA' s motion. UTA appealed.
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2.

Statement of Facts

Teamsters is a labor organization representing employees in industries
that affect commerce. [R.1.] UTA is a public transit district organized under
section 17B-2a-801 of the Utah Code. [R.2.] The plaintiffs work for UTA as rail
operations supervisors in the TRAX division. [R.2.]

In 2013, UT A employed approximately 38 to 41 rail operations supervisors.
[R.4.] In 2014, UTA reclassified its rail operations supervisors from salaried
workers to hourly workers. [R.4.] One or more of the rail operations supervisors
contacted Teamsters, requesting assistance in organizing and bargaining
collectively. [R.4.] Teamsters obtained authorization cards from 23 rail operations
supervisors-a majority. [R.4.]
Teamsters sent a letter to UTA informing it of organizing efforts among the
rail operations supervisors. [R.4.] UTA responded that it "recognize[d] that its
employees have the right to self-organize and form, join, or assist labor
organizations pursuant to" section 17B-2a-813(1) of the Utah Public Transit
District Act. [R.9.] Teamsters requested recognition for union representation for
rail operations supervisors at TRAX and offered to hire a neutral third party to
conduct a card check to verify that the 23 authorization cards were from rail
operations supervisors on UTA's payroll. [R.11.]
UTA rejected Teamsters' request for recognition. [R.13.] UTA indicated,
first, that it did "not agree that the Rail Operations Supervisors at TRAX are an
appropriate bargaining unit for representation," and second, that it rejected the

6
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card check as a sufficient procedure showing the desire for representation by a
majority of the unit. [R.13.] UTA indicated that it would require that Teamsters
file a petition for an election. [R.13.]
The rail operations supervisors brought this action seeking declaratory
judgment that they are an appropriate bargaining unit under section 17B-2a813(2) of the Utah Code. [R.2.] Simultaneously, Teamsters sought declaratory
judgment that it was the exclusive bargaining representative for the bargaining
unit of rail operations supervisors at TRAX. [R.2.] Teamsters and the rail
II

operations supervisors asked the district court to compel[] UTA to bargain with
Teamsters Local 222 regarding the wages, salaries, hours, working conditions,
and welfare, pension, and retirement of the bargaining unit." [R.3.]
Teamsters moved for summary judgment. [R.156-70;277-94.] The district
court granted the motion, ruling that UTA's rail operations supervisors are
11

employees" with the right to organize and collectively bargain. [R.278, attached

at Add. C.] Teamsters asked the court to authorize a card check, rather than a
secret ballot election. [R.168-70.] The district court granted that request, stating
that a secret ballot election was preferable but essentially was too difficult now
that the Utah Labor Relations Board no longer exists. [R.290-94.]
The card check failed to produce the requisite number of cards, meaning
that the rail operations supervisors had voted not to unionize. [R.301-02.]
Teamsters filed a rule 60(b) motion, claiming several errors in the card check.
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[R.304-12.] At that point, the district court "reconsider[ed] its early ruling to use a
'card check' method" because it had "major concerns with ... the overall efficacy
of the 'card check' method." [R.436.] The district court determined that "[a]
secret-ballot election is better designed to ascertain the true beliefs of the affected
employees." [R.436;440-42.]
The court granted Teamsters' rule 60(b) motion in part, but ordered a
secret ballot election to rectify any deficiencies in the card check. [R.434-42.] The
II

court ordered the parties to meet and confer" regarding rules for the election.
[R.442.] The court issued an Order Directing Election, setting forth rules for the
election. [R.651-55.]
Teamsters held the secret ballot election. [R.671-84.] The rail operations
supervisors again voted not to unionize. [R.697-99.] As a result, Teamsters did
not have a majority representation of the rail operations supervisors, and the rail
operations supervisors were not certified as a collective bargaining unit. [R.699.]
Having received the results of the election, the district court entered its final
judgment. [R.697-99, attached at Add. B.]
UT A moved for a new trial on the question of whether rail operations
II

supervisors were employees," the issue decided on summary judgment. [R.70772.] The district court denied UTA's motion for new trial. [R.1008-16, attached at
Add. A.] UTA appealed. [R.1018-19.] Even though the election failed, the court's
ruling, if it stands, allows UT A supervisors to attempt to unionize in the future.
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Summary of the Argument

The district court erred when it granted summary judgment in favor of the
Teamsters on the ground that UTA' s rail operations supervisors are "employees"
for purposes of collective bargaining under the Utah Public Transit District Act.
Since it was enacted in 1969, the Utah Public Transit District Act has
required that "[t]he rights, benefits, and other employee protective conditions
and remedies" of federal law apply to UTA. 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 § 30 (now
codified at Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(1)). UTA's employees have the right to selforganize; "form, join, or assist labor organizations"; and "bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing." Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(2)(a). In
exchange, UTA must "recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor
organization representing a majority" of their employees. Id.§ 17B-2a-813(2)(c)(i).
The Utah Public Transit District Act does not define the term "employees,"
but it refers to the federal Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964. Id. § 17B-2a813(1). That Act does not define "employees" but preserves then-existing rights
under the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA"). 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1964)
(current version at 49 U.S. C. § 5333(b)). The NLRA, in turn, defines "employees"
for collective bargaining purposes and expressly excludes "supervisors" from the
definition of" employees." 29 U.S.C.

§ 152(3)

(2012); id. (1964). By extension, the

Utah Public Transit District Act does not extend collective bargaining rights to
"supervisors." This court can reverse on this ground alone.
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The result is the same under the definition of "employees" in the Utah
Labor Relations Act ("ULRA"), which the district court misinterpreted. The
context of the ULRA reveals that "supervisors" were not entitled to collective
bargaining protections. It was enacted in 1937, copied from the NLRA, which
was enacted in 1935. However, in 1947, following a controversial decision of the
U.S. Supreme Court, Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments, which
amended the NLRA to clarify that" supervisors" were not II employees." Pub. L.
No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (1947) (amendments originally codified at 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(2), (3) (Supp. 1 (1947)). The House and Senate Reports make clear that

Congress always intended the term "employee" to exclude supervisors.
The Utah Legislature did not amend the ULRA. It did not need to. Had the
Taft-Hartley Amendments changed the meaning of the term "employee" from
the one Congress gave it originally, then the failure of Utah to amend the ULRA
would support the district court's interpretation. The fact that the Taft-Hartley
Amendments were clarifying reveals that Utah's definition excluded supervisors
in 1937 and thereafter. Utah case law and statutes from the period confirm that
II

Utah never treated "supervisors" as "employees," but as employers."
Under both interpretations, supervisors are not "employees" with
collective bargaining rights under the Utah Public Transit Act. This court should
reverse and remand for a factual determination of whether UTA' s rail operations
II

supervisors are supervisors" for purposes of collective bargaining.
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Argument

Under the Utah Public Transit District Act, supervisors are not afforded
collective bargaining rights. This is because the Utah Public Transit District Act
afforded only those collective-bargaining rights required by the Urban Mass
Transportation Act. And the Urban Mass Transportation Act required states to
afford only those rights then-protected by the National Labor Relations Act
("NLRA"), which did not extend collective bargaining rights to supervisors.
The result is no different if the scope of the rights afforded by the Utah
Public Transit District Act mirrors the scope of the rights in the Utah Labor
Relations Act ("ULRA"). The ULRA was patterned on the NLRA in the 1930s,
and in 1947 Congress clarified that the NLRA never afforded collective
bargaining rights to supervisors. The ULRA also never afforded such rights.
1.

The Utah Public Transit District Act Does Not Provide Supervisors the
Right to Bargain Collectively Because It Provides Only Those Rights
Required Under Federal Law in 1964, and Federal Law Did Not Provide
Supervisors the Right to Bargain Collectively in 1964

In 1964, Congress passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act to help
communities improve their mass transit operations. Pub. L. 88-365, 78 Stat. 302
(1964) (originally codified at 49 U.S.C. §§ 1601 -1611 (1964); current version at 49

U.S.C. §§ 5301 - 5340); see Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated

Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 17 (1982).
At the time, many mass transit operations were private, which meant that
transit employees' bargaining rights were protected under the NLRA, which
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protected private, but not public, workers. Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 17.
Congress understood that after the enactment of the Urban Mass Transportation
Act many transit workers would become public employees, which meant they
would no longer be afforded the protections of the NLRA. Id.
While Congress wanted to improve transportation infrastructure, it also
wanted to ensure that transit employees would be protected as they had been
under the NLRA. Id. For that reason, Congress conditioned the receipt of federal
funds to improve public transit systems upon whether states enacted legislation
to preserve "existing collective bargaining agreements," to continue "collective
bargaining rights," and to protect "individual employees against a worsening of
their positions related to employment." 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1964) (current
version at 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(2)(A)-(C)) (attached at Add. D, E).1
In 1969, to satisfy the condition for receiving federal funds, the Utah
Legislature enacted the Utah Public Transit District Act. 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12
§§ 1-59 (current version at Utah Code§§ 17B-2a-801 to -826). The Utah Public
Transit District Act confirms that the legislature protected only those rights that
the Urban Mass Transportation Act required Utah to protect: "The rights,
benefits, and other employee protective conditions and remedies of Section 13(c)

The relevant section of the Urban Mass Transportation Act is substantially
the same as it was in 1964. Compare 49 U.S.C. § 1609(c) (1964), with 49 U.S.C.
§ 5333(b) (2012 & Supp. 2016). For convenience, this brief cites the current version
unless noted.
1

12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1609(c)), as
determined by the Secretary of Labor, shall apply to the establishment and
operation by the district of a public transit service or system." 1969 Utah Laws
ch. 12 §§ 30, 31 (current version at§ 17B-2a-813(1)) (attached at Add. F, G). 2
The Utah Public Transit District Act explains the rights and responsibilities
11

of UTA and its employees. UTA is required to recognize and bargain
exclusively with any labor organization representing a majority of the district's
employees in an appropriate unit." Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(2)(c)(i). In turn,
"[e]mployees of a public transit system established and operated by a public
transit district have the right to: (i) self-organization; (ii) form, join, or assist labor
organizations; and (iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own
choosing." Id. § 17B-2a-813(2)(a).
When UTA's rail operations supervisors attempted to organize, UTA
refused to recognize them as "employees," asserting that "supervisors" are not
"employees" allowed to bargain collectively under the NLRA and therefore are
II

not employees" allowed to bargain collectively under the Utah Public Transit
District Act. The district court disagreed. As described below, the district court
erred.

The relevant sections of the Utah Public Transit District Act are substantially
the same today as they were in 1969. Compare 1969 Utah Laws ch. 12 §§ 30, 31,
with Utah Code § 17B-2a-813 (2017). For convenience, this brief cites the current
version unless noted.
2
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1.1

The Court's Objective in Interpreting a Stahtte Is to Give Effect to
the Legislature's Intent

This court's objective in interpreting a statute "is to give effect to the
legislature's intent." Carranza v. United States, 2011 UT 80, ,I 8, 267 P.3d 912
(internal quotation marks omitted). To discern legislative intent, the court looks
first to the plain meaning of the language the legislature used. Olsen v. Eagle

Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ,I 9, 248 P.3d 465. And in determining the plain
meaning, the court looks to how the language is used in context, not in isolation.

Id.

,I,r 9, 12. The relevant context includes both "the structure and language of the

statutory scheme." Id.

,r 12.

When interpreting Utah statutes modeled on federal statutes, "[t]his Court
has previously adopted federal interpretations for sections of the Utah Code
which are identical to or copied after federal acts." W. Coating, Inc. v. Gibbons &

Reed Co., 788 P.2d 503, 505-06 (Utah 1990); see also Kell v. State, 2012 UT 25, ,r,r 2728, 285 P.3d 1133 (looking to federal Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty
Act to interpret Utah Post-Conviction Remedies Act); Summit Water Distrib. Co. v.

Summit Cnty., 2005 UT 73, ,r,r 21-24, 123 P.3d 437 (looking to federal Antitrust
Act to interpret Utah Antitrust Act).
This is because "[w]hen the legislature 'borrows terms of art in which are
accumulated the legal tradition and meaning of centuries of practice, it
presumably knows and adopts the cluster of ideas that were attached to each
borrowed word in the body of learning from which it was taken."' Maxfield v.
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Herbert, 2012 UT 44, ,r 31,284 P.3d 647 (quoting Morissette v. United States, 342
U.S. 246, 263 (1952)). "In other words, when a word or phrase is 'transplanted
from another legal source, whether the common law or other legislation, it brings
the old soil with it."' Id. (quoting Felix Frankfurter, Some Reflections on the Reading

of Statutes, 47 Colurn. L. Rev. 527, 537 (1947)).
Based on these principles and for the reasons described below, this court
should hold that when the Utah Legislature used the phrase "rights, benefits,
and other employee protective conditions and remedies" in the Utah Public
Transit District Act, it referred to those same rights, benefits, and employee
protective conditions and remedies required by the Urban Mass Transportation
Act, which, in turn, are those rights, benefits, and employee protective conditions
and remedies afforded under the NLRA in 1964. Because the NLRA in 1964
expressly excluded "supervisors" as "employees" for purposes of collective
bargaining, the Utah Public Transit District Act did not extend collective
bargaining rights to supervisors. UTA's rail operations supervisors therefore do
not have rights to collectively bargain under the Utah Public Transit District Act.
1.2

The Utah Public Transit District Act Protected Only Those Rights
Recognized by the NLRA in 1964

The Utah Public Transit District Act states that, "[t]he rights, benefits, and
other employee protective conditions and remedies of Section 13(c) of the Urban
Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, apply to a public transit district's establishment and
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operation of a public transit service or system." Utah Code§ 17B-2a-813(1)
(emphasis added). The Urban Mass Transportation Act states that it is "a
condition of financial assistance" that "the interests of employees affected by the
assistance shall be protected under arrangements the Secretary of Labor
concludes are fair and equitable," including "the preservation of rights,
privileges, and benefits ... under existing collective bargaining agreements or
otherwise," "the continuation of collective bargaining rights,"" and "the
protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions related
to employment." 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b)(l), (2)(A)-(C) (emphasis added).
Case law makes clear that the purpose of the Urban Mass Transportation
Act was to require only the continuation of those employees' then-existing
collective bargaining rights. The purpose was to entice "a state or local
government [to] make arrangements to preserve transit workers' existing
collective-bargaining rights." Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 16 (emphasis added).
As one court explained, "Congress meant to require the continuation of
collective bargaining rights." Amalgamated Transit Union Int'l v. Donovan, 767 F.2d
939,947 (D.C. Cir.1985) (emphasis added). The Urban Mass Transportation Act
"was designed to preserve the status quo such that, where workers enjoyed
collective bargaining rights prior to a state's acquisition of a transit system with
federal money, those workers were to be assured of a continuance of collective
bargaining. Maintaining the status quo usually meant substantially preserving
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collective bargaining rights that had been established by federal labor policy." Id.
at 948 (internal quotation marks and citation omitted).
Because the Urban Mass Transportation Act required states to preserve
"existing collective bargaining rights," and because the Utah Public Transit
District Act intended to afford the "rights, benefits, and other employee
protective conditions and remedies" of the Urban Mass Transportation Act, the
dispositive issue here is whether supervisors had "existing" rights to bargain
collectively in 1964 when Congress enacted the Urban Mass Transportation Act.
Supervisors did not have that right.
1.3

Supervisors Did Not Have the Right to Bargain Collectively Under
the NLRA in 1964

Under federal law, collective bargaining rights are - and were, in 1964governed by the NLRA. 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 169 (2012). 3 The NLRA regulates the
collective bargaining rights and responsibilities of employers and employees
who "affect[] commerce." Id. § 160(a); see NLRB v. Carteret Towing Co., 307 F.2d
835,387 (4th Cir. 1962) ("Congress intended to have the National Labor Relations
Act extend to all employers who engage in commerce.").
Given the breadth of the term "commerce," the NLRA reaches nearly all
American workers except public employees. And the rights afforded by the

The relevant sections of the NLRA are substantially the same, and retain the
same numbering, today as in 1964. Compare 29 U.S.C. §§ 151 - 169 (2012), with 29
U.S.C. §§ 151 -168 (1964). For convenience, this brief cites the current version
unless noted.
3
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NLRA, as applied to public transit employees via the Urban Mass Transportation
Act, govern here. E.g. Burke v. Utah Transit Auth., 462 F.3d 1253, 1259-60 (10th Cir.
2006) (turning to decisions of the NLRB to determine whether bus and light rail
II

employees could be consolidated in one appropriate bargaining unit" under the
Urban Mass Transportation Act and Utah Public Transit District Act). The ULRA
protects those few Utah private workers who do not engage in commerce and
therefore are not protected by the NLRA, and the Utah Public Transit District Act
protects certain public employees.
Under the NLRA,

11
[

e]mployees shall have the right to self-organization, to

form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities
for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection." 29
U.S.C. § 157.
11

Critically, both in 1964 and today, [t]he term' employee' ... shall not
include ... any individual employed as a supervisor." Id. § 152(3). The full
provision states:
II

The term employee" shall include any employee, and shall

not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states
otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work
has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor
practice, and who has not obtained any other regular
and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
18
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person at his home, or any individual employed by his
parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of
an independent contractor, or any individual employed as
a supervisor, or any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended
from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined.
29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (emphases added) (1964 version attached at Add. H; current
version attached at Add. I). 4
That same section defines "supervisors" as including "any individual
having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer, suspend, lay
off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or
responsibly to direct them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to
recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the exercise of such
authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of
independent judgment." Id.§ 152(11).
When the Urban Mass Transportation Act required states to protect "the
interest of employees," it did not require states to create new collective
bargaining rights for supervisors. Thus, the Utah Public Transit District Act does
not extend to supervisors the right to bargain collectively. This court should
reverse and remand for a factual determination of whether UTA' s rail operations
supervisors are supervisors under the definition provided by under the NLRA,
and, therefore, under the Utah Public Transit District Act.

4

The history of this provision will be discussed extensively below.
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2.

The Result Is the Same if the Utah Public Transit District Act Adopted
the Definition of the ULRA

The district court did not rely on the Urban Mass Transportation Act or the
NLRA. Instead, the district court turned to the ULRA for guidance as to the
meaning of the word "employees." [R.288-90. ]5 But under the ULRA, the result is
the same. Utah Code§§ 34-20-1 to -14 (2017) (attached at Add. J.)
II

II

The rights and roles of employees" and employers" in collective
bargaining are delineated in sections 34-20-7 and 34-20-8. Section 34-20-2 defines
II

both" employee" and employer" for purposes of that chapter. Section 34-2011

2(4)(a) states that '[e]mployee' includes any employee unless this chapter
II

explicitly states otherwise." The term expressly excludes an individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of a family or
person at his home, or an individual employed by his parent or spouse." Id.§ 3420-2(4)(b). An '"[e]mployer' includes a person acting in the interest of an
employer, directly or indirectly." Id. § 34-20-2(5).
The district court asked whether supervisors are "employees" or
11

employers" for purposes of Utah's collective bargaining laws. Although UT A's

"rail operations supervisors" are the only supervisors at issue here, the district
court's ruling would extend to all supervisors, including upper management.

The district court turned first to dictionary definitions. [R.289.] UTA does
not argue that a dictionary definition of employee" would necessarily exclude
"supervisors." The U.S. Supreme Court has said as much. NLRB v. Ky. River
Cmty. Care, Inc., 532 U.S. 706, 711 (2001).
5

II
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NLRB v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 281 (1974) (discussing
NLRA' s potential application to vice presidents).
In what follows, UTA explains the history of state and federal labor law,
both of which lead to the conclusion that Utah never intended to ascribe
collective bargaining rights to supervisors. Although the district court correctly
recited the historical events, it failed to recognize their meaning. UTA then turns
to the principles of statutory construction that the district court misapplied.
2.1

Utah Never Considered Supervisors to Be Employees Under Labor
Laws

This court's "role in interpreting [a] statute is to give its words the
meaning they would have had in the minds of the general public at the time of
enactment." State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4,

,r 16, 322 P.3d 719. Courts should consider

"the surrounding circumstances existing at the time of [the statute's] passage" to
determine a term's meaning. Chapman v. Handley, 24 P. 673, 674 (Utah 1890).
As described below, when Utah adopted its collective bargaining laws in
1937, it did not intend "supervisors" to be included in the term "employees."
This is confirmed by the fact that in 1947 Congress clarified that supervisors were
never employees. It is also confirmed by contemporaneous Utah law and the
context of the terms "employee" and "employer" in the ULRA.
To understand these points, it is important to understand the evolution of
Utah and federal labor law, from ratification of the Utah Constitution through
1947, when Congress passed the Taft-Hartley Amendments.
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2.1.1

The Early Years of Utah Labor Law

The Utah Constitution states that "[t]he Legislature shall prohibit ... [t]he
political and commercial control of employees." Utah Const. art. XVI, § 3. Shortly
after statehood, Utah enacted labor laws. One such law stated that labor unions
were not unlawful for working men or women: "It shall not be unlawful for
working men and women to organize themselves into, or carry on, labor unions
for the purpose of lessening the hours of labor, increasing the wages, bettering
the conditions of the members of such organization; or carrying out their
legitimate purposes as freely as they could do if acting singly." Utah Comp.
Laws § 3651 (1917) (attached at Add. K).
At the time, Utah law distinguished two types of workers: "viceII

principals" and fellow servants." Id. §§ 3682, 3683. "Vice-principals" included
"[a]ll persons engaged in the service of any person, firm, or corporation, ... who
are intrusted by such person, firm, or corporation as employer with the authority
of superintendence, control, or command of other persons in the employ or
service of such employer, or with the authority to direct any other employe[e] in
the performance of any duties of such employe[e]." Id.§ 3682. In contrast,
11

fellow servants" included

11
[

a]II persons who are engaged in the service of such

employer, and ... [not] intrusted by such employer with any superintendence or
control over his fellow employe[e]s." Id.§ 3683.
Early Utah case law discussing workers compensation held that" one
cannot at the same time be employer and employ[ee] or master and servant."
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Rockefeller v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 197 P. 1038, 1042 (Utah 1921). This was true
even when a person who would be considered an employer (or vice-principal)
was performing a task that might be considered the task of an employee (or
fellow servant). Southenz Pac. Co. v. Schaer, 114 F. 466,469 (8th Cir. 1902)
(discussing Utah law). Utah law provided that "employe[e]s who are intrusted
by their employers with the authority to superintend other employe[e]s of the
same master, or with the authority to direct any other employe[e] in the
discharge of any of his duties, are vice principals of such employer." Id.
2.1.2

The NLRA, federal Wagner Act, of 1935

In 1935, Congress enacted the NLRA, also known as the Wagner Act. Pub.
L. No. 74-198, 49 Stat. 449 (originally codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151-166 (Supp. 1
(1935)) (attached at Add. L). 6 The NLRA created the National Labor Relations
Board ("NLRB") and set forth its policy-i.e., to address unequal bargaining
power between employees and employers:
The inequality of bargaining power between employees
who do not possess full freedom of association or actual
liberty of contract, and employers who are organized in
the corporate or other forms of ownership association
substantially burdens and affects the flow of
commerce .... Experience has proved that protection
by law of the right of employees to organize and
bargain collectively safeguards commerce from injury,
For clarity, the NLRA refers to one Act over time. Because this brief will
discuss two pieces of major legislation related to it, the brief at times refers to the
Wagner Act when discussing the 1935 legislation (Add. L) and the Taft-Hartley
Amendments when referring to the 1947 legislation (Add. P). Both pieces of
legislation, however, are part of the NLRA.
6
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impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of
commerce by ... restoring equality of bargaining power
between employers and employees.
§ 1, 49

II

II

Stat. at 449. The NLRA defined employee" and employer" as follows:
(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting in
the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
shall not include the United States, or any State or
political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to
the Railway Labor Act, or any labor organization (other
than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in
the capacity of officer or agent of such labor
organization.
(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee,
and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as
a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and
substantially equivalent employment, but shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his
parent or spouse.

§ 2,

49 Stat. at 450.
At that time, the NLRB generally excluded supervisors and foremen from

bargaining units. The NLRB presumed, without expressly stating, that
supervisors did not fall within the definition of" employees." For example, in In

re United States Stamping Co., the NLRB found that "[t]he foremen and assistant
foremen are paid respectively on a salary and an hourly basis and ought also to
be excluded as having supervisory authority and duties that relate them more
directly to the management than to the workers." 1 N.L.R.B. 123, 127 (1936), 1936
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WL 6759 (attached at Add. M). A series of other decisions routinely excluded
supervisors as part of the "employee" bargaining unit. E.g., In re Saxon Mills, 1
N.L.R.B. 153, 156 (1936), 1936 WL 6762 (certifying bargaining unit exclusive of
supervisors); In re R.C.A. Manufacturing Co., Inc., 2 N.L.R.B. 159, 165 (1936), 1936
WL 7784 (same); In re Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co. of Cal., 3 N.L.R.B. 431, 439
(1937), 1937 WL 7333 (same).
2.1.3

The ULRA, Utah Little Wagner Act, of 1937

In this context of state and federal law, Utah enacted the ULRA in 1937,
often called the "Little Wagner Act." 1937 Utah Laws ch. 55 §§ 1-18 (current
version at Utah Code§§ 34-20-1 to -14)) (attached at Add. N). Utah adopted
verbatim the NLRA' s declaration of policy, except making appropriate changes
such replacing "interstate" with" intrastate." Id. § 2. Utah also adopted verbatim
the NLRA' s somewhat vague definitions of" employer" and employee." Id. § 3;
II

see Se. Furniture Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 111 P.2d 153, 153-54 (Utah 1941).
2.1.4

The NLRB Interprets the NLRA Inconsistently Between
1942 and 1947
II

In 1942, the NLRB addressed squarely whether a unit composed entirely
of supervisory employees was a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining." See In re Md. Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B. 733,737 (1943), 1943 WL 10134
(explaining 1942 decision). Over the next few years, the NLRB issued a series of
inconsistent decisions on this point.
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At first, the NLRB recognized the right of foremen to organize bargaining
units, later refused to approve foremen organization units, and still later
recognized their right to bargain collectively. See Bethlehem Steel Co. v. N. Y. State

Labor Relations Bd., 330 U.S. 767, 770 (1947) (describing inconsistent decisions);
N.L.R.B. v. Bell Aerospace Co. Div. of Textron, Inc., 416 U.S. 267, 277 (1974) (stating
related decisions from this period "manifested a progressive uncertainty").
2.1.5

The U.S. Supreme Court Issues Packard Motor Car
Company v. NLRB in March 1947

In March 1947, the U.S. Supreme Court issued Packard Motor Car Co. v.

NLRB, the case that spurred Congress to clarify its definition of "employees" in
the NLRA. 330 U.S. 485 (1947) (attached at Add. 0). Over 1,000 foremen of the
Packard attempted to organize. Id. at 487. Packard objected on the ground that
the foremen were not "employees," but were "employers" because they "actD in
the interest of an employer." Id. at 488 (citing 49 Stat. 450). The NLRB disagreed,
holding that Packard's "foremen" were "employees" under the NLRA. Id.
The court affirmed, 5-4, holding that the NLRB had the authority to make
this decision. Id. at 488-89. The court did not condone the policy of allowing
foremen to bargain collectively, but held only that the NLRA did not expressly
preclude it. Id. at 489. The court recognized its "only function is to determine
whether the order of the Board is authorized by the statute." Id. at 488. The court
explained that" it is for Congress to create exceptions or qualifications at odds
with its plain terms." Id. at 490. The court would not look into legislative history
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to determine whether u exclusion of foremen was intended," because it
concluded that the NLRA was not ambiguous. Id. at 492.
The court acknow !edged Packard's argument that "unionization of
foremen is from many points bad industrial policy," but declined to rule on the
merits of that issue, concluding that "[h]owever we might appraise the force of
these arguments as a policy matter, we are not authorized to base decision of a
question of law upon them. They concern the wisdom of the legislation; they
cannot alter the meaning of otherwise plain provisions." Id. at 493.
The court recognized the inherent inconsistency in allowing management
to unionize, but did not specify where it drew the line between workers who
were "employees" within the meaning of the NLRA and workers who were
"employers" within the meaning of the NLRA. In a footnote, it commented: "If a
union of vice presidents, presidents or others of like relationship to a corporation
comes here claiming rights under this Act, it will be time enough then to point
out the obvious and relevant differences between the 1100 foremen of this
company and corporate officers elected by the board of directors." Id. at 490 n.2.
Four justices dissented. Justice Douglas authored a strongly worded
dissenting opinion: "For if foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of the
[NLRA], so are vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents,
assistant superintendents-indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company,
including the president. ... But once vice-presidents, managers, superintendents,
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foremen all are unionized, management and labor will become more of a solid
phalanx than separate factions in warring camps." Id. at 494 (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
Justice Douglas also noted that, although the statute said that "employee"
included "any employee," the term was "used in opposition to the term
'employer,"' which was "defined to include' any person acting in the interest of
an employer.' The term' employer' thus includes some employees." Id. at 495
(internal citation omitted). He could "find no evidence that one personnel group
may be both employers and employees within the meaning of the Act." Id.
Speaking to legislative history, Justice Douglas wrote that there was "no
trace of Congressional concern with the problems of supervisory personnel. The
reports and debates are barren of any reference to them." Id. at 498. He noted that
II

three other federal Acts expressly included subordinate officials" in the
II

definition of employee," which suggested, along with the legislative history of
the NLRA, that Congress did not intend to include supervisors as employees. Id.
at 499; see Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 279 (discussing same).
The Congressional response to Packard, described below, demonstrates
that Congress agreed with Justice Douglas - not that Congress had mistakenly
extended collective bargaining rights to supervisors and needed to fix that
problem, but that Congress never extended collective bargaining rights to
supervisors under the NLRA.
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2.1.6

The Taft-Hartley Amendments Are Enacted in June 1947

Packard issued March 10, 1947, and Congress immediately moved to clarify
the NLRA. In April, Representative Hartley introduced a bill in the House of
Representatives, followed by Senator Taft's bill in the Senate in May. 1947 Taft-

Hartley Passage and NLRB Structural Changes, NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS
BOARD,https://www.nlrb.gov/who-we-are/ our-history/1947-taft-hartleypassage-and-nlrb-structural-changes (last visited August 30, 2017) [hereinafter

1947 Taft-Hartley Passage and NLRB Structural Changes].
Collectively, the amendments were known as the Taft-Hartley Act. Pub. L.
No. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136 (amendments originally codified at 29 U.S.C. §§ 151- 67
(Supp. 1 (1947)) (attached at Add. P). The Taft-Hartley Act made the following
II

II

clarifications to the definitions of employer" and employee":
(2) The term employer" includes any person acting as
an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned
Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank,
or any State or political subdivision thereof, or any
corporation or association operating a hospital, if no
part of the net earnings inures to the benefit of any
private shareholder or individual, or any person subject
to the Railway Labor Act, as amended from time to
time, or any labor organization (other than when acting
as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of
officer or agent of such labor organization.
II

II

(3) The term employee" shall include any employee,
and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless the Act explicitly states otherwise, and
shall include any individual whose work has ceased as
a consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice,
and who has not obtained any other regular and
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substantially equivalent employment, but shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or
person at his home, or any individual employed by his
parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of
an independent contractor, or any individual employed as
a supervisor, or any individual employed by an
employer subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended
from time to time, or by any other person who is not an
employer as herein defined.
§ 2, 61 Stat. at 137-38 (emphases added).

Representative Hartley's House Report and Senator Taft's Senate Report
are instructive. The U.S. Supreme Court subsequently relied on them in
generating its post-Taft-Hartley jurisprudence: "Significantly, both the House
Report and the Senate Report voiced concern over the Board's broad reading of
the term 'employee' to include those clearly within the managerial hierarchy."

Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 283-284.
As described below, each Report explains that Congress was not changing,
II

but was clarifying, the definition of employees" in the NLRA.

2.1.6.1

Representative Hartley's House Report

Representative Hartley's House Report outlines why it was necessary to
clarify the NLRA. H. R. Rep. No. 80-245 (1947) (pp. 292-309 attached at Add. Q)
[full document at R.821-83].
First, and most generally, Representative Hartley expressed frustration
that the NLRB had misinterpreted the Act to be overly friendly to employers and
II

not adequately friendly to employees. He wrote that the NLRB appears to have
assumed that when Congress said it wished to protect the rights of 'workers' it
30
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mean to protect labor organizations ... , even when the labor organizations
exploited the workers or engaged in other activities that were inconsistent with
the interests of workers." Id. at 302. He further explained that "[t]o the Board, the
interests of the unions, not those of the workers, seem to have been of paramount
importance. The Board has had little regard for the rights of employees, and its
misconception of its duties doubtless has increased industrial strife." Id.
Second, the bill clarified that the term "employee" does not include
supervisors. Id. at 304. Representative Hartley explained the Board's errors in
11

interpreting the Act: [T]he bill forbids the Board to regard as employees
foremen and other representatives of management who act for employers in their
dealings with employees and their unions." Id. at 299. This was necessary, he
II

wrote, because so-called independent unions of foremen are not in fact
independent, but ... the unions of men the foremen supervise actually control
them. The evidence further shows that management must have in the plants
agents who are entirely loyal, just as representatives of the workers must be
undivided in their loyalty to the workers." Id.
Finally, the bill amended the definition of" employer," changing the
II

phrase any person acting in the interest of an employer" to "any person acting

as an agent of an employer." Id. at 302 (emphasis in original). Representative
Hartley explained that, under the old language, "the Board frequently 'imputed'
to employers anything that anyone connected with an employer, no matter how
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remotely, said or did, notwithstanding that the employer had not authorized
what was said or done, and in many cases even had prohibited it. By such
rulings, the Board often was able to punish employers for things they did not do,
did not authorize, and had tried to prevent." Id. As a result of the new definition,
only when a person was acting as "agent" of the employer would his actions be
ascribed to the employer. Representative Hartley explained that the amendment

•

would "make the ordinary rules of the law of agency equally applicable to
employers and to unions." Id.
Crucially, Representative Hartley explained that the Board had
misinterpreted the original Act: "When Congress passed the Labor Act, we were
concerned, as we said in its preamble, with the welfare of 'workers' and 'wage
earners,' not of the boss. It was to protect workers and their unions against
foremen, not to unionize foremen, that Congress passed the act." Id. at 304. In
short, "unionizing supervisors under the Labor Act is inconsistent with the
purpose of the act." Id. at 305. He explained the reason that foremen should not
have the same protections as other employees, citing the same reasons given by
Justice Douglas. Id. at 307-08.

In the end, Representative Hartley confirmed that: "by this bill, Congress
makes clear once more what it tried to make clear when, in passing the act, it defined
as an' employer,' not an' employee,' any person' acting in the interest of an
employer."' Id. at 308 (emphasis added).
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2.1.6.2

Senator Taft's Senate Report

In the Senate Report, Senator Taft described the need for clarifying

legislation as "urgent." S. Rep. No. 80-105, at 408 (1947) (pp. 407-11 attached at
Add. R) [full document at R.885-982]. He explained the urgency as follows:" A
recent development which probably more than any other single factor has upset
any real balance of power in the collective-bargaining process has been the
successful efforts of labor organizations to invoke the NLRA for covering
supervisory personnel, traditionally regarded as part of management, into
organizations composed of or subservient to the unions of the very men they
were hired to supervise." Id. at 409.
He explained that "[i]t was not until 1945, after several changes in position,
that the National Labor Relations Board itself by divided vote finally decided
that supervisory employees were covered by the [NLRA]. This construction was
recently upheld by the Supreme Court in the Packard Motor Car case (decided
March 10, 1947.)" Id. at 409-10. Noting that the court had not upheld the policy,
only the Board's ability to interpret the word "employee," he stated: "This
means, as Mr. Justice Douglas pointed out in his dissenting opinion-and as
Board counsel conceded in argument- that unless Congress amends the act in
this respect its process can be used to unionize even vice presidents since they
are not specifically exempted from the category of' employees.

111

Id. at 410.

Senator Taft wrote: "In recommending the adoption of this amendment,
the committee is trying to make clear what Congress attempted to demonstrate last year
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when it adopted the Case bill.[71 By drawing a more definite line between
management and labor we believe the proposed language has fully met some of
the technical criticisms to the corresponding section referred to in the President's
veto of that bill. It should be noted that all that the bill does is to leave foremen in the

same position in which they were until the Labor Board reversed the position it had
originally taken in 1943." Id. at 411. He summarized the change by saying "[i]t
eliminates the genuine supervisor from the coverage of the act as an employee
and makes it clear that he should be deemed a part of management." Id. In other
words, the clarification was necessary to avoid the absurd conclusion that vice
presidents could have the protections of law when they collectively bargain.
2.1.6.3

Veto and Override

The House passed Representative Hartley's bill 308-107, and the Senate
passed the Taft bill, 68-24. 1947 Taft-Hartley Passage and NLRB Structural Changes.
President Truman vetoed it. 93 Cong. Rec. 7500-03 (1947). Within days, the
House overrode the veto 331-83, and the Senate overrode the veto 68-25, which
was six votes more than needed. Presidential Vetoes, 1789-1988, S. Pub. 102-12, at
378-79 (1992). The bill became law Jnne 23, 1947, just three-and-a-half months
after Packard. Id.; Pub. L. No. 80-101, 136 (1947).

The Case bill was introduced in Congress in 1946 to amend the NLRA,
including to exclude supervisors as statutory employees. See Int'l Bros. of Elec.
Workers v. NLRB, 487 F.2d 1143, 1166 n.25 (describing history of Case bill). It
passed both houses of Congress, but was vetoed by President Truman. Id.
7
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Because Congress clarified that the NLRA never defined "employees" to
include supervisors, Utah did not amend the ULRA. Congress had clarified that

Packard was inconsistent with what Congress intended in 1935, the language
Utah copied in 1937. Utah did not need to amend its language because no Utah
court had erroneously interpreted the ULRA and, as explained above, at the time
the ULRA was enacted, the NLRB decisions had generally excluded supervisors
as part of bargaining units. E.g. In re U.S. Stamping Co., 1 NLRB at 127.
The district court here disagreed. The court rejected the history and
concluded that because Packard had said the language of the NLRA was
unambiguous, the ULRA is also unambiguous and therefore the legislative
history was irrelevant. [R.1013-14.] In what follows, UTA explains how the
district court erred in assuming a 1947 U.S. Supreme Court decision reflects what
the Utah Legislature intended in 1937.
2.2

Because the Taft-Hartley Amendment Clarified the NLRA, Its
Definition of "Employees" Is the Same Definition in the ULRA

The district court erred in treating the Taft-Hartley Amendments as
legislative history, rather than subsequent legislation. [R.1012.] This is an
important distinction, one made clear by the U.S. Supreme Court, which has
consistently held that subsequent legislation is entitled to great weight in
statutory construction, even where legislative history is not.
The district court also erred when it concluded that, because current Utah
law does not recognize clarifying amendments, federal clarifying amendments in
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1947 also cannot be recognized. [R.1009-10.] But federal law does recognize
clarifying amendments as retroactive, particularly when the U.S. Supreme Court
says a word is unambiguous, as Packard did here, but Congress concludes the
court erred and amends the legislation to make its intention more clear. Because
under federal law clarifying amendments apply retroactively, the 1947 TaftHartley Amendments retroactively apply to the NLRA-and, in turn, confirm
that the ULRA does not provide to supervisors the right to bargain collectively.
Finally, the district court failed to recognize that contemporary Utah law
shows that, in 1937, Utah-like the NLRB at that time-defined "supervisors" to
be "employers" rather than "employees." UTA addresses each error in turn.
2.2.1

Subsequent Legislation Declaring the Intent of an Earlier
Statute is Entitled to Great Weight in Statutory
Construction

First, the district court rejected the importance of the Taft-Hartley
Amendments, stating that it had "serious concerns about whether one Congress
can usefully or accurately describe an earlier Congress's intent in passing a
previous statute, concerns that are shared by the United States Supreme Court."
[R.1012.] Here, the district court confused postenactment legislative history with
subsequent legislation. Although postenactment legislative history is of dubious
value, it is well settled under federal law that "[s]ubsequent legislation declaring
the intent of an earlier statute is entitled to great weight in statutory
construction." Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 380-81 (1969).
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The U.S. Supreme Court expressly addressed the distinction: "subsequent
legislation" refers to legislation that was passed by Congress to clarify previous
legislation. Consumer Products Safety Commission v. GTE Sylvania, Inc., 447 U.S.
102, 117-18 & n.13 (1980). It does not refer to "legislative history" before the
original act was passed or to legislative commentary after-the-fact. Id. This is
because, "[w]ith respect to subsequent legislation, ... Congress has proceeded
formally through the legislative process. A mere statement in a conference report
of such legislation as to what the Committee believes an earlier statute meant is
obviously less weighty." Id. (emphasis in original).
The district court cited two cases that illustrate the point: GTE and

Bruesewitz v. Wyeth LLC, 562 U.S. 223 (2011). Bruesewitz confirms that "[p]ostenactment legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a legitimate tool of
statutory interpretation." 562 U.S. at 242. Justice Scalia called it a "contradiction
in terms" referring to statements made in subsequent debates, not to subsequent

legislation. Id. The cases cited by Brueswitz show the distinction. In United States v.
Wrightwood Dairy Co., the court refused to rely on "[t]he opinions of some
members of the Senate, conflicting with the explicit statements of the meaning of
the statutory language made by the Committee reports and members of the
Committees." 315 U.S. 110, 125 (1942). And in United States v. United Mine

Workers of America, the court refused to rely on "remarks" made during Senate
debates about a bill that did not pass. 330 U.S. 258, 281-82 (1947).
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In contrast, Red Lion refers to subsequent legislation. In Red Lion, the court

considered a statute amended by Congress to make clear that it agreed with an
agency interpretation of a statute enacted thirty years earlier. 395 U.S. at 380. The
court afforded the 1959 amendment "great weight in statutory construction," id.
at 381, holding that it made clear what Congress had meant in the 1927 statute.

Id. The cases cited in Red Lion illustrate the operative distinction.
The first case is Federal Housing Administration v. Darlington, Inc., 358 U.S.
84 (1958). In Darlington, the court considered a 1954 amendment to a 1947 law.
358 U.S. at 85-86. The court said, "[s]ubsequent legislation which declares the
intent of an earlier law is not, of course, conclusive in determining what the
previous Congress meant. But the later law is entitled to weight when it comes to
the problem of construction." Id. at 90.
The second case is Glidden Co. v. Zdanok, 370 U.S. 530 (1962). In Glidden, the
court built on that principle, saying the Darlington maxim is "[e]specially ... so
when the Congress has been stimulated by decisions of this Court to investigate
the historical materials involved and has drawn from them a contrary
conclusion." 370 U.S. at 541. The court also identified its source of "subsequent
legislation which declares the intent of an earlier law": "[an] examination of the
House and Senate Reports." Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
Another case also illustrates the point. In United States v. Hutcheson, the
court relied on the House and Senate Reports and concluded that Congress
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passed the Norris-LaGuardia Act "to restore the broad purpose which Congress
thought it had formulated in the Clayton Act but which was frustrated, so
Congress believed, by unduly restrictive judicial construction." 312 U.S. 219, 23536 (1941). Thus, the subsequent legislation demonstrated that "[t]he NorrisLaGuardia Act reasserted the original purpose of the Clayton Act." Id. at 236. 8
The district court erred in comparing this case to GTE and Bruesewitz,
rather than Red Lion. The Taft-Hartley Amendments were clear in their goal to
negate a judicial interpretation and clarify what Congress meant all along. The
House and Senate Reports make that plain. Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 278-81.
2.2.2

Whether the Taft-Hartley Amendments Are Clarifying
and Apply Rerroactively Is Governed by Federal Law

The district court also erred when it applied current Utah law to reject any
import for clarifying amendments under federal law in 1947. Subsequent
legislation, by definition, includes clarifying amendments, which serve to
"declar[e] the intent of an earlier statute." Red Lion, 395 U.S. at 380-81. "An
amendment of a statute may be evidence of the legislative intent underlying the
earlier form of the statute. Such an amendment therefore may be used to divine
the legislative intent with regard to the original law." 82 C.J.S. Statutes§ 460
(footnotes omitted); see also id. §§ 509-12.

None of these cases consider whether the makeup of Congress had changed.
The district court erred in doing so. [R.1013-14.] Indeed, in Red Lion, a 1959
Congress clarified a 1927 statute. But even if the makeup of Congress were
important, Congress overrode a presidential veto with Taft-Hartley.
8
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2.2.2.1

Under Federal Law, Clarifying Amendments
Make What Was Intended All Along
Unmistakably Clear

The district court incorrectly concluded that because this court does not
recognize state clarifying amendments, federal clarifying amendments are not
indicative of a statute's meaning. [R.1009.] UTA acknowledges state labor law,
rather than federal labor law, controls. Jackson Transit Auth. v. Local Div. 1285,

Amalgamated Transit Union, 457 U.S. 15, 27-29 (1982). But that state law is copied
from federal law, which makes the interpretation of federal law dispositive.
UTA also acknowledges that in Utah, clarifying amendments are not
controlling. Waddoups v. Noorda, 2013 UT 64,

,r 9, 321 P.3d 1108. But this is

irrelevant. The principle is based in state law, which by statute articulates a
general presumption against retroactivity. Gressman v. State, 2013 UT 63,

,r 12,

323 P.3d 998 (citing Utah Code § 68-3-3).
Under federal law, a clarifying amendment is meaningful and applies
retroactively. United States v. Montgomery Cty., 761 F.2d 998, 1003 (4th Cir. 1985).9
The Fourth Circuit explained the role of clarifying amendments in United States v.

Montgomery County. The Fourth Circuit was asked whether the National Institute
of Health ("NIH") had to pay a county-imposed "transient tax" when its
outpatients spent two to three days in various hotels or motels. 761 F.2d at 999.

See also Holt v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 627 F.3d 188, 194-95 (5th Cir. 2010);
Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross & Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010);
Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283 (11th Cir. 1999); Landgraf v.
USI Film Prods., 511 U.S. 244, 272-80 (1994).
9
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The county code defined a "transient" as "a person 'who ... obtains sleeping
accommodations' for seven days or less." Id. at 999 & 1001 n.8 (omission in
original). The NIH asserted that it did not have to pay the tax because it was not
a "person." Id. at 999-1000. The district court agreed with the NIH. Id. at 1000.
Immediately thereafter, the county amended the statute to replace
"person" with "human being," making the tax due from the outpatients
themselves, not the NIH. Id. at 1002. On appeal, the NIH argued that the
amendment proved that the prior language did not reach the transactions in
question. Id. at 1003.
The Fmuth Circuit rejected the NIH' s argument, writing: "changes in
statutory language need not ipso facto constitute a change in meaning or effect.
Statutes may be passed purely to make what was intended all along even more
unmistakably clear. That is the situation here." Id. The court elaborated, as the
district court in the instant case cited, "It is true, of course, that a statute which
has all along unambiguously proclaimed WHITE cannot retrospectively be made
to assert BLACK just because the legislature, at a later date, says so." Id.
But the Fourth Circuit was unconcerned with this, saying, "[h]owever, the
... language with which we here are confronted ... is arguably only
ambiguous-and not persuasively so at that." Id. The Fourth Circuit relied on the
fact that the county enacted "within months of the district court's adverse
decision, emergency legislation to guard against what it no doubt regarded as a
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judicial misperception by the district judge of its intent in the past, and to insure
that, from and after the passage of the [amendment], that erroneous possibility
could not even arguably arise." Id.
The same is true here. Like the legislation described in Montgomery County,
the Taft-Hartley Amendments were emergency legislation passed within months
of an adverse judicial decision to guard against what Congress regarded as a
judicial misperception of its intent and to insure that the erroneous possibility
could not even arguably arise again. In other words, Congress made clear what it
had always believed to be true -supervisors were not "employees" with
collective bargaining rights under the NLRA.

2.2.2.2

The Text of A Clarifying Amendment Need Not
Declare That It Is Clarifying

The district court erred when it ruled that even if clarifying amendments
applied retroactively, the Taft-Hartley Amendments were not" clarifying"
because "the 1947 statutory amendment does not itself declare that it is a
clarifying amendmenf1 and "does not ever make an express declaration that the
bill is intended to be categorized as a 'clarifying amendment."' [R.1011-12.]
The district court misunderstood the test for whether an amendment is
clarifying. A clarifying amendment itself need not say that it is clarifying; it is
sufficient if the legislative history does so, and it is also sufficient if either the
legislative history or the amendment clearly indicate it.
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An amendment of a statute may be evidence of the
legislative intent underlying the earlier form of the
statute. Such an amendment therefore may be used to
divine the legislative intent with regard to the original
law.
A statutory amendment which construes and clarifies a
prior statute, rather than changing the law, normally
must be accepted as a legislative declaration of the
mearung of the original act. A court may find a
legislative amendment to be a clarification of a
previously existing statute where the legislative history or
the language of the statute, as amended, clearly indicates an
intent to clarify. When there has been doubt or
ambiguity surrounding a statute, an amendment by the
legislature may be interpreted as some indication of a
legislative intent to clarify, rather than to change,
existing law. Likewise, when a legislative amendment is
enacted soon after a controversy arises regarding the
mearung of an act, it is logical to regard the amendment
as a legislative interpretation of the original act.
82 C.J.S. Statutes§ 460 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted); see id.§§ 509-12.
The legislative history of the Taft-Hartley Act expressly states that the
intention was to clarify the NLRA: "So, by this bill, Congress makes clear once more

what it tried to make clear when, in passing the act, it defined as an' employer,' not
an 'employee,' any person 'acting in the interest of an employer .... "' H. R. Rep.
No. 80-245, at 308 (1947) (emphasis added).
Additionally, case law sets forth "[a] number of factors [that] may indicate
whether an amendment is clarifying rather than substantive: [1] whether the
enacting body declared that it was clarifying a prior enactment; [2] whether a
conflict or ambiguity existed prior to the amendment; and [3] whether the
amendment is consistent with a reasonable interpretation of the prior enactment
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and its legislative history." Middleton v. City of Chicago, 578 F.3d 655, 663-64 (7th
Cir. 2009); see also Piamba Cortes v. Am. Airlines, Inc., 177 F.3d 1272, 1283-84 (11th
Cir. 1999); Liquilux Gas Corp. v. Martin Gas Sales, 979 F.2d 887,890 (1st Cir. 1992);
73 Am. Jur. 2d Statutes § 241 (2017).
Using that test, the Taft-Hartley Amendments "clarified" the NLRA, at
least as far as "supervisors" were concerned. As described above, (1) the House
and Senate made clear that they were clarifying a prior enactment; (2) Packard v.

Motor Car Company, 330 U.S. 485,486 (1947), made clear that a conflict existed
prior to the amendment; and (3) Justice Douglas's Packard dissent made clear that
there was "no trace of Congressional concern with the problems of supervisory
personnel. The reports and debates are barren of any reference to them." Packard,
330 U.S. at 498 (Douglas, J., dissenting); see also Bell Aerospace, 416 U.S. at 279
(describing same).

In this context, Utah had no need to amend the ULRA to clarify that
"employee" did not include "supervisors." No Utah court had interpreted the
ULRA as Packard had let stand an interpretation of the NLRA. Thus, the original
meaning of the word "employees," clarified in the Taft-Hartley Amendments,
remained the meaning in the ULRA.
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2.3

Both the Utah Legislature and this Court Distinguished Between
Employers and Employees in Both the Workers Compensation
Setting and the Collective Bargaining Setting

Utah never considered supervisors to be employees with collective
bargaining rights. This is confirmed by contemporaneous Utah statutes and case
law that show that Utah consistently distinguished between employees and
supervisors, considering "supervisors" to be a subset of "employers," not
"employees."
2.3.1

This Court Consistently Distinguished Between
Employees and Supervisors When Interpreting Labor
Laws

Like NLRB cases between the passage of the NLRA in 1935 and the
passage of the ULRA in 1937, Utah cases from the time period reveal that the
terms "employer" and "employee" were mutually exclusive in the collective
bargaining context.10

In 1939, this court reviewed a decision of the Utah Labor Relations Board
addressing whether certain supervisors had "interfere[d] with, restrain[ed] or
coerc[ed] employees" regarding their rights to bargain in violation of the Labor
Code. Bldg. Serv. Emp. Local No. 59 v. Newhouse Realty Co., 95 P.2d 507, 573 (Utah
1939). The question arose because certain "supervisory employees" who had the
right to "hire and fire" had discussed with the non-supervisory employees their

10 As noted above, this court made clear in a workers compensation case that
"one cannot at the same time be employer and employ[ee] or master and
servant." Rockefeller v. Indus. Comm'n of Utah, 197 P. 1038, 1042 (Utah 1921). Those
classifications are still in effect. Utah Code§§ 34-25-1, -2.
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right to collectively bargain. Id. at 577. These supervisory employees included a
"head housekeeper in charge of all employees from the mezzanine floor to the
twelfth floor of the hotel, who has the power to hire and fire in her department."

Id. at 515. The court determined that the head housekeeper's actions had not
constituted "interference," but clearly considered her on the" employer" side of
the divide. Id. at 515-17. Throughout that case, individuals were described in
terms of whether they could "hire or fire" -that being the standard used to
separate supervisors from non-supervisors in both workers compensation cases
and collective bargaining cases.
Although the NLRB cases in the early 1940s were inconsistent, Utah cases
were not. In 1943, before the Taft-Hartley Amendments, this court considered
whether the American Foundry and Machine Company had engaged in certain
unfair labor practices when its foremen and management had threatened to fire
anyone they found to be unionizing. Am. Foundry & Mach. Co. v. Utah Labor

Relations Bd., 141 P.2d 390, 390-91 (Utah 1943).
In 1949, following the passage of the Taft-Hartley Amendments, this court
continued to treat supervisors as different from employees. For example, it
affirmed the Board's certification of a collective bargaining unit that "include[d]
all production laundry workers and exclude[ d] clerical workers and supervisors
with power to hire and fire." Hotel Utah Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 211 P.2d 200, 201
(Utah 1949). This court wrote, "[i]n our opinion to include all workers, except
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clerical help and supervisors is an appropriate inclusion-exclusion line." Id. at
205. This court allowed another bargaining unit that included "[b]ellboys,
porters, elevator operators, baggage checkroom attendants, doormen, page boys
and valets," but excluded "front office employees, clerks, housekeeping
department employees, culinary and banquet department employees, garage
employees and all supervisory employees with authority to hire and fire." Hotel

Utah Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 209 P.2d 235,236 (Utah 1949).
In 1951, this court affirmed a collective bargaining class that included "all
shoe repairmen and excluding ... supervisory employees with the power to hire
or fire." Utah Labor Relations Bd. v. Broadway Shoe Repairing Co., 236 P.2d 1072,
1073 (Utah 1951). And in 1954, this court distinguished "union men" from "nonunion employees" and "supervisory employees." Rasmussen v. U.S. Steel Co., 265
P.2d 1002, 1002-03 (Utah 1954).
These cases reveal that, both before and after the Taft-Hartley
Amendments, this court consistently distinguished supervisors, foremen,
management, and the like from lower-level "employees" for purposes of
certifying bargaining units. This is because, just as "employees" are different
II

from employers" in the workers compensation arena, Utah, like Congress,
considered "employees" to exclude "supervisors" for purposes of collective
bargaining because supervisors were the "employer."
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2.3.2

Other Sections of the Utah Code Are in Accord

The Utah Legislature's use of the term "employee" in other sections of
Utah's collective bargaining laws confirm this result. Nearby sections reveal that
the words "employer" and "employee" must be read to be exclusive groups of
people. If a supervisor is an "employer," in that he acts in the interest of the
employer, he cannot simultaneously be an "employee."
This is important because this court does not "interpret the 'plain meaning'
of a statutory term in isolation. [The court's] task, instead, is to determine the
meaning of the text given the relevant context of the statute (including,
particularly, the structure and language of the statutory scheme)." Olsen v. Eagle

Mountain City, 2011 UT 10, ,I 12,248 P.3d 465. In contrast, this court must "read
the plain language of the statute as a whole, and interpret its provisions in
harmony with other statutes in the same chapter and related chapters. We follow
the cardinal rule that the general purpose, intent or purport of the whole act shall
control, and that all the parts be interpreted as subsidiary and harmonious to its
manifest object." Miller v. Weaver, 2003 UT 12, ,I 17, 66 P.3d 529 (internal
quotation marks and citations omitted). "When evaluating the plain language of
a particular statutory provision, [this court] interpret[s] it in harmony with other
statutes in the same chapter and related chapters." Summit Water Distrib. Co. v.

Summit Cnty., 2005 UT 73, ,I 17, 123 P.3d 437 (internal quotation marks omitted).
The doctrine of in pari materia is also instructive, as "a reflection of practical
experience in the interpretation of statutes: a legislative body generally uses a
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particular word with a consistent meaning in a given context." Erlenbaugh v.

United States, 409 U.S. 239,243 (1973) (cited by Utah Dep't of Transp. v. Carlson,
2014 UT 24, ,r 17, 332 P.3d 900). "If it is natural or reasonable to think that the
understanding of the legislature or of persons affected by the statute would be
influenced by another statute, then those statutes should be construed to be in
pari materia, construed with reference to one another and harmonized if
possible." Hansen v. Eyre, 2003 UT App 274, ,r 7, 74 P.3d 1182 (internal quotation
marks omitted).
The following examples from the Utah Code demonstrate that the word
11

II

employer" and employee" must refer to different individuals. This is

important because it shows the legislature's intention in using the word
11

employee," and also because it shows that the dictionary definition of

11

employee" -that is, all people who work for an entity, including the CEO-

cannot be correct in this context.
The "Declaration of policy" concerning Employment Relations and
Collective Bargains clearly delineates differing groups of people:
• The public policy of the state ... recognizes that
there are three major interests involved, namely: that
of the public, the employee, and the employer. These
three interests are to a considerable extent
interrelated. It is the policy of the state to protect and
promote each of these interests with due regard to
the situation and to the rights of the others.
• It is the policy of the state, in order to preserve and
promote the interests of the public, the employee,
and the employer alike, to establish standards of fair
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conduct in employment relations and to provide a
convenient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by
which these interests may have their respective
rights and obligations adjudicated.
Utah Code§ 34-20-1(1), (4). Two other definitions from the same section similarly
II

reveal that the terms employee" and "employer" are exclusive:
• "Labor dispute means any controversy between an
employer and the majority of the employer's
employees in a collective bargaining unit ....
• "Labor organization means an organization of any
kind or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan in which employees participate
that exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of
dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor
disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment,
or conditions of work."

Id. § 34-20-2(10), (11).
The same conclusion is reached by the very definition of "unfair labor
practices," which are described in terms of the employer's relationship with the
employees:
• It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer,
individually or in concert with others ... (a) [t]o
interfere with, restrain or coerce employees ... (b)
[t]o dominate or interfere with the formation or
administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it ....

Id.§ 34-20-8(1). In fact, the entirety of section 34-20-8 relies on a distinction
between "employers" and "employees." Under these statutes, one person- such
as a "supervisor" - cannot be both an employee and employer. Utah law has
II

always treated "employers" and employees" as exclusive groups.
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Thus, like case law from the time period, other statutory uses of the word
11

employer" and "employee" demonstrate that the two were always intended to

be exclusive. In the context of the entire chapter, it is difficult to see how the
II

legislature might have intended the word employee" to include all supervisors,
up to and including vice presidents.11
2.4

The Contrary Conclusion Yields an Absurd Consequence

It is worth outlining the absurd consequences that result if supervisors are
employees for purposes of collective bargaining. /.(Normally, where the language
of a statute is clear and unambiguous, our analysis ends; our duty is to give effect
to that plain meaning. However, [a]n equally well-settled caveat to the plain
meaning rules states that a court should not follow the literal language of a
statute if its plain meaning works an absurd result" State ex rel. Z.C., 2007 UT 54,

,r 11, 165 P.3d 1206 (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks omitted).
"The absurd results canon of statutory construction recognizes that
although 'the plain language interpretation of a statute enjoys a robust

By contrast, section 34-20-2(5) expressly excludes charitable hospitals from
the definition of "employer." The Taft-Hartley Amendments excluded charitable
hospitals as part of the federal definition of "employer," stating in the House
Report that the regulation of charitable hospitals was to be left to the states
because charitable hospitals are not engaged in commerce. H. R. Rep. No. 80-245
at 303. Neither the House Report nor the Senate Report has any further
discussion. See generally H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, S. Rep. No. 80-105.
In 1951, this court held that because the statute did not exclude "hospitals"
from the definition of" employers," it must include them. Utah Labor Relations Bd.
v. Utah Valley Hosp., 235 P.2d 520, 525 (Utah 1951). In 1969, the Utah Legislature
amended the Utah Code to exclude hospitals. Utah Code § 34-20-2 (1969).
11
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presumption in its favor, it is also true that [a legislative body] cannot, in every
instance, be counted on to have said what it meant or to have meant what it
said."' Id.

,r 11 (quoting FBI v. Abramson, 456 U.S. 615, 638 (1982) (O'Connor, J.,

dissenting)) (alteration in original). Said differently, "the absurd consequences
canon ... resolves an ambiguity by choosing the reading that avoids absurd
results." Bagley v. Bagley, 2016 UT 48, ,r 27, 387 P.3d 1000.
The conclusion that supervisors are "employees" yields an absurd
consequence. Justice Douglas, Senator Taft, and Representative Hartley made
that clear: "For if foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of the [NLRA], so
are vice-presidents, managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant
superintendents -indeed, all who are on the payroll of the company, including
the president .... But once vice-presidents, managers, superintendents, foremen
all are unionized, management and labor will become more of a solid phalanx
than separate factions in warring camps." Packard Motor Car Co. v. NLRB, 330 U.S.
485, 494 (1947) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
2.4.1

Independent Contractors Are Expressly Excluded Under
Federal Law, but not Under Utah Law

The point is illustrated by how Utah treats independent contractors. The
Wagner Act did not mention independent contractors. Pub. L. No. 74-198, § 9(c),
49 Stat. 450 (1935). In 1944, the NLRB concluded, and the Supreme Court
affirmed, that Hearst Publications' newsboys were "employees" who could join
together for collective bargaining, over Hearst's argument that they were
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"independent contractors," who could not. NLRB v. Hearst Publ'ns Inc., 322 U.S.
111, 131-32 (1944) (overruled in part by Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co. v. Darden, 503
U.S. 318 (1992)).

Representative Hartley stated that the court's conclusion was absurd. He
stated that "[a]n 'employee,' according to all standard dictionaries, according to
the law as the courts have stated it, and according to the understanding of almost
everyone, with the exception of members of the National Labor Relations Board,
means someone who works for another for hire." H.R. Rep. No. 80-245, at 309
(1947). He stated that Congi·ess meant" employee" as that word has always been
interpreted, "not new meanings that, 9 years later, the Labor Board might think
up." Id. He declared that Congress should expressly clarify that independent
contractors do not fall within the definition of "employee." Id. That amendment
passed as well, and, as a result, independent contractors are not "employees"
under federal law for purposes of collective bargaining. 29 U.S.C. § 152(3).
This is important because, just as the Utah Legislature did not amend its
statute to clarify that supervisors are not" employees," it did not clarify that
independent contractors are not employees under section 34-20-2(4). In other
words, the Utah Code does not exclude "independent contractors" from the term
"employees," Utah Code § 34-20-2(4), but the United States Code does, 29 U.S.C.
§ 152(3). And under

NLRB v. Hearst Publications, Inc., the plain language of the
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•
statute that was the NLRA, and continues to be the ULRA, includes
"independent contractors" as employees. 332 U.S. at 131-32.

If the district court's same logic regarding" supervisors" is applied to
"independent contractors," then in Utah, "independent contractors" are
"employees" for purposes of collective bargaining. This would contradict several
other sections of the Utah Code that do not treat independent contractors as

•

employees. E.g., Utah Code§ 35A-4-204(3) (defining "employee" to exclude
independent contractors in Employment Security Act);§ 61-2f-303
(distinguishing "employees" from "independent contractors" for real estate
licensing);§ 63G-7-102(3)(c) (defining "employee" to exclude independent
contractors in Governmental Immunity Act of Utah). Including supervisors
under the umbrella of "employees" results in equally absurd consequences.
This court should vacate summary judgment and remand for the court to
resolve the fact question of whether UTA' s rail operations supervisors are
supervisors for purposes of collective bargaining.

3.

This Court Should Instruct the District Court, If It Becomes Necessary,
to Order a Secret Ballot Election Rather than a Card Check

•

Finally, UT A requests that this court provide guidance on the issue of card
checks versus special elections. This issue is relevant only if this court reverses
the entry of summary judgment and the district court later finds, as a factual
matter, that UT A's rail operations supervisors are not supervisors for purposes
of collective bargaining.
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•

The district court initially ordered a card check. [R.290-94.] But when the
card check proved to be fraught with uncertainty, the district court ordered a
secret ballot election. [R.436,440-42.] The parties agreed on certain elements of the
secret ballot election, and the district court resolved the rest. [R.651-55.] After the
election, neither party raised procedural challenges, so there should be no
dispute that a secret ballot remains the appropriate method.
As the district court recognized, the card check method is less reliable and
subjects employees to threats and group pressure. (R.440-42.] A secret ballot
mitigates those concerns. In 1949, this court explained the virtues of a secret
ballot election in the union con text:
The election method is a suggested means, and in our
opinion, is the most effective way of obtaining an
untrammeled expression of the desires of the employees.
It is not difficult to imagine that in bemg canvassed by
Union agents to sign an authorization card an employee
is subjected to Union coercion or at least mental pressure
by the agents or by other 1nembers more interested in
the authorization .... There is little chance for undue
influence when employees are entitled to a secret vote,
and we commend this method to the Commission,
particularly, where as here, the employer made a timely
request for its use.
Hotel Utah Co. v. Indus. Comm'n, 211 P.2d 200, 202-03 (Utah 1949). Federal law

also requires the secret ballot method, and has done so since the Taft-Hartley
Amendments. 29 U.S.C. § 159(c).12
12 The Wagner Act authorized the NLRB to "take a secret ballot of employees,
or utilize any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives." Pub. L.
No. 74-198, § 9(c), 49 Stat. 453 (1935). The ULRA authorized the Utah Labor
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Because special elections are preferable and required by federal law, this
court should instruct the district court that, if the process becomes necessary, it
must order a special election rather than a card check.
Conclusion

The district court erred in its interpretation of the term "employees" in
section 34-20-2 of the Utah Public Transit District Act. This court should vacate

summary judgment and remand for the court to resolve the fact question of
whether UTA's rail operations supervisors are supervisors for purposes of
collective bargaining. This court should also instruct the district court that, if
necessary, to order a secret ballot election rather than a card check.
DATED this 31st day of August, 2017.
ZIMMERMAN JONES BOOHER

Isl Troy L. Booher
Troy L. Booher
Julie J. Nels on
Erin B. Hull
Attorneys for Appellant

Board to II take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method
to ascertain such representatives." 1937 Utah Laws ch. 55 § l0(c). But the TaftHartley Act stated that the NLRB "shall direct an election by secret ballot." Pub.
L. No. 80-101, § 9(c) 61 Stat. 136, 144 (1947). The ULRA was not similarly
amended. Utah Code § 34-20-9(3).
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riLED DISTRICT

Third Judicial 0 ~0URT
IStrict

FEB O9 2017
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 and JOHN
AND JANE DOE NOS.1-23,

RULING AND ORDER
Case No. 140902884

Plaintiffs,

vs.

February 9, 2017

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY,

Judge Ryan M. Harris

Defendant.

Before the Court is a Motion for New Trial Pursuant to Rules 52 and 59 ("the Motion"),
filed by Defendant Utah Transit Authority

eurA").

By the Motion, UTA asks the Court to

reconsider its ruling, delivered in a lengthy Memorandum Decision and Order on October 13,
2015, that UTA's rail operations supervisors are "employees" as that term is used in the Public
Transit District Act ('1the Act't Utah Code Ann.§ 17B-2a-813(2)(a), and that therefore those rail
operations supervisors have the statutory right to organize and collectively bargain. Plaintiff
Teamsters Local 222 ("the Unionn) opposes the Motion. The Motion is fully briefed and ready
for decision. UTA has requested a hearing, but the Court does not believe that oral argument

will substantially assist the Court in adjudicating the Motion, and therefore denies UTA's request
for oral argument.
The question that the Court decided in October 2015 was one of statutory interpretation:
what does the term "employeei, mean as used in the Act? The Court answered that question by
reference to dictionaries, which the Court thought unanimously provided a straightforward
definition of the term that does not exclude supervisors. as well as by reference to other
sections of the Utah Code. See Oct. 13, 2015 Mem. Decision and Order, at 12-13. Specifically,
the Court looked to Utah's "Little Wagner Act," passed in 1937 and today codified at Utah Code
11

Ann.§ 34-20-2(4), which contains a definition of "employee that does not exclude supervisors.
Id. at 10, 13. In the course of that discussion, the Court also noted that the analogous federal
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statute (the 'Wagner Act"} was originally passed in 1935, and at that point contained the same
expansive definition of "empioyee,n without any exclusion for supervisors. Id. at 9-10, 13. It was
not until 1947 that the U.S. Congress amended the Wagner Act's definition of "employeen to
include a specific exclusion for "supervisors." Id. at 10 (citing Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136,
enacted June 23, 1947 (now codified at 29 U.S.C. § 152(3)). In its Memorandum Decision, the
Court noted the significance of the U.S. Congress taking pains to amend its statute to exclude
"supervisorsn from the definition of "employeen in their labor relations code, while the Utah
Legislature declined to make any similar change. Partly on this basis (and partly on the plain
meaning of the term and its dictionary definition), the Court held that the term "employee" as
used in the Act included all employees, including supervisory employees.
UTA now asserts that this determination was legal error, and that the Court's
interpretation of the .statute was faulty. UTA posits that the 1947 amendment to the federal
labor relations statute was merely a "clarifyinglt amendment intended to clarify that Congress0

12

even back in 1935-had all along meant for the term employee to exclude "supervisors." UTA
argues that, because the 1947 amendment to the Wagner Act was merely a "clarifying 11
amendment, Utah's failure to likewise amend its Little Wagner Act (to exclude "supervisors")
should not be assigned the rather high level of significance that the Court attributed to it. There
are several problems with this argument.
First of all, the governing question here is governed by state law, not by federal law. The
parties agreed on that point before. See id. at 8 (noting that "both sides recognize that the
question of whether the UTA rail operations supervisors can organize and collectively bargain is
ultimately a question of state law, and not of federal law'). Under state law, there is no longer
any such thing as a "clarifying" amendment. See Waddoups v. Noorda. 2013 UT 64,

1J 9

1

321

P.3d 1108 (stating that the Utah Supreme Court has "repudiated the "exception° to retroadivity
11

rules that allowed "clarifying amendments" to operate retroactively); see also Gressman v.
State. 2013 UT 63,

1J

16, 323 P.3d 998 (stating that "we have never applied" clarifying
2
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amendments as "an exception" to retroactivity rules). The Utah Supreme Court has clearly
been uncomfortable with the concept of "clarifying" amendments for many years now, ~ ' ~ .
Visitor Information Center Authority of Grand County v. Customer Serv. Div., 930 P.2d 1196,
1198 (Utah 1997) (stating that "[l]ater versions of a statute do not necessarily reveal the intent
behind an earlier version, 11 and that many legislative changes simply "support the proposition
that the statute previously meant something different from what it now says,,), and in the face of
all of this case law this Court is itself uncomfortable altering what appeared to the Court, in
October 2015 1 to be a fairly straightforward exercise in statutory interpretation, based on a
principle that has recently been "repudiated' by the Utah Supreme Court.
Second, there is a presumption that "a new legislative enactment is an amendment

rather than a clarification of existing law." and this presumption "may be rebutted only if it is
clear the legislature intended to interpret rather than change the law." See State v. Elmore. 228
P.3d 760, 770 (Wash. Ct. App. 2010); see also 82 C.J.S. STATUTES§ 460 (stating that "[a] court

may find a legislative amendment to be a clarification of a previously existing statute Where the
legislative history or the language of the statute, as amended, clearly indicates an intent to

clarify"}. UTA has not rebutted this presumption here. Certainly, the federal cases cited by UTA

do not provide a basis for rebutting this presumption; indeed, these. cases agree that the
category of "clarifying" amendments is a narrow one, to be applied only when the intent to

"clarify" is clear. Some of UTA's cited cases, including United States v. Montgomery County.
761 F.2d 998 (4th Cir~ 1985), merely advert to the possibility of a clarifying amendment. Id. at
1003 (stating that "change_s in statutory language need not ipso facto constitute a change in
meaning or effect." and that "{s]tatutes may be passed p·ure(y to mak~ what was intended all
along even more unmistakably clear" (emphasis added}); see also Piamba Cortes v. American
Airlines, Inc., 177 F.~d 1272, 1283 (11 th Cir. 1999) (stating that "an amendment containing new
language may be intended to clarify existing lawi (emphasis added)).

However, the Fourth

Circuit in Montgomery County went on to note that the Clcfarifying amendment" exception was

3
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limited, and that "a statute which has all along unambiguously proclaimed WHITE cannot
retrospectively be made to assert BLACK just because the legislature. at a later datei says so."
Id. Another cited case involved a statutory amendment that expressly stated, in the statutory

amendment itself, that it was a clarifying amendment. See Dobbs v. Anthem Blue Cross and
Blue Shield, 600 F.3d 1275, 1282 (10th Cir. 2010) (stating that "§906{b) states that it is merely a
'clarification' rather than a substantive change in the law'l And the other cited cases are not
relevant to the question at hand. See Holt v. State Farm Fire & Cas.·Co .• 627 F.2d 188, 194-95

(5th Cir. 2010) (saying nothing about clarifying amendments); Landgraf v. USI Film Prods. 511
U~S. 244, 272-80 {1994) (same). In essence, the Court is ofthe view that the cited federal case
law does not quite support the weight that UTA.attempts to lay upon it.
Moreover, even if the Court were to apply UTA's cited cases to this situation,. the Court
would still not reach the tesult UTA desires. The Coµrt, for several reasons, cannot conclude
that the amendment to the Wagner Act was actually a "clarifyingn amendment.

Initially. and most fundamentally, the 1947 statutory amendment does not .itself declare
that it is a. clarifying amendment. Congress has made such a declaration on occasiQn, see, ~ '
Dobbs, 600 F.3d at 1282, and its failure to do so here must be given some weight,~. fill:.,
Fonseca v. City of Gilroy. 56 Cal.Rptr.3d 374, 391-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2007) (stating that
"particularly when there is no definitive 'clarifying' expression by the Legislature in the

amendments themselves, we will presume that a substantial or material statutor,y change . .

~

bespeaks legislative intention to change, and not just clarify. the law"); see also Salt Lake
County v. Holliday Water Co., 2010 UT 45. ,m 43-44, 234 P.3d 1105 (nqting that the text of the
amendment contained "nothing . . . that appear[ed] to. be an attempt to clatjfy preexisting
language_" and therefore holding that the amendment was "not a mere clarification of the law"
but, ratheri "an affirmative addition of a new exemption to the statute

0
).

Likewise, the legislative history to which UTA so hopefully points also does not ever
make an express declaration that the bill is intended fo be categorized as a "clarifying
4
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amendment," with all of the legal implications such a classification carries. Instead, the author

of the House Report (Rep. Hartley, the bill's sponsor) simply indicates his belief that, by this
amendment, "Congress makes clear once more what it tried to make clear when, in passing the
act, it defined as an •employer', not an 'employee,, any person 'acting in the interest of an
employer."' See H.R. Rep. No. 245, at 308 {1947).

UTA infers that statements like this,

appearing in the House Report (and in another similar Senate Report), are sufficient to
categorize this amendment as a "clarifying11 amendment. But UTA fails to grapple with the fact
that neither the bill itself, nor its sponsors, ever actually made the specific categorization that
UTA wishes they had made.
Next, even if the cited legislative history could be interpreted as broadly as UTA urges,
the Court has serious concerns about whether one Congress can usefully or accurately
describe an earlier Congress's intent in passing a previous statute, concerns that are shared by
the United States Supreme Court. See, ~ . Bruesewitz v. Wyeth. LLC. 562 U.S. 223. 242

(2011) (stating that "[p]ost-enactrnent legislative history (a contradiction in terms) is not a
legitimate tool of statutory interpretation"); Consumer Prod. Safety Comm'n ·v. GTE Sylvania,

Inc., 447 U.S. 102, 117-18 (1980) {stating that "the views of a subsequent Congress form a
hazardous basis for inferring the intent of an earlier one"). These concerns become especially
pointed when one considers the circumstances surrounding the passage of the Wagner Act and
the Taft-HartJey Act. The Wagner Act was passed in 1935 by the 74 th Congress, which was an
overwhelmingly Democratic Congress made up of 70 Democratic Senators and 322 Democratic
representatives. 1

The Taft-Hartley Act was passed a full twelve years later, by the 80th

Congress, which happened to be the first Congress in quite some time that was controlled by
Republicans (51 Senators and 248 Representatives). Different Congresses are controlled by
different parties over time, and take different positions on different issues. It would be one thing

1

Although these numbers are not in the record, the Court believes it can take judicial notice of the
partisan makeup of various Congresses.

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

01012

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 v. UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Case No. 140902884

0

if a purported "clarifying amendment was passed by the same Congress that passed the
original law, but it is another thing entirely to think that a different Congress more than a decade
tater, controlled by a different party and made up of presumably many different people, would be
able to accurately convey, in

a House Report or otherwise, what a previous Congress intended.

Some jurists {including, most famously, the late Justice Scalia) have problems with any resort to
legislative history. See, ~ . Koons Buick Pontiac GMC. Inc. v. Nigh, 543 U.S. 50, 73 (2004)
{Scalia, J., dissenting) (stating that "I have often criticized the Court's use of legislative history
because it lends itself to a kind of ventriloquism" in which "committee reports are used to make

words appear to come from Congress's mouth which were spoken or written by others
(individual Members of Congress, congressional aides, or even enterprising lobbyists)"). In this
Court's view, that is too hard a line to take, because sometimes legislative history can add value
to

~

statutory interpretation analysis. But in this particular case, very little value is added by the

proffered legislative history. It is hard enough to extrapolate the intent of an entire legislative
body from the views of one (or even a number of) legisfator(s)r even when that legislator is
speaking about passage of an act that occurred in the very same Congress. But where the
legislative history proffered purports to speak of legislative intent regarding events that occurred
twelve years in the past, in a different Congress, the weight one should give to that legislative
history would appear to be at a very low ebb. See GTE Sylvania, 447 U.S. at 118 (stating that a

piece of legislative history from a subsequent Congress is not "entitled to much weight').
Finally, and most convincingly here, resort to legislative history is categorically
inappropriate, even for jurists not named Scalia. where the legislative passage to be interpreted

is unambiguous. See U.S. v. Gonzales, 520 U.S. 1, 6 {1997) (stating that "there is no reason to
11

resort to legislative history where there is a "straightforward statutory command"); see also
LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39,

11 26,

337 P.3d 254 (stating that a court "may resort to other

indications of legislative intent, including legislative history," only where the statutory language is
ambiguous); Taylor ex rel. C.T. v. Johnson. 1999 UT 35,

,r 13. 977 P.2d 479 {stating that "it is

6
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elementary that we do not seek guidance from legislative history . . . when the statute is clear
and unambiguous").

Where the passage is unambiguous. the statute is to be interpreted

according to the plain meaning of the terms, wjthout resort to· any extrinsic evidence. including
legislative history. In addition, as UTA's own cases teach, if the passage is unambiguous 1 then

any ame·ndment to change it is not a !&clarifying" amendment but rather, an amendment that
substantively changes the meaning of the term. See Montgomery County. 761 F.2d at 1003

(stating that "a statute which has all along unambiguously proclaimed WHITE cannot
retrospectively be made to assert BLACK just because the legislature, at .a later date, says son).
In this case, no less an authority than the United States Supreme Court has already
declared that the passage in question was unambiguous to begin with. See Packard Motor Car
11

Co. v. N.L.R.B .• 330 U.S. 491, 492 (1947) (stating that [t]here is ..• no ambiguity in this Act to
be clarified by resort to legislative history"). Indeed, 0 UTA does not dispute that Packard said
that the language [in the Wagner Act] was unambiguous." See UTA Reply Br., at 3. Rather,

UTA impliedly asserts that Congress apparently overruled the Supreme Court on the question of
ambiguity. This argument is without merit. If the United States Supreme Court holds that a
particular passage is unambiguous, then that is the end of the matter. A Judicial determination
that a passage is unambiguous means, by definition, that there are not two reasonable

interpretations of that passage. If Congress takes another view, then its original interpretation
was, ipso facto, not reasonable. Congress may certainly disagree with. the CQurt's interpretation
of the statute, and may even amend the statute, but none of that legislative action changes the
fact that the passage was originally unambiguous, and it is unambiguous because the Supreme
Court says it is. Courts, including (and especially) the Supreme Court, get to decide whether a

passage is or is not ambiguous. UTA provides no authority for the rather novel proposition that
Congress can overrule a court's determination as to whether a passage is unambiguous.
Indeed, when a 11court of last resort," such as the U.S. Supreme Court; interprets or
construes a statute, that court "is explaining its understanding of what the statute has meant

7
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continuously since the date when it became lpw." See State v. Aubuchon, 90.A3d 914, 921 (Vt.
2014) (citing McClung v. Employment Dev. Depl 99 P.3d 1015, 1018 (Cal. 2004)). In su.ch an
instance? after the court of last resort "definitively and finally interprets a statute1 the Legisl'ature
may amend the st~tute to say something different (b]ut if it does so, it changes the law; it does
not merely state what the law always was." Id.; see also Elmore. 228 P.3d at 769 (stating that
"it is ultimately for the courts to construe the law, 11 and that _.once the highest court construes a

statute, that construction operates as if it were originally written into the statute/' and that
thereafter a legislative body may no longer constitutionally "clarify" that statute to contradict the
judiciary's interpretation, although it can certainly amend the statute); State

v. Rios, 237 P.3d

1052J 1061 (Ariz. Ct. App. 2010) (stating that "[e]ven if a statute is ambiguous when enacted,
once a judicial interpretation clarifies it, the statute is no longer ambiguous and the Legislature
may not clarify its intent1'). Thus, anything that a legislative body might have to say about the
meaning of a statute following definitive judicial interpretation is, by constitutional definition. not
a "clarifying" amendment. In this case, the U.S. Supreme Court interpreted the Wagner Act in
Packard. That interpretation is definitive. because the U.S. Supreme Court is without question a

"court of last resort," and because "[i]t is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial
department

to say

what the law is.'' ~ Marbury v. Madison. 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).

By

definition, then, the 1947 change to the statute cannot be considered a "clarifyingn amendment.
In sum, this Court simply does not believe that Congress's 1947 change to the Wagner

Act was a "clarifying" amendment. That amendment fundamentally changed the definition of a
term-a definition that had been interpreted and solidified by no less an authority than the U.S.
Supreme Court-to add exceptions that were not previously included. This Court is simpfy not
persuaded that this is one of those presumably rare instances where a legislative amendment
can be deemed merely "clarifying.~· Therefore, the fact that the Utah Legislature, for 70 years

now, has· declined to make a similar amendment to the Little Wagner Act is a fact that the Court
appropriately found, and continues to find, significant.

8
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This Court undertook a lengthy analysis in 2015, and determined that the term
11

"employee as used in the Act did not exclude supervisors. The Court is unpersuaded, after
reviewing UTA's latest motion and the relevant case law, that its decision was at all infirm the
first time around. The Court's previous decision stands. UTA's Motion is DENI ED.
This Ruling and Order is the order of the Court with regard to the Motion, and no further
writing is necessary to effectuate this decision.
DATED this

94"'

day of February! 2017.
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Attorneys for Defendant Utah Transit Authority

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRJCT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE qF UTAH

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 and JOHN and
JANE DOE nos. 1-23,

[PROPOSED] FINAL JUDGMENT
Civil No. 140902884

Plaintiffs,
Judge Ryan M. Harris
V.

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORJTY,
Defendant.

l.

By Memorandum Decision and Order dated October 13, 2015, the Court granted

the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiff Teamsters Local 222 ("Teamsters") and
ruled that Defendant Utah Transit Authority's ("UTA") TRAX Rail Operations Supervisors
constituted an appropriate bargaining unit under Utah Code Ann.§ l 7B-2a-813(2). The Court
subsequently issued an Order Directing Election dated August 17, 2016, in which the Court
ordered that a secret ballot election take place on Monday and Tuesday, September 12-13, 2016,
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at UTA's Jordan River Service Center, to determine whether the Teamsters held majority support
within the bargaining unit.
2.

On September 14, 2016, UTA filed an Election Report prepared by CaITie Taylor,

the Election Monitor chosen by the parties.
3.

According to the Election Report, the secret ballot election was held as directed

by the Court, and the Election Monitor counted and tallied the ballots on September 13, 2016.
4.

The Election Monitor reported that 44 total ballots were cast, without any

challenged ballots.
5.

There were 19 "yes" votes in favor of union representation by the Teamsters, and

25 "no" votes against union representation by the Teamsters. Accordingly, the ·'no" votes
prevailed.
6.

Based on the results of the secret ballot election, Plaintiff Teamsters Local 222

does not have majority representation within the bargaining unit consisting of TRAX Rail
Operations Supervisors at UTA.
7.

Futthermore, as stated in the Order Directing Election, Teamsters Local 222 shall

be barred from seeking another determination of majority status until one year from the date of
the final determination of the election results.
ORDER OF FINAL JUDGMENT
The Court now orders that Teamsters Local 222 is not the exclusive bargaining
representative for the bargaining unit of TRAX Rail Operations Supervisors at UTA, and that
Teamsters Local 222 shall be barred from seeking another determination of majority status
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within that unit until September 13, 2017. Furthem1ore, UTA shall not be compelled to bargain
with Teamsters Local 222.
This is the Final Judgment of the Court in this case.

In accordance with the Utah State District Courts E-filing Standard No. 4, and
URCP Rule 10(e), this Order does not bear the handwritten signature of
the Judge, but instead displays an electronic signature at the upper
right-hand comer of the first page of this Order.

Approved as to Form:
/s/ Russell T. Monahan
(permission given via email)

Russell T. Monahan
Attorney for Plaintiff
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on this 17th day of October, 2016, a true and correct copy of the
foregoing [PROPOSED] FINAL JUDGMENT was electronically filed with the Clerk of the
Court using the Utah Trial Court/ECF system which sent notification of such to the following:
Russell T. Monahan
COOK & MONAHAN
323 South 600 East
Suite 200
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102

Isl Doris Van den Al<ker
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FILED 01srmcr COURT
Third Jud:c!al rnstilCt

OCT

i

3 r.o~c:-

IN THE DISTRICT. COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIA.L DIST.Rib l. '~J
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE Oy:
OF
UT.MfLA!(ECOUNT(..Q~
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ __

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222and JOHN
AND JANE DOE NOS. 1-23,

MEMORANDUM DECISION

AND ORDER
Plaintiffs,
Case No. 140902884

vs.
October 13, 2015

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY,
Judge Ryan M. Harris
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on September 29, 2015 for oral argument on a
Motion for Summary Judgment ethe Motion"), filed by Plaintiff Teamsters Local 222 ("the
1

Union 1). Prior to the hearing, the Motion was fully briefed.

At the hearing! the Union was

represented by Russell T. Monahan, and Defendant Utah Transit Authority ("UTA"} was
represented by Scott A. Hagen and Kimberly A Child. After consideration of the memoranda
filed by the parties, the arguments made at the September 29 hearing, and applicable statutes
and case law, the Court enters the following Memorandum Decision and Order.
INTRODUCTION

In this case, the Court is called upon to determine whether "rail operations supervisors',
in UTA's TRAX division are entitled to organize and bargain collectively with their employer. If
this question were decided under federal (aw, as nearly all labor law issues are these days, the
answer may well be "No/' due to the fact that, since 1947, federal labor law has not allowed
"supervisors" the privilege of organizing and collectively bargaining. 1

But due to unique

circumstances explained more fully below, the parties agree that the question in this case is

1

The parties to this case take different positions as to whether, as a factual matter, these "rail operations

supervisors11 are actually "supervisors11 as that term is used in labor law. That factual question is not
before the Court on this particular Motion for Summary Judgment, and in fact is rendered moot by the

Court's decision herein.
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governed not by federal law, but by state law, informed to some degree by federal labor policy.

The parties take different positions with regard to whether, under Utah law, supervisors have the
right to organize and collectively bargain.
While at some level it might seem counter-intuitive that Utah, of all states, would have
local labor laws that are, in any respect, more favorable to workers than federal law, upon
careful review of the applicable statutes, that indeed appears to be the case. Utah's labor laws,
some of which have been on the books since the 1930s without significant amendment at any
time since, indicate that all "employees" of any "public transit systemn have the right to organize
and bargain collectively. While Congress, in 1947, amended federal labor law to create an
exception for "supervisors," Utah's similar statute has never been so amended. The Utah
legislature is, of course, free to amend its laws to match the federal exclusion for "supervisors."
But at no point over the past 80 years has the legislature made that change. Until it does, this
Court is obligated to enforce the statutes as written, according to their plain language and
ordinary meaning.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth below, under Utah law UTA1s rail operations
supervisors, as "employees" of a 11 public transit system," have the right to organize and
collectively bargain. And for the reasons set forth herein, the Court will conduct a "card check"
to determine whether or not a majority of those employees have selected the Union to represent
them. Therefore, the Union's Motion is GRANTED. for the reasons discussed below.
UNDISPUTED FACTS

1.

Prior to 1969, all transit service in the State of Utah was provided by private transit

companies. In 1969, the Utah legislature passed the Public Transit District Act, now codified at
Utah Code Ann. § 17B-2a-801 et seq. ("the Act"). In 1970, very soon thereafter, UTA was
created under authority of the Act as a public transit district. UTA is, and has been since its
inception, a local district political subdivision of the State of Utah.

2
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A few years before passage of the Act1 the federal government had made available

federal funds for the purpose of supporting local public transit districts.

In 1964, Congress

passed the Urban Mass Transportation Act ("UMTA"). If state and local governments met the
requirements of UMTA, they could access federal funds for the purpose of supporting local
public mass transit.
3.

One of the crucial requirements of the federal government upon which it

conditioned use of federal funds was that local transit districts would have to make it possible for

employees of the local transit districts to organize and collectively bargain. Section 13(c) of
UMTA states expressly that 'Ta]s a condition of financial assistance . . . , the interests of
employees affected by the assistance shall be protected under arrangements the Secretary of
Labor concludes are fair and equitable." which arrangements musL at a minimum, provide for:
• "the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits ... under existing
collective bargaining agreements";
•

"the continuation of collective bargaining rights"; and

•

"the protection of individual employees against
11
positions related to employment.

a

worsening of their

See 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b).

4.

In keeping with these requirements, the Utah Act contains provisions intended to

allow employees of any public transit district created pursuant to the Act to organize and
collectively bargain.

The Act states plainly that "[e]mployees of a public transit system

established and operated by a public transit district have the right to: (i) self-organization; (ii)
form, join, or assist labor organizations; and (iii) bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing." See Utah Code Ann. § 178-2a-813(2)(a). Moreover. 11 [e]ach public transit
district shall

• recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization representing a

majority of the district's employees in an appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours,
working conditions, and welfare, pension, and retirement provisions." Id. at§ 813(2)(c).

3
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For decades now, the rank-and-file employees of UTA (e.g., bus drivers) have

taken advantage of these provisions, and they have organized and appointed Local 382 of the
Amalgamated Transit Union ciLocal 382") as their representative to bargain collectively on their
behalf. See,~. Burke v. Utah Transit Authority and Local 382. 462 F.3d 1253, 1256 {10th Cir.
2006) {stating that q[sFnce its inception, Local 382 of the Amalgamated Transit Union has
continuously represented the employees of Utah,s public transit system").
6.

However, Local 382 has never represented UTA's approximately 40 "rail

operations supervisors."
7.

In approximately January 2014, UTA ceased paying its rail operations supervisors

on a salary basis and, instead, made them hourly employees.

At least some of the rail

operations supervisors were not pleased with this new developmentt and contacted the Union to
inquire about whether action could be taken to organize.
8.

In February 2014, Spencer Hogue, the Secretary-Treasurer of the Union, met with

a number of the rail operations supervisors, and at the meeting obtained a number of
authorization cards from them. Hogue eventually obtained a number of additional authorization
cards, and thereupon sent a letter to UTA informing them that 23 ran operations supervisors-a
clear majority-had signed cards authorizing the Union to bargain collectively on their behalf.
The Union asked UTA to formally recognize it as the authorized representative of UTA's rail
operations supervisors.
9.

UTA refused, and explained its belief that UTA's rail operations supervisors were

not protected by the Act and that UTA did not have to bargain with the rail operations
supervisors' representatives. Moreover, UTA questioned the 11 cards 11 obtained by Hogue, and
asked for a chance to verify the supervisors1 wishes through an election.
10.

After the Union and UTA could not come to agreement on these issues, the Union

filed this lawsuit in April 2014. The Union now moves for summary judgment, asking the Court
to determine, as a matter of law, that the rail operations supervisors are "employees" covered by

4
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the Act and therefore empowered to organize and collectively bargain, and asking the Court to
declare ·that a "card checkn is a sufficiently reliable method to ascertain whether the Union
"represent[s]a majority

or the rail operations supervisors.
STANDARD

At issue here is a motion for summary judgment, filed pursuant to Utah R. Civ. P. 56.

Rule 56 provides that summary judgment should only be granted where "the pleadings,
depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if

any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law/' Utah R. Civ. P. 56(c). The party moving for summary
judgment "must make an initial showing that he is entitled to judgment and that there is no
genuine issue of material fact that would preclude summary judgment in his favor," and if he
11

does so, the burden then shifts to the nonmoving party to show that there is a genuine issue of
material fact or a deficiency with the moving party's legal theory that would preclude summary
judgment." See Jones & Trevor Mktg., Inc. v. Lowry. 2012 UT 39, 1(29, 284 P.3d 630.
DISCUSSION

I. THE RAIL OPERATIONS SUPERVISORS ARE "EMPLOYEES" AS THAT TERM IS
USED IN THE ACT
The Act states that "[e]mployees of a public transit system" have the right to organize

and collectively bargain.

The first question presented by the Motion is whether UTA's rail

operations supervisors are "employeestt as that term is used in the Act. For the reasons that

follow, the Court is persuaded that they are.

A.
To answer the seemingly simple question of whether UTA's rail operations supervisors

are "employees" of UTA as that term is used in the Act, it is first helpful to look at both the law
governing the UMTA and federally-subsidized local transit districts, as well as the historical
development of labor and collective bargaining rights across the country.

5

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00281

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 v. UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Case No. 140902884

By the 1960s, Congress became aware of "the increasingly precarious financial
condition of a number of private transportation companies across the country, and it feared that
co·mmunities might be left without adequate mass transportation~n See Jackson Transit Auth. v.
Local Div. 1285, Amalgamated Transit Union. 457 U.S. 15, 17 (1982) (citation omitted). In an
effort to make sure that local governments had plenty of options in providing useful mass transit
to their citizens, Congress in 1964 passed UMTA. Under UMTA, the federal government made
federal dollars available to states for the development of local transit systems, including funds
for the outright purchase by local governments of some of these "failing private transportation
companies."

Id.

However, Congress recognized that, in many instances, these private

transportation companies had unionized workers who had already collectively bargained for
certain working conditions, and Congress wanted to make sure any local government takeover
ofthese private companies would not impair the labor rights of these transit workers.
One hurdle that Congress faced, in working through the situation, was that government
workers, whether at the state or federal level, were not protected by federal labor laws.
Specifically, the National Labor Relations Act, at the time, already excluded "any State or
political subdivision thereor from the definition of "employer."

See 29 U.S.C. § 152(2).

Congress chose not to amend this definition, and chose to leave state and local governments
exempt from federal labor laws, even if they were to purchase some of these failing private
transportation companies. Instead, Congress looked for another way to protect the collective
bargaining rights of employees of these struggling transit companies, one that could keep this
exemption intact.
In the end. Congress chose to strike Cla delicate balancen between state and federal law.
See Amalgamated Transit Union lnt'I v. Donovan. 767 F.2d 939, 950 (D.C. Cir. 1985).

By

passing UMTA, Congress made federal funds available to the states for the development of
focal transit systems, but (as is often the case with federal dollars) those funds came with
strings attached. In order to qualify for federal funds, states had to demonstrate, inter alia. that

6
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they had in place mechanisms designed to protect public transit employees' labor rights 1 and
the federal Secretary of Labor had to sign off on those mechanisms as "fair and equitableD
before federal funds could issue. See 49 U.S.C. § 5333(b){1). In deciding whether to sign off
on any given state's arrangements, the Secretary of Labor would endeavor to ascertain whether
the employees of the public transit system would be able to enjoy "collective bargaining rights,

r)

including "at a minimumn the right Uta be represented in meaningful, good faith negotiations with
their employer over wages, hours and other terms and conditions of employment."

See

Donovan, 767 F.2d at 950. Although UMTA does not explicitly use the term ''at a minimum,n or
speak in terms of "floors" or "ceilings,n several cases discussing this issue expressly state that
the Secretary of Labor was to ensure that certain minimum standards are met. As noted, the
Donovan Court used the phrase "at a minimumr, on two occasions in this context. See id. at
949, 950. And the Tenth Circuit, more recently, was even more clear:
[T]he purpose of Section 13(c) [of UMTA] is not to invalidate overly-protective
terms in a Section 13(c) agreement, but rather to prevent federal funds from
being used to destroy the collective-bargaining rights of organized workers.
[Citation omitted.] To that end, § 13(c) establishes "minimal standards,n Burke v.
Utah Transit Auth. and Local 382, 462 F.3d 1253, at 1258 (10th Cir. 2006), and
does not concern itself with other provisions to which the parties.might agree.

City of Colorado Springs v. Solis, 589 F.3d 1121 1 1132-33 (10th Cir. 2009).
Despite the fact that the Secretary of Labor was instructed to examine each state's
arrangement to make sure that it provided transit workers with certain minimum labor rights,
Congress by passing UMTA "made it absolutely clear that it did not intend to create a body of
federal law applicable to labor relations between local governmental entities and transit
workers." See Jackson Transit, 457 U.S. at 27. While federal labor policy would inform the
Secretary's "minimal standards" inquiry, UMTA
would not supersede state law, [and] would leave intact the exclusion of local
government employers from the National Labor Relations Act, and state courts
would retain jurisdiction to determine the application of state policy to focal
government transit relations. Congress intended that [UMTA] would be an
important tool to protect the collective-bargaining rights of transit workers, by
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ensuring that state law preserved their rights before federal aid could be used to
convert private companies into public entities. But Congress designed [UMTA]
as a means to accommodate state law to collective bargaining, not as a means
to substitute a federal law of collective bargaining for state labor law.

Id. at 27-28 (internal citations omitted).
In this case, both sides recognize that the question of whether the UTA rail operations
supervisors can organize and collectively bargain is ultimately a question of state law, and not of
federal law. See Union's Br., at 7; UTA's Br., at 3. However, UTA argues that the state-law
question is to be informed by "federal labor policy," see UTA's Br., at 31 and points out that
federal labor law, at least since 1947, provides that "supervisors" are not "employees" who have
a right to organize or collectively bargain. UTA's assertion-that current federal labor policy
does not allow "supervisors" to organize or collectively bargain-is surely correct, as discussed
below.

But in the Court's view, UTA misperceives the role federal labor policy plays in

answering the question before the Court. The Union argues that federal labor policy supplies
11

11

minimum standards-a "floor" but not a cei1in9 -below which state law protections for local
transit workers cannot go without jeopardizing federal funds flowing to state transit districts, but
that nothing in UMTA (or the policies behind UMTA) prevents a state, if it wishes, from providing
additional labor relations protections to workers above and beyond those afforded to workers
under federal law. The Court is persuaded by the Union's position on this point. The question
is ultimately governed by state law, irrespective of federal labor policy, unless state law
protections for transit workers fall below those minimum protections afforded by federal law.

As noted, UTA is correct when it asserts that current federal law provides no labor
relations protection for "supervisors."

See 29 U.S.C. § 152(3) (providing that "[t]he term

'employee' ... shall not include ... any individual employed as a supervisor"). And there. may
in fact be good policy reasons for legislative bodies to enact an exclusion for "supervisorsu from
11

the statutory definition of employee.

0

See,~, Smithfield Packing Co. v. NLRB, 510 F.3d 507,

516 (4th Cir. 2007) (stating that supervisors are not protected "for good reason: management,
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like labor, must have faithful agents" and because "supervisors are management obliged to be
loyal to their employer's interests"). But federal law did not always exclude "supervisors" from
the statutory definition of "employee. n
The National Labor Relations Act was originally passed through Congress in 1935, in the
midst of the New Deal. The original law, which was known as the "Wagner Actt contained an
extremely broad definition of "employee," which definition contained no exclusion for
supervisors. See Union's Br., at Exhibit 2 (citing the original Wagner Act, which stated that
"[t]he term employee shall include any employee," with no exception for supervisors, and
containing only an exclusion for "any individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse"). From its original passage in 1935, until 1947 (when Congress passed the TaftHartley Act), federal law contained this expansive definition of "employee," which applied to any
"employee" whose job affected interstate commerce.

Because the Wagner Act only governed employees engaged in interstate commerce,
and because in the 1930s-before widespread air travel or. certainly. the Internet-the reach of

interstate commerce was not as broad as it is today, the passage of the Wagner Act did not
cover all of the nation's employees. At that time, there were still quite a number of employees
who worked for small businesses that did not engage in interstate commerce. To cover these
employees, many states followed up passage of the Wagner Act by enacting labor relations
statutes of their own, which statutes were commonly called "Little Wagner Acts.n Utah was one
of the states that passed a "Little Wagner Act, n in 1937, and that statute is still on the books
today, codified at Utah Code Ann.§ 34-20-1 et seq. That statute was originally passed with an
expansive definition of "employee" that was substantively identical to the original federal
Wagner Act, without any exclusion for "supervisors": and that definition remains more or less
unchanged to this day.

9

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00285

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222

v.

UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Case No. 140902884

Over the decades following passage of Utah's Little Wagner Act, as the reach of
interstate commercial activity has gradually grown, the applicability of Utah's law has

proportionately decreased, to the point where, today, the statute has more or less fallen into
disuse. For instance, that statute calls for the creation of a Utah Labor Relations Board, a state
agency that was for many years active and vibrant. See Utah Code Ann. § 34-20-3; see also
Hotel Utah Co. v. Industrial Comm'n, 211 P.2d 200 (Utah 1949) (discussing the actions of the
Utah Labor Relations Board).

However, no such state labor board exists today; the parties

agreed at oral argument that no such board has existed for many decades. Indeed, at oral
argument, in an answer to a question from the Court, the parties could not come up with any
examples of workers to whom Utah's Little Wagner Act today squarely applies.
Despite its apparent obsolescence, the statute remains on the books today, and in
substantially the same form as when it was passed in the 1930s. Notably for the purposes of
this case, Congress in 1947 passed the Taft-Hartley Act (over President Truman's veto), which
amended the Wagner Act by, inter alia. adding an exclusion for "supervisors" to the definition of
"employee." See Pub. L. 80-101, 61 Stat. 136, enacted June 23, 1947 (now codified at 29
11

U.S.C. § 152(3), and excluding from the definition of employee" "any individual employed as a
supervisor'). Thus, under federal law, in effect since 1947, "supervisors" are not "employees"
who are entitled to organize and collectively bargain. However, the Utah legislature did not ever
amend the Little Wagner Act in the same way, whether in 1947 or at any time thereafter. Even
today, the Little Wagner Act's definition of "employee" is the same as the pre-1947 federal law,

with no exclusion for "supervisors. See Utah Code Ann.§ 34-20-2(4).
11

B.
Wrth that historical background in mind, the Court now turns to the question at hand,
namely, whether UTA's rail operations supervisors are "employees" under the Act, which
11

provides that [e]mployees of a public transit system" have certain labor relations rights,
including the right to organize and collectively bargain. The Union urges the Court to apply a

10

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00286

TEAMSTERS LOCAL 222 v. UTAH TRANSIT AUTHORITY

Case No. 140902884

Aplain meaning" definition of "employee," or to look to Utah's Little Wagner Act for guidance as
to how the Utah legislature intended the term to be denned. UTA, by contrast, urges the Court
to look to current federal law conceptions of "employee/' which since 1947 have excluded
"supervisors.~ UTA argued passionately at oral argument that allowing these supervisors to
organize would run contrary to nearly 70 years of established federal labor law and practice. In

the Courfs view, the Unio"n has the better of the argument.
As noted above. the question is ultimately governed by state law. See Jackson Transit,
457 U.S. at 24 (stating that "Congress intended that labor relations between transit workers and
local governments would be controlled by state law'). Under UMTA, states accepting federal
aid for local transit systems must provide local transit workers with a certain basic level of
protection for labor relations and colfectively bargaining rights.

See 49 U.S.C..§ 5333(b).

Federal labor policy is involved simply to provide certain "minimal standards" below which state
law mechanisms put in place for protection of these rights may not fall. See Solis, 589 P.3d at
1133. The fact that Utah law may afford certain rights to workers that federal law does not
provide does not violate federal law or policy. The Court is simply not persuaded by UTA's

argument that federal labor law (which excludes supervisors} should trump state law (which
does not). State law provides the answer to the question, unless state law provides fewer rights

than federal law. Here, because state law appears to create more rights th.an federal law,
federal law and/or policy is simply not dispositive. 2

2

At oral argument, UTA argued that, if the Court rufes in the Union's favor and allows UTA1s rail
operations supervisors to organize and collectively bargain. such a ruling would upset and run counter to
well-established federal labor laws and· practices. The Court considers these concerns overstated. As
the Court explored with counsel at oral argument. this Memorandum Decision and Order will affect only
supervisors who work for UTA. Counsel were unable to provide the Court, at oral argument, with
examples of any other employees, either inside Utah or across the country. who will be affected by this
decision. Indeed, UTA1s supervisors-if, in fact, they are llsupeniisors"-may very well be the only
supervisors in the United States with the rightto organize and collectively bargain. And this fact, by itself,
demonstrates the hyperbolic nature of UTA s concerns: if this decision only affects a small number of
supervisors working for one single public transit district in one single state, it will hardly spell the end of
established labor law as we know it.
1

11
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In the end, the Court's task in this case is relatively straightforward: what does the term
"employee" mean

as used in the Act?

See Utah Code Ann.§ 17B-2a-813(2). If the Act itself

had a definition of .. employee," the Court would of course look there first.

See State v.

Rasabout. 2015 UT 72, 1J43, - P.3d - (Lee, J., concurring) (stating that "a threshold question is
whether the legislative text conveys some specialized meaningJI such as ~ "statutorily defined

term" or a "legal term of art" and stating that, if it does, ''the specialized meaning contro!s

11
).

But

in .this case, the Utah legislature did not provide any statutory definition of the term within the
Act, or otherwise within the Act provide any indication that it was using the term "employee'' .in
some spe~ializecf or unique way .. In such cases, courts are to interpret the statutory language
"according to the prafn meaning of pts] text." See Olsen v. Eagle Mountain City. 2011 UT 10,
1{9, 248 P.3d 465.
A "starting point" for a courtis 'assessment of ordinary meaning is the dictionary:• See
1

State v. Bagnes, 2014 UT 4, 1{14. 322 P.3d 719 (citing Hi-Country Prop. Rights Grp. v·. Emmer,
2013 UT 33, 1{19, 304 P.3d 851). The term "employee,11 as used in comrnon dictionaries and in

Qrdin$ry parlance, clearly includes supeivisory employees.

Webster's Dictionary defines

"employee., simply as "o.ne .employed by another." Dictionary.com defines "employee11 as "a

person working for another person or a business firm for pay. And the American Heritage Desk
i1

Dictionary defines "employee" as "a person who works for another person or business in return
1

for salary, wages, or other compensation." See Union s Br. 1 at 8. These defin_itions are all
simple and plain enough, and all of them are easily broad enough to encompass the rail

operations supervisors who work for UTA. The Court is aware of no dictionary definition of the
word "employee~ that excludes "supervisors11 from its definition, and UTA cites none.
Another ptace that courts look to when a term is not defined within a particular section of

the Utah Code is to other sections of the Utah Code. See Wasatch Crest Ins. Co. v. LWP

Claims Adm'rs Corp., 2007 UT 32,

fflJ

13-14, 158 P.3d 548 (stating that "[a]lthough the Utah

Insurance Code does not define the tenn 'distribution,' the term is defined elsewhere in the Utah
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Code as a portion of equity"); see also Territorial Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Baird. 781 P.2d 452, 461
(Utah 1989) (stating that 11 [a]lthough the Utah Fraudulent Conveyances Act does not define
'good faith,' the term is defined elsewhere in the Utah Code as 'honesty in fact in the conduct or
transaction concerned'"); LeBeau v. State, 2014 UT 39, 1[34, 337 P.3d 254 (stating that

"[t]hough the Legislature did not specifically define 'interests of justice' in the aggravated
kidnapping statute, it has provided guidance elsewhere in the Utah Code"). In this case, while

the Act itself contains no definition of employee." there is another place within the Utah CodeCl

and, notably, within the labor relations context-where the Utah legislature has expressly
defined uemployee": the Little Wagner Act. And as noted, that statute, which in this respect has
been unchanged for nearly 80 years, defines "employee 11 as "any employee unless this chapter
explicitly states otheiwise," without any exclusion for supervisors. See Utah Code Ann.§ 34-20-

2(4){a). UTA rightly points out that it is not subject to the Little Wagner Act because it is not an
11

employer11 under that statute, since that statute defines "employer" as excluding any ustate or

political subdivision of a state .., See id. § 34-20-2{5){b). But while the Little Wagner Act does

not strictly apply here, it is the only place in the Utah Code where the Utah legislature has
defined the term "employee" in the labor relations context, and that definition was on the books
in 1969 when the Utah legislature enacted the Act.

Accordingly, the Court finds the Little

Wagner Act's definition to be very useful guidance in trying to determine what the Utah
legislature meant when it used the term "employee" in the Act.
Certainly, the Utah legislature is (and has been for nearly 80 years) free to change its
definition of "employee" in the labor relations context, both as that term is used in the Act and in
the Little Wagner Act. To date, however, it has not done so, and continues to define the term,
within the labor relations context, as a term that does not exclude supervisors. This Court is
bound to interpret legislative enactments according to their plain meaning, even if the Court may
think that the current legislature might not necessarily pass that same law. See, ~ , Carranza
v. U.S., 2011 UT 80, 1139, 267 P.3d 912 (Nehring, J., dissenting) (stating that courts "do not
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interpret statutes by assuming which rights the legislature should want to protect'). Here, the
term "employee" is used-both in the Act and in the Little Wagner Act-without any exclusion
for supervisors. which definition squares with the plain language (or "dictionart) definition of the
term. Despite the fact that this definition provides labor relations protections to persons who

may not receive it under applicable federal law, the state statutes are plain enough:

all

employees of a public transit system, including supeivisors, have the right to seJf-organization;
to form, join or assist labor organizations; and to bargain collectively. See Utah Code Ann. §
178-2a-813(2)(a). The Court therefore holds that UTA's rail operations supervisors are indeed
#employees" as that term is currently used in Utah state labor relations law.
II. THE COURT WILL CONDUCT A CARD CHECK TO VERIFY THAT A MAJORITY OF
THE RAIL OPERATIONS SUPERVISORS HAVE CHOSEN THE UNION
Next. the Union asks this Court to determine that a "card check" is an appropriate
method for determining whether or not a majority of UTA's rail operations supervisors have
chosen the Union to be their bargaining representative.

A "card check" entails simply

11

comparing the ucards obtained by Hogue, the Union official, with a certified list of UTA's rail
operations supervisors, with the goal toward verifying that the cards were indeed signed by
actual rail operations supervisors working for UTA For its part, UTA resists using the "card
check" method, and asks this Court to order that an election take place where all of UTA's rail
operations supervisors will be given an opportunity to cast a secret ballot either for or against
Union representation.
At root, this question is also one of statutory interpretation. The Act requires UTA to
"recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization representing a majority of the
district1s employees in an appropriate unit." See Utah Code Ann.§ 178-2a-813(2)(c)(i). Neither
side here contests the issue of whether the rail operations supervisors are, or would be, "an
appropriate unit." Rather, the dispute centers on the language compelling UTA to bargain with
any "labor organization representing a majority' of the rail operations supervisors. The Union

14
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maintains that a "card check" is a perfectly acceptable way to verify whether or not a "majority"
of the supervisors have asked for Union representation. UTA, by contrast, claims that a "card
check" is less reliable than an election, before which both sides can campaign and at which
each supervisor can cast a secret ballot. The Act itself, unfortunately, contains no additional

guidance with regard to the appropriate method for determining whether any particular labor
organization has garnered majority support.
Once again, however, the Court looks to the Little Wagner Act for guidance, even though
it is not directly applicable in cases involving UTA. As noted, it is the Utah legislature's only
guidance in the labor relations context, and the Court again finds that statute helpful in
construing the terms of the rather spare Public Transit District Act. In the Little Wagner Act, the
Utah legislature stated that the question of whether a labor organization actually does represent
a particular set of employees can be answered by "tak[ingJ a secret ballot of employeesn or by

"utilizpng] any other suitable method to ascertain such representatives." See Utah Code Ann. §
34-20-9(3).
This section of the Little Wagner Act was the subject of the Utah Supreme Court's
decision in Hotel Utah Co. v. Industrial Comm•n. 211 P.2d 200 (Utah 1949). In that case, the
Court affirmed the decision by the then-robust Utah Labor Relations Board to use a "card check

11

method to ascertain union representation, holding that a "card checku was indeed a '1suitable
11

method'' under the Little Wagner Act, and that the Board did not abuse the discretion vested in

it by the. statute" in using the card check method. Id. at 203. However1 after "sustaining the
Board in the method used, 11 the Court noted that an "electionf' by secret ballot is the "most
effective way of obtaining an untrammeled expression of the desires of the employees," and the
best way to minimize the risk of "undue influence/ and strongly encouraged the Board to use
elections rather than card checks in the future. Id.
The Court notes, however, that the debate taking place in the Hotel Utah opinion was
occurring within the context of the existence of a robust Utah Labor Relations Board, whose
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task it was to oversee any such elections and to conduct any such card checks. Even today,

where most labor issues are governed by federal law, the National Labor Relations Board takes
care of administering union elections and overseeing card checks. Because this is not a federal

issue, assistance from the National Labor Relations Board is not available. And the Utah Labor
Relations Board is no longer functional. Thus1 there exists no administrative body to preside
over or conduct either an election or a card check in this case. And this practical reality is highly
relevant to the Court's decision here.
lf a robust Utah Labor Relations Board existed, the Court may well be inclined to take
the Hotel Utah Court at its word, and instruct the Board to oversee and administer an election, in
light of the fact that the Court went out of its way to express its view that secret ballot elections
are "the most effective way" to ascertain whether a union really does represent the 11 majority" of
employees. But that option appears to the Court, as a practical matter, to be foreclosed here
simply by virtue of the absence of any competent and operational administrative body to
oversee and administer any such election. UTA urges this

Court to do so itself, or to appoint a

special master for the purposes of overseeing an election. See. UTA Br.• at 11. But this strikes
the Court as a task generally beyond the ordinary ken of the judiciary. Courts interpret the law,
and apply it to the facts of the cases that come before them. Courts do not typically oversee

or

administer elections, even labor relations elections. Simply entertaining the notion brings to
mind a host of unanswered questions, including:· where would the election take place? What
would the ballot look like? When would the election take place? What rules would be in place
with regard fo campaigning? Who would practically enforce any such rules? Who wourd
physically be present to oversee the ballot process? What would be the mechanism for dealing
with the inevitable disputes that would arise between the parties regarding campaigning and
balloting? In the present context, the Court is simply unwilling to step into that arena.
In the absence of any functioning administrative body to oversee any such election, the
Court falls back on the method that was {despite the Court's stated preference for elections)
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actuaJly sustained as "suitable" in the Hotel Utah case: a card check. See Hotel Utah. 211 P.2d
at 202-03.

The Court recognizes that, in the federal setting, it is the same National Labor

Relations Board that conducts card checks as oversees and administers elections. The Qourt

arso recognizes that verifying card checks is, like administering elections, also not within the
usual job description of a judge. But as a practical matter, a judge is much better equipped to
conduct a card check than to oversee and administer an election. In practice, conducting a card

check verification can be done in chambers, following the in camera submission of the signed
cards (from the Union) and an employee list (from UTA). As noted, this method has, at least
once, been sustained by the Utah Supreme Court as a "suitable method," under Utah's Little
Wagner Act, to verify whether a union really does represent a majority of employees. And in the
absence of any operational administrative entity to oversee elections, the Court views a card
check verification as the best and most practicar alternative available.
Accordingly, the Court concludes that a card check is a lawful, acceptable, and ''suitable"
method of verifying whether the Union really does represent a "majority" of UTA's rail operations
supervisors.

The Court will conduct the card check verification itself, fn chambers.

Within

fourteen days of the issuance of this Memorandum Decision and Order, the Union shall submit
the cards it believes it has procured, and UTA shall submit an official list of its rail operations
supervisors. Both submissions shall be made via hand delivery to the Court's chambers. The
Court will make those submissions part of the record, but those submissions will be marked
"SEALED" and will not be available for review by anyone other than the party who submitted
them, without further order of the Court. The Court specifically finds that these submissions
need to be kept private from the other side, and that whatever interests that might exist in favor
of public access to these records are substantially outweighed by the Union's and UTA's
interests in making sure that their employee lists as well as the list of those alleged to have
signed "cards" are kept private. As soon as practicable following in camera submission of the
cards and the employee list, the Court will conduct an in camera review and comparison of the
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cards to the employee list, and will make a determination as to whether a majority of the rail
operations supervisors listed on the employee list have in fact signed cards authorizing the

Union to represent them.
CONCLUSION
For

an

of the foregoing reasons, the Union's Motion is GRANTED in its entirety. The

factual dispute between these parties about whether UTA's rail operations supervisors are
actually employed in a supervisory capacity is tendered moot by the decisions made herein.
This case can be resolved on legal grounds. Under Utah law, UTA's rail operations supervisors
are "employees" who have a right to organize and bargain collectively, regardless of whether or
not they are acting in a supervisory capacity. The Court will determine, through an in camera
review of the cards and the employee list, whether or not a majority of those rail operations
supervisors have authorized the Union to represent them.
This Memorandum Decision and Order is the order of the Court with regard to the
Motion, and no further writing is necessary to effectuate this decision.
DATED this

I:>.\-I,\

day of October, 2015.
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§ 1611

TITLE 49.-TRANSPORTATION

Page 9375

which is appropriate, in the Judgment of the Administrator, for a public transportation system to
serve commuters or others in the locality taking
into consideration the local patterns and trends
of urban growth;
(5) the term "mass transportation" means
transportation by bus or rail or other conveyance,
either publicly or Privately owned, serving the
general public (but not including school buses or
charter or sightseeing service) and moving over
prescribed routes.
(e) Authorization of appropriations.

There are hereby authortzed to be appropriated,
out of any money in the Treasury not otherwise appropriated, the funds necessary to carry out all functions under this chapter except loans under section
1602 of this title. All funds appropriated under this
chapter for other than administrative expenses shall
remain available until expended.
(f) Regulation of operation of system, rates, rentals,

or other charges; compliance with undertakings.

None of the provisions of this chapter shall be
construed to authorize the Administrator to regulate
in any manner the mode of operation of any mass
transportation system with respect to which a grant
ls made under section 1602 of this title or, after such
grant ts made, to regulate the rates, fares, tolls,
rentals, or other charges fixed or prescribed for such
system by any local public or private transit agency;
but nothing In this subsection shall prevent the Administrator from taking such actions as may be
necessary to require compliance by the agency or
agencies involved with any undertakings furnished
by such agency or agencies In connection with the
application for the grant. (Pub. L. 88-365, § 9, July
9, 1964, 78 Stat. 306.)
1609. Labor standards.
(a) Action or Administrator.

§

The Administrator shall take such action as may
be necessary to insure that all laborers and mechanics
employed by contracors or subcontractors in the
performance of construction work financed with
the assistance of loans or grants under this chapter
shall be paid wages at rates not less than those
prevailing on slmJlar construction in the locality
as determined by the Secretary of Labor in accordance with the Davis-Bacon Act, as amended. The
Administrator shall not approve any such loan or
grant without first obtaining adequate assurance
that required labor standards will be maintained
upon the construction work.
(b) Authority of Secretary of Labor.

The Secretary of Labor shall have, with respect to
the labor standards specified in subsection <a> of
this section, the authority and functions set forth

in Reorganization Plan Numbered 14 of 1950 (15
F.R. 3176; 64 Stat. 1267, and section 276c of Title 40.
(c) Interests of employees; protective arrangements:
terms and conditions.
It shall be a condition of any assistance under

this chapter that fair and equitable arrangements
are made, BS determined by the Secretary of Labor,
to protect the lnterests"of employees e.trected by
such assistance. Such protective arrangements shall
include, withoub being limited to, such provisions
BS may be necessary for Cl) the preservation of
rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) under existing
collective bargaining agreements or otherwise; <2>
the continuation of collective bargalning rights; <3>
the protection of individual employees against a
worsening of their positions with respect to their
employment; <4> assurances of employment to employees of acquired mass transportation systems and
priority of reemployment of employees terminated
or laid off; and (5) paid tralning or retraining- programs. Such arrangements shall include provisions
protecting individual employees against a worsening
of their positions with respect to their employment
which shall in no event provide benefits less than
those established pursuant to section 5(2) (f) of this
title. The contract for the granting of any such
assistance shall specify the terms and conditions
of the protective arrangements. (Pub. L. 88-365,
§ 10, July 9, 1964, 78 Stat. 307.>
REFED.ENCES IN TzxT

The Da.vts-Baeon Act, as amended, referred to In subsec.
(a.), Is classified to sections 276a. to 276a.-5 of Title 40,
Public Buildings, Property and Works.
Reorga.niza.tlon Pla.n Numbered 14 ot 1950 ( 15 F .R.
3176; 64 Stat. 1267). referred to In subsec. (b), ls set out
as a. note under section 133z-15 ot Title 5, Executive Departments and Government Officers e.nd Employees.

§ 1610. Air pollution control.

In providing financial assistance to any project
under section 1602 of this title, the Administrator
shall take into consideration whether the facilities
and equipment to be acquired, constructed, reconstructed, or improved will be designed and equipped
to prevent and control air pollution 1n accordance
with any criteria established for this purpose by the
Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare. (Pub.
L. 88-365, § 11, July 9, 1964, 78 Stat. 308.)
§ 1611. Limitation on grants within one State.

Grants made under section 1602 of this title (other
than grants for relocation payments in accordance
with section 1606Cb) of this title> for projects tn any
one State shall not exceed in the aggregate 12 ½
per centum of the aggregate amoWlt of grant funds
authorized to be appropriated pursuant to section
1603 (b) of this title. (Pub. L. 88-365, § 12, July 9,
1964, 78 Stat. 308.>
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(a) Prevailing wages requirement.--The Secretary of Transportation shall ensure that laborers and mechanics employed
by contractors and subcontractors in construction work financed with a grant or loan under this chapter be paid wages
not less than those prevailing on similar construction in the locality, as determined by the Secretary of Labor under
sections 3141 through 3144, 3146, and 3147 of title 40. The Secretary of Transportation may approve a grant or loan
only after being assured that required labor standards will be maintained on the construction work. For a labor standard
under this subsection, the Secretary of Labor has the same duties and powers stated in Reorganization Plan No. 14 of
1950 (eff. May 24, 1950, 64 Stat. 1267) and section 3145 of title 40.

(b) Employee protective arrangernents.-(1) As a condition of financial assistance under sections 5307-5312, 5316, 5318,
5323(a)(l), 5323(b), 5323(d), 5328, 5337, and 5338(b) of this title, the interests of employees affected by the assistance
shall be protected under arrangements the Secretary of Labor concludes are fair and equitable. The agreement granting
the assistance under sections 5307-5312, 5316, 5318, 5323(a)(l), 5323(b), 5323(d), 5328, 5337, and 5338(b) shall specify
the arrangements.

(2) Arrangements under this subsection shall include provisions that may be necessary for--

(A) the preservation of rights, privileges, and benefits (including continuation of pension rights and benefits) under
existing collective bargaining agreements or otherwise;

(B) the continuation of collective bargaining rights;

(C) the protection of individual employees against a worsening of their positions related to employment;

(D) assurances of employment to employees of acquired public transportation systems;

(E) assurances of priority of reemployment of employees whose employment is ended or who are laid off; and

(F) paid training or retraining programs.
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(3) Arrangements under this subsection shall provide benefits at least equal to benefits established under section 11326
of this title.

(4) Fair and equitable arrangements to protect the interests of employees utilized by the Secretary of Labor for assistance
to purchase like-kind equipment or facilities, and grant amendments which do not materially revise or amend existing
assistance agreements, shall be certified without referral.

(5) When the Secretary is called upon to issue fair and equitable determinations involving assurances of employment when
one private transit bus service contractor replaces another through competitive bidding, such decisions shall be based
on the principles set forth in the Department of Labor's decision of September 21, 1994, as clarified by the supplemental
ruling of November 7, 1994, with respect to grant NV-90-X021. This paragraph shall not serve as a basis for objections
under section 215.3(d) oftitle 29, Code of Federal Regulations.
CREDIT(S)
(Added Pub.L. 103-272, § l(d), July 5, 1994, 108 Stat. 835; amended Pub.L. 104-88, Title III,§ 308(e), Dec. 29, 1995,
109 Stat. 947; Pub.L. 105-178, Title III, § 3029(b)(9), June 9, 1998, 112 Stat. 372; Pub.L. 107-217, § 3(n)(3), Aug. 21,
2002, 116 Stat. 1302; Pub.L. 109-59, Title III,§§ 3002(b)(4), 3031, Aug. 10, 2005, 119 Stat. 1545, 1625; Pub.L. 112-141,
Div. B, § 20030(h), July 6, 2012, 126 Stat. 731.)

Notes of Decisions (39)
49 U.S.C.A. § 5333, 49 USCA § 5333
Current through P.L. 115-45. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Documt!nt
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LAWS
of the

STATE OF UTAH, 1969
Passed at the

FIRST SPECIAL SESSION
THIRTY-EIGHTH LEGISLATURE
BANKS AND BANKING
CHAPTER 1
(Passed May 7, 1969. In effect May 9, 1969)

H. B. No. 7

INDUSTRIAL LOAN CORPORATIONS

An Act Amending Chapter 17, Laws of Utah 1969 (H. B. No. 201 of the
38th Legislature); Providing For a Different Date For It to Become
Effective; and Providing For an Effective Date For This Act.
Be it enacted by the Legislatur.e of the State of Utah:
Section 1. Chapter amended.
Chapter 17, Laws of Utah 1969, (H.B. 201 of the 38th Legislature),
is amended by adding Section thereto to read as follows:
"Section 1· This act shall take effect on July 1, 1969."
Section 2. Act effective.
This act shall take effect upon approval.
Approved May 9, 1969.

CHAPTER 2
H. B. No. 9

(Passed May 8, 1969. In effect July l, 1969)

CONSUMER CREDIT CODE: CONFORMING TO FEDERAL
· ACT AND REGULATIONS
An Act Amending Sections 3.104, 3.105, and 6.104 of the Utah Uniform
Consumer Credit Code, as Enacted by Chapter 18, Laws of Utah 1969
(H.B. 200 of the 38th Legislature), Relating t.o Certain Consumer
and Other Credit Transactions; Conforming This Code More Closely
to the Requirements of the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act
and the Regulations Issued Thereunder; and Providing an Effective
Date.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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be held and utilized by the university, directly or indirectly, for purposes of its own research or as common areas supervised and controlled
by it and not leased to private persons or parties, even though such
portions may be utilized by lessees of other areas of the research park
or by other private interests in connection with the general purposes
of the research park. Upon expiration of termination of any lease of
property lying within such research park resulting in reversion of direct
control to the university of the subject land, improvements and/or
equipment, such land, improvements and equipment shall immediately
become exempt from taxation and contribution in lieu thereof, and the
proration of the annualized taxes or contribution in lieu thereof shall
be made as of the date of such lease expiration or termination.

Salt Lake City to provide services - Fire - Police Facilities.
The board of commissioners of Salt Lake City is hereby authorized
and directed to provide police and fue protection and to furnish, install
and maintain customary municipal services and facilities for street lighting, traffic control, sidewalks, curb, gutter, drainage, sewage disposal
and water supply with respect to all areas of the research park to be
Section 6.

established upon lands conveyed to the University of Utah under the
patent. Such services and facilities shall be provided as the need therefore shall be determined by the state board of higher education and
shall be furnished and provided subject to connection fees, use charges
and other service fees customarily assessed against similar persons, companies or properties within the territorial limit.a of Salt Lake City. No
special improvement district shall be created or special taxes imposed
with respect to the services and facilities provided under this section.

Section 7. Roads part of state highway system.
The state road com.mission of Utah is empowered between regular
sessions of the legislature to enter into agreements with the University
of Utah designating all or part of the roads within or adjacent to the research park hereby established as part of the state highway system-.

Section 8. Savings clause.

H any provision of this act, or the application of any provision to any
person or circumst.ance, is held invalid, the remainder of this act shall
not be affected thereby.
Approved May 15, 1969.

CHAPTER 12 .
PUBLIC TRANSIT DISTRICT LAW
S. B. No. 4

(Passed May 9, 1969. In effect July 9, 1969)

An Act Relating to the Creation, Organization and Governance of Public
Transit Districts; Providing for the Powers and Functions of These
Districts, Designation and Manner of Appointment of Officers, Tenure,
Acquisition and Exemption From Taxation and Execution of District
Property, ~uance of Bonds, Levy and Collection of Taxes, Annexation and Withdrawal From These Districts, Payment of Claims Against
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fied to the court for judgment and in that case the part of the evidence
specified and the stipulation specifying the evidence shall be the record
on review.

Section 25.

Written decision and findings of fact.

Within 30 days after conclusion of the hearing the board shall render
its decision in writing together with written findings of fact. Copies of
the findings and decision shall be sent to the petitioners and intervenors
by certified mail, postage prepaid.
Section 26.

Safety appliances and procedures.

The district shall be subject to regulations of the public service commission relating to safety appliances and procedures, and the commission shall inspect all work done pursuant to this act and may make
further additions or changes necessary for the purpose of safety to employees and the general public.
Section 27.

Subject to existing traffic laws.

The district shall be subject, in the operation of its transportation facilities and equipment, to the laws and regulations of the State of Utah
and of applicable municipalities relating to traffic and operation of vehicles upon the streets and highways of the state.

Section 28.

Power to issue bonds, borrow money, incur deb.ts.

The district may issue bonds, borrow money and incur debts as authorized by law or this act. The district may satisfy any indebtedness as
provided in this act or in any other applicable law and may, for purposes
of satisfaction of said indebtedness, incur new obligations of the type
satisfied.

Section 29. Powers of district.
"The district may contract, accept grants, contributions or loans (directly through the sale of securities or equipment trust certificates, or
otherwise) from the United States, or any department, instrumentality,
or agency thereof, to establish, finance, construct, improve, maintain
or operate transit facilities and equipment or to study and plan transit
facilities in accordance with any legislation congress has adopted or may
adopt. The district may do all things necessary within the limitation
imposed by this act, including the creation of any indebtedness permitted by this act, in order to avail itself of any aid, assistance, or cooperation available under federal legislation, including, without limitations, compliance with such labor standards and the making of such arrangements for employees as may be required by the United States or
any department, instrumentality or agencies thereof."
Section 30. Rights of employees upheld.
The rights, benefits and other employee protective conditions and
remedies of section 13 (c) of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of
1964, as amended (49 U.S.C. 1609(c)), as determined by the Secretary
of Labor, shall apply to the establishment and operation by the district
of any public transit service or system and t.o any lease, contract, or
other arrangement to operate such system or services. Whenever the
district shall operate such system or services, or enter into any lease,
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contract, or other arrangement for the operation of such system or services, the distict shall take such action as may be necessary to extend to
employees or affected public transit service systems furnishing like
services, in accordance with seniority, the first opportunity for reasonably comparable employment in any available non-supervisory jobs in
respect to such operations for which they can qualify after a reasonable
training period. Such employment shall not result in any worsening
of the employee's position in his form.er employment or any loss of
wages, hours, working conditions, seniority, fringe benefits and rights
and privileges pertaining thereto.
Section 31. Right of employees to organize, assist organization, bargain
collectively - Striking excepted.

Employees of any public transit system established and operated by
the district shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or
assist labor organizations and to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing provided, however, that such employees and
labor organizations shall not have the right to join in any strike against
such public transit system. The district shall recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization representing a majority of its employees in an appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours,
working conditions, and welfare and pension and retirement provisions,
and, upon reaching agreement with such labor organization, to enter into
and execute a written contract incorporating therein the agreements so
reached.
Section 32. Submit to arbitration board if bargaining has no results Board membership - Determination board final - Selection of third
arbitrator - Term "labor dispute" broadly construed.

Whenever any labor disputes arise in the operation of any public
transit service or system established and operated by the District and
collective bargaining does not result in an agreement, the District and
the labor organization shall submit such dispute to arbitration by a
board composed of three (3) persons, one appointed, by the District, one
appointed by the labor organization representing the employees and a
third member to be agreed upon by the labor organization and the District. The member agreed upon by the labor organization and the District
shall act as chairman of the board. The determination of the majority
of the board of arbitration thus established shall be final and binding
on all matters in dispute. If, after a period of ten days from the date
of appointment of the second-named of the two arbitrators representing
the District and the labor organization, the third arbitrator has not been
selected, then either arbitrator may request the Director of the Federal
Mediation and Concilliation Service t.o furnish a list of five persons qualified to act as an impartial arbitrator from which list the third arbitrator
shall be selected. The names submitted shall be local persons or within
as close a proximity to the local area as possible. The arbitrators appointed by the District and the labor organization, promptly after the receipt of such list, shall determine by lot the order of elimination and
thereafter each shall, in that order, alternately eliminate one name until
only one name remains. The remaining person on the list shall be the
third arbitrator. The t.erm "labor dispute" shall be broadly construed
and shall include any controversy concerning wages, salaries, working
conditions, hours, or benefits, including health and welfare, sick leave,
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Utah Code

17B-2a-813 Rights, benefits, and protective conditions for employees of a public transit
district -- Strike prohibited -- Employees of an acquired transit system.
(1) The rights, benefits and other employee protective conditions and remedies of Section 13(c)
of the Urban Mass Transportation Act of 1964, 49 U.S.C. Sec. 5333(b), as determined by the
Secretary of Labor, apply to a public transit district's establishment and operation of a public
transit service or system.
(2)
(a) Employees of a public transit system established and operated by a public transit district have
the right to:
(i) self-organization;
(ii) form, join, or assist labor organizations; and
(iii) bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing.
(b) Employees of a public transit district and labor organizations may not join in a strike against
the public transit system operated by the public transit district.
(c) Each public transit district shall:
(i) recognize and bargain exclusively with any labor organization representing a majority of the
district's employees in an appropriate unit with respect to wages, salaries, hours, working
conditions and welfare pension, and retirement provisions; and
(ii) upon reaching agreement with the labor organization enter into and execute a written
contract incorporating the agreement.
(3) If a public transit district acquires an existing public transit system:
(a) all employees of the acquired system who are necessary for the operation of the acquired
system, except executive and administrative officers and employees, shall be:
(i) transferred to and appointed employees of the acquiring public transit district; and
(ii) given sick leave, seniority, vacation, and pension or retirement credits in accordance with
the acquired system's records;
(b) members and beneficiaries of a pension or retirement plan or other program of benefits
that the acquired system has established shall continue to have rights privileges, benefits,
obligations, and status with respect to that established plan or program; and
(c) the public transit district may establish, amend, or modify, by agreement with employees
or their authorized representatives, the terms, conditions, and provisions of a pension or
retirement plan or of an amendment or modification of a pension or retirement plan.
(4) A pension administrator for a retirement plan sponsored by a public transit district or a
person designated by the administrator shall maintain retirement records in accordance with
Subsection 49-11-618(2).
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Amended by Chapter 448, 2013 General Session
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which payment shall be mnde ln advance, or by relm•
buraement, from funds of the Commission In such
amounts as may be agreed upon by the commlaalon and
the Secretary or Labor,
"Sec. 10. !Hearings.} ~e Commlsalon, or on the
authorlzatlon ot the Comm1BSlon, any subcommittee or
panel thereof, may, tor the purpose of carrying out lts
runctlon.s and duties, hold such hearings and alt and act
at such times nnd places e.s the commission or such subcommittee or panel may deem advisable.
"Sec, 11. }Contracts.) The Commlsaton ls authorized
to negotiate and enter Into contracts with private organlzatlons to carry out such studies and to prepare such
reporta as the Commlaalon determines to be necessary In
order to carry out lta dutlea.
"Scc.1Z. (Information from other agencfes.1 The Commission ls authorized to secure directly rrom any executive department, agency, or independent. lnatrumentallty
of the Government any lnformatlon It deems neceesary to
carry out lta runctlons under thla A-:t; and each such
department, agency, and Instrumentality ls authorized
and directed to cooperate with the Commlaalon and, to
the extent permitted by law, to rurnlah such lnforma.tlon
to the Commission, upon request made by the Chairman.
"Sec. 13. (.Report to the Presfdent and the Congreu,·
termination of e:tbtcnce of Commfs,fon.J The Commlsslon shall submit a ftnal report ot lta findings and recommenda.tlona to the Prealdent and the Congreaa by January
I, 1966. The Commission shall cease to exist thirty days
atter submitting Its ftnal report.
"!',,r.. 14. (Autl,oruation of approprfatfon.7.J There
are here'Jy authorized to be npproprlnted to the Commlsalon, out or any money ln the Treasury not otherwise
appropriated, such sums not In excess of &l,000,000, as
may be necessnry to carry out the provisions or this Act.''
Ex. ORD, No. 10918.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON
LADOR•MANAOEMENT POLICY

Ex. Ord. No. 1091B, Feb. 16, 1961, 26 P.R. 1427, provided:

By virtue of the authority vested In me aa President
or the Unlted States, It ls ordered as follows:
SEcrION 1. There la hereby established the President's
Advisory Committee on Labor-Management Polley (herelnart.er referred to ns the Committee), The Committee
shall be composed of the Secretary or Labor, the Secretary
of commerce, and nineteen other members who shall be
designated by the President from time to time. or the
nineteen dealgnnted members, ftve shnll be from the
public at large, seven shall be from labor, nnd seven shall
be trom mnnngement. The Secretary or Labor 11nd the
Secretary or commerce shall each alternatively serve
as chairman or the Committee for periods or one year, the
Secretary of Labar to so serve during the ftrst year following the date ot this order.
SEC. 2. The Committee shall study, nnd shall advise
with 11nd make recommendations to the President with
respect to, pollcles t.hnt mny be rollowed by lnbor, management, or the public which wlll promote rree and responsible collective bnrgalnlng, industrial pence, sound wnge
and price poUcles, blgher stnndnrds ot llvtng, and Increased productivity. The Committee shall lnclude
among the matters to be considered by lt ln connection
with lts studies nnd recommendations (1) policies
designed to ensure that Amertcnn products are competitive In world markets, and (2) the beneftta nnd
problems created by 11.utomatlon and other technological
advances.
SEC. 3. All executive departments and ngenclei: or the
Feder11.l Government Rre authorized and dlrecti:<t to cooperato with the Committee and to furnish It such lnrormatlon ancl assistance, not Inconsistent with law, a.s
It may require ln the performnnce or Its duties.
SEC. 4. Conaon1mt with lnw, the Department. of Lnbor
and the Department or Commerce shall, aa may be necessary tor the effectuation ot the purposes ot this order,
furnish assistance to the Committee In nccordnnce with
section 214 ot the net of Mn.y 3, 1945, 69 Stnt. 134 (31
u.s.c. 691), Such nsslstance may Include detalllng em•
ployeea to t.be Committee, one or whom mny serve as
executive omcer or the Commlttec, to perform such runctlons, consistent wlth the purp06es or this order, as the
Committee mny assign to them, nnd shall lnclude the
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rurnlshlng of necessary office sp11.ce 11.nd faclllttca to the
Committee by the Department of Lllbor.
JORN

P.

KJ:NNEDT

§ 142. Deftnitions.

When used In thls chapter<1> The term "industry affecting commerce"
means any Industry or o.cUvlty In commerce or in
which a labor dispute would burden or obstruct
commerce or tend to burden or obstruct commerce or the free now oI commerc~.
<2> The term "strike" Includes any strike or
other concerted stoppage of work by employees
<1nctuci1ng 11 stoppage by reason of the cxplro.tion
of a. collectlve-bargo.lnlng agreement> o.nd any
concerted slowdown or other concerted tnterrupUon of operations by employees.
(3) The terms "commerce", "labor disputes".
"employer'\ ..employee", 11 labor organization",
.. representative .., ..person", nnd "supervisor" shall
have the same meaning as when used in subche.pter II of this chapter ns amended by this
chapter.
<June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title V, I 601, 61 Stat. 181,)
§ 143, Saving provisions.

Nothing In this chapter shall be construed to require an Individual employee to render labor or
service withouL his consent, nor shall anything In
this chapter be construed to make the quitting of
his lnbor by an Individual employee an 111ego.l act;
nor shall any court Issue any process to compel the
performance by an individual employee of such labor
or service. without his consent; nor sho.11 the quitting
of labor by an employee or employees in good f alth
because of abnormally do.ngerous conditions for
work at the pince of employment of such employee
or employees be deemed a strike under this chapter,
<June 23, 1947 ch. 120, title V, I 602, 61 Stat. 162.)

or provisions.
If any provision of this chn.pter, or the npi::Jlcntlon

§ J.t4. Separability

of such provision to any person or circumstance,
shnlJ be held lnvnlld, the remainder of this chapter,
or the nppllcntlon of such provl!.!on to pcrsous or
circumstances other than those as to which It 1s
held inva.lld, sha.11 not be affected thereby, <June
23, 1947, ch. 120, title V, I 603, 61 Stat. 162.)
SUBCHAPTER Il.-NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS

or policy.
The denlnl by ~ome employers of the right of
employees to organize and the rerusal by some employers to accept the procedure of collectlve bargainIng lead to strikes nnd other rorms of tndustrlni strlf e
or unrest, which have the Intent or the necessary
effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a)
Impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of the
lnstrumentniltles or commerce; Cb> occurring in the
current or commerce; <c> materially affecting, restraining, or controlling the flow of raw materials or
manufactured or processed goods from or Into the
channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials
or goods in commerce; or (d) causing ditnlnutlon of
employment and wages ln such volume as substantially to lmpalr or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or Into the channels of commerce.
§ 151. Findings and declaration
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The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess run freedom of assoclntion or actual Uberty or contract, and employers who
are organized in the corporate or other Corms or
ownership association substantially burdens and
affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate
recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing powe1· or wage earners in
industry and by preventing the stabtllzaUon or competitive wage rates and working conditions within
and between industries.
Experience has proved that protectlon by law of the
right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce from Injury, Impairment.
or Interruption, and promotes the flow or commerce
by removing certain recognized sources of Industrial
strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of Industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or
other working condltlons, and by restoring equaUty
of bargaining power between employers and employees.
Experience has further demonstrated that certain
practices by some labor organlzathins, their officers,
and members have the Intent or the necessary effect
of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing
the Cree flow of goods In such commerce through
strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or
through concerted actlvttles which Impair the Interest or the public In the free flow of such commerce.
The elimination or such practices ls a necessary condition to the assurance or the rlghts herein guaranteed.
It ls declared to be the policy or the United States
to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the free flow of commerce and to mltlgntc
and eliminate these obstructions when they have
occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure
or collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers or full freedom or association, selforganization, and designation or rcpresente.tlves or
their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating
the terms and conditions of thell' tmployment or
other mutual aid or protection. <July 5, 1935, ch.
372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449; June 23, 1947, ch. 120, tJUe I,
§ 101, 61 Stat, 136.>
AMENDMENTS

1047-Act June 23, 1947, amended section generally to
restnte the declaration or poUcy nnd to make the ftndlng

nnd policy or this subchnpter "two-sided",
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1047 AMENDMENT

Section 104 or net June 23, 1947, provided: ''The nmendments mndc by this title ( this subchnpter I Ehnll take
cJl'ect sixty days after the dnte or the enactment of this
Act (June 23, lll47), except that the authority of the
President lo appoint certnln omcers conferred upon him
by section 3 of the NnUonnl Lnbor Relntlons Act ns
nmended by this Utlc (section 153 or thls title) may be
exercised Co.rthwlth."
§

152. Definitions.
When used In this subchapterCl) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees tn bankruptcy, or receivers.
C2> The term ''employer" includes any person
acting as an agent of nn employer, directly or in-
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directly, but shall not include the United States or
any wholly owned Government corporation, or any
Federal Reserve Bank, or any State or political
subdivision thereof, or any corporation or association operating a. hospital, if no part of the net earnings Inures to the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, or any person subject to the
Ratlwny Labor Act, as an1ended from time to time,
or any labor organization <other than when actlns
as an employer>, or anyone acting 1n the capacity
of officer or a.gent of such labor organization.
(3 > The term "employee" shaJl include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of
a particular employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased as a consequence
or, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because or uny unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not
include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the d'>mestlc service of any family
or person at his home,~!' dny Individual employed
by his parent or spouse, or any individual having
the status of an Independent contractor, or any
individual employed as a supervisor, or any tndlvldunl employed by an employer subject to the
Ratlway Labor Act, a.s amended fl'om time to time,
or by any other person who Is not an employe1· as
herein defined.
<4> The term "representatives" Includes any individual or lnbol' orgnnizatlon.
<5> The term ·'labor organizntlon" means any
organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation committee or plan, in which
employees pa1-tlclpate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing wtth employers
concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours or employment, or conditions of
work.
<6> The term "commerce'' means t1·ade, traffic,
commerce, transportation. or communication
among the several States, or between the Dlst.dct
of Columbia or any Territory of the United States
and nny State or other Territory, or between any
foreign country and any State, Territory, or the
L'isti-ict of Columbia, or within the District of
Columbia or any Territory, or between points in
the same State but through any other State or any
Territory or the District of Columbia or any rorelgn country,
<7> The term "affecting commerce" means tn
commerce, or burdening or obstrucLlng commerce
or the f1•ee flow of commerce, or having led or
tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.
(8) The term "unfair labor pro.ctlcc" means any
unfnir labor practice listed in section 158 of this
title,
<9> The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of
employment, or concerning the e.ssoclntlon or representation of persons in negotlatlng. fixing,
maintaining, chnnging, or seeking to arrange
terms or conditions of employment, regardless o!
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whether the disputants stand in the proximate
relation of employer and employee.
<10 >The term "Natlonnl Labor Relations Boo.rd"
means the National Labor Relations Boo.rd provided for in sccUon 163 of this title.
<11> The term ..supervisor" means nny individual having authority, in the interest of the
employer. to hire, transfer, suspend, lay oft, recall,
promote. discharge. nsslgn, reward, or discipline
other employees, or responsibly to direct them, or
to ndJust their grievances, or eff ectlvely to recommend such nctlon, if ln connection with Lhe foregoing the exercise of such authority is not of a
merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the
use of Independent Judgment.
Cl2> The term "professlonal employee" means<o.> any employee engaged in work (1) predominantly intellectual and varJed Jn character
ns opposed to routine mental, mnnual, mechanical, or pbyslcnl work; <ll> involving the consistent exercise of discretion and Judgment in Jts
performar.r.e; <Un of such a character that the
output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized In relation to n given period
of time; CM 1·equlring knowledge of an advanced type ln a field of science or learning customnrUy ncquJred by n prolonged course of speclallzed inteJlectual instruction and study fn an
1nstltut1on of higher learning or o. hospital, ~s
dlsttngulshcd Crom a general academic education
or from o.n o.pprentlceshJp or from training in
the performance of routine mental, manual, or
physical processes; or
Cb> any employee, who (I) has completed the
courses of specJalized intellectual Instruction
nnd study described ln clause <!v> of subpo.rngraph <a> of this po.ragrnph, nnd <U> is per•
forming related work under the supervision of a
professional person to qualify him:,elf to become
o. professional employee as defined Jn said pa1·ngraph <a).
C13) In determining whether any person ts acting ns o.n "agent., ot another person so o.s to make
such other person responsible for his acts, the
question of whether the specific nets performed
were actunlly authortzcd or subsequently ratified
shaJl not be controlllng.
(July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 2, 49 Sto.t.150; June 23, 1947,
ch. 120, title I,§ 101, 61 Stnt. 137.>
REFERENCES 1N 'l'ExT

The Rnllway Labor Act, ns amended from time to time,
referred to In tho text, le classified to chapter a of
Title 45, RnUroads.
AMENDMENTS

1947-Act June 23, 1947, 11mended section generally to
redefine the terma used ln this subchnpter an~ to define
several new terms.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1947 AMENDMENT
Effective d11te or net June 23, 1047, ace note set out.
under aectlon 161 or this tJtle.
C0MMVNIST ORGANIZATIONS, AND M!:MDERS

Prohlbttlons placed on Communist orgnnlzntlana, nnd
members ,hereat, with respect to lnbor, ace chnpter 23
or Title 60, Wnr and NuUonnl oerenso, p:ntlcularly acctlona 782 (4A), 784, 792a, and 841--a44 or that title.
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6153. National Labor RelaUons Board.
(a) Creation, composition, appointment, and tenure;
Chairman; removal of members.
The Natlonnl Labor Relations Boo.rd <hereinafter cnlled the "Board"> created by this subcho.p.
ter prlor lo lts amendment by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, ls continued ns an agency
or the United States, except that the Boo.rd shnll
consist or five Instead of three members, appointed
by the Presldcnt by and with the advice and consent
of Lhe Senate. or the two nddlttonnl members so
provided for, one shall be appointed !or a term of
five years nnd the other for a term of two years.
Their successors, and the successors of the other
members, shall be appointed for terms of five years
each, excepting that nny 1ndMdual chosen to fill a
vacancy shnll be appointed only iJr the unexpired
term of the member whom he shall succeed. The
President shall designate one member to serve as
Chairman of the Board, Any member of the Board
may be removed by the P1·esfdent, upon notice and
hearing, for neglect of duty or mnlfenso.ncc in office,
but for no other cause.
(b) DclcgaU011 of powcrR to members and rcgiounl
directors; review and stay of actious of regional
directors; quorum; scat.
The Board ls authorized to delegate to any
group of three or more members any or all of the
powers which It may Itself exercise. The Board ls
also autho1·fzed to delegate to its regional directors Its
powers under section 159 of this title to determine
the unit o.pproprfo.te for the purpose of collective
bargaining, to !nvestlgate o.nd provide for hearings,
and determine wl.ether a. question of representation
exists. nnd to direct an election or to.kc a secret
ballot under subsection <c> or <e> or section 159 of
thls title nnd certify the results thereof, except that
upon the fl Ung of a request therefor with the Boa.rd
by any Interested person, the Board may review
any action of a regf anal director delegated to him
under this paragraph, but such a review shall not,
unless specifically ordered by the Boo.rd, operate as
a stay or any action taken by the regional director.
A vncanc!' In the Board sho.11 not Impair the right
of the remaining members to exercise all of the
powers of the Boo.rd, and three members of the
Board sho.Jl, at all times, constitute a quorum of the
Bonrd, except that two members shnll constitute a
quorwn of any group desfgnnted pursuant to the
first sentence hereof. The Board shall have an
official seal which shall be Judicially noticed.
(c) Annual reports lo Congress and the President.
The Bon1·d shall at the close of each flscnl year
make o. report fn writing to Congress nnd to the
President stating tn detafl the cases lt has heard,
the decisions it has rendered, the names, salaries, and
duties of nu employees nnd officers in the employ or
under the supervision of the Boo.rd, and an account
of o.11 moneys it has disbursed.
(d) General Counse\; appointment nnd tenure; powers
and duties; vacancy.
There sho.Jl be a. General Counsel or the Board
who shall be appointed by the President, by and with
the advice and consent of the Senate, for a term of
four years. The General Counsel of the Boo.rd shall
exercise general supervision over nll attorneys em-•
ployed by the Board <other than trial examiners and
legal o.sslstants to Board members> and over the officers and employees ln the regional offices. He shall
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have final authorJty, on behalf of the Board, 1n respect of the lnvcstJgatlon of chnt•ges and issuance of
complaints under sectlon 160 of this title, and in
respect of the prosecution of such complaints before
the Board, and shall have such other dutJes ns the
Board may prescribe or as may be provided by law.
In case of a vacancy in the office of the General
Counsel the Pl'esident is authorized to designate
the officel' or employee who shall net as General
Counsel during such vacancy, but no person or persons so designated shall so act c1) for more than
!arty days when the Congress is In session unless a
nomination to flll such vacancy shall have been
submitted to the Senate, 01· C2) after the adjournmeut sine die of the session of the Senate in which
such nomination wa.s submltt.cd. rJuly 5, 1935, ch.
372, § 3, 49 Stat. 451; June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title I,
§ 101, 61 Stat. 139; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86-257,
title VII, §§ 701 Cb>, 703, 73 Stat. 542.>
REFEnENCES IN TEXT
The Lnbor Mnnngement Relations Act, 1947, referred to
In text ls the oct or June 23, 1947, clnsslfled to this chnpter.
AMENDMENTS

1950-Subsec. (b). Pub. L. 86-257, I 701(b), nuthorlzed the Boord to delegnte to Its reglonnl directors Its
powers under section 159 of this title to determine the
unlt 11pproprlnle for tlle purpose or collective b11rgnlnl11g,
lo lnvestlgnto nnd provide for henrlngs, nnd determine
whether I\ question of represcntnllon cxlsta, nnd to direct
nn clcctlon or tnke I\ secret bnllot under &ectlon 159(c)
or 150(c) or t,hls title nnd certify the results thereof.
Subsec. (d). PUb. L. 86-257, I 703, nuthorlzed the
President to designate the officer or employee who shnll
net ns Oeneral Counsel ln the cnse of n vncnncy In the
office of the Oenerut Counsel.
1047-Act June 23, 1047, nmendecl section genernlly by
lncreuslng members!llp from three to fi\'e, dcJegntlng lts powers o.ud dutle· 1.0 n quorum or nny three members, nnd by nppolntlug n Oenernl Counsel nnd outllnlng
hls powers and duties.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1050 AMENDMENT

Section 707 or Pub. L. 86-257 provided thnt: ''Tho
nmcnd:nents mode by this tltlo I to subsecs. (b) and (d)
of thls section end sections 158 (b)(4-7), (e). (l),
150(c) (3), 100 (Z), (m) or this tltlcl shnll tnke effect. sixty
dnys nrter the dnte of the ennctment or this Act ISept. 14,
1050 I nnd no provlslon or this title shnll be deemed to
mnke on unfnlr lnbor prnctlcc, any net which ls perrormed
prior to such effcctlvo date which did not constitute nn
unrnlr labor practice prior thereto."

§ 154. Same; l'ligibility for reappointment; officers nnd

employced; payment of expenses.

Ca) Each member of the Board rind the General
Counsel of the Hoard shall be ellsJble for reappointment, and shall not eng11ge In any other business,
vocation, or employmer,t. 'I1l1! Boa.rd shall appoint
nn executive secretary, and such attomcys, exnmlners, and regional directors, and such other employees as It may from time to time nnd necessary
for the proper performant'e of it.s duUes. The
Board may not employ any attorneys for the purpose ot reviewing transcripts o! hearings or preparing drafts of opinions except that any attorney
employed for assignment as a legal 11/isistant to any
Board member may for such Board member review
such transcripts and prepare such drafts. No trial
examiner's report shall be reviewed. either before
or after Its publication, by any person of her than
a membel' of the Board or his lfgal assistant, and
no trial examiner shall ndvlse or consult with the
Board with respect to exceptions taken to his find-
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ings, rulings, or recommendations. The Board may
ci;tabllsh or utilize such regional, local, or other
agencies, 'and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from time to time be
needed. Attorneys appointed under thls section
may, at the dircctJon of the Board, appear for and
repl'esent the Boal'd in any case ln court. Nothing
In this subchapter shall be construed to authorize
the Boa.rd to appoint indivlduals for the purpose ot
conclllatlon or mediation, or for e,:onomfc analysis.
Cb) All of the expenses of the Boa.rd, including all
necessary traveling and subsistence expenses outside
the District o! Columbia Incurred by the members er
employees of the Board under Its orders, shall be allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized
vouchers therefor approved by the Board or by any
Individual Jt designates !or that purpose. <July 5,
1935, ch. 372, § 4, 49 Stat. 451; June 23, 1947, ch.
120, title I, § 101, 61 Stat. 139; Oct. 15, 1949, ch. 695,
§ 5Ca), 63 Stat. 880.)
CODITTCATION

Provisions of subsec, (n) which prescribed the basic
compensation or members or the iloard nnd the Oeneral
counsel were omitted to conform to tho provisions or
the Fedcrnl Executive Snlnry Schedule. Seo section 2210
et &eq. of Tille 5, Executive Depintments nnd Oovernment
Officers 11nd Employees.
AMENDMENTS

!040-Subsec. (n). Act. Oct. 16, 1040, lncrensed r.ompensntlon of members of Bonrd nnd Oenornl Counsel from
$12,000 to $15,000 per o.nnum.
1047-Act June 23, 1047, nmended section gonern.lly
by Increasing Bonrd members' snlnrles from e10,ooo to
012.000 per nnnum, by providing n snlary or $12,000 per
nnnum ror the oenernl coum:el, omlttlng former subsec.
(bl relating to the termlnatlon or the "Old Board", and
redeslgnnUng former subsec, (c) relating to payment or
expenses or Bon rd, to be subsec. ( b).
EFFECTIVE DATE 01' 1947 AMENDMENT
Effective dote or net Juno 23, 1947, see note set out
under section 151 or this title.
§ 155. Same;

principal o!lkc, conducting inquiries
throughout country; participation in decisions or
inquiries conducted hy member,
The principal office of the Board shall be in the

DlstrJct of Columbia, but It may meet and exercise
any or au of its powers at any other place. The
Board may, by one or more of its members or by such
agents or agencies as It may designate, prosecute any
inquiry necessary to its functJons in any part of the
United States. A mcr.1ber who participates In such
an lnquJry shall not be disqualified !ram subse*
quently participating In a decision of the Board In
the same cose. <July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 5, 49 Stat.
452: June 23, 1947, ch. 120, titJe I, 1101, 61 Stat. 140.>
AMENDl',ll!:NTS

1047-Act June 23, 1047, reenncted aectlon wlthout
change.
EFFECTIVE DATE 01' 1047 AMENDMENT
ElTectlvc dute or oct June 23, 1047, see noto set out
under section 151 of thls tltle.

§ 156. Snme; rules and regulations.

The Board shall have authority from time to time
to make, amand, and rescind, in the manner pre-

scrl bed by the Admlni.;trnttve Procedure Act, such
rules and regulations as may be necessary t.o carry
out the provisions of this s11bchapter. (July 5, 1935,
ch. 372, § 6Ca>, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, ch. 120,
title I,§ 101, 61 Stat.. F J
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RZl'ERZNCESINTal'

The Admlnlatratlve Procedure Act, referred to In the
text, la clnsslfted to chapter 10 o! Tltle 6, Ex1cutlve De•
pnrtmenta nnd Government omccra nnd Employees,
CODIFICATION

Section fl of net ,July 6, 1036, rild not contn1n a subsec•
tton Cb).
AMZNDHJ.NTS

1047-•Act June 23, 1047, provided that the rules and
regulotlons Issued by the Bolll'd should be In the mnnner
prescribed by the Admlnlatrntlve Proce<lure Act.
EFFECTIVE DATE or 1047 AMENDMENT
mectln dnte o! net June 23, 1047, see note set out

under section 161 of thla title.

Right or employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc.
Employees shnll have the right to sal!-orgo.niznUon, to form. Join, or assist labor organizntfons, to
bargain collectively th1·ough representntlvcs or their
own choosing, and to cngnge In other concerted
activities !or the purpose of collective bnrgalnlng or
other mutunl nld or protcctlcm, nn1 shnll also have
the right to refrnln from any or all•>! such acttvitle~
except to the extent that such right may be affected
by nn agreement requiring membership In n lnbor
orgnnlzatlon ns a condition or employmen~ ns authorized In section 158 (nl <3l of this title. (July
5, 1935, ch. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452: June 23, 1947,
ch. 120, title I,§ 101, 81 Stnt. 140.>
§ 157,

AMENl>?otENTS

1947-Act June :?3, 1947, restatect rlghta o( employees
to bnrgnlu collectlvely nnd ndded provlslon that they hnve

lhe right. to refrain from Joining ln concerted nctlvltlea
with their Cellow employees.
EFFECTIVE ••••TE or 1047 AMENDMENT
!Mectlve dnte or net June 23, 1947, 11~e note set out
under section 161 o! thls tltle.
COMMUNIST OROANIZATI0NS, AND MEMBERS

Prohibitions plo.ced on Communist organlzntlons, and
members thereof, with respect to lnbor, see chnpter 23
of Tltle 60, Wo.r nnd NQtlonnl Defense, pnrtlculnrly aectlona 782 (4A), 784, 792n o.nd 841-844 of that title.

Unrair labor practices.
<n> It shnll be an unfair labor practice for an
employer<1) to Interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise o! the rights guaranteed In
section 157 of this tltle:
(2) to dominate or Interfere with the formation
or ndmlnlstratlon of rmy labor orgnn1zntion or
contribute flnnncial or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulnttons made
and published by the Board pursuant to section
156 of this title, a.n employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to co!lfer with
him durtng working hou1·s without loss of time or

§ 158,

Pt\Y:

<3> by discrlmlnntion in regard to hire or tenure
of employment or any term or condition of en,ployment to enco·.irnge r,r discourage memb~::-::ihlp
In nny labor organization: Provided, That nothing
tn this subchapter, or 1n any other statute of the
United States, shnll preclude an employer from
makJng an asreement with a labor organlza.tlon
<not established, mntntained, or assisted by any
action defined in thls subsection as an unfair labor
practice> to require as e. condition of employment
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membership therein on or after the thirtieth lay
following the beginning of such employment or
the effective date of such agreement, whichever ls
the Inter, (1) 1! such lnbor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section
159<a> of this title, in the nppropriate collecUvebnrgalnlng unit covered by such agreement when
made: and un unless fallowing an election held
as provided in section 159<e> of this tlUe within
one yenr preceding the eff ecttve date of such agreement, the Bo11rd shall have certified thnt nt least
a. maJortty of the employees cltgible to vote in
such election have voted to rescind the authority
of such labor orgnnlzatton to make such an agree~
mcnt: Provided. furt1ier, Thnt no employer shall
Justlfy nny dlscrlminatlon against ar. employee
for norunembershtp 1n a lnbor orgnnization <A>
i! he has reasonable grounds !o Jellevlng thnt
such memberahtp was not avnilallle to the employee on the se.me tenns ani conditions generally appllcn bie to other members, or (B > if be
hns reasonable grounds tor believing that membership was dented or terminated tor rensons
other thnn the f nllure of the employee to tender
the periodic dues and the tnlttntlon fees unlf ormly required ns e. condition of ncqulring or
rctalntns membership;
<4 > to discharge or otherwise discriminnte
age.Inst nn employee because he has fllrd charges
or given te~tlmony under this subchnptc1·:
'5 > to refuse to bargnin collectively with the
representntlvcs ot hls employees, subject to the
provisions of section 159 <a> of this tttle,
<b> It shall be nn unfRlr inbor pr11cttce for a labor
organization or Its agentscu to restrain or coerce CA> employeeli in the
exercise of the rights gunrnnteed In section 157 of
this tttle: Provided, Thnt this •:.aragrnph shnll not
impnlr the right of a labor orgnntzatlon to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention o! membership therein: or <Bl nn
employer in the selecUon of his representatives
for the purposes of collective bnrgnlntng or the
ndJustment or grievances:
C2 > to en use or attempt to en use nn employer to
dlscrlmtnnte ngn~st Rn employee In vtolntlon or
subsection <a> (3) of this section or t:> discriminate Rgalnst an employee wlth respect to whom
membership in such orgnnlzatlon hns been denied
01· terminnted on some ground other than his tnllure to tender the periodic cu:?s nnd the tnltiatlon
fees uniformly required as a condition o! acquiring
or retnlnlng membership:
<3> to refuse to bargRin coUcctively with nn employer, provided it ls the representnttve of his employees subject to the provtslons or section 159 en l
of this title:
•4 > <f> to cngnge in, or to induce or encourn~e
any individual employed by any person engaged in
commerce or in an Industry affectlng commerce to
engage in, a strike or a 1·erusal in the course of
hts employment to use, mnnufacture, process,
transport, or otherwise, handle or work on nny
1:1oods, articles, matcrinls, or commodttlcs or to
perform nny services: or <il> to threnten, coerce,
or restrnln nny person engaged 1n commerce or
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fn an lndust1·y affecting commerce, where in either

case on object thereof ls<A> forcing or requiring any employer or sellemployed person to Join any labor or employer
organization or to enter Into any agreement
which ls prohibited by subsection Ce> of this
section:
<Bl forcing or requiring any person to cease
usfng, sclUng, handUng, transporting, or otherwise dealing In the products of any other producer, processor, or manufactw·er, or to cease
doing business with any other person, or forclng
or requiring any othel' employer to l'ecognlze or
bargain with a labor organization as the representative of his employees unless such labor
organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That
nothing contained 1n this clause CB> shall be
construed to make unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary
picketing;
re> forcing or requiring any employer to
recognize or bargain with a particular labor
organization as the representative of hls employees If another labor organization has been
certified as the 1·epresentat1ve of such employees
under the provisions of section 159 of this title;
t D> f oi·clng or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees In a particular labor organization or In a particular trade,
craft, or class rather than to employees In another labor organization or in another trade,
craft, or class, unless sn:•;1 employer ls fallln~
to conform to an ordr. or certlflcatlon of the
Board determining the bargaining representative tor employees per!ormlng such work:
Provtded, 'That nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person to enter upon the premises
of any employer Cother than his own employer>,
1! the employees of such employe1· are engager. !:1
a strike ratified or app1·oved by a 1·epresentatlvc: r l
such employees whom such employer ls requ1--e"
to recognize under this subchapter: Provided
further, That for the r.,urposes of this paragraph
f4> only, nothing contained ln such paragraph
shall be construed to p1·ohlblt pubJ.clty, other than
picketing, for the purpose of truthfully advlsinl?
the public, lncludlug consumers and members of
a labor organization, that a r.,roduct or products
are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are
dlstrJbuted by another employer, as Jong as sueh
publicity does not have an effect of inducing any
individual employed by any person other than
the :.,rtmary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, dellve1·, or transport any
goods, or not to perform any services, at the estllblishment o! the employer engaged in such
distribution;
(5) to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized under subsection (a> C3) ot this
section the payment, as a condition precedent to
becomlnB a member of such organization, of a tee
in nn amount which the Bonrd finds excessive or
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discriminatory under all the circumstances. In
making such a finding, the Board shall consider,
among other relevant factors, the practices anc1
customs ot labor organizations In the partlculr
Industry, and the wages currently paid to the em
ployees affected:
C6> to cause or attempt to cause an employer to
pay or dellvcr or agree to pay or dellver any money
or other thin@' of value, in the nature of an exaction, tor services which arc not performed or not to
be performed; and
C7 > to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten
to picket or cause to be plclceted, any employer
where an object U1ereof ls forcing or retiulrlng an
employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representatlve of his employees,
or forcing or requiring the employees or an employer to accept or selec~ such labor organization
as their collective barge •nlng rcpresentatlvP, unless such labor organlzatlon ls currently certified
as the representative of such employees:
<A> where the employer has lawfully recognized In accordance with thJs subchapter any
other labor organization and a question concernIng representation may not approp1·lately be
raised under section 159<c> of tills title,
CB> where within the preceding twelve
months n valid election under sec.tlon 159(c) of
this title has been conducted, or
CC) where such picketing has been condt.cted
without a petition undt!. section 15D<c> of this
title being flied within a reasonahle period of
time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such pi:ketlng: Provided, That
when such a petition has been filed the Board
shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions
of section 159Cc> Cl> o! this title or the abgance
of a showing of a substantial interest on the part
o! the labor organization, cllrect an election ln
sueh unit as the Boa1·d finds to be appropriate
and shall certify the results thereof: Provided
furtll.er, That nothing In this subparagraph cc>
shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or
other publi ~tty for the purpose of truthfully
advising the puhllc <Including consumers> that
an employer docs not employ members of, or
have a contt·act with, a labor orcanlzatton, unless nn effect a! such picketing ls to Induce nny
individual employed by any other person in t,he
course o! his employment, not to pick up, del!ver or transport any goods or not to pertonn
any services.
Nothing In this paragraph <7> shall be construed
to pennit ~i,y act which would otherwise be an unfair labo,· practice under this s11bsectlon.
Cc) The e>.!'ressJng of any views, argument, or
opJnfon, or the dissetnlnntlon thereof, whether In
written, printed, graphic, or visual form, shall not
constitute or be evidence of nn unfair labor practice
under any of the provisions of this subchapter, If
such rxpresslon contains no threat of reprisal or
rorce or promise or benefit.
Cd) For the purposes of this section, to 1,nrsain
collectively ls the performance of the mutual ohllgatlon of the employer nnd the representative of

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

§158

TITLE 2£1.-LABOR

the employees to meet at rensonable times and co11fcr in good fnith with respect to wnges, hours, o.nd
other terms o.nd conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of nn ncrecmcnt, or any queslton arising
thereunder, and the execution or a written contract
Incorporating nny ngrecment reached IC requested
by either pnrtY, but such oblfcatlon docs not compel either party to ngree to n proposnl or require
the mnking of a concession: Provided, That where
there ls in effect a collect1ve-bn1·gnlnlng contrn..:t
covering cniploYccs ln o.n Industry nffectlnc commerce, the duty to bnrgnln collectively sho.11 aJso
mcnn thnt no pnrty to such contrnct shnll terminate
or modify sucll contract. unlc~s the pnrty desiring
such tcnnlnatlon or modlflcntlon<1 >serves a w1·1tten notice upon the other party
to the cont1·act of the proposed terminntlon or
modlficntion sixty days prior to the explrntlon date
thereof, 01· in the event such contract contains no
explrntf on date. sixty do.ys prior to the time It ls
proposed to mnke such termination or modification;
<2> offers to meet and confer with the othe1·
party for the purpose of ncgotlo.tlng n new contract or a contract contnlnlnc the proposed modifications:
<3) notifies the Fcdl'ral Mediation and ConclllaUon Service within thirty dnys after such notice or
the existence of a dispute, and simultaneously
therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency
established to mediate nnd conciliate disputes
within the State or Territory where the dispute
occurred, provided no agreement, has been reached
by thnt time; nnd
C4) continues in full Carce nnd effect, without
resorting to strike or lock-out, ~u the terms nnd
conditions or the existing contract for n period or
sixty days after such notice is elven or until the
expirntlon date of such contract, whichever occurs
lnter:
The duties imposed upon employers. employees, and
lnbor organlzntlons by pnrngraphs 12)-(4) of this
subsection shnll become innppllcablc upon nn i:1tcrvenlng certiflcatlon ol' the Board, under which the
lnbor orsanlzntlon or lndlVldunl, wl1lch ls o. pe.rty
to the contract, hns been superseded as or ceased to
be the rcpresentntlve of the employees subject to
the provisions of section 159Cn> of this title, nnd
the duties so Imposed shall not be co:1strued ns requiring either party to discuss or agree to nny modlfica tlon of the te1·ms o.nd conditions contained In a
contract for n fixed period, If such modification Is
to become effective before such terms and conditions
can be reopened under the provlslo:is of the contract.
Any employee who engages In n strike within the
slxty-dny period specified In this subsection shall
lose his stntus ns nn employee of the employer enca[tcd In the pnrtlcular labor dispute, !or the purposes or sections 158-160 of this title, but such loss
of slntus for .such cmplol•ce shaJl terminate l! and
when be ls reemployed by such employer.
Ce> It, shall be nn un!nlr lnbor practice tor any
labor orgo.nJzat1011 o.nd any employer to enter into
any contract or agreement, express or implied,
whereby such employer ccnses or refrnlns or agrees
to ceaso or rcfrn.in from handling, using, selllng,
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transporting or otherwise deallng in nny of the
products of nny other employer, or to cease doing
business with nny other person, and nny contract
or agreement entered into heret.orore or herenfter
conto.lnlng such an o.greement shnll be to such extent W1enfOl'Clble o.nd void: Provided, That nothing
in this subsection sht11l apply to nn r,grccmcnt between n. labor orgnnlzo.tlon nnd an employer ln the
construction industry relating to the contmctlng
or subcontrnctlng of work to be done at the site of
the const1"Uctlon, alteration, painting, or repnir or
a. building, structure, or othe1· work: Provided further, That for the ·purpoEes of this subsection 1md
subsection Cb> or this section the terms "nny employer", "nny person engaged in commerce or llil
Industry affecting commerce", and "nny person"
when used in reletlon to the terms "any other producer, processor, or mnnuract.url'r", "nny other employer", or "nny other person" shall not include
persons In the relation of 11 Jobber, manufacturer,
contrnctor, 01· subcontractor working on thl' goods or
premises of the Jobbe1· 01· mnnufncturcr or pcrfarming pnns of an Integrated process or productlo11 In
the npparcl nnd clothing industry: ProvfdC'd further,
That notlllng tn this subchnpter shall prohtb!L the
enforcement of nny agreement which ls wlt11in the
foregoing cxcept.lon.
en It shall not be nn unfair lnbor practice under
subsccUons <n> nnd Cb) of thts section for nn employer engaged primarily in the building nnd construction Industry to mnko an agreement covering
employees encnccd Cor who, upon their employment, \Vlll be engaged> ln the building nnd construction Industry with o. labor orgnnlzntlon of which
building and const1·uctlon employees nre members
<not established, maintained, or nsslsted by any nctlon defined in subsection <n> or this section as nn
unfair labor practice) becnuse Cl) the majority
status of such labor on;nnizatlon ho.s not been established u.,der the p1·ovtsions of section 159 or this
title prior to the making of such nin-cement, or (2>
such ngreement requires ns a condition of employment, membership In such labor or~anlzntion after
the seventh dl\Y following the beginning of such
employment or the effective dnte of the agreement,
whichever ls later, 01· (3) such ngrccment requires
the employer to notify such labor orgnnizntlon or
opportunities for employment with such employer,
or gives such labor orgo.nizntlon nn opportunity to
refer quo.lifted l\ppllcants for such employment, or
<4> such ngreement specifies mlnlmum trnlnlng or
experience qunliflcatlons Car employment or provides for priority in opportunltlcs ror employment
bn.sed upon length of service with such employer,
tn the industry or in the partlculn.r geographical
arc~: Provided, Tho.t nothing in this subsection
shall set aside the flnnl proviso to subsection Ca) <3>
or this section: Provided Jurtlier. That any agreement which would be Invalid, but for clause Cl) of
this subsection. shall not be a bnr to 11 petition fllcd
pursuant to section 159Cc) or 159Ce) of this tltle.
<July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452: June 23, 1947,
ch. 120, title I, I 101, 61 Stnt. 140; Oct. 22, 1951, ch.
534, 1 l<b), 65 St.at. 601: Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86257, title II, § 201Ce>, title VII, §§ 704Co.>-<c>, 705
<o.>, 73 Stat. 525, 542.)
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AMENDMENTS

1050-Subsec. (n) (3). Pub. L. 80-257, ~ 20l(e), ellmlnnt.ed worda "nnd hna nt the time the ngreement wns
mnde or within the preceding twelve montbe received
rrom the Bonrd n notice of compllnnco with secllons 150
(f) 1 (BL (h) of this Utlo" tollowlng "such ngreemcnt
when mndo" ln cl. (1).
Subsec. (b) (4). Pub. L. 86-267, § 704(n), nmong ot.hor
chnngcs, eubslltutod "induce or encourngc nny lndlvldunl
employed by nny person engngcd in commcrco or ln on
Industry nffecUng commerce to engngo ln, n ttrlko or n
rerusnl In the course ot his employment" tor "Induce or
encournge the employees ot nny employer to ongnge In,
n strike or n concerted rerusnl In the coura~ or their
employment" In cl. (l), nddod cl. (II), nnd Inserted provisions relntlng to ngreements prohibited by subsection
(e) or this section In cl. (A). tho proviso rein Ung to
prlmnry atrlkoe nnd prlmnry plckeUng ln cl. (B), nnd the
Inst proviso relnt.lng to publlclly.
Subsec, (b) (7). Pub. L. 86-257, I 704(c). ndded subsec. (b) (7).
Subscc. (c). Puh.L.80-257, i'l04(b),nddrdsubsec. (e).
Subsec. (t). Pub. L. 80-257, § 706(n), nddcd subsec U).
1051-Subsec. (D) (3). Act Oct. 22, 1051, substituted
"nnd hns ot • • • such an ngrcemcnt" "nnd (II) • • • to
mnko such nn ngreement:"
1047-Act June 23, 1047, amended &ecLlon genernny by
stntlng whnt were unfnlr lnbor prnctlces by n union as
well ns by nn employer, nnd by oddlng provisions protectIng the right or free speech for both employers nnd
unions.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1050 AMENDMENT
Subsecs. (b) (7), (e), nnd (f) or this section, nnd
nmendmcnts to subsecs. (b) (4)-(6) ot thlA section effective sixty dnys n!ter Sept. 14, 1059, seo section '107 ot
Pub. L. 86-25'1, set. out ns n note undor section 153 or
this title.
Ern:CTJVE DATE OJ:' 1047 AMENDMENT
Ef1'ecUvo dnte or net Juno 23, 1047, see note set out
under section 161 of this title.
UNFAtlt LA.Don PRACTICES Pmoa TO JONE 23, 1047
St>ctlon 102 or net June 23, 1047, provided: "No provlslon or this title !this subchnpt.er] shnll be deemed to
mnke nn unfnlr lnbor pinctlce nny n.ct which wne per•
rormed prior to the dnte or the enoctment of this
net !June 23, 10471 which did not constltuto nn unfnlr
lnbor prnctlce prior thereto, nnd the provisions or section
8 (n) (3) nnd section 8 (b) (2) ot the Nn.tlonnl Lo.bar Roln•
Uons Act na amended by this tlUe (subseca. (o) (3) and
(b) (2) or this scctlonl ahnll not mako nn untnlr labor
proctlce the pertormnnce of nny obligation under a. collectlve-bnrgnlnlng ngreement entered lnt.o prior to the
dote ot the ennctment of this Act IJune :.?3, 1047], or (In
tllo cnac or on ngreomcn t for n. period or not more thnn
one yenr, entered Into on or net.er such dntc of enactment,
but prior to the ef1'cctlve dnte -:ir thl.l:I title, If the perrormnnce or such obllgotlon would not hnve constituted nn
untnlr labor practice under section 8 (3) 1subd. (3) of this
_aectlon I of the Nn.Uonnl Lnbt•r Rclo.tlons Act prior to the
elfectlvo dnte or this title Isixty dnys nrter June 23, 10471
unleas such ngToement wo.s renewed or extended aubsequent thereto."
A0REENENTS REQUIRING MEMDERSHIP IN A LADOR
OROANJZATION AS A CONDITION OF EMPLOYMENT

Section 'l06(b) of Pub. L. 86-257 provided thnt: "Nothing contained ln the omendment mnde by subsection (n)
I o.ddlng subsec. (!) or this sect1on I ehnll be construed
n.s n.uthorlzlng I.he execution or nppllcntlon o! ngreements requiring membership ln 11 lnbor orgnnlznUon o.a
n cond1Uon o! employment In ony Stotc or Torrlt.ory
In wl1lch such execution or o.ppllcnUon ls prohibited by
St11te or Terrltorlnl Lnw."
cnoss REJ:'ERENCES
Actlone by cmd ngnlnst la.bor orgnnlzntlons, see section
186 or this ttlle.
Boycotts nnd other unlo.wful comblnotlons. right. to
sue, aeo section 18'1 of this title.
Federnl Credit Unions, providing !ncllltlcs tor opera-.
Uons or, see section 16Ba. of this title,
30-IS00 0-0G-vol, 1--31
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Federot employment denied persons who assert right to
strike ngnlnet Oovernment, see sections 188p, 11Br or
Title 6, Executive Deportments ond Government Officers
nnd Employees.
InJunctlvo relier grnnted to Boord ngnlnst unfnlr lnbor
practices nnd boycotts, sec dectlon 160(J) nnd (l) or
this title.
Restrictions on pnymonts nnd lonns to employee representntlvee, see section 180 of this tit.le.
Right to strike pre11erved, see section 163 of this Ut~e.
Strikes eubJect to lnJunctlon, see 6CCtlon 1'18 of this
title.

§ 158n. Pro\'iding fncilitie11 for operntlons of Fcdernl

Credit Unions,
Provision by nn employer of facilities for the operations of n Federn1 Credit Union on the premises of
such employer shnlJ not be deemed to be intimidation,
coercion, interference, restraint or discrimination
within the provisions of sections 157 nnd 158 of this
ttt1c, or nets nmcndntory thereof. <Dec. 6, 1937, ch.
3, § 5. 51 Stat. 5.>
§ 159. Hepre1umt11th-es 11nd elections.

(n) Exclusin representatives; employees' adjustment of grie,·nnces directly with employer.
Representatives designated or selected !or the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the
employees In a unit appropriate for such purposes,
sha 11 be the exclusive representatives of all the employees In such unlt for the purposes of colJectlve
barcninlng In respect to rates of pay, wages, hours
of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any indlvlctuat employee or a group
of employees shall have the right nt any time to present grievances to their empir.yer and to have such
grievnnces adjusted, without the intervention of the
bnrgainlng represcntnllve, ns long ns the adjustment
ls not Inconsistent with the terms of a collecllvebnrgainlnc conlrnct or agreement then In effect:
Provided further, That the bnri;:alninc representntlve
has been elven opportunity to be present at such
adjustment.
(b) Determinnlion of bnrgnlning unit by Ilonrd,
The Board shnlt decide In each cnsc whether, In
order lo nssure to empJoyees the fullest. rrecd om tn
cxerclslnc the rights guarnntccd by this subchapler,
the unit appropriate for the purposes of col'ectlve
barcalnlng shn11 be the employer unit, craft unit,
p1nnt unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That ttie
Bonrd shall not <l) dt'clde thnt any unit Is npproprlnte fat• such purposes If such unit lnc1udcs both profcsslonn1 employees and employees who are not
p1·ofcsslonnl employees unless a majority of such
professional employees vole for Inclusion In such
u11it: or (2) decide lhnt any crnft unit Is lnnpproprlntc for such purposes on thr. ground that a different unlt has been established by a prior Board deter•
mlnatlon. unless a majority of the employees In the
proposed craft unit vote ngnlnst separate representallon or f3) decide thnt any unit ls appropriate for
such purposes if It lnc'udes, together with other employees, nny individual employed ns a guard to
enforce against employees nnd other persons rules
lo protect property of the employer or to protect
the safety of persons on the employer's premises: but
no labor orgnnlz.1.tlon shall be certified ns the representative of employees In n bnrgnlnfng unit or
guards If such organization ndmlts to membership,
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or ls affiliated directly or Indirectly with an orcani•
z:itlon which admits to membership, employees other
than guards.
(c) Hearings on questions affecting commerce; rules

and regulnlions,

Cl> Whenever a petltion shaJl ho.,•e been flied, in

accordance with such regulations as may be proscribed by the BoardCA> by an employee or croup of employees or
any lndtvldual or lal>or orcn.nb:atlon acting ln
their behalf alleging that a. substantial number of
employees (I) wish to be represented for collective
bargaining and that their employer declines to
recognizo their representative as the rcpresentatlvo defined ln subsection <a> of this section, or
<11> assert that the individual or labor organization, which has been certified or ts belnc currently
recognized by theJr employer as the bargaining
representative, Is no longer a representative as
defined ln subsection <a> of this sectlon: or
<B> by an employer, nllegtng that one or more
lndlvlduols or labor organizations hnve presented
to him a claim to be recognized as the representative denned 1n subsection <a> of thls ~ectlon:
the Board shnll lm•cstlcate such petition and if It has
reasonable cause to believe that a question of repre~entatlon nffect1nc commerce exists shnll provide for
an npproprlate hearing upon due notice. Such hearIng may be conducted by nn officer or emplc.yec of the
recionnl office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds upon
the record or such he11ring that such a question of
representation exists. it shall direct an election by
~ecret ballot nnd shall certify the results thereof,
f2) In determining whether or not a question of
representation affectlng commerce exists, the same
regulations and rules of decision shnll apply Irrespective or the Identity or the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and ln no case shnll
the Board deny a labor organlzntlon a pince on the
ballot by reason of an order with respect to such
labor orsantzntlon or Its predecessor not Issued ln
conformity wtth section 160 Cc) of this title.
C3 > No election shall be directed tn any bargainIng unit or any subdivision within which ln the precedtng twelve-month period, a valld election shnll
have been held. Employees engaged ln an economic
strike who are not entitled to reln~tatement shall be
el1glblc to voto under such regulations as the Board
shall find are consistent with tho purposes and provisions of thls subehapter in nny election conducted
within twelve months after the commencement of
the strike. In any election whero none of the
choices on the ballot receives a majority, a. run-off
shall be conducted. the ballot pro\'Jdlng for a ~election between the two cLolccs receiving the largest
and second largest number of valid votes cast ln the
election.
<4> Nothing ln this seetlfln shall b:? construed to
prohibit the waiving or hearings by stipulation for
the purpose of u. consent e'ectlon ln conformity with
regulations and rules of decision of the Board.
(5) In determining whether a untt ls appropriate
for the purposes specified ln subsection (b) of this
section the extent to which the employees have orsanlzcd shall not be controlllnll,
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(d) Petition for enforcement or review; transcript.
Whenever an order or the Board made pursuant
to section 160 Cc> of this title ls based ln whole
or ln part upon facts certlfled following on lnvestlgatlan pursuant to subsection Cc) of this section
and there ls a petition for the enforcement or
review of such order, such certlflcatlon and the
record of such Investigation shall bo Included ln tho
transcript or the entire record requJred to bo filed
under .subsection Ce) or en or section 160 of this
tltle, and thereupon the decree or the court enforctng, modifying, or setting aside in whole or tu
part the order of the Board shall be made and entered upon tho pleadings, testimony, and proceedlngs set forth In such transcript.
(e) Secret ballot; limltallon of elections.
Cll Upon the tlltng with the Board, by 30 per
centum or more of the employees tn a bargaining
unit covered by a'l agreement between their employer nnd r.. labor organlzntlon made pursuant to
section 158 <n> ca> of this title, of a petltlon a.Ueclng
they desire that such authority be rescinded, the
Bonrd shall tnke a secret ballot of the employees In
such unit and certify the results thereof to such
labor orgnnlzatlon and to the employer.
C2) No election shall be condncted pursuant to
this subsection In any barcalnlng unlt or nny subdlvlslon wlthln whtch, Jn the preceding twelve-month
period, a vnlld election shall have been held.
(f)-(h) Repealed. Pub, L. 86-257, title II, § 201(d),
Sept. 14, 1959, 73 Stnt. 525.

CJuly 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 9, 49 stat. 453: June 23, 1947,
ch. 120, title I, 1101, 61 Stat. 143: Oct. 22, 1951, ch.
534, § 1 Ca), <b>, 65 Stat. 601: Sept, 14, 1959, Pub. L.
86-257, title n. § 201Cd>, tltle vn. I 702, 73 stat.
525, 542,)
AMENDMENTS
1959-Subsec. (c) (3). Pub. L. 86-267, 0 70:1, 11ub11tltuted "Employees engnged 1n nn economic strike who
nre not entitled to reinstatement eho.11 be eUglble to
vote under such regulntlona na the Boo.rd sho.U find are
conalstent wlth the purposes nnd provisions of tbls RUb•
chapter ln any election conducted within twelve months
after the commencement or the strike" tor "Employeea
on strike who a.re not entitled to relnstntement sho.11 not
be eUglbJe to vote,"
Subsecs. (f) nnd (g). Pub, L. 86-257, I 201(d), repea.led aubscca. (f) a.nd (g), wblch requlred unlona to
ftle their conatltutlona, bylnws nnd a report, prescribed
the contents of the report nnd directed the ftllng of
annual ftnnnclal reporta, nnd nre now covered by section
431 of this tltle.
Subsec. (hl, Pub. L. 86-257, I 201 (d}, repenled sulr
sec. (h), whlch related to nffldnvlts showing union's offl•
cers tree from Communist Pnrty nffltln Uon or ballet.
1951-Subaec. (o), Act Oct. 22, 1051, I Uc). de1eted
former subdlvlalon (1) nnd renumbered aubdlvlalone (2)
cmd (3) 11.8 (1) nnd (2).
Bubseca. (O-(h). Act Oct. 22, 1051, I l(d), deJeted
"No pet! tlon under section 159 (e) ( 1) aho.11 be entertnlned" wherever nppearlng.
1047-Act June 23, 1947, a.mended section genernlly to
allow employees to cnn-y their grievances directly to the
employer, to circumscribe certnln powers of the BoEll'd,
to make the union file with the Becretnry or Lnbor its
const.ltutlon, bylaws, nnd report before being certlfled ns
n bargnlnlng agent, to requlre nnnunl reports by labor
unions, nnd to require lnbor unions to rue o.ffldnvlts with
the Bonrd showing thnt none or lta omcer11 uro nmuated
with or believe In the Communist Pnrty.
EFFECTIVE DATZ OJ' 1959 AMENDMENT
Amendment or subsec, (c) (3) ot thls aectlon by Pub.
L. 86-267 effective slxty do.ye ntter September 14, 1969.
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see sect.Ion 707 or Pub. L. 86-267, LJt out na
oectlon 163 or thla tltle,
EFFECTIVE DATE OF

11

note under

1047 AMENDMENT

Effective dnte or net June 23, 1047, see note set out
under section 161 or thls title.
CERTAJN'CERTJnCATJONS OF BARGAINING UNITS UNAFFECTED

Secllon 103 or net June 23, 1047, provided: "No provlalons of this tit.le Ithle subchnpter) oho.11 nffect nny certlficnUon or representntlvee or nny determlnntlon ns to
the npproprlnle collccllve-bnrgnlnlng unit, which wo.s
mnde under secllon O or lhe Nntlonnl Lnbor Relotlons Act
(this sect.Ion) prior to the errectlve dnte or this tllle
[sixty dnys nrtcr June 23, 10471 untll one yenr orter the
dnte or such Cf!rlUlcntlon or lr, In respect or nny such
ct'rtlncotlon, n collectlvf!-bnrgnlnlng contrnct wos entf!red
lnto prior to lhe effective dnlc or thls Utle fsixty dnys
nCler June 23, 10471, unlll the end or the contrnct period
or unlll one yenr orter such dote, Whichever flrst occurs."
COMMUNIST OnCANIZATI0NS, AND MEMDEI\S

Proh1b1tlons plnccd on Communist orgonlzn.tlons, nnd
members thereor, with rCEpcct to lnbor, see chnptcr 23
or Tille 60. Wnr nnd Nn.tlonnl Defense, pnrtlculnrly sections 782 (4A}, 784, 70211 nnd 841-844 of thnt title,
Fl:.,lfl\AL ROL~ OF CIVJL PROCEDORE

AppllcR~'>n :,r rules, see rule 81, Tltle 28, Appendix,
Judiciary niid .'udtc1nl Procedure.
§ IGO, Prevention of unfair labor practices.
(a) Powers of Bonrd generally.

The Board ls empowered, ns hcrelna!ter provided,
to prevent nny person from engngfng fn any unfair
tabor prnctlce (listed In section 158 or this title)
nffcctlng commerce. '1.'hls power shall not be affectcd
by nny other menns ot ~'iJustment or prevention thnt
has been or mny be est1bllshed by agreement. lnw,
or otherwise: Provided, 'fhnt the Board ls empowered
by ngreement wlth nny agency of nny Stnte or Territory to cede to such ngency Jurisdiction over any
cases In nny Industry <other than mining, manufac•
turlng, communications, and transportation except
where predomlnnntly local In character) even though
such cases may Involve labor disputes affecUng commerce, unless the provision o! the State or Territorial
statute appllcnble to the determlnntton of such cnses
by such agency Is Inconsistent with the correspondJng provision oi this subchapter or hns received n
construction Inconsistent therewith.
(b) Complaint and notice of hearing; nnswcr; court
rules of evidence Inat1plicablc.

Whenever Jt Is charged thnt any person has engnged in or Is engaging In any such unfair lnbor
practice, the Board, or any agent or agency deslgnnted by the Board for such purposes, shall have
power to issue and c.ause to be served upon such
person a. complaint. stating the charges ln thnt
respect, and containing a notice of hcnring before the
Board or n member thereof, or before a designated
agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than
five days after the serving of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shnll issue based upon any
unfair labor practice occurring more than six months
prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and
the service of n copy thereof upon the person against
whom such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby wns prevented from fllfng such
chnrge by reason of service In the nrmed forces. in
which event the six-month period shnfl be computed
from the dny o! his dJschnrge. Any such complaint
may be amended by the member, agent, or agency

conducting the henrlng or the Bonrd In Its discretion
at any time prior to the Issuance or an order based
thereon. The person so complained of shnll have the
right to file an answer to the original or nmended
complnlnt nnd to appenr in person or otherwl~e and
give testimony nt the place nnd ttmc fixed In the
complaint. In the discretion or the member, agent,
or agency conducting the hearing or the Boa1·d, any
other person may be nllowed to Intervene in the said
proceeding and to present testimony. Any such
proceeding shall, so !nr ns practicable, be conducted
In nccordnncc 'n'lth the rules of evidence applicable
In the district courts o! the United States under the
rules o! clvll procedure for the district courts of the
Uniled States, adopted by the Supreme Court o! the
united States pursuant to section 20'12 of Title 28.
:c) Reduclion

or

testimony to writing; findings and

orders of Board,

The testtmony taken by such member, ngent, or
agency or the Board shall be reduced to writing nnd
filed with the Board. Therenfter, in Its discretion,
the Board upon notice may take further testimony
or henr argument. I! upon the prepondernnce or the
testimony tnken the Board shnll be of the opinion
t.hat any person named In the complnlnt has engnged
In or is engaging ln nny such unfair labor practice,
then the Board shall state its findings o! r net and
shnll Issue and cnuse to be served on such person nn
order requlrlng such person to cease and desist from
such unfal r lnbor prnctlce, nnd to take such affirmative nctlon including reinstatement of employees
with or without back pay, as wm effectunte the
policies of this subchnpter: Provided, That where an
order directs relnstntement or an employee, back
pay may be required of the employer or labor organ•
IZntlon. as the cnse may be, responsible for the
discrimination suffered by him: And provided
further, That Jn determining whether a comptnlnt
shall Issue allegmg n violation or subsection Ca> <l >
or Ca) <2> of section 158 of this title, and ln deciding
such cases, the same regulatlons and rules or decision
shnll appJy irrespective or whether or not the labor
orgnnlzatlon affected is afflllnted with n lnbor orgnn!Zntlon national or international In scope. Such
order may further require such person to make
reports from time to time showing the extent to
which 1t hns compllcd with the order. If upon the
preponderance or the testimony taken the Board
shall not be of the opinion that the person named
In the complaint hns engngcd in or Is engaging In
nny such unfair lnbor prnctlcc, then the Bonrd shnll
state Its findings of !net and shnl1 Issue an order dismissing the said complaint. No order of the Bonrd
shnll require the reinstatement of nny indivldunt ns
an employee who hns been suspended or discharged,
or the payment to him of any back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged !or cnuse. ln
cnse the evidence Is presented before a member of the
Board, or before an examiner or examiners thereof,
such member, or such examiner or examiners ns the
case mny be, shall issue and cause to be served on
the parties to the proceeding n proposed report,
together with a recommended order, which shall be
ftled with the Bonrd, and tr no exceptions arc flied
within twenty dny.:; after service thereof upon such
parties, or within such further period as the Board
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mny authorize, such recommended order shnll become the order of the Board nnd become effective ns
thc1·e!n prescribed.
(d) Modific.ntion or findlngtt or orders prior to filing
record in court.

Until the l'ecord in n cnse shnll hnvc been filed
in a court, ns hereinafter provided, the Bonrd may
nt any Ume upon reo.sonnble notice and in such
monner ns it shnll deem proper, modify or set n.slde,
in whole or In pnrt, ony finding or order mnde or
issued by it.
(e) Petition to court for enforcement of order; pro-

ct•eding~: rc,·ic,v of judgment.
The Bonrd shnll hnve power to petition nny court
o! a.ppenls o! the United States, or 1f all the courts
or appeals to which &pplicaUon may be mnde are
in vnclitlon, nny district court o! the UnJted States,
within any circuit or distrlcL, respectively, wherein
the unfair lnbo1· prncUce In question occurred or
wherein such person res1des or transncts business,
fo1• the e11forcement o! such order and for npproprlate tempornry relief 01· restrolnlng order, nnd shall
flle ln the court the record in the proceedings, ns
provided in section 2112 or Tltle 28. Upon the flling o! such petition, the court shall cnuse notice
thereof to be served upon such person, nnd thereupon shall have Jurlsdlctton of the proceeding nnd
ot the question determined therein, nnd shnll have
power to grant such tempornry relief or restraining
order as it deems Just and proper, and to mnke and
enter a decree enforcing, modifying, nnd enforc.lng
ns so modified, or setting nslde in whole or in pnrt
the order or the Bonrd. No ob}ect1on thnt. has not
been urget. be!ore the Board, its member, a.gent,
or agency, shnlt be considered by the court, unless
the !allure or neglect to urge such obJectlon shnll be
excused becnuse of extraordinary circumstances.
The findings of the Board with respect to questions
or fact if supported by subsb.ntlnl evidence on the
record considered as a, who)(! she.11 be conclusive.
If either po.rty shall apply to the court for leave to
ndduce nddltlonal evl dence and shall show to the
sntls!actfon or the court thnt such additional evidence ls material nnd thnt there were reasonable
°Frounds for the fnllure to ndduce such evidence in
the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or
ngenr.y, the court mny order such nddltlonnl evidence to be tnken before the Board, its member,
agen~. or agency, and to be made a part of the
record. The Bonrd mny modlfy Its findings as to
the !nct.s, or mnke new findings by reason of additional evidence so taken nnd filed, and it shall file
such modified or new findings, which findings with
respect to questions o! fnct if supported by substantlnl evidence on the record considered ns a whole
shnll be conclusive, and shnll file Its recommendations, if any, for the modiflcntJon or setting a.side
or its original order. Upon the filing o! the record
with it the Jurisdiction of the court shnll be exclusive and its Judgment and decree shall be finol,
except thnt the snme shall be subject to review by
the appropriate United States court o! appeals 1f
nppUcntion was mo.de to the district court as herelno.bove provided, nnd by the Supreme Court of the
United States upon writ o! certiorari or certlflcat1011 as provided ln section 1254 of Title 28.
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petition lo court.
Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board

(f) Re,·icw of final order of Board on

gr anting or denying 111 whole or in part the relief
sought mny obtn!n a. review or such 01·dcr In nny
United Stntes court of nppc11ls in the circuit
wherein the unfair labor prnctice In question was
alleged to hn ve been engaged in or wherein such
person resides or transacts business, or in the United
States Court of Appenls for the District or Columbln, by filing In such a court n written petition praying that the order of the Boo.rd be modified or set
aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith
transmitted by the cle1·k or the court to the Board,
o.nd thereupon the nggrieved pnl'tY shall file In the
court the record In the proceeding, certified by the
Bonrd, ns provided in section 2112 of Title 28.
Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall proceed in the snme manner o.s In the co.se o! nn applica.tlon by the Board under subsection Ce) of this
section. nnd shnll have the snme Jurisdiction to
grant to the Bonrd such temporary l'elle! or restraining order ns It deems just nnd proper, nnd In like
manner to mnke nnd enter n decree enforcing,
modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting
aside Jn whole or in part the order of the Boo.rd;
the findings or the Board with respect to questions
of !net Ir supported by substantlnl evidence on the
record considered as a whole shnll in like manner
be conclusive.
(g) Institution of court proceedings ns stay of Board's
order.

'I11e commencement of proceedings under subsection <ei or U> of this secUon shall not, unless speclflcnllY ordered by the court, operate as a. stay of
the Board's order.
(h) Jnrisdfction of courhi unnfrl'cted hv limltatlons
prescribed in Hectlons 101-115 of this title,

When granting approprlo.te temporary relier or
a. restraining order, or mnklng and entering n decree

enforcing, modifying, nnd enforcing as so modlfled
or setting aside in whole or in part nn order of the
Board, as provided In this section, the Jurisdiction
or courts sitting tn equity shnll not be limited by
sections 101-115 of this title.
hearings on petitions.
Petitions filed under this subchnpter shall be henrd
~xpeditlously, nnd if possible within ten dnys after
they have been docketed.
(i) Expeditious

(j) Injunctions.

The Board shnll have power, upon Issuance of 11
complaint as provided ln subsection (b) o! this section charging that nny person has engnged In or ts
engagJ1.g In an unfo.lr lnbor prnctlce, to petition any
United states district court, within any dfst.rict
wherein the unralr labor practice In question is
alleged to have occurred or wherein such person
resides or transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filfng of
any such petition the court shall en.use notice
thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Bonrd
such temporary relief or restraining order as Jt
deems Just and proper.
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(k) Hearings on jurisdictional strikes.

Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an un!alr labor practice within the meaning of pnrasraph <4> (0> o! section 158 (b) o! this
title, the Board Is empowered and directed to hear
and detcnnine the di sputc out o! which such unfair
labor practice shnfl have arisen, unless, mthln ten
days after notice that such charge hns been fllcd, the
parties to such dispute submit to the Board sntJsfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed
upon meU1ods for the voluntary adjustment of, the
dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such
voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge
shaJl be dismissed.
(I) Boycotts and strike.If to force recognition or uncer.

tified Jnhor orgnnizntions; injunctions; notice;
Mervicc
process.

or

Whenever It Is charged that any pe1·son has engagPd in an unfair labor practice within t11e meanIng of paragraph <4 > <A>, CB>, or CC> of section
158Cb) of this title, or section 158ce, o! this title or
section 158(bl C7> of this title, the prellmlnary investlgaUon of such charge shall be made forthwith
and given priority over all other cases except cases
of like character In the office where It ls fifed or to
which It ls referred. If, arter such Investigation,
the officer 01· regional attorney to whom the mnttcr
may be refe1·red ho.s reasonable cnusc to believe
such chnrge ls true and that a complaint should
issue, he shall, on behalf of the Board, petition any
United States dlstrJct court within any district
where the unfair labor prnctice In question hns
occurred, is aUegcd to have occurred, or wherein
such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate inJunctlve relief pending the final adJudlcntlon of the Bonrd wJth respect to such matter.
Upon the filing of any such petition the district
court shall have Jurisdiction to grant such JnJunctlve relief or temporary restraining order as it
deems Just nnd proper, notwlthstandJng nny other
provision of law: Provided further, That no temporary restraining order shall be issued without
notice unless a petltion o.Jlegcs thn t substantial
and irreparable injury to the charging party w1Il
be wiavoldo.ble nnd such temporary restraining
order shnll be effective !or no longer thnn five dnys
and wlll become void nt the expiration of such
pel'iod: Provided further, That such officer 01· 1·e•
gional attorney shall not apply for nny rcstralning
order under section 158 Cb) C7> or this title if a
charge against the employer under section 156Ca>
<2> of this title has been flJed and after the preliminary investigation, he has rensonable cnuse to
believe that such charge Is true nnd thnt a complaint should issue. Upon filing or nny such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be
served upon any person involved in the charge and
such person, including the charging party, shall be
given an opportunity to appear by counsel nnd
present any 1·clcvnnt testimony: Provided further,
That for the purposes of this subsection district
courts shall be deemed to have Jurisdiction of n
labor organization ( 1> In the district in which such
organlzntlon maintains its Principal office, or <2>
ln any district In which its duly authorized officers
or agents are engnged In promoting or protecting
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the intcrc::.t:; of employee members. The service of
legal pro::e:;~ u1,on such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the lnbor organization and
make such 01·gn.nlzat1on n party to the suit. In
situations where such relief 1s appropriate the procedure specified herein shall apply to charges with
respect to section 158<b> <4> <D> of this title.
(m) Priority or cases.
Whenever it is charged that any person ho.s engaged in an unfair labor practice wlthln the meanIng o! subsection Ca) (3) or Cb> C2) o! section 158
of this title, such charge shall be given priority over
nll other cases except cnscs of like character In the
office where it is filed or to which it 1s referred nnd
cases given priority under subsection m o! this
section. <July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 10, 49 Stat. 453:
June 25, 1936, ch. 804, 49 Stat, 1921; June 23, 1947,
ch. 120, title I, § 101, 61 Sta-;. 146; June 25, 1948, ch.
646, § 32 <a>, (b), 6!! Stat. 091: May 24, 1949, ch. 139,
§ 127, 63 Stat. 107; Aug. 28, 1958, Pub. L. 85-791,
§ 13, 72 Stat. 945; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub. L. 86-257, title
VII,§§ 104Cd), 706, 73 Stat. 544,l
REFERENCES lN TExT

"Sections 101-115 ot this title." ret.-rred to In the text,
la a reference to net Mo.r. 23, 1932, ch. 90, 47 Stat. 70,
popularly known aa the Norrls•Lo.Ounrdlo. Acli.
Section 11 o: tho.t net, formerly clo.salOed to section 111
of thls title, wo.a repented nnd reenacted as section 3602
or Tltle 18, Crlmea and Criminal Procedure, by act June
26, l<l48, ch. 645. f 21, 62 Stnt. 86~, efT. Sept. 1, 1948.
Section 12 ot that net, formerly clnsstOed to 11ectlon 112
of this t1tle, was also repealed by 11ct June 26, 1048, 11nd Is
now covered by rule 42 (b), Fcder11l Rules or Crlmlnnl
Procedure, Title 18, Appendix.
CODIFICATION

In subsec. ( e), reference to the D1strlct Court at the
United States tor the Dlrtrlct of Columbln, which was
cllmlnntcd by Pub. L. 85-701, I 13 (b), w11a prevlously
omltted on authority of net June 26, 1948.
AMENDMENTS

1969-Subscc. (l), Pub. L. 86-267, I '104(d). lncludetl
unto.Ir l11bor practices wlthln the mennlng ot sections
158(e) and 168(b) (7} of this tltle, and Inserted the proviso prohlbltlng the officer or regional attorney trom
applying tor any rcstr11tnlng order under section 16B(b)
(7} or this title 1t n chnrge ngnlnst the employer under
section 15B(a) (2) of thls tltle hns been filed and ofter
the prellmlnnry Investigation, he hM rcnsonahle co.use to
bellevo tho.t such chnrge ls true and that n complaint
should Issue.
Subscc, (m). Pub. L. B6-257, f 706, added subsec. (m).
1968-Subscc. (d). Pub. t. 85-791, § 13(n), ellmlnnted
"a. transcript of" following "until",
Subsec. (e). Pub. L. 85-701, § 13(b), ellmlnnted "(lncludlnr;r the United Stntes Court of Appcnls tor the District of Columblfl.)" preceding", or 1! nll tbe court.a", nnd
substituted "file In tho court the record ln the proceedings, ns provided tn section 211~ or Title 28" !or "certify
nnd file ln the court n trnnscrtpt of the entire record ln
th~ proceedings including the plendlngs nnd testimony
upon which such order wns entered nnd the ftndlnge nnd
order or the Boord" In the first sentence, In second sentence suhstltut.ed "t.he filing of such petition" tor
"such nung or" nnd ellmlnatcd •·upon t.he plcndtnga,
testimony nnd proceedings set forth ln such transcript"
Collowlng ''mnke nnd enter", ln fttth sentence substltuted
"member" tor ..members" !ol!owlng "betore the Boo.rd,
lts", nnd aubstltut.ed "record" tor "transcript", and In
seventh sentence, substituted "Upon the Ollng of the
record with it the'' tor "The", 1md "section 1254 at 'I'ltle
28" tor "sections 346 and 347 of Tltle 28".
Subsec. Ct). Pub. L. 86-701, I 13(c), substituted
"transmitted by the clerk of the court to" ror "served
upon" a.nd "the record In the procecdlng, certified by the
Bonrd, aa provided In section :;u 12 ot T1tlo 28" tor "n
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trnnscrlpt of the entlri, record In the proceeding, certl•
fled by the Bonrd lncludl11g tht: plendlng nnd testimony
upon which the order complnlncd or wna entered, nnd the
findings nnd order or the Bonrd" In tho second r;entel'\ce,
and ln third aentenco substituted "the flllng or such
petition," tor "such filing", and ellmlnated "exclusive"
preceding "Jurisdiction".
10-17-Act June 23, 19-17, nmended section genernlly
nnd added subsec:s. (J)-(1) which glves the Boo.rd gencrnl power to petition district court for tempornry relief
11r restraining order, directs Bonrd to hear nnd determine
Jurlsdlctlonnl strikes, nnd to Investigate boycotts and
strikes tc rorce recognition oC an uncertified tnbor union
nnd to petition district court for lnJunctl\'e relief,
CHANDE OF NAME

The "circuit courts or nppenl" nnd the ''circuit courts of
nppenls of the United Stntes" hn\'e been ch•mged to
''United States courts or nppcnls" by net June 25, 19-18,
J 32 ( n). ns nmended by net Mny 2-l, 1049.
The "District court of the United States for the District
or Colutnbla" wns changed to the "United Btntes District
Court ror the District or Columbia" by net June 25, 1948,
I 3:! ( b), ns nn1ended by net Mny 24. 1049. See sections 88
and 132 or Title 28, Judlclnry and Judlclnl Procedure.
supreme court or the District of Columbln wns c11nnged
to "District court or the United Stntes tor the District
of Colutnbln" by net June 25, 1936.
Court or Appeals or the District or Columbia wna
chnngcd to United States Court or Appeals ror the District
or Columbia by act June 7, 1934, ch, 426, 48 Stnt. 926.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1969 AMENDMENT
Amendment or section by Pub. L. 86-257 effective sixty
dnys after Sept. 14, 1959, see section 707 or Pub. L. 86-257,
set out a.s a note under section 153 or this tltle,
EFFECTIVE DATE or 1947 AMENDMENT
Effective date or oct June 23, 1947, see note set out
under section 151 or thlB title.
COMr.ltTNIST ORGANIZATlONS, AND MEMBERS

Prohibitions placed on Communist organlzl\ttons, nncl
members thereof, wlth respect to lnbor, see chnpter 23
or Title 60, War ancl Nntlonal Defense, pnrtlculnrly
sect:ons 782 (4A), 78-1, '70211 nnd 8-11-844 or thnt title.
FEDERAL RULES

or CtvtL

PROCEDURE

Appllcatlon or rules, see rule 81, Tltlo 28, Appendix,
Judiciary and Judicial Procedure,
§ 161. Investigatory powers

or

Board.

For the purpose or nil hearings and investigations,
which, in the opinion of the Bonrd, nre necessary and
proper for the exercise of the powers vested In it t.Jy
sections 159 and 160 of this title()) Documentary e,·idence; summoning witnesses
nnd taking testimony.
The Bonrd, or its duly authorized agents or
ngenoles, shnll at all reasonnble times hnve access
to, for the purpose of examination, and the right
to copy any evidence of any person being investl•
gated or proceeded ngninst that relates to any
matter under lnvestlgntion or ln question. The
B:>ard, or any member thereof, shall upon application c,f nny party to such proceedings, forthwith
Issue to such party subpenas requlrlng the attendnnce and testimony of Witne~ses or the prcductlon
or any evidence In such proceeding or lnvestlgntlon requested in such appUcntlon. Within five
days after the service or a. subpenn. on any person
requiring the production of any evidence ln his
possession or under his control, such person mny
petition the Boo.rd to revoke, and the Board shall
revoke, such subpena if In its opinion the evidence
whose production is required does not relate to
any matter un :ier Investigation, or any matter In
question In such proceecUngs, or Jf In Its opinion

such subpenn. does not describe with sufficient
particularity the evidence whose production ls re•
quired. Any member of the Board, or any agent
or agency designated by the Board fol' such pur•
poses, may administer oaths and affirmations, ex•
amine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such at•
tendnnce of witnesses and the production of such
evidence mny be required from nny place In the
United States or any Territory or pos~esslon
thereof, at any designated place of hearing,
(2) Court nid in compelling production of e,·idence
and nttendnnce of witnes!les.
In case of contumacy or refusn.l to obey a sub•
penn. Issued to nny person, any district court of
the United States or the United Stntes courts of
any Territory or possession, within the Jurlsdlc•
tlon of which the inquiry ls carried on or within
the Jurisdiction of which said person guilty of
contwnncy or ref us al to obey ls found or resides
or trnnsacts business, upon applicn.tlon by the
B:>ard Ehall hnve Jurisdiction to issue to such per•
son nn order requiring such person to appenr
before the Board, Its member, agent, or ngency,
there to produce evidence 1f so ordered, or there
to give testimony touching the matter under lnvestlgn.tlon or In question: nnd nny f allure to obey
such order of the court may be punished by sa~d
court ns a. contempt thereof.
(3) PrMlege
tion.

or witnessesi immunity from

prosecu•

No person shall be excused from attending and
testifying or from producing books, records, correspondence, documents, or other evidence In
obedience to the subpenn. of the Boa1·d, on the
ground that the testimony or evidence required of
him may tend to Incriminate him or subject him
to o. penalty or forfeiture; but no lndlvldunl shall
be prosecuted or subjected to nny penalty or tor!elture !or or on account of any transaction,
matter, or thing concerning which ha ls com•
t>clled, after having claimed his prlvllege against
self-lncrlmlnntlon, to testify or produce evidence,
except that such lndlvldunl so testlfylng shall not
be exempt from prosecution and punishment for
perjury committed In so testl!ytng.
(0 Process, service nnd return; Cees of witnesses.

Complaints, orders, and other process nnd
papers o! the Board, Its member, agent, or agency,
mo.y be served either personalty or by registered
mall or by telegro,ph or by leaving n. copy thereof
at the principal omce or place of business of the
p~rson required to be served. The verified return
by the lndlvldual so servlng the same setting
forth the manner of such service shall be proof
of the same, and the return post office receipt or
telegraph receipt there!or when reglstered and
mniled or telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof
of service or the same. Wltn,:,sses summoned
before the Board, lts member, agent, or ngency,
shn.11 be paid the same feei: and 1.Dileage that are
paid witnesses In the courts of the United States,
and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the
persons to.king the same shall severally be entitled
to the same fees as are paid for like services Jn the
courts of the United States.
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(5) Process, where scncd,
All process of any court to which npplicatfon
may be made under this subchnpter may be served
In the judlcio.l district wherein the defendant or
other person required to be served resides or may
be!ound.
(6) Information and aRKiHtance from departments.
The several departments and agencies of the
Government, when directed by the President, shall
furnish the Board, upon Its request, all records,
papers, nnd lnformatfon In thelr possession relating to nny matter before the Board.
<July 5, 1936, ch. 372, § 11, 49 Stat. 455; June 25,
1938, ch. 804, 49 Stat. 1921: June 23, 1947, ch. 120,
title I, I 101, 61 Stat. 150.>
CoDrrrcATJON
In pnr. (2), reference to "the Dlatr!ct court or the
United Stntes !or the Dlstrlrt or Columbln" wn11 omitted
on nuthortty or net June 25, 194B, ch. 646, I 32 (b), 62
Stnt. 991, since the District or Columbia constitutes a
JUdlclnl district, nnd the D "trlct Court or tho Un 1 trd
States tor the Dlrtrlct or Columbln ts Included within
t.he term "a.ny district court o! tho United Stntes" ns
used In such subsection. See sections BB nnd 132 or
Title 28, Judlclnry and Judicial Procedure.
AMENDMENTS
1047-Act June :?3, 194'7, restnled the ecctlon with the
nddltlon or provisions requiring the lssunnce o! subpenns
n11 n mnttor ot <"ourae on the request or lilly pnrty.
CHANGE OF' NAME
Suprt"me Court or the District or Columbln wns changed
to the "District Court or the United Slates Cor the D!i;lrlct
ot Columbln" by net June 25, 1936.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 194'7 AMENDMENT
Etrectlvc dnte ot act June 23, 194'7, sea note set out
under section 151 ot this tllle.
F'EDrRAL RULES OF CIVIL l'R'lCEDORE
Subpenn, sec rule 45, ntlt 2B, Appendix, Judlclnry nnd
Judlclnl Procedurr..

and penalties,
Any person who shall wlllfuIJy resist. prevent. Impede, or Interfere with any member of the Bonrd
or nny of Its agents or nscncies In the performnnce of
duties pursuant to this subchapter shnll be punished
by n. fine of not more thnn $5,000 or by imprisonment for not more thnn one year, or both. <J11ly 5,
1936, cb. 372, § 12, 49 Stat. 456: June 23, 1947, ch.
120, title I,§ 101, 61 Stat.151.>
§ 162. orrcnseH

AMENDMENTS

1947-Act June 23, 1047, reenacted section without
chnnge.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1047 AMENDMENT

EITectlvc da.te or net June 23, 1947, see note set out
undrr i;cctlon 151 or this title.

to strike preserved.
Nolhlng In this subchnptcr, except ns speclflcally
provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to
interfere with or Impede or diminish In nny way the
right to strike, or to affect the limitations or quaUflcntlons on tha.t right. <July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 13,
'i9 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title I, § 101, 61
Stat.161,)
§ 163. Right

AMENDMENTS

1947-Act Juno 23, 1947, amended section so ns to provide thnt except ns speclftcnlly provided for ln thls subchnpter nothlng shnll lntcrtc>re wlth or dlmlnlsh the
right to strlko nnd thnt nothing wa.s to be construed

to n!Tect the llmltntlons or qunllftcntlons on the right
to utrlke, thus recognlzlng that the right to strike ls
not nn unllmllrd nnd unqunllOed right.
EfTECTIVB DATE OF lD-\7 AMENDMENT
Etrectlve date ot net June 23, 1047, see note set out
under i;ectlon 151 of thls title.

Supervisors as union members; recognition by
employers; declination of jurisdiction by Don rd
over Jahor disputes; aHsertlon of Jurisdiction by
Stale or Territorial agencies and courts.
<a> Nothing herein shnll prohibit any individual
employed as a supervisor from becoming or remnlnlng a member of a labor organizntlon, but no employer subject lo this subchapter shall be compelled
lo deem lndlVldunls defined herein as supervisors as
emp'oyces for the purpose of any lnw, either national
or loc11l, relnllns to collective bargaining.
<b> Nolhin 6 in this subchnpter shall be construed
ns authorizl,1g the execution or nppllcnllon ot agreements requiring membership In n labor orsnnlzallon
ns n condition ot employment In any State or Territory In wh!ch such execution or nppllcnl!on ts prohlbltcd by Slate or Territorial law.
<c> (1) The Board, In Its discretion, may, by rule
of decision or by publlshed rules adopted pursuant
to the Admln!stratlve Procedure Act, decline to
assert Jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving
nny class or category of employers, where, ln the
opinion of the Bonl'd, the effect of such lnbor dispute on commerce Is not. sufficiently substnntlnl tu
wnrrnnt. the exercise of its Jurisdiction: Provided.,
Thal the Board shall not. decllne to assert Jurisdiction over any labor dispute over which It would
assert jurisdiction under the standards prevnlllng
upon August 1, 1969.
<2> Nothing In this subchapter shall be deemed
to prevent. or bar any agency or the courts o! nny
State or Terrltol'y (including the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, aunm, and the Vlrgln Islands>,
lrom assuming and asserting Jurisdiction over lnbor
disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to
paragraph C1> of this subsection, to nssert. Jurlsdict!on. <July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 14, 49 Stat. 457;
June 23, !947, tltle I,§ 101, 61 Stat.151: Sept, 14, 1959,
Pub. L. 86-257, title VII,§ 701<n>, 73 Stnt. 541.)

§ 164,

REFERENCES IN TEXT
The Admlnlstrntlve Proctldure Act, referred to In subsec. (c), ls clnsslftcd to chapter 19 ot Title 5, Executive
Depnrtments a.nd Government ornccrs and Employees.
AMENDMENTS

1050-Subsec. (c).

Pub. L. 86-257 added sub5CC. (C).

1047-Act June 23, 1047, amended section g~nernlly
by Inserting new subject mntter. Section formerly rcCe: red to conflict or Jnws n.nd ls now covered by sccllon
165 or tills title.
EFFECTIVE DATE OF 1947 AME:NDMENT

Effective date or a.ct June 23, 1047, eec note set out
under section 151 or this title.

laws,
Whether the npplfcatlon of the provision of section 672 of Title 11 conflicts with the nppllcatlon of
lhe provisions ot this subchapler, this subchaplcr
shall prcvnU: Provided, Thnt in any situation where
the provisions of this subchnpter cannot be validly
enforced, the provisions of such other Acts shnll remnln In full force and effect. <July 5, 1936, ch. 372,
§ 165. Conflict of
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§166

TITLE 29.-LABOR

§ 5, 49 Stat. 45'1; June 23, 194'1, ch. 120, title I, I 101,
61 Ste.t.151.>
AMENDMENTS

1047-Act June 23, 1947, nmended section gcnernlly by
tnsertlng new subject mntler which wns formerly covered
by section 164 or this Utle. Section formerly referred
to sepnrnblllty provlslons nnd ls now covered by section
100 or this title.

Page 6304

SUBCHAPTER III.-co:'lCILIA110N OF LABOR
DISPUTES; NATIONAL EMERGENCIES
§ 171, Decloratlon or purr,oae ond policy.

Eff'ectlve do.te or act June 23, 1947, see note set out
under section 151 01' this title.

It ls the policy of the United States thatCal sound and stnblu Industrial peace nnd the
advancement or the general welfare, healt11, and
safety or the Nation end of the best interests o(
employe1·s nnd employees can most satisfactorily
be secured by the settl<im<'nt or Issues between employers and employe~- through the processes oC
conrercnce and collective bargaining between employers and the representatives or their employees;
Cb> the settlement c,r Issues between employers
and employees through collecUvc bargaining may
be advnnced by mnldng ava1lnble full and adequate
sovcrnmentnl facffltles for concllintlon, mediation,
and voluntary arbitrntk>n to aid and encourngc employers nnd the representatives or their employees
to rcnrh and maintain agreements concerning totes
of pay, hours, and working conditions, and to make
all reasonable efforts -:o settle their dlftcrences by
mutual agreement reached through conferences and
collccUve bargaining or by such methods ns may be
provided for in any E,ppllcable agreement for the
~ettlement or disputes: and
<c> certain contro\·ersies which arise between
pnrt1es to collectlve-bnrgalnlng agreements may be
avoided or minimized by making available full and
ndequate governmentnl racllltles Cor furnishing asst.stance to employers llnd the representatives or their
employees in rormulaUng for inclusJon w1thln such
agreements provision for adcqunte notice or any
proposed changes in the terms or such agreements,
ror the flnnl adjustment or grlevnnces or questions
regarding the appllcation or interpretation or such
agreements, and other provisions designed to pr:?vr.nt the subsequent arising of such controversies.
<June 23, 1947, ch. 120, title II, I 201, 61 Stat. 152.)

§ 168, Validation of certificates and

§ 172. Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service,

EFTECTl\'E DATE or 1047 AMENDMENT
Effectlvc date or net June 23, 1047, see note set out under sectlon 151 or this title.

§ 166. Scparabllit)' or pro,·islons.

U any pro\'lslon or thls subchnpter, 01· the nppllcatlon or such provision to nny person or circumstances, shall be held Invalid. the remninder or this
subchnptcr, or the npplicntlon or such provision to
pcrsrms or circumstances other than those as to
whlcl1 It is held lnvnlid, shall not be affected thereby.
1July 5, 1935, ch. 372, § 16, 49 stat. 457; June 23,
1947, ch.120, title I,§ 101, 61 Sta.t.151.l
AMENDMENTS

1947-Act June 23, J947, nmended section gcnernJly
by Inserting new subject mntter wt.lch wns rormerly
covered by sectlon 165 or this tltle. Section formerly
referred to short tltle or chapter and Is now covered by
section 167 or thin tltle.
EFFECTIVE DATE 01' 1947 AMENDMENT
Eff'ectlve date or net June 23, 1947, see note set out
under section 151 or this title.

§ 167. Short title or subchapter.

This subchnpter mny be cited as the ''Nntfonal
Lnbor Relations Act·•. CJuly 5, 1935, ch, 3'12, § 17,
ns added June 23, 1947, ch. 120, Utle I, § 101, 61
Stat. 152.>
En'!X:rrvE DATE

other Board

actionR.
No petition entertained. no investigation made, no
election held, and no certfflcnUon Issued by the Nntfonnl Labor Relations Bonrd, under nny or the provisions of section 159 or this title, shnll be invalid
by reason of the failure or the Consress or Industrial
o,·gnnizatlons to have complled with the requirements or section 159 m. lg), or 'h > or this title
prior to December 22, 1949, or by reason of the
ranurc or the Amcricnn Federation of Labor to have
complied with the provisions of section 159 Cf), Cg),
or Ch) or this title prior to November 7, 1947: Provided, That no UnblUty shall be imposed under any
prov 4.slon or this chnpter upon nny person £or failure
to honor any election or certlficnte referred to nbove,
prfor to October 22, 1951: Provided, however, That
this proviso shnll not have the effect or setting aside
or In nny wny nftectlng Judgments or decrees heretofore entered under section 160 te> or in of this
title and which hnve become final. 1July 5, 1935,
ch. 372, § 18, ns added Oct. 22, 1951, ch. 534, § l ,n>,
65 Stat. 601. >
REl"EJIENCES lN TEXT

Section 169 (r), (g), or (h) or thh; title, referred to In
tho text, were rcpca.lcd. Sec section 431 or thla tl1.le,

(n) Creation; appointment of Director.

There ls created an Independent agency to be
known as the Federal Mediation and Conciliation
Service (herein ref erred to as the "Service", except
that for sixty days after June 23, 1947, such term
shall rerer to the Conclllatlon Service or the Department or Labor). The Service shall be under
the direction or a Federal Mediation and ConclUatlon Director Cherelnarter rererred to ns the "Director">, who shall be appointed by the President by
and wlth the advice and consent or the Sennte. The
Director shnU not engage f n any other business,
vocation, ar employment.
(b) Appointment of officers and employees; cxpendi-

llircs for supplies, fncillties, and S<!rvicea.
The Dh·ector ls authorized, subject to the civil
service laws, to appoint such clerical nnd other personnel as may be necessary for the execution of the
functions or the Service, and shall flx their compensation 1n accordance with the Classlflcntton Act or
1949, and may, without rl~gard to the provisions of
the civil service laws, appoint such conc1l1at01·s
a.nd mediators as may be necessru-y to carry
out the functions of the Service. The Director Is
authorized to mnke such expenditures for supplies,
Cacllitles, nnd services ns he deems necessary. Such
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§ 151. Findings and declaration of policy, 29 USCA § 151

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29

U.S.C.A. § 151

§ 151. Findings and declaration of policy

Currentness
The denial by some employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by some employers to accept the
procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial strife or unrest, which have the intent
or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or operation of
the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, restraining, or
controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or processed goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the
prices of such materials or goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and wages in such volume as
substantially to impair or disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do not possess full freedom of association or actual liberty
of contract, and employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of ownership association substantially
burdens and affects the flow of commerce, and tends to aggravate recurrent business depressions, by depressing wage
rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and by preventing the stabilization of competitive wage rates
and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that protection by law of the right of employees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards
commerce from injury, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the flow of commerce by removing certain recognized
sources of industrial strife and unrest, by encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment of industrial
disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality of bargaining
power between employers and employees.
Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some labor organizations, their officers, and members
have the intent or the necessary effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing the free flow of goods in
such commerce through strikes and other forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair the
interest of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to
the assurance of the rights herein guaranteed.

It is hereby declared to be the policy of the United States to eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to
the free flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when they have occurred by encouraging the
practice and procedure of collective bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers of full freedom of association,
self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and
conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or protection.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 1, 49 Stat. 449; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 136.)

Notes of Decisions (566)
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§ 152. Definitions, 29 USCA § 152

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter IL National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29

U.S.C.A § 152

§ 152. Definitions

Currentness
When used in this subchapter--

(1) The term "person" includes one or more individuals, labor organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations,
legal representatives, trustees, trustees in cases under Title 11, or receivers.

(2) The term "employer" includes any person acting as an agent of an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not
include the United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal Reserve Bank, or any State
or political subdivision thereof, or any person subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C.A. § 151 et seq.], as amended
from time to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an employer), or anyone acting in the capacity
of officer or agent of such labor organization.

(3) The term "employee" shall include any employee, and shall not be limited to the employees of a particular
employer, unless this subchapter explicitly states otherwise, and shall include any individual whose work has ceased
as a consequence of, or in connection with, any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and
who has not obtained any other regular and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual
employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service of any family or person at his home, or any individual
employed by his parent or spouse, or any individual having the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed by an employer subject to the Railway Labor Act [45 U.S.C.A.
§ 151 et seq.], as amended from time to time, or by any other person who is not an employer as herein defined.

(4) The term "representatives" includes any individual or labor organization.

(5) The term "labor organization" means any organization of any kind, or any agency or employee representation
committee or plan, in which employees participate and which exists for the purpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with
employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.

(6) The term "commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States,

or between the District of Columbia or any Territory of the United States and any State or other Territory, or between
any foreign country and any State, Territory, or the District of Columbia, or within the District of Columbia or any
Territory, or between points in the same State but through any other State or any Territory or the District of Columbia
or any foreign country.
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§ 152. Definitions, 29 USCA § 152

(7) The term "affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow of

commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing commerce or the free flow
of commerce.

(8) The term "unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice listed in section 158 of this title.

(9) The term "labor dispute" includes any controversy concerning terms, tenure or conditions of employment, or
concerning the association or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to
arrange terms or conditions of employment, regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation of
employer and employee.

(10) The term "National Labor Relations Board" means the National Labor Relations Board provided for in section

153 of this title.

(11) The term "supervisor" means any individual having authority, in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer,
suspend, lay off, recall, promote, discharge, assign, reward, or discipline other employees, or responsibly to direct
them, or to adjust their grievances, or effectively to recommend such action, if in connection with the foregoing the
exercise of such authority is not of a merely routine or clerical nature, but requires the use of independent judgment.

(12) The term "professional employee" means--

(a) any employee engaged in work (i) predominantly intellectual and varied in character as opposed to routine
mental, manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii) involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its
performance; (iii) of such a character that the output produced or the result accomplished cannot be standardized
in relation to a given period of time; (iv) requiring knowledge of an advanced type in a field of science or learning
customarily acquired by a P!olonged course of specialized intellectual instruction and study in an institution of
higher learning or a hospital, as distinguished from a general academic education or from an apprenticeship or from
training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical processes; or

(b) any employee, who (i) has completed the courses of specialized intellectual instruction and study described in
clause (iv) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related work under the supervision of a professional person to
qualify himself to become a professional employee as defined in paragraph (a).

(13) In determining whether any person is acting as an "agent" of another person so as to make such other person
responsible for his acts, the question of whether the specific acts performed were actually authorized or subsequently
ratified shall not be controlling.

(14) The term "health care institution" shall include any hospital, convalescent hospital, health maintenance
organization, health clinic, nursing home, extended care facility, or other institution devoted to the care of sick, infirm,
or aged person. 1
CREDIT(S)
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§ 152. Definitions, 29 USCA § 152

(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 2, 49 Stat. 450; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 137; July 26, 1974, Pub.L. 93-360,
§ l(a), (b), 88 Stat. 395; Nov. 6, 1978, Pub.L. 95-598, Title III,§ 319, 92 Stat. 2678.)

Notes of Decisions (1969)

Footnotes
1

So in original. Probably should be "persons".

29 U.S.C.A. § 152, 29 USCA § 152
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P .L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
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§ 153. National Labor Relations Board, 29 USCA § 153

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas)
29 U.S.C.A. § 153
§ 153. National Labor Relations Board

Currentness

(a) Creation, composition, appointment, and tenure; Chairman; removal of members
The National Labor Relations Board (hereinafter called the "Board") created by this subchapter prior to its amendment
by the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 [29 U.S.C.A. § 141 et seq.], is continued as an agency of the United States,
except that the Board shall consist of five instead of three members, appointed by the President by and with the advice
and consent of the Senate. Of the two additional members so provided for, one shall be appointed for a term of five years
and the other for a term of two years. Their successors, and the successors of the other members, shall be appointed for
terms of five years each, excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed only for the unexpired
term of the member whom he shall succeed. The President shall designate one member to serve as Chairman of the
Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearing, for neglect of duty or
malfeasance in office, but for no other cause.

(b) Delegation of powers to members and regional directors; review and stay of actions of regional directors; quorum; seal
The Board is authorized to delegate to any group of three or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself
exercise. The Board is also authorized to delegate to its regional directors its powers under section 159 of this title to
determine the unit appropriate for the purpose of collective bargaining, to investigate and provide for hearings, and
determine whether a question of representation exists, and to direct an election or take a secret ballot under subsection
(c) or (e) of section 159 of this title and certify the results thereof, except that upon the filing of a request therefor with
the Board by any interested person, the Board may review any action of a regional director delegated to him under this
paragraph, but such a review shall not, unless specifically ordered by the Board, operate as a stay of any action taken
by the regional director. A vacancy in the Board shall not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all of
the powers of the Board, and three members of the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quorum of the Board, except
that two members shall constitute a quorum of any group designated pursuant to the first sentence hereof. The Board
shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.

(c) Annual reports to Congress and the President
The Board shall at the close of each fiscal year make a report in writing to Congress and to the President summarizing
significant case activities and operations for that fiscal year.

(d) General Counsel; appointment and tenure; powers and duties; vacancy
There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel of the Board shall exercise general supervision over
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§ 153. National Labor Relations Board, 29 USCA § 153

all attorneys employed by the Board (other than administrative law judges and legal assistants to Board members) and
over the officers and employees in the regional offices. He shall have final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of
the investigation of charges and issuance of complaints under section 160 of this title, and in respect of the prosecution
of such complaints before the Board, and shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may be provided
by law. In case of a vacancy in the office of the General Counsel the President is authorized to designate the officer or
employee who shall act as General Counsel during such vacancy, but no person or persons so designated shall so act
(1) for more than forty days when the Congress is in session unless a nomination to fill such vacancy shall have been
submitted to the Senate, or (2) after the adjournment sine die of the session of the Senate in which such nomination
was submitted.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 3, 49 Stat. 451; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 139; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.L. 86-257,
Title VII,§§ 70l(b), 703, 73 Stat. 542; Jan. 2, 1975, Pub.L. 93-608, § 3(3), 88 Stat. 1972; Mar. 27, 1978, Pub.L. 95-251, §
3, 92 Stat. 184; Dec. 21, 1982, Pub.L. 97-375, Title II,§ 213, 96 Stat. 1826.)

Notes of Decisions (192)
29 U.S.C.A. § 153, 29 USCA § 153
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
.End of Document
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§ 154. National Labor Relations Board; eligibility for reappointment; ... , 29 USCA § 154

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29 U.S.C.A. § 154
§ 154. National Labor Relations Board; eligibility for

reappointment; officers and employees; payment of expenses
Currentness
(a) Each member of the Board and the General Counsel of the Board shall be eligible for reappointment, and shall
not engage in any other business, vocation, or employment. The Board shall appoint an executive secretary, and such
attorneys, examiners, and regional directors, and such other employees as it may from time to time fmd necessary for
the proper performance of its duties. The Board may not employ any attorneys for the purpose of reviewing transcripts
of hearings or preparing drafts of opinions except that any attorney employed for assignment as a legal assistant to any
Board member may for such Board member review such transcripts and prepare such drafts. No administrative law
judge's report shall be reviewed, either before or after its publication, by any person other than a member of the Board or
his legal assistant, and no administrative law judge shall advise or consult with the Board with respect to exceptions taken
to his findings, rulings, or recommendations. The Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other agencies,
and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from time to time be needed. Attorneys appointed under
this section may, at the direction of the Board, appear for and represent the Board in any case in court. Nothing in this
subchapter shall be construed to authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation,
or for economic analysis.

(b) All of the expenses of the Board, including all necessary traveling and subsistence expenses outside the District
of Columbia incurred by the members or employees of the Board under its orders, shall be allowed and paid on the
presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the Board or by any individual it designates for that purpose.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, §4, 49 Stat. 451; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 139; Mar. 27, 1978, Pub.L. 95-251,
§ 3, 92 Stat. 184.)

Notes of Decisions (3)
29 U.S.C.A. § 154, 29 USCA § 154
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 155. National Labor Relations Board; principal office, conducting ... , 29 USCA § 155

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Armos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29 U.S.CA. § 155
§ 155. National Labor Relations Board; principal office, conducting inquiries

throughout country; participation in decisions or inquiries conducted by member
Currentness
The principal office of the Board shall be in the District of Columbia, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers
at any other place. The Board may, by one or more of its members or by such agents or agencies as it may designate,
prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions in any part of the United States. A member who participates in such an
inquiry shall not be disqualified from subsequently participating in a decision of the Board in the same case.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 5, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 140.)

Notes of Decisions (4)
29 U.S.C.A. § 155, 29 USCA § 155
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 156. Rules and regulations, 29 USCA § 156

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs &Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & An.nos)
29 U.S.C.A. § 156
§ 156. Rules and regulations

Cu1Tentness
The Board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by subchapter
II of chapter 5 of Title 5, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this subchapter.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 6, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 140.)

Notes of Decisions (103)
29 U.S.C.A. § 156, 29 USCA § 156
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 157. Right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc., 29 USCA § 157

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29 U.S.C.A. § 157
§ 157. Right of employees as to organization, collective bargaining, etc.

Currentness
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activities for the purpose of collective
bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities
except to the extent that such right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section l 58(a)(3) of this title.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 7, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 140.)

Notes of Decisions (1337)
29 U.S.C.A. § 157, 29 USCA § 157
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 158. Unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 158

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas)
29 U.S.C.A. § 158
§ 158. Unfair labor practices

Currentness
<Notes of Decisions for 29 USCA § 158 are displayed in eleven separate documents. Notes of Decisions for
subdivision I are contained in this document. For Notes of Decisions for subdivisions II to XI, see documents
for 29 USCA § 158, post.>

(a) Unfair labor practices by employer

It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer--

(1) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title;

(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial
or other support to it: Provided, That subject to rules and regulations made and published by the Board pursuant to
section 156 of this title, an employer shall not be prohibited from permitting employees to confer with him during
working hours without loss of time or pay;

(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage
or discourage membership in any labor organization: Provided, That nothing in this subchapter, or in any other statute
of the United States, shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor organization (not established,
maintained, or assisted by any action defined in this subsection as an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition
of employment membership therein on or after the thirtieth day following the beginning of such employment or the
effective date of such agreement, whichever is the later, (i) if such labor organization is the representative of the
employees as provided in section 159(a) of this title, in the appropriate collective-bargaining unit covered by such
agreement when made, and (ii) unless following an election held as provided in section 159(e) of this title within
one year preceding the effective date of such agreement, the Board shall have certified that at least a majority of
the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to rescind the authority of such labor organization to
make such an agreement: Provided further, That no employer shall justify any discrimination against an employee
for nonmembership in a labor organization (A) if he has reasonable grounds for believing that such membership was
not available to the employee on the same terms and conditions generally applicable to other members, or (B) if he
has reasonable grounds for believing that membership was denied or terminated for reasons other than the failure
of the employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or
retaining membership;
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§ 158. Unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 158

(4) to discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because he has filed charges or given testimony under
this subchapter;

(5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 159(a)
of this title.

(b) Unfair labor practices by labor organization

It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or its agents--

(1) to restrain or coerce (A) employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157 of this title: Provided, That
this paragraph shall not impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its own rules with respect to the acquisition
or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of his representatives for the purposes of
collective bargaining or the adjustment of grievances;

(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate against_an employee in violation of subsection (a)(3)
of this section or to discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has
been denied or terminated on some ground other than his failure to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining membership;

(3) to refuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representative of his employees subject to the
provisions of section l 59(a) of this title;

(4) (i) to engage in, or to induce or encourage any individual employed by any person engaged in commerce or in an
industry affecting commerce to engage in, a strike or a refusal in the course of his employment to use, manufacture,
process, transport, or otherwise handle or work on any goods, articles, materials, or commodities or to perform any
services; or (ii) to threaten, coerce, or restrain any person engaged in commerce or in an industry affecting commerce,
where in either case an object thereof is--

(A) forcing or requiring any employer or self-employed person to join any labor or employer organization or to
enter into any agreement which is prohibited by subsection (e) of this section;

(B) forcing or requiring any person to cease using, selling, handling, transporting, or otherwise dealing in the

products of any other producer, processor, or manufacturer, or to cease doing business with any other person, or
forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative of
his employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the representative of such employees under the
provisions of section 159 of this title: Provided, That nothing contained in this clause (B) shall be construed to make
unlawful, where not otherwise unlawful, any primary strike or primary picketing;

(C) forcing or requiring any employer to recognize or bargain with a particular labor organization as the
representative of his employees if another labor organization has been certified as the representative of such
employees under the provisions of section 159 of this title;
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§ 158. Unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 158

(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign particular work to employees in a particular labor organization
or in a particular trade, craft, or class rather than to employees in another labor organization or in another trade,
craft, or class, unless such employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the Board determining the
bargaining representative for employees performing such work:
Provided, That nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed to make unlawful a refusal by any person
to enter upon the premises of any employer (other than his own employer), if the employees of such employer are
engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative of such employees whom such employer is required
to recognize under this subchapter: Providedfurtlzer, That for the purposes of this paragraph (4) only, nothing
contained in such paragraph shall be construed to prohibit publicity, other than picketing, for the purpose of
truthfully advising the public, including consumers and members of a labor organization, that a product or products
are produced by an employer with whom the labor organization has a primary dispute and are distributed by another
employer, as long as such publicity does not have an effect of inducing any individual employed by any person other
than the primary employer in the course of his employment to refuse to pick up, deliver, or transport any goods, or
not to perform any services, at the establishment of the employer engaged in such distribution;

(5) to require of employees covered by an agreement authorized under subsection (a)(3) of this section the payment,
as a condition precedent to becoming a member of such organization, of a fee in an amount which the Board fmds
excessive or discriminatory under all the circumstances. In making such a finding, the Board shall consider, among
other relevant factors, the practices and customs of labor organizations in the particular industry, and the wages
currently paid to the employees affected;

(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to pay or deliver or agree to pay or deliver any money or other thing of
value, in the nature of an exaction, for services which are not performed or not to be performed; and

(7) to picket or cause to be picketed, or threaten to picket or cause to be picketed, any employer where an object
thereof is forcing or requiring an employer to recognize or bargain with a labor organization as the representative
of his employees, or forcing or requiring the employees of an employer to accept or select such labor organization
as their collective bargaining representative, unless such labor organization is currently certified as the representative
of such employees:

(A) where the employer has lawfully recognized in accordance with this subchapter any other labor organization
and a question concerning representation may not appropriately be raised under section 159(c) of this title,

(B) where within the preceding twelve months a valid election under section 159(c) of this title has been conducted, or

(C) where such picketing has been conducted without a petition under section 159(c) of this title being filed within a
reasonable period of time not to exceed thirty days from the commencement of such picketing: Provided, That when
such a petition has been filed the Board shall forthwith, without regard to the provisions of section 159(c)(l) of this
title or the absence of a showing of a substantial interest on the part of the labor organization, direct an election in
such unit as the Board finds to be appropriate and shall certify the results thereof: Provided further, That nothing in
this subparagraph (C) shall be construed to prohibit any picketing or other publicity for the purpose of truthfully
advising the public (including consumers) that an employer does not employ members of, or have a contract with,
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a labor organization, unless an effect of such picketing is to induce any individual employed by any other person in
the course of his employment, not to pick up, deliver or transport any goods or not to perform any services.
Nothing in this paragraph (7) shall be construed to permit any act which would otherwise be an unfair labor practice
under this subsection.

(c) Expression of views without threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit
The expressing of any views, argument, or opinion, or the dissemination thereof, whether in written, printed, graphic, or
visual form, shall not constitute or be evidence of an unfair labor practice under any of the provisions of this subchapter,
if such expression contains no threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.

(d) Obligation to bargain collectively
For the purposes of this section, to bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith with respect to wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment, or the negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder, and
the execution of a written contract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession: Provided, That where there
is in effect a collective-bargaining contract covering employees in an industry affecting commerce, the duty to bargain
collectively shall also mean that no party to such contract shall terminate or modify such contract, unless the party
desiring such termination or modification--

(1) serves a written notice upon the other party to the contract of the proposed termination or modification sixty days

prior to the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains no expiration date, sixty days prior to the
time it is proposed to make such termination or modification;

(2) offers to meet and confer with the other party for the purpose of negotiating a new contract or a contract containing
the proposed modifications;

(3) notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service within thirty days after such notice of the existence of a
dispute, and simultaneously therewith notifies any State or Territorial agency established to mediate and conciliate
disputes within the State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreement has been reached by that
time;and

(4) continues in full force and effect, without resorting to strike or lock-out, all the terms and conditions of the existing
contract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or until the expiration date of such contract, whichever
occurs later:

The duties imposed upon employers, employees, and labor organizations by paragraphs (2) to (4) of this subsection shall
become inapplicable upon an intervening certification of the Board, under which the labor organization or individual,
which is a party to the contract, has been superseded as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject
to the provisions of section 159(a) of this title, and the duties so imposed shall not be construed as requiring either
party to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed period, if
such modification is to become effective before such terms and conditions can be reopened under the provisions of the
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contract. Any employee who engages in a strike within any notice period specified in this subsection, or who engages in
any strike within the appropriate period specified in subsection (g) of this section, shall lose his status as an employee of
the employer engaged in the particular labor dispute, for the purposes of sections 158, 159, and 160 of this title, but such
loss of status for such employee shall terminate if and when he is reemployed by such employer. Whenever the collective
bargaining involves employees of a health care institution, the provisions of th.is subsection shall be modified as follows:

(A) The notice of paragraph (1) of this subsection shall be ninety days; the notice of paragraph (3) ofth.is subsection
shall be sixty days; and the contract period of paragraph (4) of this subsection shall be ninety days.

(B) Where the bargaining is for an initial agreement following certification or recognition, at least thirty days' notice
of the existence of a dispute shall be given by the labor organization to the agencies set forth in paragraph (3) of this
subsection.

(C) After notice is given to the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service under either clause (A) or (B) of
this sentence, the Service shall promptly communicate with the parties and use its best efforts, by mediation and
conciliation, to bring them to agreement. The parties shall participate fully and promptly in such meetings as may be
undertaken by the Service for the purpose of aiding in a settlement of the dispute.

(e) Enforceability of contract or agreement to boycott any other employer; exception

It shall be an unfair labor practice for any labor organization and any employer to enter into any contract or agreement,
express or implied, whereby such employer ceases or refrains or agrees to cease or refrain from handling, using, selling,
transporting or otherwise dealing in any of the products of any other employer, or to cease doing business with any other
person, and any contract or agreement entered into heretofore or hereafter containing such an agreement shall be to such
extent unenforcible 1 and void: Provided, That nothing in this subsection shall apply to an agreement between a labor
organization and an employer in the construction industry relating to the contracting or subcontracting of work to be
done at the site of the construction, alteration, painting, or repair of a building, structure, or other work: Providedfurther,
That for the purposes of this subsection and subsection (b)(4)(B) of this section the terms "any employer", "any person
engaged in commerce or an industry affecting commerce", and "any person" when used in relation to the terms "any
other producer, processor, or manufacturer", "any other employer", or "any other person" shall not include persons in
the relation of a jobber, manufacturer, contractor, or subcontractor working on the goods or premises of the jobber or
manufacturer or performing parts of an integrated process of production in the apparel and clothing industry: Provided
further, That nothing in this subchapter shall prohibit the enforcement of any agreement which is within the foregoing
exception.

(t) Agreement covering employees in the building and construction industry

It shall not be an unfair labor practice under subsections (a) and (b) of this section for an employer engaged primarily
in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering employees engaged (or who, upon their
employment, will be engaged) in the building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building and
construction employees are members (not established, maintained, or assisted by any action defined in subsection (a) of
this section as an unfair labor practice) because (I) the majority status of such labor organization has not been established
under the provisions of section 159 of this title prior to the making of such agreement, or (2) such agreement requires
as a condition of employment, membership in such labor organization after the seventh day following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of the agreement, whichever is later, or (3) such agreement requires the employer
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to notify such labor organization of opportunities for employment with such employer, or gives such labor organization
an opportunity to refer qualified applicants for such employment, or (4) such agreement specifies minimum training or
experience qualifications for employment or provides for priority in opportunities for employment based upon length
of service with such employer, in the industry or in the particular geographical area: Provided, That nothing in this
subsection shall set aside the final proviso to subsection (a)(3) of this section: Providedfurther, That any agreement which
would be invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition filed pursuant to section 159(c)
or 159(e) of this title.

(g) Notification of intention to strike or picket at any health care institution
A labor organization before engaging in any stiike, picketing, or other concerted refusal to work at any health care
institution shall, not less than ten days prior to such action, notify the institution in writing and the Federal Mediation and
Conciliation Service of that intention, except that in the case of bargaining for an initial agreement following certification
or recognition the notice required by this subsection shall not be given until the expiration of the period specified in
clause (B) of the last sentence of subsection (d) of this section. The notice shall state the date and time that such action
will commence. The notice, once given, may be extended by the written agreement of both parties.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 8, 49 Stat. 452; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 140; Oct. 22, 1951, c. 534, § l(b), 65
Stat. 601; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.L. 86-257, Title II,§ 20l(e), Title VII,§§ 704(a)-(c), 705(a), 73 Stat. 525, 542 to 545; July
26, 1974, Pub.L. 93-360, § l(c)-(e), 88 Stat. 395, 396.)

Notes of Decisions (344)

Footnotes
1
So in original. Probably should be "unenforceable".
29 U.S.C.A. § 158, 29 USCA § 158
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 158a. Providing facilities for operations of Federal Credit Unions, 29 USCA § 158a

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs &Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & An.nos)
29 U.S.C.A. § 158a
§ 158a. Providing facilities for operations of Federal Credit Unions

Currentness
Provision by an employer of facilities for the operations of a Federal Credit Union on the premises of such employer shall
not be deemed to be intimidation, coercion, interference, restraint or discrimination within the provisions of sectiot1s
157 and 158 of this title, or acts amendatory thereof.

CREDIT(S)
(Dec. 6, 1937, c. 3, § 5, 51 Stat. 5.)

29 U.S.C.A. § 158a, 29 USCA § 158a
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 159. Representatives and elections, 29 USCA § 159

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29 U.S.C.A. § 159
§ 159. Representatives and elections

Currentness

(a) Exclusive representatives; employees' adjustment of grievances directly with employer
Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in such unit for the purposes
of collective bargaining in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours of employment, or other conditions of employment:
Provided, That any individual employee or a group of employees shall have the right at any time to present grievances
to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without the intervention of the bargaining representative, as
long as the adjustment is not inconsistent with the terms of a collective-bargaining contract or agreement then in effect:
Provided further, That the bargaining representative has been given opportunity to be present at such adjustment.

(b) Determination of bargaining unit by Board

The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure to employees the fullest freedom in exercising the rights
guaranteed by this subchapter, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the employer unit,
craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision thereof: Provided, That the Board shall not (1) decide that any unit is appropriate
for such purposes if such urut includes both professional employees and employees who are not professional employees
unless a majority of such professional employees vote for inclusion in such unit; or (2) decide that any craft unit is
inappropriate for such purposes on the ground that a different unit has been established by a prior Board determination,
unless a majority of the employees in the proposed craft unit vote against separate representation or (3) decide that
any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together with other employees, any individual employed as a
guard to enforce against employees and other persons rules to protect property of the employer or to protect the safety
of persons on the employer's premises; but no labor organization shall be certified as the representative of employees
in a bargaining unit of guards if such organization admits to membership, or is affiliated directly or indirectly with an
organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.

(c) Hearings on questions affecting commerce; rules and regulations

(1) Whenever a petition shall have been filed, in accordance with such regulations as may be prescribed by the Board--

(A) by an employee or group of employees or any individual or labor organization acting in their behalf alleging that
a substantial number of employees (i) wish to be represented for collective bargaining and that their employer declines
to recognize their representative as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section, or (ii) assert that the
individual or labor organization, which has been certified or is being currently recognized by their employer as the
bargaining representative, is no longer a representative as defined in subsection (a) of this section; or
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(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or labor organizations have presented to him a claim to be
recognized as the representative defined in subsection (a) of this section;

the Board shall investigate such petition and if it has reasonable cause to believe that a question of representation affecting
commerce exists shall provide for an appropriate hearing upon due notice. Such hearing may be conducted by an officer
or employee of the regional office, who shall not make any recommendations with respect thereto. If the Board finds
upon the record of such hearing that such a question of representation exists, it shall direct an election by secret ballot
and shall certify the results thereof.

(2) In determining whether or not a question of representation affecting commerce exists, the same regulations and rules
of decision shall apply irrespective of the identity of the persons filing the petition or the kind of relief sought and in no
case shall the Board deny a labor organization a place on the ballot by reason of an order with respect to such labor
organization or its predecessor not issued in conformity with section 160(c) of this title.

(3) No election shall be directed in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which in the preceding twelvemonth period, a valid election shall have been held. Employees engaged in an economic strike who are not entitled to
reinstatement shall be eligible to vote under such regulations as the Board shall fmd are consistent with the purposes and
provisions of this subchapter in any election conducted within twelve months after the commencement of the strike. In
any election where none of the choices on the ballot receives a majority, a run-off shall be conducted, the ballot providing
for a selection between the two choices receiving the largest and second largest number of valid votes cast in the election.

(4) Nothing in this section shall be construed to prohibit the waiving of hearings by stipulation for the purpose of a
consent election in conformity with regulations and rules of decision of the Board.

(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for the purposes specified in subsection (b) of this section the extent to
which the employees have organized shall not be controlling.

(d) Petition for enforcement or review; transcript
Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section 160(c) of this title is based in whole or in part upon facts
certified following an investigation pursuant to subsection (c) of this section and there is a petition for the enforcement
or review of such order, such certification and the record of such investigation shall be included in the transcript of the
entire record required to be filed under subsection (e) or (f) of section 160 of this title, and thereupon the decree of the
court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board shall be made and entered upon
the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in such transcript.

(e) Secret ballot; limitation of elections

(1) Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of the employees in a bargaining unit covered by an

agreement between their employer and a labor organization made pursuant to section 158(a)(3) of this title, of a petition
alleging they desire that such authority be rescinded, the Board shall take a secret ballot of the employees in such unit
and certify the results thereof to such labor organization and to the employer.
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(2) No election shall be conducted pursuant to this subsection in any bargaining unit or any subdivision within which,
in the preceding twelve-month period, a valid election shall have been held.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 9, 49 Stat. 453; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 143; Oct. 22, 1951, c. 534, § l(c), (d),
65 Stat. 601; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.L. 86-257, Title II,§ 201(d), Title VII,§ 702, 73 Stat. 525, 542.)

Notes of Decisions (3150)
29 U.S.C.A. § 159, 29 USCA § 159
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 160. Prevention of unfair labor practices, 29 USCA § 160

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annas)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29 U.S.C.A. § 160
§ 160. Prevention of unfair labor practices

Currentness
<Notes of Decisions for this section are displayed in two separate documents. Notes of Decisions for roman
heads I through XI are contained in this document. For additional Notes of Decisions, see the second document
for 29 USCA § 160.>

(a) Powers of Board generally
The Board is empowered, as hereinafter provided, to prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice (listed
in section 158 of this title) affecting commerce. This power shall not be affected by any other means of adjustment or
prevention that has been or may be established by agreement, law, or otherwise: Provided, That the Board is empowered
by agreement with any agency of any State or Territory to cede to such agency jurisdiction over any cases in any industry
(other than mining, manufacturing, communications, and transportation except where predominantly local in character)
even though such cases may involve labor disputes affecting commerce, unless the provision of the State or Territorial
statute applicable to the determination of such cases by such agency is inconsistent with the corresponding provision of
this subchapter or has received a construction inconsistent therewith.

(b) Complaint and notice of hearing; answer; court rules of evidence inapplicable

Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or
any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, shall have power to issue and cause to be served upon
such person a complaint stating the charges in that respect, and containing a notice of hearing before the Board or a
member thereof, or before a designated agent or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less than five days after the serving
of said complaint: Provided, That no complaint shall issue based upon any unfair labor practice occurring more than six
months prior to the filing of the charge with the Board and the service of a copy thereof upon the person against whom
such charge is made, unless the person aggrieved thereby was prevented from filing such charge by reason of service
in the armed forces, in which event the six-month period shall be computed from the day of his discharge. Any such
complaint may be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board in its discretion at
any time prior to the issuance of an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have the right to file an
answer to the original or amended complaint and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and
time fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing or the Board, any
other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any such proceeding shall, so
far as practicable, be conducted in accordance with the rules of evidence applicable in the district courts of the United
States under the rules of civil procedure for the district courts of the United States, adopted by the Supreme Court of
the United States pursuant to section 2072 of Title 28.

(c) Reduction of testimony to writing; fmdings and orders of Board
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The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the Board shall be reduced to writing and filed with the
Board. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take further testimony or hear argument. If upon the
preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the complaint has
engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall state its findings of fact and shall issue
and cause to be served on such person an order requiring such person to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice,
and to take such affirmative action including reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, as will effectuate
the policies of this subchapter: Provided, That where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may be
required of the employer or labor organization, as the case may be, responsible for the discrimination suffered by him:
And provided further, That in determining whether a complaint shall issue alleging a violation of subsection (a)(l) or (a)
(2) of section 158 of this title, and in deciding such cases, the same regulations and rules of decision shall apply irrespective
of whether or not the labor organization affected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in
scope. Such order may further require such person to make reports from time to time showing the extent to which it has
complied with the order. If upon the preponderance of the testimony taken the Board shall not be of the opinion that
the person named in the complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor practice, then the Board shall
state its findings of fact and shall issue an order dismissing the said complaint. No order of the Board shall require the
reinstatement of any individual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged, or the payment to him of any
back pay, if such individual was suspended or discharged for cause. In case the evidence is presented before a member of
the Board, or before an administrative law judge or judges thereof, such member, or such judge or judges as the case may
be, shall issue and cause to be served on the parties to the proceeding a proposed report, together with a recommended
order, which shall be filed with the Board, and if no exceptions are filed within twenty days after service thereof upon
such parties, or within such further period as the Board may authorize, such recommended order shall become the order
of the Board and become effective as therein prescribed.

(d) Modification of findings or orders prior to filing record in court
Until the record in a case shall have been filed in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time upon
reasonable notice and in such manner as it shall deem proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in part, any finding or
order made or issued by it.

(e) Petition to court for enforcement of order; proceedings; review of judgment
The Board shall have power to petition any court of appeals of the United States, or if all the courts of appeals to
which application may be made are in vacation, any district court of the United States, within any circuit or district,
respectively, wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein such person resides or transacts business,
for the enforcement of such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order, and shall file in the court the
record in the proceedings, as provided in section 2112 of Title 28. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall cause
notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question
determined therein, and shall have power to grant such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper,
and to make and enter a decree enforcing, modifying and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part
the order of the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be
considered by the court, unless the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because of extraordinary
circumstances. The findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall apply to the court for leave to adduce additional
evidence and shall show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence is material and that there were
reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Board, its member, agent, or agency,
the court may order such additional evidence to be taken before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made
a part of the record. The Board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings by reason of additional
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evidence so taken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which findings with respect to questions
of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and shall file its
recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of its original order. Upon the filing of the record with
it the jurisdiction of the court shall be exclusive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same shall
be subject to review by the appropriate United States court of appeals if application was made to the district court as
hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United States upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided
in section 1254 of Title 28.

(t) Review of final order of Board on petition to court

Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board granting or denying in whole or in part the relief sought may obtain
a review of such order in any United States court of appeals in the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question
was alleged to have been engaged in or wherein such person resides or transacts business, or in the United States Court
of Appeals for the District of Columbia, by filing in such a court a written petition praying that the order of the Board
be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shall be forthwith transmitted by the clerk of the court to the Board,
and thereupon the aggrieved party shall file in the court the record in the proceeding, certified by the Board, as provided
in section 2112 of Title 28. Upon the filing of such petition, the court shall proceed in the same manner as in the case
of an application by the Board under subsection (e) of this section, and shall have the same jurisdiction to grant to the
Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a
decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of the Board;
the findings of the Board with respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on the record considered
as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive.

{g) Institution of court proceedings as stay of Board's order
The commencement of proceedings under subsection (e) or (f) of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the
court, operate as a stay of the Board's order.

{h) Jurisdiction of courts unaffected by limitations prescribed in chapter 6 of this title

When granting appropriate temporary relief or a restraining order, or making and entering a decree enforcing, modifying,
and enforcing as so modified or setting aside in whole or in part an order of the Board, as provided in this section, the
jurisdiction of courts sitting in equity shall not be limited by chapter 6 of this title.

{i) Repealed. Pub.L. 98-620, Title IV,§ 402(31), Nov. 8, 1984, 98 Stat. 3360

(j) Injunctions

The Board shall have power, upon issuance of a complaint as provided in subsection (b) of this section charging that
any person has engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, to petition any United States district court, within
any district wherein the unfair labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein such person resides or
transacts business, for appropriate temporary relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the court
shall cause notice thereof to be served upon such person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board
such temporary relief or restraining order as it deems just and proper.
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(k) Hearings on jurisdictional strikes

Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(D)
of section l 58(b) of this title, the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such
unfair labor practice shall have arisen, unless, within ten days after notice that such charge has been filed, the parties to
such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory evidence that they have adjusted, or agreed upon methods for the voluntary
adjustment of, the dispute. Upon compliance by the parties to the dispute with the decision of the Board or upon such
voluntary adjustment of the dispute, such charge shall be dismissed.

(I) Boycotts and strikes to force recognition of uncertified labor organizations; injunctions; notice; service of process

Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph (4)(A),
(B), or (C) of section 158(b) of this title, or section 158(e) ofthis title or section 158(b)(7) of this title, the preliminary
investigation of such charge shall be made forthwith and given priority over all other cases except cases of like character
in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney to whom
the matter may be referred has reasonable cause to believe such charge is true and that a complaint should issue, he shall,
on behalf of the Board, petition any United States district court within any district where the unfair labor practice in
question has occurred, is alleged to have occurred, or wherein such person resides or transacts business, for appropriate
injunctive relief pending the fmal adjudication of the Board with respect to such matter. Upon the filing of any such
petition the district court shall have jurisdiction to grant such injunctive relief or temporary restraining order as it deems
just and proper, notwithstanding any other provision oflaw: Providedfurther, That no temporary restraining order shall
be issued without notice unless a petition alleges that substantial and irreparable injury to the charging party will be
unavoidable and such temporary restraining order shall be effective for no longer than five days and will become void at
the expiration of such period: Provided further, That such officer or regional attorney shall not apply for any restraining
order under section l 58(b)(7) of this title if a charge against the employer under section 158(a)(2) of this title has been filed
and after the preliminary investigation, he has reasonable cause to believe that such charge is true and that a complaint
should issue. Upon filing of any such petition the courts shall cause notice thereof to be served upon any person involved
in the charge and such person, including the charging party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and
present any relevant testimony: Providedfurther, That for the purposes of this subsection district courts shall be deemed
to have jurisdiction of a labor organization (1) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal office,
or (2) in any district in which its duly authorized officers or agents are engaged in promoting or protecting the interests
of employee members. The service of legal process upon such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor
organization and make such organization a party to the suit. In situations where such relief is appropriate the procedure
specified herein shall apply to charges with respect to section 158(b)(4)(D) of this title.

(m) Priority of cases

Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an unfair labor practice within the meaning of subsection (a)(3)
or (b)(2) of section 158 of this title, such charge shall be given priority over all other cases except cases of like character
in the office where it is filed or to which it is referred and cases given priority under subsection (1) of this section.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 10, 49 Stat. 453; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 146; June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 32(a),
(b), 62 Stat. 991; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 127, 63 Stat. 107; Aug. 28, 1958, Pub.L. 85-791, § 13, 72 Stat. 945; Sept. 14,
1959, Pub.L. 86-257, Title VII,§§ 704(d), 706, 73 Stat. 544; Mar. 27, 1978, Pub.L. 95-251, § 3, 92 Stat. 184; Nov. 8, 1984,
Pub.L. 98-620, Title IV,§ 402(31), 98 Stat. 3360.)
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United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29

U.S.C..A. § 160

§ 160. Prevention of unfair labor practices

CmTentness
<Notes of Decisions for this section are displayed in two separate documents. Notes of Decisions for roman
heads XII through XVII are contained in this document. For additional Notes of Decisions, see the first
document for 29 USCA § 160.>

Notes of Decisions {8698)
29 U.S.C.A. § 160, 29 USCA § 160
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 161. Investigatory powers of Board, 29 USCA § 161

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas)
29

U.S.C.A. § 161

§ 161. Investigatory powers of Board

Currentness
For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion of the Board, are necessary and proper for the
exercise of the powers vested in it by sections 159 and 160 of this title--

(1) Documentary evidence; summoning witnesses and taking testimony
The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of
examination, and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded against that relates to
any matter under investigation or in question. The Board, or any member thereof, shall upon application of any party
to such proceedings, forthwith issue to such party subpenas requiring the attendance and testimony of witnesses or
the production of any evidence in such proceedings or investigation requested in such application. Within five days
after the service of a subpena on any person requiring the production of any evidence in his possession or under his
control, such person may petition the Board to revoke, and the Board shall revoke, such subpena if in its opinion the
evidence whose production is required does not relate to any matter under investigation, or any matter in question in
such proceedings, or if in its opinion such subpena does not describe with sufficient particularity the evidence whose
production is required. Any member of the Board, or any agent or agency designated by the Board for such purposes,
may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and receive evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and
the production of such evidence may be required from any place in the United States or any Territory or possession
thereof, at any designated place of hearing.

(2) Court aid in compelling production of evidence and attendance of witnesses
In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpena issued to any person, any district court of the United States or
the United States courts of any Territory or possession, within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or
within the jurisdiction of which said person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts
business, upon application by the Board shall have jurisdiction to issue to such person an order requiring such person
to appear before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give
testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such order of the court may
be punished by said court as a contempt thereof.

(3) Repealed. Pub.L. 91-452, Title II,§ 234, Oct. 15, 1970, 84 Stat. 930.

(4) Process, service and return; fees of witnesses
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Complaints, orders, and other process and papers of the Board, its member, agent, or agency, may be served either
personally or by registered or certified mail or by telegraph or by leaving a copy thereof at the principal office or
place of business of the person required to be served. The verified return by the individual so serving the same setting
forth the manner of such service shall be proof of the same, and the return post office receipt or telegraph receipt
therefor when registered or certified and mailed or when telegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of service of the same.
Witnesses summoned before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and mileage that are
paid witnesses in the courts of the United States, and witnesses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking
the same shall severally be entitled to the same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the United States.

(5) Process, where served

All process of any court to which application may be made under this subchapter may be served in the judicial district
wherein the defendant or other person required to be served resides or may be found.

(6) Information and assistance from departments
The several departments and agencies of the Government, when directed by the President, shall furnish the Board,
upon its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any matter before the Board.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 11, 49 Stat. 455; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 150; June 25, 1948, c. 646, § 32(b),
62 Stat. 991; May 24, 1949, c. 139, § 127, 63 Stat. 107; Oct. 15, 1970, Pub.L. 91-452, Title II,§ 234, 84 Stat. 930; June 11,
1960, Pub.L. 86-507, § 1(57), as added May 21, 1980, Pub.L. 96-245, 94 Stat. 347.)

Notes of Decisions (265)

29 U.S.C.A. § 161, 29 USCA § 161
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29 U.S.C.A. § 162

§ 162. Offenses and penalties

Currentness
Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede, or interfere with any member of the Board or any of its agents or
agencies in the performance of duties pursuant to this subchapter shall be punished by a fine of not more than $5,000
or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 12, 49 Stat. 456; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151.)

Notes of Decisions (7)
29 U.S.C.A. § 162, 29 USCA § 162
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)
29 U.S.CA. § 163
§ 163. Right to strike preserved

Currentness
Nothing in this subchapter, except as specifically provided for herein, shall be construed so as either to interfere with or
impede or diminish in any way the right to strike, or to affect the limitations or qualifications on that right.
CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 13, 49 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151.)

Noles of Decisions (49)
29 U.S.C.A. § 163, 29 USCA § 163
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas)
29 U.S.C.A. § 164
§ 164. Construction of provisions

Currentness
(a) Supenisors as union members
Nothing herein shall prohibit any individual employed as a supervisor from becoming or remaining a member of a
labor organization, but no employer subject to this subchapter shall be compelled to deem individuals defined herein as
supervisors as employees for the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.

(b) Agreements requiring union membership in violation of State law
Nothing in this subchapter shall be construed as authorizing the execution or application of agreements requiring
membership in a labor organization as a condition of employment in any State or Territory in which such execution or
application is prohibited by State or Territorial law.

(c) Power of Board to decline jurisdiction of labor disputes; assertion of jurisdiction by State and Territorial courts

(1) The Board, in its discretion, may, by rule of decision or by published rules adopted pursuant to subchapter II of
chapter 5 of Title 5, decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute involving any class or category of employers,
where, in the opinion of the Board, the effect of such labor dispute on commerce is not sufficiently substantial to warrant
the exercise of its jurisdiction: Provided, That the Board shall not decline to assert jurisdiction over any labor dispute
over which it would assert jurisdiction under the standards prevailing upon August I, 1959.

(2) Nothing in this subchapter shall be deemed to prevent or bar any agency or the courts of any State or Territory
(including the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico, Guam, and the Virgin Islands), from assuming and asserting jurisdiction
over labor disputes over which the Board declines, pursuant to paragraph (1) of this subsection, to assert jurisdiction.
CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 14, 49 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151; Sept. 14, 1959, Pub.L. 86-257,
Title VII,§ 70l(a), 73 Stat. 541.)

Notes of Decisions (123)
29 U.S.C.A. § 164, 29 USCA § 164
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
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United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annas)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas)
29 U.S.C.A. § 165
§ 165. Conflict of laws

Currentness
Wherever the application of the provisions of section 272 of chapter 10 of the Act entitled "An Act to establish a
uniform system of bankruptcy throughout the United States", approved July 1, 1898, and Acts amendatory thereof and
supplementary thereto (U.S.C., title 11, sec. 672), conflicts with the application of the provisions of this subchapter,
this subchapter shall prevail: Provided, That in any situation where the provisions of this subchapter cannot be validly
enforced, the provisions of such other Acts shall remain in full force and effect.
CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 15, 49 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151.)

Notes of Decisions (1)
29 U.S.C.A. § 165, 29 USCA § 165
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 166. Separability, 29 USCA § 166

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas)
29 U.S.C.A. § 166
§ 166. Separability

Currentness
If any provision of this subchapter, or the application of such provision to any person or circumstances, shall be held
invalid, the remainder of this subchapter, or the application of such provision to persons or circumstances other than
those as to which it is held invalid, shall not be affected thereby.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 16, 49 Stat. 457; June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 151.)

Notes of Decisions (2)
29 U.S.C.A. § 166, 29 USCA § 166
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 167. Short title of subchapter, 29 USCA § 167

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)

29 U.S.C.A. § 167
§ 167. Short title of subchapter

Currentness
This subchapter may be cited as the "National Labor Relations Act".

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 17, as added June 23, 1947, c. 120, Title I,§ 101, 61 Stat. 152.)

29 U.S.C.A. § 167, 29 USCA § 167
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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§ 168. Validation of certificates and other Board actions, 29 USCA § 168

United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs &Annas)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annas)

29 U.S.C.A. § 168
§ 168. Validation of certificates and other Board actions

Currentness
No petition entertained, no investigation made, no election held, and no certification issued by the National Labor
Relations Board, under any of the provisions of section 159 of this title, shall be invalid by reason of the failure of the
Congress of Industrial Organizations to have complied with the requirements of section l 59(f), (g), or (h) of this title
prior to December 22, 1949, or by reason of the failure of the American Federation of Labor to have complied with the
provisions of section l 59(f), (g), or (h) of this title prior to November 7, 1947: Provided, That no liability shall be imposed
under any provision of this chapter upon any person for failure to honor any election or certificate referred to above,
prior to October 22, 1951: Provided, however, That this proviso shall not have the effect of setting aside or in any way
affecting judgments or decrees heretofore entered under section 160(e) or (f) of this title and which have become final.
CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 18, as added Oct. 22, 1951, c. 534, § l(a), 65 Stat. 601.)

29 U.S.C.A. § 168, 29 USCA § 168
Current through P.L. 115-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End or Document
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United States Code Annotated
Title 29. Labor
Chapter 7. Labor-Management Relations (Refs & Annos)
Subchapter II. National Labor Relations (Refs & Annos)

29 U.S.C.A. § 169
§ 169. Employees with religious convictions; payment of dues and fees

Currentness
Any employee who is a member of and adheres to established and traditional tenets or teachings of a bona fide religion,
body, or sect which has historically held conscientious objections to joining or financially supporting labor organizations
shall not be required to join or financially support any labor organization as a condition of employment; except that such
employee may be required in a contract between such employees' employer and a labor organization in lieu of periodic
dues and initiation fees, to pay sums equal to such dues and initiation fees to a nonreligious, nonlabor organization
charitable fund exempt from taxation under section 50l(c)(3) of Title 26, chosen by such employee from a list of at
least three such funds, designated in such contract or if the contract fails to designate such funds, then to any such fund
chosen by the employee. If such employee who holds conscientious objections pursuant to this section requests the labor
organization to use the grievance-arbitration procedure on the employee's behalf, the labor organization is authorized
to charge the employee for the reasonable cost of using such procedure.

CREDIT(S)
(July 5, 1935, c. 372, § 19, as added July 26, 1974, Pub.L. 93-360, § 3, 88 Stat. 397; amended Dec. 24, 1980, Pub.L.
96-593, 94 Stat. 3452.)

Notes of Decisions (4)
29 U.S.C.A. § 169, 29 USCA § 169
Current through P.L. I 15-46. Also includes P.L. 115-49 to 115-51. Title 26 current through 115-52.
End of Document
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Utah Code

Chapter 20
Employment Relations and Collective Bargaining
34-20-1 Declaration of policy.
The public policy of the state as to employment relations and collective bargaining in the
furtherance of which this chapter is enacted, is declared to be as follows:
(1) It recognizes that there are three major interests involved, namely: that of the public, the
employee, and the employer. These three interests are to a considerable extent interrelated. It
is the policy of the state to protect and promote each of these interests with due regard to the
situation and to the rights of the others.
(2) Industrial peace, regular and adequate income for the employee, and uninterrupted production
of goods and services are promotive of all of these interests. They are largely dependent
upon the maintenance of fair, friendly, and mutually satisfactory employment relations and the
availability of suitable machinery for the peaceful adjustment of whatever controversies may
arise. It is recognized that certain employers, including farmers and farmer cooperatives, in
addition to their general employer problems, face special problems arising from perishable
commodities and seasonal production which require adequate consideration. It is also
recognized that whatever may be the rights of disputants with respect to each other in any
controversy regarding employment relations, they should not be permitted in the conduct of
their controversy to intrude directly into the primary rights of third parties to earn a livelihood,
transact business, and engage in the ordinary affairs of life by any lawful means and free from
molestation, interference, restraint, or coercion.
(3) Negotiation of terms and conditions of work should result from voluntary agreement between
employer and employee. For the purpose of such negotiation an employee has the right,
if he desires, to associate with others in organizing and bargaining collectively through
representatives of his own choosing, without intimidation or coercion from any source.
(4) It is the policy of the state, in order to preserve and promote the interests of the public, the
employee, and the employer alike, to establish standards of fair conduct in employment
relations and to provide a convenient, expeditious and impartial tribunal by which these
interests may have their respective rights and obligations adjudicated.
Enacted by Chapter 85, 1969 General Session

(Ji)

34-20-2 Definitions.
As used in this chapter:
(1) "Affecting commerce" means in commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the free
flow of commerce, or having led or tending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing
commerce or the free flow of commerce within the state.
(2) "Commerce" means trade, traffic, commerce, transportation, or communication within the state.
(3) "Election" means a proceeding in which the employees in a collective bargaining unit cast a
secret ballot for collective bargaining representatives or for any other purpose specified in this
chapter and includes elections conducted by the board or by any tribunal having competent
jurisdiction or whose jurisdiction was accepted by the parties.
(4)
(a) "Employee" includes any employee unless this chapter explicitly states otherwise, and
includes an individual whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
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any current labor dispute or because of any unfair labor practice, and who has not obtained
any other regular and substantially equivalent employment.
(b) "Employee" does not include an individual employed as an agricultural laborer, or in the
domestic service of a family or person at his home, or an individual employed by his parent or
spouse.
(5) "Employer" includes a person acting in the interest of an employer, directly or indirectly, but
does not include:
(a) the United States;
(b) a state or political subdivision of a state;
(c) a person subject to the federal Railway Labor Act;
(d) a labor organization, other than when acting as an employer;
(e) a corporation or association operating a hospital if no part of the net earnings inures to the
benefit of any private shareholder or individual; or
(f) anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of a labor organization.
(6) "Federal executive agency" means an executive agency, as defined in 5 U.S.C. Sec.105, of
the federal government.
(7) "Franchise" means the same as that term is defined in 16 C.F.R. Sec. 436.1.
(8) "Franchisee" means the same as that term is defined in 16 C.F.R. Sec. 436.1.
(9) "Franchisor" means the same as that term is defined in 16 C.F.R. Sec. 436.1.
(10) "Labor dispute" means any controversy between an employer and the majority of the
employer's employees in a collective bargaining unit concerning the right or process or details
of collective bargaining or the designation of representatives.
(11) "Labor organization" means an organization of any kind or any agency or employee
representation committee or plan in which employees participate that exists for the purpose, in
whole or in part, of dealing with employers concerning grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of work.
(12) "Labor relations board" or "board" means the board created in Section 34-20-3.
(13) "Person" includes an individual, partnership, association, corporation, legal representative,
trustee, trustee in bankruptcy, or receiver.
( 14) "Representative" includes an individual or labor organization.
(15) "Secondary boycott" includes combining or conspiring to cause or threaten to cause injury to
one with whom no labor dispute exists, whether by:
(a) withholding patronage, labor, or other beneficial business intercourse;
(b) picketing;
(c) refusing to handle, install, use, or work on particular materials, equipment, or supplies; or
(d) by any other unlawful means, in order to bring him against his will into a concerted plan to
coerce or inflict damage upon another.
(16) "Unfair labor practice" means any unfair labor practice listed in Section 34-20-8.
Amended by Chapter 370, 2016 General Session

34-20-3 Labor relations board.
(1)
(a) There is created the Labor Relations Board consisting of the following:
(i) the commissioner of the Labor Commission;
(ii) two members appointed by the governor with the consent of the Senate consisting of:
(A) a representative of employers, in the appointment of whom the governor shall consider
nominations from employer organizations; and
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(B) a representative of employees, in the appointment of whom the governor shall consider
nominations from employee organizations.

(b)
(i) Except as provided in Subsection (1 )(b)(ii), as terms of members appointed under
Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) expire, the governor shall appoint each new member or reappointed
member to a four-year term.
(ii) Notwithstanding the requirements of Subsection (1 )(b)(i), the governor shall, at the time
of appointment or reappointment, adjust the length of terms to ensure that the terms of
members appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) are staggered so one member is appointed
every two years.
(c) The commissioner shall serve as chair of the board.
{d) A vacancy occurring on the board for any cause of the members appointed under Subsection
(1 )(a)(ii) shall be filled by the governor with the consent of the Senate pursuant to this section
for the unexpired term of the vacating member.
(e) The governor may at any time remove a member appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) but
only for inefficiency, neglect of duty, malfeasance or malfeasance in office, or for cause upon
a hearing.
(f) A member of the board appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) may not hold any other office
in the government of the United States, this state or any other state, or of any county
government or municipal corporation within a state.
(g) A member appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii) may not receive compensation or benefits for
the member's service, but may receive per diem and travel expenses in accordance with:
(i) Section 63A-3-106;
(ii) Section 63A-3-107; and
(iii) rules made by the Division of Finance pursuant to Sections 63A-3-106 and 63A-3-107.
(2) A meeting of the board may be called:
(a) by the chair; or
(b) jointly by the members appointed under Subsection (1 )(a)(ii).
(3) The chair may provide staff and administrative support as necessary from the Labor
Commission.
(4) A vacancy in the board does not impair the right of the remaining members to exercise all the
powers of the board, and two members of the board shall at all times constitute a quorum.
(5) The board shall have an official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
Amended by Chapter 348, 2016 General Session
34-20-4 Labor relations board -- Employees -- Agencies -- Expenses.
(1) The board may employ an executive secretary, attorneys, examiners, and may employ such
other employees with regard to existing laws applicable to the employment and compensation
of officers and employees of the state as it may from time to time find necessary for the proper
performance of its duties. The board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other
agencies, and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from time to time be
needed. Attorneys employed under this section may, at the direction of the board, appear for
and represent the board in any case in court. Nothing in this act shall be construed to authorize
the board to employ individuals for the purpose of conciliation or mediation (or for statistical
work) where and if such service may be obtained from the Labor Commission.
(2) All of the expenses of the board, including the necessary traveling expenses, incurred by
the members or employees of the board under its orders, shall be allowed and paid on the
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presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the board or by any individual it
designates for the purpose.
Amended by Chapter 375, 1997 General Session
34-20-5 Labor relations board -- Offices -- Jurisdiction -- Member's participation in case.
The principal office of the board shall be at the state capitol, but it may meet and exercise any
or all of its powers at any other place. The board may, by one or more of its members or by the
agents or agencies it may designate, prosecute any inquiry necessary to its functions in any part
of the state. A member who participates in the inquiry may not be disqualified from subsequently
participating in a decision of the board in the same case.
Amended by Chapter 297, 2011 General Session
34-20-6 Labor relations board -- Rules and regulations.
The board shall have authority from time to time to make, amend and rescind such rules and
regulations as may be necessary to carry out the provisions of this act. Such rules and regulations
shall be effective upon publication in the manner in which the board shall prescribe.

~

Enacted by Chapter 85, 1969 General Session
34-20-7 Organization and collective bargaining -- Employees' rights.
Employees shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations,
to bargain collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection; and such
employees shall also have the right to refrain from any or all of such activities.
Enacted by Chapter 85, 1969 General Session
34-20-8 Unfair labor practices.
(1) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employer, individually or in concert with others:
(a) To interfere with, restrain or coerce employees in the exercise of the rights guaranteed in
Section 34-20-7.
(b) To dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or
contribute financial or other support to it; provided, that subject to rules and regulations made
and published by the board pursuant to Section 34-20-6, an employer is not prohibited from
permitting employees to confer with the employer during working hours without loss of time or
pay.
(c) By discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of
employment to encourage or discourage membership in any labor organization; provided,
that nothing in this act shall preclude an employer from making an agreement with a labor
organization (not established, maintained or assisted by any action defined in this act as
an unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment, membership therein, if
such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in Subsection
34-20-9(1) in the appropriate collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when
made.
(d) To refuse to bargain collectively with the representative of a majority of the employer's
employees in any collective bargaining unit; provided, that, when two or more labor
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organizations claim to represent a majority of the employees in the bargaining unit, the
employer shall be free to file with the board a petition for investigation of certification of
representatives and during the pendency of the proceedings the employer may not be
considered to have refused to bargain.
(e) To bargain collectively with the representatives of less than a majority of the employer's
employees in a collective bargaining unit.
(f) To discharge or otherwise discriminate against an employee because the employee has filed
charges or given testimony under this chapter.
(2) It shall be an unfair labor practice for an employee individually or in concert with others:
(a) To coerce or intimidate an employee in the enjoyment of the employee's legal rights, including
those guaranteed in Section 34-20-7, or to intimidate the employee's family, picket the
employee's domicile, or injure the person or property of the employee or the employee's
family.
(b) To coerce, intimidate or induce an employer to interfere with any of the employer's employees
in the enjoyment of their legal rights, including those guaranteed in Section 34-20-7, or to
engage in any practice with regard to the employer's employees which would constitute an
unfair labor practice if undertaken by the employer on the employer's own initiative.
(c) To co-operate in engaging in, promoting, or inducing picketing (not constituting an exercise of
constitutionally guaranteed free speech), boycotting or any other overt concomitant of a strike
unless a majority in a collective bargaining unit of the employees of an employer against
whom such acts are primarily directed have voted by secret ballot to call a strike.
(d) To hinder or prevent, by mass picketing, threats, intimidation, force, or coercion of any
kind the pursuit of any lawful work or employment, or to obstruct or interfere with entrance
to or egress from any place of employment, or to obstruct or interfere with free and
uninterrupted use of public roads, streets, highways, railways, airports, or other ways of travel
or conveyance.
(e) To engage in a secondary boycott; or to hinder or prevent, by threats, intimidation, force,
coercion, or sabotage, the obtaining, use or disposition of materials, equipment, or services;
or to combine or conspire to hinder or prevent the obtaining, use or disposition of materials,
equipment or services, provided, however, that nothing herein shall prevent sympathetic
strikes in support of those in similar occupations working for other employers in the same
craft.
(f) To take unauthorized possession of property of the employer.
(3) It shall be an unfair labor practice for any person to do or cause to be done on behalf of or in
the interest of employers or employees, or in connection with or to influence the outcome of any
controversy as to employment relations, any act prohibited by Subsections (1) and (2) of this
section.
Amended by Chapter 348, 2016 General Session

34-20-9 Collective bargaining -- Representatives -- Powers of board.
(1)
(a) Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining by the
majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for those purposes shall be the exclusive
representatives of all the employees in that unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in
respect to rate of pay, wages, hours of employment, and of other conditions of employment.
(b) Any individual employee or group of employees may present grievances to their employer at
any time.
Pages
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(2) The board shall decide in each case whether, in order to ensure to employees the full benefit
of their right to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and otherwise to effectuate the
policies of this act, the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining shall be the
employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision of same.
(3) Whenever a question affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly operation of industry arises
concerning the representation of employees, the board may investigate such controversy
and certify to the parties in writing, the name or names of the representatives that have been
designated or selected. In any such investigation, the board shall provide for an appropriate
hearing upon due notice, either in conjunction with a proceeding under Section 34-20-10, or
otherwise, and may take a secret ballot of employees, or utilize any other suitable method to
ascertain such representatives.

(4)
(a) Whenever an order of the board made according to Section 34-20-10 is based in whole or
in part upon facts certified following an investigation under Subsection (3), and there is a
petition for the enforcement or review of such order, the certification and the record of the
investigation shall be included in the transcript of the entire record required to be filed under
Section 34-20-10.
(b) The decree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting aside in whole or in part the order of
the board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set
forth in the transcript.

Gs.

Amended by Chapter 161, 1987 General Session

34-20-10 Unfair labor practices -- Powers of board to prevent -- Procedure.
(1)
(a) The board may prevent any person from engaging in any unfair labor practice, as listed in
Section 34-20-8, affecting intrastate commerce or the orderly operation of industry.
(b) This authority is exclusive and is not affected by any other means of adjustment or prevention
that has been or may be established by agreement, code, law, or otherwise.
(2) The board shall comply with the procedures and requirements of Title 63G, Chapter 4,
Administrative Procedures Act, in its adjudicative proceedings.
(3) When it is charged that any person has engaged in or is engaged in any unfair labor practice,
the board, or any agent or agency designated by the board, may issue and serve a notice of
agency action on that person.
(4)
(a) If, upon all the testimony taken, the board finds that any person named in the complaint has
engaged in or is engaging in an unfair labor practice, the board shall state its findings of
fact and shall issue and serve on the person an order to cease and desist from the unfair
labor practice and to take other affirmative action designated by the commission, including
reinstatement of employees with or without back pay, to effectuate the policies of this chapter.
(b) The order may require the person to make periodic reports showing the extent to which it has
complied with the order.
(c) If, upon all the testimony taken, the board determines that no person named in the complaint
has engaged in or is engaging in any unfair labor practice, the board shall state its findings of
fact and shall issue an order dismissing the complaint.
(5)
(a) The board may petition the district court to enforce the order and for appropriate temporary
relief or for a restraining order.
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(b) The board shall certify and file in the court:
(i) a transcript of the entire record in the proceeding;
(ii) the pleadings and testimony upon which the order was entered; and
(iii) the findings and order of the board.
(c) When the petition is filed, the board shall serve notice on all parties to the action.
(d) Upon filing of the petition, the court has jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question to
be determined.
(e) The court may grant temporary relief or a restraining order, and, based upon the pleadings,
testimony, and proceedings set forth in the transcript, order that the board's order be
enforced, modified, or set aside in whole or in part.
(f) The court may not consider any objection that was not presented before the board, its
member, agent, or agency, unless the failure or neglect to urge the objection is excused
because of extraordinary circumstances.
(g) The board's findings of fact, if supported by evidence, are conclusive.
(h)
(i) If either party applies to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence, and shows to
the satisfaction of the court that the additional evidence is material and that there were
reasonable grounds for the failure to adduce the evidence in the hearing before the board,
its member, agent, or agency, the court may order additional evidence to be taken before
the board, its member, agent, or agency, and to be made part of the transcript.
(ii) The board may modify its findings as to the facts, or make new findings, because of the
additional evidence taken and filed.
(iii) The board shall file the modified or new findings, which, if supported by evidence, are
conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting aside of
its original order.
Amended by Chapter 382, 2008 General Session

34-20-11 Hearings and investigations -- Power of board -- Witnesses -- Procedure.
For the purpose of all hearings and investigations, which, in the opinion of the board, are
necessary and proper for the exercise of the powers vested in it by Sections 34-20-9 and 34-20-10:
(1) The board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at all reasonable times have access
to, for the purpose of examination, and the right to copy, any evidence of any person being
investigated or proceeded against that relates to any matter under investigation or in question.
Any member of the board shall have power to issue subpoenas requiring the attendance and
testimony of witnesses and the production of any evidence that relates to any matter under
investigation or in question, before the board, its member, agent, or agency conducting the
hearing or investigation. Any member of the board, or any agent or agency designated by the
board, for these purposes, may administer oaths and affirmations, examine witnesses, and
receive evidence. Attendance of witnesses and the production of evidence may be required
from any place in the state at any duly designated place of hearing.
(2) In case of contumacy or refusal to obey a subpoena issued to any person, any district court of
Utah within the jurisdiction of which the inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which
the person guilty of contumacy or refusal to obey is found or resides or transacts business upon
application by the board shall have jurisdiction to issue to the person an order requiring the
person to appear before the board, its member, agent, or agency, to produce evidence if so
ordered, or to give testimony touching the matter under investigation or in question; and any
failure to obey the order of the court may be punished by the court as a contempt.
Page 7
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(3) In the event a witness asserts a privilege against self-incrimination, testimony and evidence
from the witness may be compelled pursuant to Title 77, Chapter 22b, Grants of Immunity.
(4) Complaints, orders, and other processes and papers of the board, its member, agent, or
agency, may be served either personally, by certified or registered mail, by telegraph, or by
leaving a copy at the principal office or place of business of the person required to be served.
The verified return by the individual serving the documents setting forth the manner of the
service shall be proof of the service, and the return post office receipt or telegram receipt
when certified or registered and mailed or telegraphed shall be proof of service. Witnesses
summoned before the board, its member, agent, or agency, shall be paid the same fees and
mileage that are paid witnesses in the courts of the state, and witnesses whose depositions are
taken and the persons taking them shall be entitled to the same fees paid for the same services
in the courts of the state.
(5) All departments and agencies of the state, when directed by the governor, shall furnish to the
board, upon its request, all records, papers, and information in their possession relating to any
matter before the board.
Amended by Chapter 296, 1997 General Session

34-20-12 Willful interference -- Penalty.
Any person who shall willfully resist, prevent, impede or interfere with any member of the board,
or any of its agents or agencies, in the performance of duties pursuant to this act shall be punished
by a fine of not more than $5,000, or by imprisonment for not more than one year, or both.
Enacted by Chapter 85, 1969 General Session

34-20-13 Right to strike.
This chapter does not interfere with, impede, or diminish in any way the right to strike.
Amended by Chapter 201, 1991 General Session

34-20-14 Determining joint employment status ... Franchisors excluded.
(1) For purposes of determining whether two or more persons are considered joint employers
under this chapter, an administrative ruling of a federal executive agency may not be
considered a generally applicable law unless that administrative ruling is determined to be
generally applicable by a court of law, or adopted by statute or rule .
(2)
(a) For purposes of this chapter, a franchisor is not considered to be an employer of:
(i) a franchisee; or
(ii) a franchisee's employee.
(b) With respect to a specific claim for relief under this chapter made by a franchisee or a
franchisee's employee, this Subsection (2) does not apply to a franchisor under a franchise
that exercises a type or degree of control over the franchisee or the franchisee's employee
not customarily exercised by a franchisor for the purpose of protecting the franchisor's
trademarks and brand.
Enacted by Chapter 370, 2016 General Session
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shall constitute the grand jury. I£ more than seven of such persons nre
present, their muncs must be written by the clerk on separate ba11ots, folded
so as to conceal the names. and p]accd in a box. The clerk must then draw
out of the box seven ballots, and the persons whose names are thereon shall
constitute the grand jury.
01•rtn<l jury to consist of seven: n,•e m:is fln1l
nn lncllctmcnt,· Con. n.rt. 1, sec. 13; §§ 87S7,
8820.

Fees at sr;iml Jurors, § 26-12.

3620. (1320.) Jurors in justice•s court. Summoning. When jtmn. :ire
required in nny jnsice's court, the number required by law must, upon thr
order of the justice thereof, he summoned by a peace officer of the juris•

diction.
Fees or Jurors In Justices' courts, § :?550.

Pn}·n1cnt or recs In nll,•a.nce, § 2aii-J,

3621. (1321.) Id. Qualifications. Such jurors must be summoned from
the persons resident in either the city or precinct, competent to serve as
jurors, nnd not exempt from such service, by notifying them orally that they
arc so ~ummoncdl and of the time and plncc at ,,;hich their attendance is

required.
3622. (1322.) Id, Return. The officer summoning such jurors must.
at or before the time fixed for their appenrancc, return the order to the court,
with a list of t_hc persons summoned inclorscd thereon.
3623. (1323.) Id. Number summoned. How drawn. At the time appointed for a jury trial in justices' courts, the list of jurors summoned, which
shall be eight, or double the number ~greed upon before the tria.1 by the
parties, must be called, and the names of those ntlending nnd not C"-cused
11111st be written upon separate slips of paper. folded so ns to conceal the
names, and placed in a box, fro,n which the trial jury must be clraW'n.
l\ront. Ch•. c. § 3·10•,
Jury trln.1 In justlcc1s coul't_. ctvU procedure,
§§ 7485-7-1S7.

,TurY trial ln j\Jstlco's court, crlmfnnl pro-

ce<lure.

n D-13-l-!1•145.

TITLE 58.
LABOR.

CHAPTER I.
BOARD OF LABOR
3634.

(1324.)

Appointment.

Qualifications.

Term.

Upon the ap-

prova.t of this chapter (1\·farch 14, 1901), the governor, by nnd with the consent of the senate, sha11 appoint three persons, not more than two of whom
shall bc1ong to the same political party, who shall be styled a state board
of labor, conciliation, and nrbitrntion. One shall he an employer of labor;
another shall be nn cmployc and be selected from some labor organization;
the third shall be some person who is neither an cmpJoye nor an employer
of manual lnbor, and shal1 be chnirman of the board. One shall serve for
one year, one for three years, and one for five years. ns may be designated
by the governor nt the time of their appointment. At the expiration of their
terms their successors shall be appointed in like manner for the term of
four years. Should a vacnncy occur at any time, the governor slmII, jn the
same manner, appoint some one to serve the unexpired term, a.nd until the
appoinment and qun.Hfication of bis successor. Each member of said board
shall, before entering upon his duties, take the constjtutional oath of office.
Amid '01, p. 68.
Autborlty ror crea.tlon oC botlt'tl, con. nrt. 10,
sr.c. !?.

Dulles or bonru lmposctl on ln<.lustrln.1 commission, sub, !I § · 30i0.

3635. (1325.) Secretary. The board shall select from its members n
secretary and shall establish suitable nt1es of procedure. Atn'd '01, p. 68.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00746

LABOR-BOARD OF.

779

3636. (1326.) Daty of board when strike or lockout is threatened.
Whenever it shall come to the know1cdgc of the said board that a strike1 or
lockout is seriously threatened in the state, involving any employer and his e_mployes, if he is employing hot less than ten pci•sons, it shall be the duty of
the said board to put itsc]f into communication as soon ns may be with such
employer and employ cs, nnd cndca vor by mediation to effect ·an a:n,icable
· settlement. Said ban.rd shall also request each of the parties to forward to
its secretary an application for arbitration.
R. S. '98, § 1333; '01, p. 68.
Burc:iu or lmmlsrntlon, lll.bor, n.ncl sl:illsllcs,
§1 ao::-t-303-1.

Duties or lh{s cl10ptcr hnposc,l on the Jndustl'lnl commission. sub. !l, § 3076.
Ln.uorers mny organize, §§ 3G51-3G5S.

3637. (1327.) Duty of board after application to arbitrate received.
As soon as practicable after receiving such applications, the board shall request each of the parties to the dispute to agree upon a written statement
of facts relating to the controversy, and to submit the same to the board;
providrd, that, when such agreement and statc·mcnt cannot be reached, each
of sn.icl parties may separately submit to the hoard a writtc11 stn.temc11t of
grievances. Applications to the said board for arbitration on the part
of employers must precede any lockout, and, on the part of the employcs,
any strike; proi.-'idcd, that, in case lockout or strike already exists, the board
shall accord arbitration if the parties shall resume their refations with each
other, as employers and cmploycs. Said applications shall include a promise
to abide by the decision o[ the board and shall be signed by the employer
or employers, or his or their authorized agent, on the one side, and by a
mnjority of his or. their cmploycs on the other.
'01, p. 69.
3638. (1328.) Bo~d to arbitrate. .May employ stenographer. As soon
as 1:>racticable after teceiving said applications, the board shaH proceed to
arbitrtLte. When it shall be necessary, in the judgment of said board, it may
engage the services of a stenographer to take and transcribe an account
of any arbitration proceedings.
'01, p. 69.
3639. (1329.) May subpa!na witnesses. General powers. The board
~hatl have power to summon as witnesses by subpccna any operative or expert in departments of business affected, and nny person who keeps the
record of wages catned in those departments, or any other person, and to
adminrstcr oaths, and to examine said witnesses, and to require the -production of books, papers, and records. In case of disobedience to a sttbpccna
the board may invoke the aid of any court in the state in requiring the attendnnce and testimony of witnesses, and the production of books, papers,
and documents under the provisions of this section. Any of the district
courts of the state, within the juris<lictio11 of which such inquiry is carried
on, may, in case of contltmncy, or refusal to obey a subpccna issued to any
such witness, issue an prdcr requiring such witness to appear before said
board a.nd produce books and papers if so ordered, and give evidence touching the matter in question. Any refusal to obey such order of the court may
be punished by such court as a contempt thereof.
R. S. '98, § 1330; '01, p. 69.
3640. (1330.) Mayors and sheriffs to notify board of threatened strikes
or lockouts. It shall be the duty of mayors of cities and sheriffs of cou_nties,
when any condition likely to lead to a strike or lockout exists in the cities .or
districts where they have jurisdiction, to immediately forward information o[
the same to the secretary of the state board of conciliation and arbitration.
Sttch information shall include the names and addresses of persons who should
be communicated with by the board.
'01, p. 69.
3641. (1331.) Sheriff to serve process. Any notice or process issued
by the state board of labor, conciliation, and arbitration shall be served by
~riy sheriff to whom the same mny be directed, or in whose lmicls the same
may be placed for servicc1 without charge.
R. S. 198, § 1335; '01, p. 69.
3642. (1332.) Decision of board. As soon as practicable after the board
has investigated the differences existing between employer and employes, it
shall make an equitable decision, which shall state what, if anything. should
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be done by either or both parties to the dispute, in order to amicably settle and
adjust the differences e.~isting between them. The findings of a majority of
the board shall constitute its decision.
R. S. '981 § 1331; '01, p. 70.
3643. ' (1333.) Decision to be recorded and made public. This decision
shall at once be made public; shall be recorded upon the propc1· book of record
to be kept by the secretary of said board, und a short statement thereof published in an annual report to be made to the governor before the 1st day of
March, of each year.
R. S. '98, § 1327; '01, p. iO,
3644. (1334.) Compensation of members. The members of the boa.rd
shall each receive a compensation of $4 for each day's service while engaged in
arbitration, said compensation to be paid by the parties to the controversy in
such proportion as the board may decide; they shall also r!!ccive the actual
and necessary expenses incurred in the performance o( their official duties,
which expenses shall be paid out of the state treasury.

R S. '98, § 1334; '01, p. 70.

CHAPTER 2.

BETTERING CONDITIONS OF LABOR.

('17, p. 210.)
3651. Labor unions not unlawful. It shall not be unlawful for working
men and women to organize themselves into, or tat·ry on, labor unions for the
purpose of lessening the hours of labor, increasing the wages, bettering the
conditions of the members of such organization; or carrying out their legitimate purposes as freely as they could do if acting singly.
Unlawful to coerce one to join or sur,1,ot·t or-

ganl7.atlon, ~, 8329, S330.

Penalty ror soUdUns 01· rcccl\ltns- moncl·

Crom cmplorcs, § 83.2G.

3652. Injunctions in labor disputes prohibited. No restraining order or
injunction slrnlt be granted by any court of the state of Utah, or a judge or
the judges thereof, in nny case between nu employer and employcs, or between employers and employes, or between employers, or between vcrsons
emplo.yed and per.sons seeking employment, involving, or growing cmt of,
a dispute concerning terms or conclitions of employment, unless necessary to
prevent irreparable injury to property, or to n property right of the party
making the application, for which injury there is 110 adequate remedy at law,
and such property or property rights must be described with particularity in
the application, which must be in writing and sworn to by the applicant, or by
his agent or attorney.
3653. Right to cease labor secured. Right
assemble. And no such
restraining order or injunction shall prohibit any person or persons, whether
singly or in concert, from terminating any relation of employment, or from
ceasing to perform any work or labor, or from recommending, advising, or
persuading others by peaceful means so to do; or from attending at nny place
where such person or persons may lawfully be, _for the purpose of pcacc[ully
obtaining or communicating information, or from peacefully pcrsuadfpg any
person to work or to abstain fro in working; or from ceasing to patronize or
to employ any party to such dispute, or from recommending, advising, or persuading others by peaceful means and lawful means so to do; or from paying
or givjng to or withholding from any person cngnged in such dispute nnv·
strike benefits or other moneys or things of value; or from peaceably
sembling in a lawful manner, and for lawfol purposes; or from doing any act
or thing which might lawfully be clone in the nbsencc of such dispute b,r any
pa.rtv thereto; nor shall any of the acts specified in this paragraph be consid ..
crel or held to be violations or the law of the state of Utah.
3654. Contempts. Orders to show cause. Procedure. Bail. Whenever
it shaJl be made to aJ~pear to any district court or ju?ge thereof, or to any

to

as-
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judge therein sitting, by the return· of a proper officer on lawful process, or
upon the affidavit of some crcclitable person, or by in formation filed by any
district attorney, that there is reasonable ground to believe that any person
has been ·guilty of su<!h contempt, the court or judge thereof, or any judge
thcrdn sitting, may issue .a rule requiring the said person so charged. to show
cadsc upon n day certain why he should not he punished therefor, ,\'vhich ·ru1e,
together with a copy a£ the affidavit or in formation, sha~I be served upoit
the J>crson charged, with sufficient promptness to enable him to prepare for
and make return to the ordci- at the time fix.:?d therein. If 111>011 or by such
return, in the judgment of the court, the alleged contempt be not sufficiently
purged, a trial shall be directed nt a time and place fixed by the court; pro-,
,•iclcd. howc'i·cr. that if the nccusccl, being a natural person, fail or refuse to
make return to the rule to show cause, an attachment may issue against his
person to compel an answer, ancl in case of his continued failure or refusal,
or if for any reason it be impracticable to dispose of the matter on the :return
day, he ma.y be required to give reasonable bail for his attendance atthc trial
and his submission to the final judgment of the court. Where the accused is
n body corporate, an attachment for the scclucstrntion of its ·property ihtty be
issued upon like refus'1.l or failure to answer.
3655. Trial by jury. In all cases within the purview of this chapter, such
trial may be by the court, or, upon clcmancl of the accust:cl, by n jury; in which
latter event the court may impanel a jury from the jurors then in attendance,
or the court or the judge thereof in chambers may cause a sufficient 1imnher
CJf jurors to be selected and summoned, as provided by law, to attend at the
time and place of tria1 1 at which timr. a jury shall be selected and impaneled
as upou n trial for misdemeanor i and such trial shall conform, as near as may
be, to the practice in criminal cases prosecuted by indictment or upon information.
3656. Judgment. Payments. Limitations. 1f the accused be found
guilty, judgment shall be entered accordingly, prescribing the punishment,
either by fine or imprisonment, or both, in the discretion of the court. Such
line shall be paid to the state of Utah, or to the complai11ant or other pnrty
injured hy the net constituting the contcmpt or may, where more than one is
so damaged, be divided or apportioned among them as the 1.:ourt may direct,
lnit in no case shall the fine to be paid to the sta~c of Utah exceed, in case
the accused is a natuntlpcrson, the sum of $1000, nor shall such iniprisonmcnt
exceed the term of six months; prodded., that in any cnsc the court or a judge
thereof may, for good cause shown, by affidavit, 01· proof taken in open court
or before such judge and filed with the papers in the case, dispense with the
rule to show cause, nnd may issue nn attachment for the arrest of the person
charged with contempt i in which event such person, when arrested; shall be
brought before such court or a judge thereof without unnecessary delay, and
shall be admitted to bail in reasonable penalty for his appearance to answer
to the charge or for trial for the contempt; mid thcrca rtcr the proceedings
shall be the same as provided herein in case the rule had issued in the first
instance.
3657. Anti-trust laws not applicable to labor organi'lations. The lnbor
of a human being is not a commodity or article. oi conuncrce. Nothing contained in the anti-trust Jaws shall be construed to f orbicl the existence and
op_cration of labor 1 ngrkulturaJ, or horticultural organizntions, instituted for
the purpose of mutual help, and not having capital stock or conducted for
profit, or to forbid or restrain individual members of such organizations f ram
lawfully carrying out the legitimate objects thereof; nor shall such organizations, or the members thereof, he held or <:onstrucd to he illegal combinations
or conspiracies in restraint of trade, under the anti-trust laws.
3658. Right of trial by jury-practice. _li, nll cases where persons. arc
charged with contempt ·of court for the ,,iolation or writs of injunction. issued
within the pun•icw of this chapter, unless ~uch contempt be committed in the
immediate presence of the court, the accused shnll have the right to a jttty trial
1

1
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upon demand, and, in case a jury trial be demanded, such jury shall be selected and impaneled as in criminal cases, and the trial shall conform as nearly
as may be to the district court practice in criminal cases.

CHAPTER 3.
EIGHT-HOUR LAW.

3666. (1336.) On public works. Eight hours shall constitute a day's
work in all penal institutions in this state, whether state, county, or municipal.
ailcl on all works and undertnkings carried on or aided by the state, co1mty, or
municipal governments. Any officer of the state or of any county or municipal government, or any person, corporation, firm, contractor, agent, mnnngcr, or foreman, who shall require or contract with any person to work in
any penal institution or upon st1ch works or undertakit1gs longer than eight
honrs in 011e calendar day, except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in imminent danger, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
·
Am'd '01, p. 37 i '03, p. 85.
3667. (1337.) In mines and smelters. The period of employment of
working men in an underground mines or workings, and in smelters and all
other institutions for the reduction or refining of ores or metals, shall be eight
hours per day, except in cases of emergency, where life or property is in imminent danger. Any person, body corporate, agent, manager, or employer
who shall ,·iolatc any of the provisions of this section shall be deemed guiltv
o{ a misdmcanor.
·
Autho1•f7.ed Lly Con. ni·t. 16, sec. 6,
p. !ll!I, ru.w!i 18!16, npply with equnl force to
Llmlllnc hom-s or employment or remnlcs,

§ 3Gi'l.

This lnw held to be constltutlonal.
Sta.le v. Hotucn. H U. ns: 46 P, 1105.
Ex J>a.rta Hoh.lan, 1-1 U. 71; 4G P. 7iiG; nlllrmell

lG!I U. S. 3GG.

'rhe pro,·lslons or this s!!<:tlon nnu clmp. 'i!l,

cmplo)·er and cmploye, n.nd a. person who works
for nnotber In a. mill or reduction works more
ll11tn clsht hours per duy cn.nnot recover on :t.
qunntum meruit for his scr\'lces during the

overUine.
Short v. DutJJon
li1 I?. 720.

n.

& C. :\£. Co., 20

u.

20:

CHAPTER 4.
EMPLOYMENT OF FEi\·IALES AND CHILDREN.
3668. (1338.) In mines and smelters forbidden. It shall be unJawfu] for
any person, firm, or corporation to employ any child under fourteen years of
age, or any female, to work in any mine or smelter in the state of Utah. Any
person, firm, or corporation who sha.11 violate any of the provisions of this
section sh~U be dccmecl guilty of a misdemeanor.
Authorl:7.el1 t,1• Con. nrt. lG, sec. 3.

3669. (1339.) Proprietor to provide seats for female help. The proprietor, manager, or person having charge of any store, shop, hotel, restat1rant, or
other place where wori1cn or girls arc employed as clerks or help therein, shal1
provide chairs, stools, or other contrivances. where such clerks or help may
rest when not employed in the discharge of their respective duties. Any person who shall Yiolatc any of the provisions of this section shall be guilty of n
misdemeanor.
:Ml~llllJl( WAGE SC.ALl!: FOR l!"Ei\IALES.

('13: p. 9.J..)
3671. Unlawful to pay less than scale. It shall be unlawful for any regular employer of female workers in the state of Utah to pay any woman less
than the wage in this section spccilicd, to wit: l1 or minors, under the age of
eighteen years, not less than iS _cents per day; for ndult ]earners and apprentices, not Jess than 90 cents per day; pro,:itlc,,C that the learning period of
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apprenticeship shall not extend for more than one year; for adults who arc
experienced in the work they arc employed to perform1 not less than $1.25

per day.
3672. Certificate of apprenticeship. All regular employers of female
workers shall give a certificate of apprenticeship £or time served to aU apprentices.
3673. Penalty. Any regular employer of fomalc workers who shall pay
to any woman less than the wage specified in § 3671 shall be guilty of a misdemeanor.
3674. Commissioner of immigration, labor, and statistics to enforce chapter. The commissioner of immigration, labor, and statistics shall have general charge of the enforcement of this chapter, but violations of the same shall
be prosecuted by all the city, state 1 and county prosecuting officers in the same
manner as in other cases of misdemeanor,
.
Duties or commlsslonc1· or lmml~rritlon, lnbot·,
nnu stntlstlcs hnposo,1 on tn,1t1strlnl comm.Js-

tilon, § 307G.

I~~IPLOYMENT OF 1.-E:UALES.

('11, p. 265.)
3677. Limiting hours of employment. Exceptions. No female shall be
employed in any manufacturing, mechanical, or mercantile ~stnblishmcnt,
laundry, hotel, or restaurant, or telegraph or telephone estabhshmcnt, hospital or office, or by a.ny express or transportation company in this state, more
than nine hours during any one day, or more than fifty-four hours in any one
wcck 1 except in cases o[ emergency in hospitals and in cases of emergency or
where li[e or property is in imminent danger or where materials arc liable to
spoil by the en forccment of this section.
3678. Penalty. Any person or persons, corporation1 or other association engaged in conducting or operating a.ny of the business institutions oL·
enterprises set forth in the foregoing section, requiring or employing any female to work longer than the period of nine hours constituting a day 1s labor.
except a5 above prnvidedt or more than fifty-four hours in any one week, shall
l>c guilty of n misdemeanor, and, upon conviction thereof shall be fined not
less than $25 nor more than $100, and costs of prosccL1tion.
D\ll)' or conuuhislonl!r or hnmll,;ratlon, lnbor,
allll !:tl:tllsllcs, to curo1·cc, § :lO!!'i.

'£he lndustrlnl commission Is lhc commls-

slonc1• or hrm1isrntlo11,
sub. !l, § :l07G.

Jnbor nnd sltLtlslll's,

CHAPTER 5.
BLACKLISTING.
3680. (1340.) Forbidden. No co~np.tny, corporntion, nor individual
shall blacklist> or publish, or cause to be published or blacklisted, any employc,
mechanic, or laborer, discharged or voluntarily leaving the service of snch
company, corporation, or individual, with intent and for the purpose of preventing such emplc_>ye, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or scci1ring similar or other employment from any other corporation, company, or indjviclual.
Exchn.n,;Cl o! hhtcltllsts !orbldtlen, Con. n.rt. 12,

sec.

W: nrt. 16, sec. 4,

3681. (1341.) Penalty. If any person or nny officer or agent of uny
company, corporation, or individual shall blacklist1 or publish, or cause to be
published, nny cmployc, mechanic, or laborer, discharged by such corporation, compnny 1 or individual, with the intent nnd for the purpose of preventing such cmployc, mechanic, or laborer from engaging in or securing similnr
or other employment from any other corporation, company, or individual, or
shall in any manner conspire or contrive, by correspondence, or otherwise, to
prevent such discharged employe from securing timploymcnt, he shall be
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deemed guilty of a felony and, upon conviction, shall be fined not less than
$500, nor more th~n $1,000, and be imprisoned in the state prison not less th:rn
sixty days nor more than one year.

CHAPTER 6.
FELLOW SERVANTS.
3682. (1342.) Who arc vice-principals. All persons engaged· in the
service of any pc1·son, firm,
corporation, foreign or domestic, doing business in this state, who arc intrustcd by such person, firm, or corporation as
employer with the authority of supcrinkndencc, control, or command or other
persons in the employ or service or such employer, or with the authority to
direct any other cmployc in the pcrf ormancc or any duties of such cmployc,
arc \'ice-principals of 5uch employer nnd arc not fellow servants.

or

,vlio nrc follm\• Ncrwrnts, l !lti8!l, n111I 11ulc.
N1·J.{l1~1•u1·c ,·n:ioN 1ml bcutlui; 111111n un~- 111·11,·ll{lon or llm i.tatul~s um uut hwhulcd In I.hi~
,·olumo.
NOT FELLOW SERY' ANTS:
T.he conductor of a mUwny trnlu wllh n
hmkr.nmn upuu lhc tho trnln.
Openshaw \'. U. & N. R}·. Co,. Ii U, 13:?.
A brakem.:in wJLh a ~nr ln:-1w1•tor.
Dnlllt'l:i \'. U. P. Rr. Co•• Ii u. :t5i; 2:1 P. 71i:!.
An engineer \\ilh it hrakNn:lll.
131'UWll \·. Hnu. Pnr.
Co., 7
:!SS: :!G P.

n,-·.
u.
rm•.A switchman i;l~nnllng to nn cn~lnc \\'llh

uwn r~1mlrln,: the c::1r.
Pool , .• Sou. Puc. Co., 'i U. !103; :;ec

lhc

.!tl\lllC

case, lliO U, ~. :.t:tS.

A car rc:p:1lrer wHh nn engineer.
Wubh \'. l'L G. W. R)·. Co., 7 U. :lll:I: !!G P.
, 981.
Neither .a section foreman nor those working
umlor him, uor ll. lolcgt-:lJlh 0111milor, with nn
•m1:lnccr.
Nrcslc:y ,•. Sou. Pac. ~·. Co., 3;; U. !?lill: 99

P. lOGi.
I
A ~iirdman with the foremun or hlH own
t•rc,,· nor wltll the forcnmu of nnt'lthrr c?rcw
worlcln~ In lhc smnc l't\l'tl nt th(? smna lime.
Arm:.Lroni: \'. 0. S. L.
Co•• S U. •120: :1!?
P. G!l:1.
A rnllro;id foreman h:n-tn~ run clmr~c of

ny.

toa<lhlJt

l'SU1'

Inn grm·el pit with :-iuch lnllorc~.

Antlct,;on , •• OJ:clcm R~• ttlltl Dc1>ot Co.. S U.

1:?S; :10 l,. :JO;i,
A l;iborer In car' shops uml f()l't'lntln c,f
swlldunen In lrnln clc1mrtmcnt.
Pool ,•• 8. P. en., :!0 u. 210; liS P. :J!!G.
Plaintiff held to be a volunteer, not u St1l'\'aniiMcchmi1 , •• East 'l'lntlc R)•, Co., 2:r U. •l!?;
G·l P. -lfi:I.
Tne foreman of .i mine h,·wlnb cnllrc rh:1r1,~
or the t1t,,lar~1·011nll worlclugs with 11 miner
working umlcr his lllrc.•dlon.
Cunnlni;lmlll ,._ U. P. R>·· Co., .\ U. :.?Oti: 'i
P. 7!1ii.

'trlhnr ,.. nrooldyn i\llnln,; Co .• -I U. 4!iS;
11 P. GJ2.
.
A superintendent of il mine with n c:ommcm
Jnbnrcr.
Rcfl(lon ,._ U. P, Ry. Co., ii U •. 34,J; Hi P.
202.

A miner wilh one Cnt(lloyccl ni; a tool•t~nrr(er,
who!ic onh· dul)' It bi to tnke Hhnrpcnect tooli;
Into the mine uncl thro\\" them off nt ,•,u•Jous
lc,·ch; niul h1·ln~ up the dull ones.
JcnklnM v. ;unmmolh .\1. Co., :?~ U. i,J:J; GS

r. sm.

A miner with on~ whrnic dul)• It I~ lo m11nn1;c mill ·opcrntc n <':t.i:c >w whh-h Ute rulncn;
cum-crcu In unrl 1.mt or the min<':
Id.
Acting forem.in on telegr.1ph llne wll h tt lluc-

UJ"t!

mnn.

Ji'rlt7. \', \V<'Htam Union T. Cn,, 2:i U, ~Ii:'::
71 P. :!0!I,
•
Two miners working on df1Teri:nt levels.
Shfehllf ,·. Sllvar mni:: Cnnllllon, r,o U. -:
lGG P. !ISS.
A fum.icemiln with gmter whom he dlrt:cu,
Ulnh Con. :\J. Co, v. Paxton,' liiO F. lH.

A mucker cttllcll lo nsslst In rcmo,•lng rcr•
lalnUml1e1~ from cnrn h>,· num:is of thtl hulslm1,;-lnl!cl'.
Votn. \·. Ohio Co111,cr Co., •12 u. J!!!l; r:.!!l P.

1111,: onJ;'fue with the

:l,l!t,

Employcs working under a superlntcndcl'lt
In rcJ)illrln~ the rlr:ht-of-\\·1L,-· of tl mllro:ul,
while being c:u-rtc,l hr n lmtn ln their work
wJlh Lhc lr,tln crew.
J:u:·hctl1L "· S:111 Pc1lro t!tc. n. n. Co., 36 l!.
·li0; l0a P. 100.
Where two sections of a tr.trn are operated
as two distinct .u1d Independent trains, th"
mcmhc1-:s of tho ,~1·cw or onr. scdlon with the
mcmbcmi of l he ,·row of lhu olhar Sl't:Uon.
~{eyers , •• S;tn Pc,lro etc. n. R, Co., :JO u.
!107; 10.f P. 736.
A mnn working on the rnltroad tr:ic:ks with
those 01,emtln,: Lhc lmlns,
Grou \'. O. S. L. It. R. Co., ,17 U. !?Ii: 150
P. !170.
Where- a forem.:in of a mine, a.'! the a~cnt
or tho "ompnn)', ~clorts un cm11lurc to tnlcc the
place lcm11orn.ril~• of :inothcr ~m11lo:rl'! who Is
excm;crl frotit worlr, nnrl the 11crsi:Jn ao se)ec:tccl
l,i subject to tha illrcc-llon und control of lhc
c-011111,mr. \\-Idell mar tllsduu•ge J1tm nt nil)'
llmc, the rclnUonRl1IJ1 hclwccn him nnd tho
cmnpany IH lhnt o( mnslcr ancl scrrnnl.
Wilson v. Slou:. Con. ~[. Co., lfi U. :m2; :i:?
P. G~G •.

VICE PRINCIPALS:
Whatever w.is done by the foreman In the
mine tn lct\\'lni;- the hole In lhc plntrorm wus
t•luu·g~tLhlc lo tho ,~cm11mm·.
lJO\\"ncy , •• Gemini 1\I. Co., 2-1 U. ~JI; liS P.
-11-1.
Where, In an nctlon for Injuries, the mwontJ'tltllcLccl c\•hlcrwc ohowctl lhut n. wu~ <lcfonrlnnt 's rorcnmn. It wns uot ·error- tor tha t·ourt
lo 11.SSttn1c llmt he wns n \'h:c-nrfnt"frml.
nlnck v, norJcy lrt. Dell Tel. Co., !?G U. 4/i I;
i3 P. 51-1.
Persons eno.ioed In the service or the mas•
ter, who are lntrusted by hlrn with th~ man-

Hh"l'mcnt or ,1Jrcl'llOn of his gcncrnt w<irlt, or
wJlll some purllL•ulnl' p1Lrl lhcrcof, .,trc nnt rcllo,\· scr,·n.nls. with the subordlni1tc cm1lloyc:1.
hut vtcc-prlnclpn.ls.
,Johnson \', U. P. Cont Co., !?S U. ·IG: iG P.
1

osn.

In the nbsence or a statute In Nevada daUn-

lng fcllo\~· sct'\'nnts, tho test lo b~ RJlfJll01l I~
whether cho ncgll,;ont net which cnusNl U1c JnJuri• wns n brcneli or n. posllh'c duty c.w!n,; hy
lhc mnstcr to hi~ ticn·nnt, ln which c•1H1a thcJlCl'!',>n performing lltc ncl ht n \'ll"C•Jlrlndpnl,
:iml .not ti. (CIIO\\· ::ICT\":ln l.
Morrh,on ~. Sl\n Pc,lro R. Co., ~ U. 85; SS
P. ll!IS.

Mcrrlll "·
81 P. 85.

o. s.

L, lt

n.

Co •• !!!l

u.

26·1:

Pool v •. S. P, Co., 20 U. 210; GS P. :l!!G.

Where the f.icts .ire undisputed, whether co~
Cf11Jllorcs nrc fcJIO\\'•SCl"\'Janls IR :t. CJUClHlou. or
!IL\\' for the l'Ourt: hut fl fnC'ts ure dlsrmtc,l,
th.c t~oul·t sltoul,1 l'onslruc the stntult?s, niut
lcn.vc the riucsllon to the Jun·.
Shephcl'd' v, O. & R. G. R. R. Co •• 41 U.
·I Gil: l:?11 I'. G!J!?,
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ln an action for wrongful death of n servant
of a. rallroad company lt11lcd in :i. foreign st:,tc,

Dfmmlclc v. Ut11b Fuel Co., 40 U. 430; 164 p.
8i2.

;mtl

ing mlni1rs lo •.mcl from the lower lcvol ls Lo
them n vlco-p1·l1wi1lul.
l•"m•non ,.. SU\"cr King Conllllon lf. Co., 50

It will ho tfr:!sttnuHl, In the allM1,n1t•e ur m•lden<-'c
thereon~ LJ111l Jn,vs shulhu· lo the nhn\'C 1mc:llori
§ 6505 wcrn. In forc:t, nl tho r1lm:c of the

nc,•htcnt,

flntl Lh:i.l

umJ~t·

8lWh bt\\'li

L.lm

(!Ill•

plnycs h1 charge or the r.nllruad u-aln wcreo nol
fallow s01-vnnt." nf tt1wk hLhorl!~.
Grow ,•• 0, 8. L. JL lL co., -!-I U. IGO;
138 P. !HIS.
A. ch:iroe In the f.tnguage ~f the st.Jtute :1~
tn \\'hill (!(H\~tllULt!li \'lco-1>rh1cl11nh1 tlllll fello\\'
c1·roJ', bul tl!i the c\'hleurc ~howt!tl
llmL lhc pl:Lhtllff 1tncl lh(' 1m1·son l~llllilng the

ser\':tnls ,vn~

lnjur1• · were not fclluw sc1·\·anti;, IL wmi not

An engineer who operntes .a mine hoist cnrry-

U. - : lli7 P. Gili.

One hnvlng the oenernl control and euper'."
vision of r.illro.i.tl repnlr \\'Ork u.nd gh•ln,: ccncm1 cllrc1:Uons rC."lJJC1!Un1: the mo\·cmcnt.B or
work frahis ls n \·kc-1>rJncl1>1LJ or lllc htbot·c1·s
1.m1111oyc1l to tlo rt?J'llllr work.
.Jc1'.ht:lltl , •• Snn Pedro, etc.,
U. •17U; tOi, P. 100.

n.

R. Co., 3ti

prcjmll cln I.

3683. (1343.) Who are fellow servants. All persons who nrc engaged
i11 the scn•icc of such employer. and who, while so engaged, arc hi the same
grade of service and arc working together at the ~tune time and place ai1d to
a common purpose, neither of !-inch pcr:;e>ns being intrustcd by such employer"
with any superintendence or control over his fellow cmploycs. are fellow
scrvnnts with each c,thcr; pror·idcd, that nothing herein contained shall be so
construed as to make the cmplnycs of such employer fellow servants with
other cmplnycs engaged in any othci- <lcpnrtment of service of such employer.
Employcs who do not come within the provisions of this section sh~tll not be
con!-';idcred fcl1ow sc1~v:ti1ts.
Whn arc nc.it (clhm• i;cr,·unl~.

~

noLe. ·

~r;s~. and

l)(~tcnsc or fc~Unw ~M,'nnl nU11wc(I. whnn e11111lo>·cr l'lll'l'.IC~ lmm1·:11wll, ~ !U:!_i: m11I. d(.'lllr:1I
whi:iu «ll!ll1loyl'l' clocM nnl 1·a1·ry ln~uram·e. ·§
:11:!!f.
.

The nbove definltlon of the te·rm ''fellow servants" t:;
llmt lbc lci;lslallll'C tmd nulhnrlll'

on~

·

u.

Dt·yhm·,.; , •• lh.:J'CUl' lt. Co., 18

·

·110: i'iii P.

:IG7.

In _an actfon ror Injuries recel."ed prfor to· fel•
low serv.ant law of 1896, lhc 1·ch1llun or pliitn;.
tin• ;tnd the· C!Jl~lnuct Wllll tn l1c 1lclcl'JlJln1!tl ht
,~ommon t:1 w ruto. :tnd, under l t, they were
(clluw ·~cr\·nnts.

Sloll v. l)al.\.• l{. Co., 1!1

u. :m;

ii7

r.

!!!Hi.

A tr:icl< wnlker of r.tllronrl cc,rmiun:r. 1mclrr
c:onunun htw, IH fellow :.cr,·;ml wllh nn C'llgl-

nccr.

~t~ph:tnl "· S. P. Co •• HI U. l!lti; 57 P. ~M.
The common lnw rule that n tr.tin t·n111hw•
lor iH nol u fcUo\\' scit\·unl with hht nuhorrHtmlc;; c:umol be clmni;ml hy u r<>gulnllon or
tho COUlll•lUY,
ltl,

The shift bosses were, .JS to one another, .follow· :iC!1·vnnlf1, uncl rlcfcmliml wa~ not lhthl~ ror
their Ntrclc!iimes.", unl~s the r•:1r~lc:tsn~~s · w:is
brou~lll lo the ntt('nllo!l or lhc dcfcmliu1f, \\·Im
nc~llgC!ntly fnllctl lo c:omnumlt·utc lhc dan1;cl'

to the plnlnllrr.

•

P-. !WI.

v.

ln_structloi1 definlno fellow servllnts ht.•ld :mJ·ffolcnt.
. .
nrm~ggcl· v, o. s. L. u. n. Cu., 2-1 tt. :rn1;

118 P. 1-10

WHO ARE FELLOW SERV_ANTS:

tu urnlcc,

nusllJ.:"l'JH'C Ill J>crmlLllllg lhc _r,ui:r (•lll' Co lie rmt
111 ,·lolntlou or Lite rules.
~nt·tln
0, S. L, IL n. Co•• 2i U. Hi; iG

.An,lcrson v. D:tly M. Co .. 16 u~ :!S; fiO P. 81:i.
rn Idaho the fnrrmnn wns 11 follow 1-ervunl or
pla1ntlrr, who \\':lN zL mcm.hm· of n ff'tH'C g:uaJ;",
nncl hence plaintiff coultl not rcc:o\'C!r fo1• his

In Nevi!da, whose sl1Lluics tin nol tlcfb1c \\•ho
:u-o fellow SP.!"\'lmts. n foreman l::1 n fellow scr\'u nt with one of bridge? crew.
Owcn.!t "· Sun Pedro Co., 31 U. !!OS: 89 P.

S!?ii;
lJcclslons on. lhc lest lo Ile n1>11llcll In No•

,·:ula, note IQ

§ lGS:!,
Where an Injury Is the result of two cont:urrlng ("1Luse~•. nnd. the mm1tcr (s rcspnnslhle
for or c1:mttlhulc1l to ona or U1em, he_ Jff not"
<'XCin1H. fmm llublllly hecu.uso 11 fcllo\\· acn·nnt

W'I\O IM rCMl)Unslblc ror Lhlt olhcl' t.•nusc ttillY
· h1wc n.lso bC<!n cultmhlc, The se1·,·unl iu,sutncs

the d::ik nml nc-gUccncc

ot

n rcllow scrv:rnt.

but nol llui.l or lh1! master,
.Jankins , •..Mnmmolh l\1; Co., :?-I U. l'il3; GS

1:,. s-m.
Hnndlcy v. D:tly M. Co., 1fi u. m;: -rn p.
!?!Hi.
Pool ,,. S. P. Co.,.20 U. 210; ii8 P. 32G.
The -employer Is llable for an Injury to an
employe rrom the concurrent ncglli;cncc or the
mnslet· nnd Jcllnw scr,•anls.
Hkl.:i. , •• S. P. Co., 21 tr. 6.'!G: 7G P. 625.
lfC!rrlll 1·. 0. S. I.. R, R. Co., 2!1 U. !!6-1; 81
P. 85.
Wrlghl ,._ Sou. Puc. Co,, 15 U. •121; ·IG P.

a~.

..

A laborer eng.iged In the .ccnstru~tton of a
re.id bed and a brakeman on 11 constntctlon
trnln hnuUng grnvcl for tho rontl bed nrc fel-

low scr\'nnts.
Lultfc v. So. Pat·. Co., 160 F.

t:m.

CHAPTER 7.

WAGES 1\ PREFERRED DEBT.
3684. (1344.)· When business is suspended. \,\!hen any property of any
company, corporation, firm. or person sliall be seized upon by any prnccss of
any court, or when their business shnl1 be suspended by the act of creditors,
or be put into the hnnc1s of a rccch•cl', assignee, or. trustee, either by voluntary
or involtmfary action, the wages, not to cxccccl $400 to each claimant, owing
to work111cn, clerks, fra.vcling or city salcsmci1, or servants for work or labor
performed within rive months next preceding the seizure or transfer of such
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property o'r mcrchni1disc, shall be considered and treated as preferred deb~,
and such ·workmen, clcr~{SJ tmve1iug or city salesmen, or servants shall be
preferred t,·cditors and shall first be paid in f.ull; nnd if there be not sufficient
to pay them in full, then the same slmll be pnid to them 11ro 1·nta, nftcr paying
costs; provi,frd! ho1c'c1:cr, that no 'lfficcr, director, or general manager of
such a corporatfon nor any 111cmbcr _in such a$sociatio1i or partnership shall
be cntit1cd to the preference herein provided.
Am 1d tJJ, p. 26~
Lien or mecll1tnlcs, etc.. § :1722.
Wnges prrrarrccl In nssJi;mrumts, § 296,
·
.
.
t ll
'.l'hc ~lnbn.'i or the opcrn.llvcs or n strcc · rn r~nu t'or wor1t pcrCormcd sixty cl1\.l'S ne?Xt preccc1tus the nppolntmcnt or n. receiver nre f!n--.
uuoq to priority over a. trust. cu~cct on the com~
pnny s property, ~Ince such- worlc. ls tlonc for

thc l)encflt or the morti::io:ccs,

Lltzcnhcr,;-ct· v. Jarvi:l-Contclln Trust Co., S
U. 15; 2S 1,. 811.
. .
. .. _ .
.
Ch:tp. 30, lnws or 1S!1:?, {lccl11.rln,; lhnt. tlchls
<luo fol' scr,•J~cs 1,crformctl 'hl' lt1bore1·s within
sl~ 111ontl1~ hcfore tho sclz11r~ nC the clcbtnr's

in·oporly on JJL'Oc.:crm. or the sm~ponslon or hlff
buslno~ by the nctlon of creditors, or hcC01·c
ltls prnr,crty .shnll be put Jn the hnnds 1:1! n rec:•ch•cr or trustee, slmll 110 1ren.tcd ns prcfcrrc1l,
.
.

docs nol ur:rccl. the rights nC. the cxl~Ung z;rnntt?C~, mm·t1mgcs, or Ucnholclcm;.
. Snit L:,.lte Lltho, Co. v. lbcx l\J. flnd S. Co.,

1r, .U. •HO: 49 P. 7GS;

Id,, tu u. 4-15; .f!I ·P. S:t:?,
A court or equity. w·hen cnllctl upon to npJlolnt a receiver or mllt·na.tl p1·opcrty, with power to apcrntc ti1c ro:ul nml conduct Its lmsl-

ncss penlllns n. !Mcclmmre ittlt, mil)', tn the
cxcrdsc or its juclklnl cllscretfon, ns n.. comlllion or fs$ulng tltc 01'tlcr,. dlrcct Ut8 rccclvct•,
out or money· ccunlr:ig to his hnmls Crom sneh
boslncss, to pny tho outstnn<lJJlg tlchls ror ln.-

bor, suppUcs, equipments, .nr poi·rn:tncnt lm-

provcmcnts of the> lnl'IL'lgrti;c<l prrmcrEy ns mny
under the clrcumstnnccs or the ortlcr be rc:tsonu.blo
Ccntrnl '.I'rust Co~ v. Utiib CcnL
Co,, lG
U, · 12i GO P. 813,
.

Rr.

3685. (13'15.) Claim. Notice to persons interested. Any such cmployc,
laborer, or scrvaut desiring to en force his dah11 for wages under this· <:haptcr
shall present a statement. under oath. showing the amount clue .a.£tc1~ nltowing
-all just credits nncl set-offs, the kind of \\'Ork for which such wages are clue,
and when performed, to the officer, pcr~pn. or court charged with ~uch prop;.
erty. within ten days after th~ seizure thereof on any writ of attachment, or
within thirty days after the same may have been placed in the hands of any
receiver, assignee,_ 01· trustee; nny person ,vith whoin any such ·ctaim shall
have been filed shall give immediate notice thereof by mniJ to all persons interested; and i_t_ sh~H he the duty ·of the person or the court receiving such
statcmcnt_to pay the amount of such c1ahh or claims to the person or pci:-sons
cntit1ccl thereto, after first paying a11 costs occasionc<l l>y the seizure of s1ich
property. out of the proceeds of the sale of the pmpctty seized, if the cla1m
be not contested as proyidcd h1 the next succeeding section.
3686. (1346.} Contest of claim. Costs. A11y pcrso11 interested may
conteSt ~uch cfaim or claims, or any p,trt thereof, by filing exceptions thereto,
supported by affidavit, with the officer ha vitig the custody of sitch property,
within ten clnys after the notice of pt-escntmcnt of said stateri1ent, and thcri·
·upon the cfainrnnt shaU be required to reduce his dah11 to judgment before•
some court luiving jurisdiction thereof, before ni1y part thereof shall be paid.
and the party contesting shnll be made a party de(endant in any sttch action
and slmll ha\re the right to contest such claim, and the prcvniling ·party shnl1
recover proper costs.

CHAPTER 8.
ATTORNEYS' FEES

IN

SUITS FOR "WAGES.

3687. (1347.) When allowed. Amount. Whenever a mechanic, artisan, miner, laborer, servant, or cmployc shnl] ha:vc cause to bring suit for
,vnges earned and due according to the terms of his employment. nncl shall
establish by the decision of the court or verdict of the jury that the amount
for which he hns brought suit is justly due, nnd that a dcinnnd had been mndc
in writing, at least fifteen days before stiit was hroughtJ for a sum not to e~cccd the amount so found due, then it shall be the duty of the court before
which the case shall be tried to nllow to, the plaintiff a reasonable attorney's
foe in addition to the amount found due £or wagest to be taxed as c·osts of
:;nit. In a justice's court such attorney's fee shall not be more than $5, ~md in
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the district court not more than $10, except in cases on appeal from a. justice's
court· to the distl'ict eourt, when he plaintiff mny rcco,•cr an attorney's foe,
11ot exceeding $25•
.A ttorncrs' fees scnct:111)., § :HG.
.Attorneys' !ces ln foreclosure of llcn for Inbor, clc. 1 § 3750; In. nclfun on bond for 1mhllc
work; § 3155; on tl.[)pcnl from in1lustrb1.I commtsslon, § 3)48,

Sec. 3il'i0 '()rovltllns- !or nttorm:ws' fee t.o m:m

chtfmnnt hcltl uncom,UluUonal 11rlor lo n.iucntlmcnl of 1811!1.

Hrub;l!ic1· v. Dennett, l!J U, •IOI: 67 P. lil\,

· CHAPTER9.
INTERFERENCE \:\.'ITH PERSONAL RIGHTS.
3688. (1347x.) Unlawful to interfere with the rights of any individual.
It shall be unlawful for any person, persons, association 0£ persons, combination of persons, or body o[ pcl"sons to interfere with the rights of any indiviclual engaged in labor, to exercise his full privileges under the constitution of
this state or of the United States, as to where he shall be employed, by whom
he shall be employed nn<l at what compcnsntion he shalt be employed. Any
one violating the provisi9ns of this section shalJ be guilty of a misdemeanor.
1
07, p. 82.
lUghts oi uic lntlMtluul. Con. m·t.. 1, sec.
1-27.
lnthn!tlnlln,; nn cmplo)"c n mlstlamcm1or1 §

Unfawful coercion 1n·oh11Jltcll, !
Workers mny orgnnlic, § !JG['iJ.

sa::?:•.

8-193.

TITLE 59.
LEG IS LATU RE.
('11, p. 2.)
3690. Bills and documents to be engrossed or typewritten. AU bills and
other documcnts·ordcrcd enrolled or engrossed by the legislature shalJ b~ delivered to the engrossing clerk o( the hous<! ordering the enrollment or engrossment, who shall, without delay, have them properly engrossed with pen
and ink or typewritten with record ink on suitable paper in the order received

by him.

TITLE 60.
LIBEL.
3692. (1348.) Libel published in good faith. Retraction. Damages. If
it shall appear 011 the tdnl of nny nction bronght for the publication oi any alleged libel in any newspaper published in this stah~, that the said alleged libel

was published in good faith, that the publication thereof was due to mistake or

misapprehension of the facts, and that a full and fair retraction of any statement therein alleged to be crroncou~ was published in the next regular issnc
of such newspaper, 01· in case of daily p:ipcrs, within th1~cc dnys after such mistake or misnpprchcnsbn wns brought to the notice of such publisher or pub-lishers, at the head of the second column on the editorial page in the same
type as was the article complained of as libelous, for three days, reference to
such retraction to be made also on the local page of such pnpcr; prot•idcd, that
i[ such libel was published in the Sunday edition of such newspaper. one of
the publications of the rctrnction herein provided [or shall be in an edition of.
such newspaper published on a Sunday; then the plaintiff in such cases shall
recovci· only actual damages; prodded, that the provisions of this titl<! shall

00755
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

Attachment L

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

THE

STATUTES AT LARGE
OF THE

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA
FROM

JANUARY 1935 TO JUNE 1936
CONCURRENT RESOLUTIONS
RECENT TREATIES AND CONv'"ENTIONS, EXECUTIVE

PROCLAMATIONS AND AGREEMENTS

EDITED, PRINTED, AND PUBLISHED BY AUTHORITY' OF CONGRESS
UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE SECRETARY OF STATE

VOL. XLIX
IN TWO PARTS
PART

I-Public Acts and Resolutions.

PART

2-Private Acts and Resolutions, Concurrent Resolutions,
Treaties and Conventions, Executive Proclamations
and Agreements.

PART 1

UNITED STATES

GOYEll..lliMENT PRINTING OFFICE
WASHINGTON : 1936

Far n:uo l,y tha Supcrintande::tt. of Docui:ncnb, W11:1hin;;ton, D. C.

-

• -

- -

-

-

_ -

•

-

Prioo $5.00 (Bucltrnm}

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00757

74TH CONGRESS. SESS. I. CHS. 368, 372. JULY 3, 5_ 1935.

449

of the United States of Mexico. In the event that such lands are

Pa;me.nt to owners.

deformincd to be lands subject to the jurisdiction of the United
States of Mexico nnd that ·ns n result o:f such determination the
owners or their nssjgnees lose their title thereto and the lease is canceled, the United Stnt~s shall p11y to the owners or their assi!!Ilees
the fair Yaluc of the building at the completion of its construction
(but not in excess of the actual cost of construr.tjon), less an amount
equal to one-third of 1 per centum of snch cost or value for enrh
month that the lease wns in effect prior to such determinntio~
SEO. 2. There is authorized to lie appropriated such amounts as
may be necessary to pay the installments of rent provided for in
such lease."
.ApproYcd, July 3, 1935.
RO

Deducttt'>n.

tii!fJ::i>riAtlon

eu-

·

lCHAPTER 372.)

AN ACT
1uly ~. 1935.
To diminish the causes of labor disputes burdening or obstructing interstate and __ [S. 1~~- __
foreign commerce, to create ti. National Labor Relations Board, nnd for other l ~ o . J9S.1
purposes.

Be it e11acted by tlte Senate and House of Representatfres of tlie
United States of Ame1-ica in Congress assembled,
Fil.'."'Dil<lGS ..U.."1> POLICY

SEC:ION 1. The denial by employers of tho right of employees to
orgn.mze ond the reiusa.l by employers to accept the procedure of

111

~=-

Labot Re-

1-·int:Ungsand pollc:r,

collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of industrial
strife or unrest, which hnYe the intent or the necessary effect of
burdening or obstructing commerce by (a) impairing the efficiency,
safet,, or operation of tho instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring m the current of commerce; ( c) materially affecting, restraining
or controlling the flow of raw materials or manufactured or proccsse~
goods from or into the channels of commerce, or the prices of such
materials or goods in commerce; or ( d) cau!)ing diminution of
employment and wages in such yolume as substantially to impair or
disrupt the market for goods flowing from or into the channels
of commerce.
The inequality of bargaining power between employees who do
not possess f':1-U freedom of a~oci~tion or actual liberty of cont.ract1
and employers who aro organized m the corporat~ or other forms ot
ownership nssocintion subsumtinlly burdens and a:ffects the flow
oi commerce, rind tends to aggrn vote recurrent business depressions,
by depressing wage rat~ and the purchasin~ power of wae;e earners
in industry and by preventing the stabilization oi competitive wage
rates and working conditions within and between industries.
Experience has proved that prot~ction by law of tho right of
employees to organize and bargain collectiYely snfeguards commerce from. injurv, impairment, or interruption, and promotes the
flo,v of commerce ..by removing certain recognized sources of industrial. stt-ife nnd unrest, by encouru&ing practices fundamental to the
friendly adjustment pf industrial ctisputes arising out of differences
as to wages, hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring
equality of bargaining power between employers nnd emplovees.
It is hereby aeclnred to be the policy of the United States to
eliminate the en.uses of certain substantial obstructions to the free
flow of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions
when they have occurred by encouraging the practke and procedure
of collecth·c bargaining and by protecting the exercise by workers
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of full :freedpm of association, self-organization,. and designation of
representatives of their own choosing, for the purpose of negotiating

the terms and conditions of their employment or other mutual aid or
protection ..
DEFINITIONS

SEc. 2. When used in this Act"Penon."

''.llmplorei:-.'•

"Empl0100.'•

"Ropresou.tativcs:•

(1) The term " person " includes one or more individuals, part~
nerships, associations, corpora~ions, legal representatives, trustees,
trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
(2) . The term ~,employer" includes any person acting in the
interest. 0£ an employer, directly or indir~ctly, bu~ ~h~ll not include
the Uruted States, or any Stale .or pohbcal subd1vis1on thereof, or
any person sµbject to the Railway Labor Act, as. amended :from tinie
to time, or any labor organization (other than when acting as an
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer ~r agent of
such labor organization.
(3) The term "employee" shall include any empl(IJee, and shall
not be limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the
Act explicitly sfates otherwise, and. shall include any individual
whose work has ceased as a consequence of, or in connection with,
any current labor dispute or because o:f any unfair· labor practice,
nnd who has not obtained any other regular 'and substantially equivalent employment, but shall not include any individual employed
as an agricultural laborer, or in the domestic service. of any family
or person at his home, or any individual employed by his parent
or spouse.
( 4) The tern1 "representatives n includes any individual or labor
or<.rnnization.

ci;;.;!bi;>r organiza-

"Cou:unerce.''

".A.Hecunr com•
merce.''

(5) The term '' labor organization ,t means any organization of
any kJnd, o,r any agency or e?nployee repres~nfati~:m comiuittee or
plan, m which employees partmpnte and wh1ch exists for the purpose, in whole .or in part, of denling with employers concerning
grievances, labor disputes, wages, rates of pay, ho1u-s 0£ employment, or conditions o:f work.
(6) The term "commerce" ineans trade, trnffic, conimcr~, transportation, or communication among the several State~ or between
the District of Columbia or any Territory of the united States
uiid a.ny Stat.a or other Territory, or between any foreign country
and any State, Territory, or the District of Cofombfo., or within
the District of Columbia or any·Territory, or between 1_>oints in the
same State but through any other State or any Terntory or the
District of Columbia.·or any foreign country.
(7) The term "affecting cominercc" meuns .fo com1nerce, or bur<lening or obl:!tructing commerce or the free .flow of conuner~, or
having led or tending to lead to a, labor dispute burdening or
obstructing commerce or the free flow of commerce.

0
•

u.r1IA1r Jnhor.

prac-

tioe. •

"Lahordispure:•

·:Naetonal½bor:a&-

IaUoDS Board.

@

( 8) The term lt unfafr labor practice '' 1neans any unfair labor
practice listed in .section 8.
(9) The tenn" labor dispute" includes any controversy concernina
terms, tenure or conditions o:f employment, or concerning the assocfntion or representation of pers.ons in negotiatfng, fi,xing, maintaining, changing, or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of emyloyment, regarclless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate
re.lation of employer and employee;
. (10) The term "National Labor Relations Board ' 1 riieans the
N. afaona
. 1 L abC>r .Re1a t·ions Boar.d created by section
• 3 of this Act.
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(11) The term'' old Board'' means the National Lnbor Relations
Board established by Executive Order N.umbered 6763 of the President on J m;ie 2S, 1934, pursuant to Public Resolution Numbered 44,
RJ?proved June 19,. 1934 (48 Stat. 1183), and.reestablished ~nd co11t1nued by Executive Order Numbered 701'4 of the Pres1tlent of
June 15, 1035;.. purs_uant to Title I of tho N_atlonal Industrial R~covery .A.ct ( 48 ::;tn.t. 195) as amended and continued by Senate Joint
Resolution 133 1 approved June 14, 1935.
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"Old13oiird.'.'
Executive Order 0763.
· VoL •8. p. 1183.
Executive Order70i•.
Vol. 48, p. l~.
Antr, p. 375.

no,um
ln~~0B:1e:J~bor
SEc. 3. (a) There is hereby created a board, to be known as the 9C:P 0fltrun:
,~ National Labor Re~atio11s Board ,, (hereinafter referred to as 11010,,, ~ hi,.
NA"rrO:N'.A.t. unon llELATIPNS

the ''Board''), which shall be composed of three members, who
shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and
consent of the Senate. One of the. original 1nembers shall be
appointed for a terni 0£ one year, one for a term of three years 1 and
one for a term of five years, but their successors slulll be appomted
for terrns of be years eacli, except that any individual chosen to
fill a vacancy shah be appoi_ntec,l only .for the µne.s:pired t~nn of
the member whom he shall succeed. The President. shall desiguate
one. me111ber to ser,·e tts chairman of tbe Board. A:ny member of
the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and hearingt for neglect df duty or malfeasance in office, but for 1io other
cause.
(b) .A. vacancy in the Board shall not inipair the right of the
remaining members to exercise all the pcn,vers of the Board, a.nd

lloap-

Tennsoromcc.

Cbaimisn.

Remouls.

Quoru~., seal~ e~c.

two members o:f the Board shall, at all times, constitute a quQrum.

The Board shaUhave n.n official seal which shall be judicially noticed.
(c) The Board shnll at the dose of ea~h 'fiscal y~ar rnake a report
in wr~ting to Congress and to the P1·E!sidcnt stating in detail the
cases it has heartl, the decisions it has rendei;-ed, the names, salaries,

Annual report.

and duties of all employees and officers in the employ or under the
supervision of the. Board, and an account of all moneys it has
disbur~cd.
· · SEo. 4. (a) Each member of ·the Board sha11 receive a salary of i~~~i:,-m2,
$10,000 .a year, shall be. eligible f9r reappointment, a-nd s}ldl µot
.
.
engage m ?-llY o~her business voc~t1on, or ~~ployment. 'F~e Ho~rd so~gJi~wtmcnl ot pershall a_ ppomt1 m_ tllout re~a1_:a. for the provmons of the ·cml-.service c v·o_1. -10, ~· 100.;; u. s.
laws ~ut subJect to th~ l.ilassifi.cntion Act ~£ 1~23, ns amende~, an .. p. ss.
. .
e~ecntive sect.etaryj. and .such attorneys, examiners, .and regional di!~=:~. n,g1ona1
dlI'ec~rs, and shall appoint such other employees with regard to
·
existing laws npplicable to the e!Ilployment and. compensation_ of
officers and employees of the· Untted States; as 1t may from time
to time .find necessary for the proper performance .of its duties and
as may be from time to tune appropriat.ed .for by Congress~ The Agen<:leii &\"ailablu,
Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other agencies,
and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as. may :from
time to time be needed.· Attorneys appointed under this section
.may, at the direction of the Bos.rd, appear for nnd represent. the
Board in any case in _court. Nothing in this Act shall be construed A.p~olntmentofmedto authorize the Board to appoint individuals for the Ellrpose. of IAtors,.rostrlctloo.
conciliation or ·m~diA,tion ( or for st:;ttisti<::al work), -y;her~ such
service may be obtained from the Department of Labor.
· (b) Upon the appointment of the thr~e original members of the Old Boa rd abOlbbed.
Board and the designation of its chairman, the old Board sluill cease
J

So in orlgin11L
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or

to exist. All employees
the old Board shall be transferred to
and become employees of the Board with salaries under the Classification Act of 1923, as amended, without acquiring by such trans:fer
a pennanent or civil .service status. All records, papers, and property of the old Board shall become records, papers, and property
o:f the Board, and all une;tpcnded funds and appropriations for the
use and maintenance of the old Board shall become funds and a.Pproz,riations available to be expended by the Board in the exercISe of
the powers, authority, and duties, confor:red on it by this Act.
Ei:peZIS& allo-qnces.
(c}_ All of the expen..c::es of the .Board, including all necessary
travelina and subsistence e..~enses oµtside the Distr1c:t of Columbia
incurred'by the members or employees of the Board u11der its orders,
shall be allo~ed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers
therefor approved by the :Board or by any individual it designates
for that purpose.
.
Prmolpol omoo.
SEO. 5. The principal office of the Board shall be in t.he District
of Columbia, but it mav meet and exercise any or all. of its powers
qu1:i:s~utlon or 1::- at any other place. The Board may, by one or more of its members
or by such agents or agencies ns it may deSignate, prosecute any
inquiry nec~ssary to its functions in a.ny part of the United States..
A ·member who participates in such an inquiry shall not be disqualified from subsequently participating in a decision of tl:ie Board
in the same case;
A<lm!nfstratr-aorulos.
SEO. 6. (a) The Board shall have authority :from timo to time
t9 :make, amend, and rescind such rules and regulations a$ may be
necessary- to carry out the provisions of th.is Act. Such rules and
regt!lations shall he· effective upon pubHcation in the manner which
the Eon.rd shall prescribe.
Trsnsfer o! emplo?•
1
tteord.or, eta.

es. '

rJOHTS OF E:Ml'LOY.EES

s~id o1 e7np1oyee.9
·

uDin1r labor pmc.-

uces.

';'ok
48, P• 19.;; Ame,
7

P·•

•

SEc. 1. Employees shall have tho right to self-organization, to
:form, join, qr assist labor orga.nizatio!}S, to 1:>argain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in
concerted activities, for the purpose of collective bargaining or other

mutual aid or protection.
SEc. 8. It shall be an un.fair labor practice for an eroployer(1) To interfere witb, restrain, or coerce employees in the exer-

cise of tho rights guaranteed in section '7.
.
(2) To dominate or interfere with the formation or a ~ trati9n of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it: Pro~-i<led, Tliat subject to rules and regulations made
n.nd published by _th_e Board pursua!lt.to section .6 (a), a:,n emplo1.er
$..hall not h_e . proh1.b1ted from_ penmttmg em_Ployees to _confer mth
him durino- working hours without loss of time or pay.
(3) By ~criminntion in regard to hire or tenure of employment
or any term or condition of employment.to encourage or discourage
membership in any lnbor organization: P.roviae.il, That nothing
in this Act, ·or in the N ationaI Industrial Recovery Act (U. S.. C.,
Su_vp. VII, title 15, secs. 701-712), as amended :from time to time,
or m any code or agr_eem.ent api;>roved or prescribed thereunder, or
in any other statute of the Unfted States, shall preclude an employer
:from making n.n. ugreement with a. labor orgnnization (not cstab~
lished, maintained, or assisted by any a~tion defined in this Act
as ~n unfair labor practice) to require as a condition of employment membership tlierein, i£ such labor organization is the representative of the employees as provided in section 9 (e.), in the apprppriate· collective bargaining unit covered by such agreement when
made.
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(4) To discharge or .otherwise discriminate aga.fost an employee
because he has filed char~es or give11 testimony uncle.1· this Ac~
(5)To refu$e to bargnm colle~tivelv with ·the representatives of
his e~ployees, subject to the provisions of Section O (a).
)OtPltES:ENT•.\Tiv'ltrS AND

:Etl.:et·roNs

ReDresontatlves and
elcetfomi,
£or the pur- .M1~tortt:vnnilo, prbm·
• ctp e m co ect \"& arempl oyees
in g11in£ng,etc.

SEc. 9. (a.) Representatives designated or selected
• bargamuig
• • by tli e ma3or1t,y
• • · ·of the
poses of co11cc t 1ve
et unit appropriate for such purposes,. shnll be the ~xclus1ve repre_senta.tives of all the employees iu such unit for the purposes of
collecth·e bargaining in r~p~ct to rates of pay, wages1 hours of
.
empl?YIJ?-e!'it, or other conditions of_ employment: Pro'lnaed, 'l'hat fr:'lf!~~iuat ri bt to
any mdiv1dual employeo o_r a group o.f emplqyees shall have the present grlevan~11.
right at any time to present grievances to their employer.
(b) The Donrd shall decide in each case whetlier, in. order to f~\urt1si~opi,;1r
insure to ·employees the full benefit of thek ri~ht to self-organizn"'.' pr fl 111P s. e c.
ti01~ .arid to ~ollective bn.riaining, n!ld otherwise to effectuate the
policies of t.lt1s Act, the umt appropnn.te for the purposes of collecth·e bargaining shall be the employer unit, crn:ft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof.
(c) Whenev~r a._ question _affecting commerce a-:ises ?oncerning ot~~:J~~tatlves
the. representation of employees, the Donrd may m•tcst1gate such l'tletbodtarselecting.

controversy nnd certify to the parties, in writing, the ·name or

names o·f the repreBentat.ives that b~ive been desi~ated or selected.
In any such investigation, the Board shall provide for an appro:priate hearing ppon du~ notice, ~ithe1· in conjunction with a proceedmg under section 10 or otherwise, and may take a secret £allot of
employees, or utilize nny other suitable. 1nethod to asce.rtin 1 such

etc.

·

neartnis.

representatives.
( d) 1Vhene,..er_ u11 order o~ the Boo.rel made pur~ant to sec~Jon onBf:c~ot':f~csu~d

10 ( c)

1s

based m whole

01.·

m part upon fads cert1fied following

nn myestig_nt}~n pursuant to su~ection {c) of this. section, ancl
there· is n. petition fot· the enforcement or rev1ew of such order such

vi:;i.forcement or re-

ee1~tifie1)tion and the record of such investigation shall be inciudetl
in the tr-anscript of the entire record requil'ed to .be filed under subsections 10 {e) or 10 (£), and thereupon the decree of the court
enforcing; :r.nodHying, or setting aside in wliole
in part ~he order
of the Board shall be made and entered upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceec:Ungs_ set forth in such trunscript.

or

PRE~~~ON OF lJlli-i".iUR L.-\BOR :PRACTICES

· emp?wer_e d, as .h ere1!1a
• fte r. prov1.
"d~ d, ratrPrevention
or uuS.EC. 10·~ ( a ). Th
. e B oard. IS
· -lu.\lor pmetices,
toprcvent any person from engn.gmg m any unfair labor hra.ctice afl~}~i: ~~ro:srce. 1
. d•. m
• sec·t•10.n .8) . nu.ec
l.'f!
t·mg c_ommerce.
. .
• power s a11•...b_e ....uu,.on •·., o oar,.
(1ISte
·Tl. ~IS
exclusive, and shall not be affected by any other means of ad3ust~
meat or prevention-that bas been or may be established by ngree•
ment, code, law, or otherwise.
(b) Wllenever it is charged that. any person has ~ngaged in- or is ~ompln.lnts; ,m~,.
engaging in any ~~ch unfair labor practice, the Doard, Ol". a~y
agent or agency <les1gnated by the Board for such purposes, shall servrcea or ctw~.
have power to issue and e:nuse to be served upon i:iuch person a complaint $roting the _charges in thnt respect, nnd. contruning a notice xouceor.hearlll!!of hearing before the Board or: n: member thereof, or be:fore a 9-esign~ted agent"or agency, at a place therein fixed, not less thnn five dnys
alter the serving of said complaint. .Any ·such ·complaint may be ~mcnd:ocm or <.-omamended by the member, ugent> or ngcncy cond·ucting the hearing pJo:r:it.
-i

So ln. od(.•.hml
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or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance oi
an order based thereon. The person so complained of shall have
swer of occnm.
the right to file an answer to the original or amended complaint
and to appear in person or otherwise and give testimony at the
place and titne fixed in the complaint. In the discretion of the
lllembar, agent or agency conducting the hearing or ,the BQard, any
other person may be allowed to intervene in the said proceeding
Prevaflini: ruJss ot .and to pi·ese:nt testimony.
In any such proceeding the rules of
evidence; enectot.
evidence prevailing in courts of law or equity shall not be controlling.
Pre~tfoil orte.~ti• _ (c) Tlie testimony taken by such member, a~ent or agency or
:mon;v.
the Board shall be red-uced to writing and :6.lea. with the Board.
Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice J:ilay take £urccase ruid dc:5ie.t or• ther testimony or heo.r argument. I£ upon all the testimony taken
ders.
the Board shall be of the opinion that any person named in the
complaint has engaged in or is engaging in any such unfair labor
practice, then the Board shall state 1ts findings o:f fact n.nd ~~all
:issue nnd cause to be served on such person nn order reqrurmg
such person to cease and desist fyom .such unfair labor practice,
and to tak~ such a_ffirmative action, ·ioc~udini reinstatemeri~ pf
employees with or mthout back pay, as will effectuate the pol,c1es
lt~ports. or compll• of this Act. ~uch _ol'qer may f_urtlier require such :{>ers~m to ma~e
ang3~~en:,ft.com• reports from time to time showma the e:de!it to wh1clt 1t has coinpfnint.
plied with the order. I:f upon afi the testimony taken the Board,
shall be of the opinion that no person named in the complaint has
engaged in or is enga~ing in _any such unfair labor practice,. then
the Board shall state 1ts findings of fact and shall issue an order
dismissing the said ·complaint.
.
ModUlcstioo,ctc..,cJ'
(d) Until a transcript pf the l.'ecord in n ca.s~ shall. have been
or&r.
filed in a court, as hereinafter pro,dded, the Board may at any
time, upo,n r~asonable no~ice <!-.nd in such J!lanner as it_ shal~ deem
proper, modify or set aside, in whole or in· part, any .finding 01·
order mnde or issued by it.
Enforcement.
(e) The Boa.rd shall have power to petition ~ny. circuit court.
ti~~ffo': a~~~uW of appeals qf the United States (including the_ Court of Appeals
court orapveil.ls.
of the. District.of polumbia), or H all t1:ie. ci~cu_it gourts of a~pe~ls
to which application may be made are _m vacation, any d1Str1ct
court of the United States (including the Supreme Court of the
District of Columbia), within any: circuit or district, respectively,
wherein the unfair labor practice in question occurred or wherein
Tempora.r)' nBtmin• such person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement 0£
iai; order s,ro'rided.
such order and for appropriate temporary relief 01• restraining
Pl\pers to bo filed,
order, and shall certify ana file in the court a transcript of the
entire record in the· proceeding, including the pleadings and testi.
iliony' up<m which such order was. entered ancl the findings ap.d
Notice; iurisdicUOII order of the Board. Upon sucl1 filing, the court shall cause notice
~nd power.sot '-'Ourt.
thereof to be se:rved upon such person, nud thereupon sha.U ha;ve
jurisdiction of the proceeding and of the question determined
therein, ancl shall have power to grant such temporary relief or
restraining order as it deems just and proper, and to make and
enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceedin!?'S set forth in
such transcript a decree_ enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as
so modified,_
setting aside in whole or in part the order of the
Objections; c:onsider• Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its
utioaot.
member, agent o.t agency, e;hall be considered by the court, unless
the failure ~r negle~t to urge such objection. shall be excused because
rfiwllni;s conclusive of extraordinary circumstances. The findmgs 0£ the Board as to
0
l3~tionnl eviden~. the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be conclusive. _If either
party shall app1y to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall show to the satisfaction o;f the court·that such addi..
. Appeota.Dc& ond an•

or
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tional evidence is material and that there were reasonable grounds
for the failure to adduce such evidence in the hearing before tho
Board, its member, agent, or agency, the court may order such
additional evidence to be taken before the Boa.rd, its member, ngcnt.
or agency, n.nd to be made a part of the transcript. The Board
Moditlcatfoa hr
mog1fy its findings ns to the £nets or make new findings, by reason B«rJrd.
of additional evi clence s6 taken and filed, n.nd it shall file such modified or new findings, which, if supported bl7' ~Yidencc, shall be conclusive, and shall file its recommendations, if nny1 for the modification or setting aside of its original. order. The Jurisdiction of the ~!:~~?tr::;;
court shall be exclusive and its judgment nnd decree shall be final, allowed.
•
except that the same shall be subject to review by the appropriate
circuit court of appeals if application was made to the district court
as hereinabove provided, and by the Supreme Court of the United
States upon writ of certiorari or certification as proYided in sections r. s. C' •• r,. i:r.i.
_289 ancl 240 of the Judicinl Code, ns nmcnded (U. S. C., title 28,
secs. 346 and 34,).
11
(f) ~ny person aggr~e,·ed by a fin~l order of the Boa~d grantjng
to set
or denymg m whole or m part the relief sought may obtam a review
of such order in any cirr.uit court of appeals of the United States in
the circuit wherein the unfair Jnbor prnct.ice in question was alleged
to linve been en~g~d in or wherein such person resides or transacts
business, or in tne Court of Appeals of the District of Columbia, by
filing in such court a '\\'Titt~n petition praying tha.t the order of the
Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition shn.ll bo
forthwith served 11pon the Board, and thereupon the n~grieved part_y
8hall file in the court a transcript of the entire record m the proceeding,. certified by the Boar~l, including the pleading and testimony
upon which the order complnined of was entered and the findings
and order of the Board. Upon such filing: the court shall proceed Prnoo<tqro,oto.
in the same mnnner ns in the case of. nn application by tl1e Board
under subsection (e) t and shall have. the snme exclusiYe jurisdict-ion
to grant to the Board su~h temporary relief or restraining order as it
deems just and r.roper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree
enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside
in whole or in part the order of the Board; and the findings of the
Board as to the facts, if supported by e,idence, shall in lik~ manner
be conclusiYe.
(g) The commencement of procee<lin!!B under subsection {c) or ( f)
of this section slrnll not, unless specifically ordered by the courtt mcnt.otprocccdlni;s.
operate as a stay of the Bonrd:s order.
h) When grnntin~ npproprinte tempora17c relief or n restraining JiirL,<1Jct!onoteQutty
1:·
•
.
or er, or mn11mg
nnc entering
n decree en orc1ng,
mo d"fy'
i
mg, an d courtsnotunpaircd,
enforcing as so modified or setting aside in whole or in part an order
of the Board, as provided in this section, the jurisdiction of courts
sitting in eq~itv shnll not be limited by the Act entitled "An Act to VoL <tic. P· ;o.13
amend the Jud~cial Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction of u.s... p. -ir..
courts sitting in equity, and £or. other purposes'', approved March
23, 1932 (U.S. C., Supp. Vil, title 29, secs. 101-115).
(i) Petitions filed unaer this Act shall be heard expeditiously, and Expcditlocs hoiuif p.ossible within ten days after they ha \ e been docketed.
ings.

mny

o..t~:~g~

sta~:t~ :~~C::~

J

7

INVESTIGATORY P01\""ERS

SEC.

11. For the purpose of all bearings and invcstiiations, "'hich,

in the opinion of the Board, are necessary nnd proper tor the exercise
of the powers vested in it by section 9 :ind section 10(l) The Board, or its duly authorized agents or agencies; shall nt
all reasonable times have access to, for the purpose of exnminntion,
and the right to copy nny cvjdence of nny person being investigated

cr!nvestii:ntory pow•
.1.m'c,

p. 453.

iu=~o~:;ccur•

'
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or pro:ceeded aiainst that-relates to any matter under investigatioI.'!- or
in question. ...'Uly member 0£ the Board shall have power to issue
subpenas requiring the attendance .and testimony of witnesses and
the production of any evidence tbnt relates to any matter under invesM
tigation or in question, before the Board, its member, agent, or agency
or!"n~i:CJ.stration conducting the hearing odr ir}vestigdatbion.h AnBy mdemfher ofhthe Board,
•
or any agent or agency eSianate y t e oar or sue purposes,
may administer oaths and nffirmntions, examine witnesses, and l'eceive
WitDesSes,titc.
eviaence. Such attendance of witnesses and the,production of such
evidence may be required from any place in the Unit~d States or any
Territory or possession thereof, at any desio-nated place of hearing.
Contwnaey or re(2) In case of contumacy or refusal to ~ey a subpena issued to
~;~b'!:c~~ns. any person, any District Court of the United States or the United
States courts of any: T<frritory or possession, or the Su})reme Court
of the District of Columbia, witlun the jurisdiction of which the
inquiry is carried on or within the jurisdiction of which said person
guilty of contumacy or refusal to obcv is found or resides or transact~ busine!:S, u_pon application by the ~~ard shall have jurisdiction
to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear
before the Board, its member, agent, or agency, there to produce
evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter
under investigation or in question; and any failure to obey such
order o:f the court may be punished by said court a.s a contempt
thereof.
.u~t~Jlege or wit(3) No person shall be exc11sed from att.e.nding and te..t;tifying or
from producing books, records,. correspondence, document.a,. or other
evidence in obedience to the subpena of the Board, on the ~ound
that the testimony or evidence required of him may tend to incriminate him or subject him to .a penalty or £or£eiture·; but no individual shall be prosecuted or subje~ted to any penalty or forfeit!,l.te
.for or on account of any transaction, matter, OI" thm,€; concernmg
Personallmmumty. which he is cpmpelled, after having claimed his priV1lege against
self-incrimination, to testify or proauce £vidence, except that stich
individual so testifying shall not be exempt from prosecution artd
punishment for perjury committed in so testifying.
Se:rvico or orders, ate.
( 4) Com plaints, orders, nnd other process and papers of the Boa,rd,
its_ '.!llember, a~ent, or agency, may he serv~d either personally or by
rei?stered mail or by telegraph or by leavmg a copy thereof at the
principal office or place of business of the perscm required to be
sei•ved. . The verified return by the individual so serving the same
setting forth the manner of such service shall be proof of the same,
and the return po$t office receipt or telegraph receipt therefor when
regi~tered and mailed or ~elegraphed as aforesaid shall be proof of
Witness rees, etc.
service of the same. Witnesses summoned before the Board, its
member, agent, .or agen~y, shall be paid the sa!l.1e fees and milea.W3
thn.t are paid witnesses in the tourts of the United States, and wit•
ncsses whose depositions are taken and the persons taking the same
shall severally be entitled to the same :fees as are paid for like
services in the eourts of the United States.
venue provisiollS,
( 5) All process of n.ny court to which application ma.y b~ made
under this .Act may be served in the judicial district wherein the
defendant. or other person required to be serve.d resides or may be'
found.
·
oo':ernmeaucencies
( 6) The several de:eartments and a~encies of the Government,
to assist.
when directed by the Presidtmt, shall 1:urnish the Board, upon its
i•equest, all records, papers, and information in their possession
relating to any matter before the Board.
I'rotection ot Board
SEo. 12. Ariy person who shall willfully resist,. prevent, imped-a,
m0Ii1bcn;, otc.
· agents or
Qr interfere with any member of t h e Board or any of 1ts
subpena powers.
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and one or more employees or nssoclntions of employees; (2) between one or more employers or asso-

clatlons of employers and one or more employers or
assoclnUons of employers; or (3) between one or
more employees or associo.tlons Qt employees and one

Sec.
159.

180,

Cfl.SC

tn:votves any confiJctlng or compct1nB

Interests In a "labor dispute•• Cns defined ln this section) of "persons partlcipntlng or Interested" therein
<n.s defined fn this section>.
(bl A person or nssoclntion sha.11 be held to be t\

person pnrtlclpnttng or Interested Jn a 1nbor dispute
It relief ts sought Mainst hlrn or lt, and If he or it Is
engngcd In the snrnc Industry, trade, ci'l\ft. or occup:ition Jn which s\;ch qisputc occurs, or has a. dlr.!ct

Cc) The term "lnbor disputc11 Includes any contro•
vcrsy concerning tenns or conditions of employment,
or concerning the nssocl~tton or 1•cprC1scntntf011 ot
persons f.n negot!n.ting, :fudng, mn.fntnlnJn~. changing,
or seeking to nrrangc tenns or cohdltfon~ o! employ..
mcnt, regBi'dless of whether or not tho dlsputnnts
stand tn the proximate rclntfon of employer nnd
employee.
Cd) Tha term 11,;ourt of the United StntQs" means
nny court of the Unlted Stutes whose Jurlsdlctlon hns

Ing: <tetcrm\nnUon ot unit. by Do11rd: qucallot\
ntrccllng commctco. hcnrtng: record on rovlow
wheto co~inm:o quc,Uous lnvot,r«f.
Provcutlon of unfair tnbor practices.

(~i

Bonrd 's order.

Indirect Interest therein. or ls u m<'mbcr. officer,

01~

or ngcnt ofQ.ny assoclntlon composed In whole or ln
part of employers 01• employees cngnged tn such
industry, trnde, crnft, or occupnt1011.

Rcprc~ntnUvea or cmployet'a tor c:ollacttvc, bl\rftllln•

Po\\·crs of Donrci. sonernlly.
(b) C(lmplnliit Md notlco ot htnrlnm RMWC1':
court rules or cvfclcnco tn11ppllc!\btc.
(c) lleductton ot tcsUmony to writ.Ing: nnctlncs nnct ordcra ot Donrct.
{d) Modlftc~t1ot1 or findings or 0rdc1a prlor to
nltng, record ln · court.
(cl I'ctltlon to court ror rnrorcemcnt ot order;
procccd1ngs; review of Judgment.
(t) licvicw ot ttnnt order or Donrd on pctltfon
to court.
((t) InsUtuHon or cuurt proc~dlnss ns aLny ot

or more employees or assoclatlons · of employees; or

when the

l161

TITLE 29.-LABOR

Pnge 2103

161.

(bl Jutlstllct1on ol courts ,mnJ:tcct.ctt by lhnl-Lnllons prcscrlbcd In sccttons 101-1.15 of
thle tJUo.
(1) ExpcdlUo,,s bcnrlngs .01~ pcttUons.
Inv<'sligntory powers or Donrd.
(l) Docurncntnt)' cvldcncc; summoning wltu'3S1il!S rmd tnklng testimony.
(2) court nid In compcUJng proctucUon of cvl•
dcnco ruut nttcndn.nce of wftncSSt:s~
(3) Prtvllcgo
wttri~sucs: hntnunity from
prosccuUon.
(4) Process. scrvlco ond rclurn; teca or wlt•

or

nrs.,;cs.
( 6) ProcrRs, . whcro served

(6) Inronnntlon nnd· asslst.ot1co from depurt162

163.

164.
165.
100.

montu.
OR'(?nscs nnd ponnJtlcs.
Riel\ t to strike prC1lcrvcd.
Conn let ot laws.
Scpnrnblllt:, clnuse.
Cltntlon of chnpter.

been or may be con!erred or defined or limltt:u by
Act of Congress1 including the courts of the District
of Columbfa.. <Mnr. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 13, 47 Stnt.
73.)

§ 151. Findings nnd declnrnlion of policy.

§ 11-i. Inmlidity of pro•,isions oC chapter; validity oC
remaining provislons.
If nny provision ot sections 101-115 ct this title
or ~ho O:ppllcation there.of to nny per.son or clrcumstnncc Js held unconstitutloJ1?.I or otherwise tnvo.Ud,
the rcmnin!ng provisions of such .sections and the
npplicatlon· or such IJrovlslons to other persons or
circumstances shall not be affected thereby. (Mar.

and other f orins or Industrial strife or unrest. which
have the lnten~ or the necessary effect of burdening
or obslructing commerce by <a) impn.lrfng the efficiency, surety. or operation or the lnstrumentnUtles of
commerce; Cb) occurring Jn the current of commerce; (c) mntcrinlly nffccUng, rcstrain'lng, or con-

§ 115. R<!pcnl of confficting nets.

All nets nnd parts ol. nets In conflict with the provisions of sections 101-115 or this title nrc hereby
r~pcaicd. <Mnr. 23, 1932, ch. 90, § 15, 47 stat. 73.>
Chapter 7.-NATIONAL LABOR RF.:I,ATIONS
Sec.
163,

Findings and qcclnrl\Uon or policy.

Detlnlt1ons.
Nallonnl Lnbor Relntlcns Donrd; crcnUon nnd. ccmposltlon;. nnnun1 reports.

154

B1UI10; sn1nTJcs; omcers o.nd employees; tcrmtnnUon
or "Old Bonrdi'; payment ot expenses.

155

Same;

166.

un

158.
1680:

prJnclpnl

omco,

conducting

trolllng the flow or raw rnaleifals or mnnu!nctured or
procrssed goods from or into the cbnnncts or commerce, or the prices of such materials or soods in

23, 1932, ch. 90, § 14t 47 Slat. 73.}

151.
152.

The denial by employers of ·the rlshi of .employees

to orgnnlzc nnd U1e refusnl by employers to ncccpt
the procef,iure of collective bnrsnlnlng lend to strikes

tnqulrlcs

tbrougltour. country: pnrtlclpntlon ln dcclsfons
or lnqulrlcs conducted by rneinbor,
Bnmc; rulca nnrl rogul11llons.
rught of employees ns to orgnnlznt10111 coltcottvc
bnrgnlnlnc, etc.
untn!r lnbor prncttccs by cmi,Loyer denned.
Providing tocl11tlcs ror oporn.Uons or Federal credit
Unlons.

commerce; or <d> cnustng diminUUon ofcml)loymcnt
nnd wases In such volume ns substanUntly to Impnfr
or disrupt the mlll'kct !or goods flowing from or into
the channels of con1mcrcc.
The 1ncqunuty of bnrgnlnlng power between employees who do not possess rull freedom of assoclntton
or nctua.1 llberty of contrnct, a.nd employers who nrc
orr:nnlzccl In thc.corporntc or other forms of ownership nssoclatton substnnUaUy burdens a'i1d affects
the flow of commerce. nnd tends to nggro,vnte recurrent business depressto11s, by depressing wngc rates
nnd the purcb11Slng power of wage earne1·s fn Industry nnd by prevcntln,r the. stnbllizntlon of compctl•
tlvc wage· rates nnd working conditions within nnd
between Jndustrfcs.
Expcr!eI:1ce has proved tlmt protection by Jnw of thi:?
rlgllt of employees to orsnnlze and hnri::nin collectively snfegun.rds comin<'rce frC'in injury, lmr,nlrmcnt, or Interruption, o.nd promotes tl,c flow or com•
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mci:ce ·Qy re,movh:1g c~rt.run rccoitnlzcd sources or
fndustrlnl strJle an_d unrest. by encouraging practices
fundamental to thc.trlcndly adjustment ot 1ndustr1al
dispute.~ nrlslng out or differenccs as to wagesl hours,
or other working conditions, nnd by nntortng cqunlIty or bnrgnlnJng pmvcr b¢twccn empl~•~ers and employ~.

Paae 2704

<7> The term "a1recttng commerce" meansJn. commerce, or burdening or obstructing commerce or the

commerc:e. or -havtn11 IC(! oi- ~n@l~ to
~end _to n. ~lmr dlsput~ bt,IJ'.dcnfng o~ obstruct:titg commcrc_c or the free fiow of commerce.
·
(8) The tenn ·•;untair· labor ptilctice'• means any
un!nir labor practice listed ii:i section i&S ·o! this
{rec ffQW. of

If.is hereby declared to be the policy ot the united -tltlc.
eta~ tG: ellmlnateJbc ciiuscs ot cert.1dn substont111l
(9) -The tern·~ "lnbor ·dispute" -!m;ludes -11lY ~Iiobst.:-ructfons to ·the free fl.ow or c_ommcrc~ and to miti- . trQy~rsr co.nccrnlna-. term,.s, .· tenure or eondltfons or
gate an_d climlnnic these obstructions when they ·have employment, or concerning the;assoclatlon cir repre~
oc:currcd by cncourn_ging the. prncUce and procedure scntation or persons In negotiating, fixing. i;nat.n~tnor col!cctlvc bp.rgaln!ng nnd by protect!~ the exer- lng, changing,. or seekJng to arrange terms or condl ..
cise by. workers of full freedom ot. association,·sclf- tfons ot= 'employment. rcgti,·~ess -~! Whether :tlle
otgo.n.lzatlon, and dcslgIUltlon or rcprcsen·tatlvcs or dl®Utants -~ia.Jld In t.be ·proxJmntc relation of em·
·
·
their own cpooslng,_ for the purpDS(!. negoUatlng ployer and employee..

or

the. terms. nnd conditions or their employment· or
other mutual nld 01• protccUon. (July 5, 1935 •.ch.
3'12,.f i. 49 Btnt. 449,)
§ 152.

D~firtlUona.

Wbc.n_uscd In ~ec~lon~ 151-166 of this tlUc-

(U The term "person" Jnc1Udcs one or more· lndlvldunls, pnrj;ncrsblps, n:ssoclatfons, corpornUops,_lcgal
reprcscntntlvcs, trustees~ trustees. in bankruptcy, or

tccriivcrs.

'

.

(2) The. term 1'empl0Yer" lnc:lud~ any person act-

lng 1µ the 1:nicrest ot an employcr.t directly o·r ind!..
rcc~ly. but shall not Include the United States, or any
Stnte o~ poUttcoJ sµbqlvislon tb~rco(Qr nny person
sublcct to sections 151-163 of Title 46, or any Inbor
organlztiUon CoUlcr· thlln when nctJrig as an cm..-

·pJoycr>, pr anyone ~cttng fn .th.e cnpacity ot officer or

air.eni ot such lnbor orgrmizaitori, .. . .
.
<a) ·The. tcnn •~_cmpioyec" sh;aU., tn~lude any em:p~oyeo1 nnd ~ball not b.e limited to th_c cmpiQyees _of
~

partic:Ul_ar employer, unless· the chapter cxpllcttty

states otherwise,

nod

shall fnclUdc any lndMduoJ

.whose, work hns c<?llSed ns a c:o~equence of, or in
connection with. imy current labor dispute or be~
.cause of any unfair fabor p,raqtlc~. ape( ,who Jlns not
obtained any other rcguJo.r nnd substanUnlJy .equlv-

'·atcnt·· employment. but ·shfill riot 'tricludc'.any fndJ ...
vtdual cmpt6ye~ ns an nt1rlculturril laborer. or.In the
doincstfo s~rvJcc of tuiy fnmlly or person at his ·11omc.
or any' .tndtvldual employed. by hls PClrent or spouse.
(4) 'I1le term "r.cpr~scnt.ativcs" inclt,tdes any Individual or Jnbor organization~ .
..
.
(5) The tenn u1abor orgEintzatlon" mco.ns nny or.c~nlzntfon of any kind, or nny ngency or employee
rcpr~sentatlon cominlttcc
plan; In .which .· em ...
ployccs pnrtfolpnte. n.nd wblch exl_$~ for the pw:-pose,
J1;1 :whole or ln pa.rt, of dcnllnEt with employers concerning grlcvnnccs, labor disputes, ··wages, riii~s of
JiriY., hours of' employment. or condltJons .6!· work.
(~) T11c term ••p~nn.merce -means· trnd~. tnifflc,
commerce, transportation, or commtlnlcntlon ~ong
·the sevcritl States, Qr between the District of Columbia or any Territory or the United St'o.tcs and any
·Btnie
other Territory, or . between any .!orclgri
countrY Md nny State, Territory. or the District or
CojumbJn, or wJthln the DlSt:dct or Columbia or. any
Territory, or betwecm ·potnts Ju the S.nme ·State· but
througlJ, any other State .or e..1y Territory or -the
.District o! Colulilbla
·e.ny foreign country.

or
0

or

or

<10> The tcim ;•NiiUonnl Labor Relo.tlons Board"
mcamdhc N~tiona.l ,4~or Rclp.tlons Board>creatcd
bY section 153 ot this title.
·
·
m> The term "old :8oiird0 means tho Nilttonat
Lubor. Ret~iJons ·Board cst~bllsbcd by Executive order Numbered 6763 o1 ~he Presid_ent on
29, 1934.
pursuantto scctlon 702n cit Title 15 approved June 19,

Jun:c

1034 (48 St.al)183), an~. reestapllsbed a.nd continued

by ·Executive Order Numbered 7074 of the ·p~sfdent
of Juµe 16, 1935, pum.iant. to dtapter 15. o.t 'l'ltle ·15
ns amended and continued by sccLlons '102 nnd· '105a
of Title 15. CJuJY. 5. 1935~ ch. 372d ·2, 49 ·stat,. ·450~)
Cnoss RE:F!ll!!N~

or· .~~1,i -B~nrd," see subsection

Tcrmtnntlon of c:dste~ce
(b) of section 164 ot thlB tJtle.

ft 15~. N.ntio~nl .Lnbor.Rclat\o.mi Donrd; cre,ation and
compos1tion; annual reports.
.
Co.> There 1s created a boaird1 to be known as tho
1
' Nntll'?t1Lil Labor Relations Board" .(herclnn!ter
terrcd to M the "Board.,>, whlcb sllall be composed
or three members, who shall be nppolntcd· .by the
~csld_ent. by .~nd· with the ndvfco. and consent of
the Sen~t~•. One o! the orlslno.l members shall be
appointed foi':a term of Olle year, one .fol' 1itemi.of
three yenrs, nnd one ror a term ot five ye:irs, but
their successors shall be ·appointed 1or terms of fl\'e
years each except .tha.t· any indlvldtiai chosi:b •.o fl.11
a vncs;,.n~y shall be nppolnt~d 9rily for tile unr: ~pJred
term rif tJ1e. m,emlJer whom he shnU succeed. The
Preside.tit shrill. designate. one member. ,ta serve as
chalrman o! the Board. Any member or t11e Boa.rd
n,ny l)e removed by the President, llPOJl·notice
·belll'Jng, for . ncglcct of cfotyor mali'casancc· ln office•
but ror no other cause.
Cb) A· vncaricy In the Board shall noflmpa.ir the
right of the ·rcmalnlng ·members to ekerclse· nll the
powers or the Board. and' two ml?lllbcrs ot the Board
sbnll, at 1111· times,· constitute a quorw:ii. . The Briai'd
shnll have· nn ·offlclnl senl which .shall be Jucllclnlly

-re-

and

notJcod.

<c> The l3oard_ sl1al1 a.t the close dt each flscnl
year make a rPport In writtn1;r to Congress and to. the
PJ:csldent stating In dctan the cases it. ·bas he~rd,
the dccJsions It bn.s rendered, the names, ·snJnrtes·,
and dtitlcs· of nll employees and officers in 'the. em...
ploy or- under_ th~ supervJslon or_ the.. Board~lln RCCOU?t of all moneys lt
dJsburscti·. (July· S,

bas.

.nnd

1935,' ch. 372~ §3. 49 Stt1.t. 451.>
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In the Matter of

UNITED STATES ~TAMPING Co:MP.ANY

ENAMEL WoRKERs' UNION

and

PORCELAIN

No. 18630

Oa,.se No. R-14
DIRECTION FOR ELECTION
Ja'lllUM'V 19, 1936

By virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the National
Labor Relations Board by Section 9 of the National Labor Relations
Act, approved July 5, 1935, and pursuant to Article III, Section 8
of the National Labor Relations Board Rules. and RegulationsSeries 1, it is
DmECTED that as part of the investigation authorized by the Board
in the above case to ascertain representatives for collective bargaining
with the United States Stamping Company, Moundsville, West Virginia, an election by secret ballot shall be conducted within a period
of one week from the date o:f this direction o:f election, under the
direction and supervision of the Regional Director for the Sixth
Region, acting in this matter as the agent of the National Labor
Relations Board and subject to Article III, Section 9 of said Rules
and Regulations, among the employees engaged in the production and
maintenance department 0£ the United States Stamping Company
on November 5, 1935 and those employed between that date and the
date of this direction of election in the production and maintenance
department, excep~ing :foremen, assistant foremen, supervisory and
clerical employees, and those who quit or have been discharged for
cause during such period, to determine whether or not they desire to
be represented by the Porcelain Enamel Workers' Union No. 18630.

I SAME TITLE]
Decision, Feb1·ua1·y 11, 1936
Stanipnig a,nd, Ena111,eU1ig J-11,<1,ustry-Strike-Representatwes: proof of choice:
comparison of can<.elled pay-roll checks with statements designating; membership in union.----Unit Appropriate for Oolleotwe Barga.ining: community of interest; functional coherence; employees on hourly and piece rate basis; distinc
tiveness of occupation; production and maintenance employees-El,ectIOn Ordered: question affecting commerce: prior strike caused by ~mployer's refusal
4

123
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NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

to recognize representatives-controversy concerning repre.3entation of employees; majority status disputed by employer; request by substantial number
in nppropriate unit-Certification of Representatives.

lllr. Robert H. Kleeb :for the Board.
Mr. Martin Brown, of Moundsville, W. Va., for the Company:
Mr. Joseph Rosenfar,b, of counsel to the Board.

DECISION
STATEMENT OF CASE

On November 4, 1935, H. G. Flaugh, an organizer of the American
Federation 0£ Labor and representing the Porcelain Enamel orkers' Union No. 18630, hereinafter called the union, filed with the Regional Director for the Sixth Region a petition for an investigation
and certification of representatives pursuant to Section 9 (c) of the
Nat.ional Labor Relations Act, approved July 5, 1935. The petition
~lleges that the union represents approximately 283, employees out
of about 414 in the production and maintenance department of the
United States Stamping Company, Moundsville, West Virginia,
liereinafter called the ~ompany, that no other individua]s or labor
organizations claim to represent any of the employees, and that a
question has arisen concerning the representation of the employees.
The petition further alleges that the question concerning representation 1s one affecting commerce within the meaning of Section 2 ('7}
of the Act.
On November 12, 1935, the Board, pursuant to Article III, Section
3 of N at.ional Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations--Series
1, authorized the Regional Director :for the Sixth Region to conduct
an investigation and to provide for
appiopriate hearing up'on due
notice. Notice of hearing was issued and duly f:erved, and hearings
were held on November 25th and 27th, 1935, before a Trial Examiner designated by the Board.
The company, through its counsel, filed a mot.ion to dismiss the
petition and an answer wherein, inter alia, the constitutionality of
the National Labor Relations Act was raised and the position taken
that t.he case was not within the jurisdiction o:f the National Labor
Relations Board. The company was represented at the hearing by
counsel who cross-examined the witnesses called by the Board but
who introduced no evidence in behalf of the company. The motion
to dismiss the petition is hereby denied. .
From the evidence adduced at the hearing and from the entire
record now before it the National Labor Relations Board promulgates the following:

,v

an
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DECISIONS AND ORDERS
FINDINGS OF FACT

1. The United States Stamping Company is a corporation created
and existing under the laws of the State of West Virginia and has
its principal office, main plant and place of business in the City of
Moundsville, in the County of Marshall and State of West Virginia.
It is engaged in the manufacture, sale and distribution of enamel
cooking utensils.
·
2. A great variety of materials, including cartons, steel, enamel,
oxides, flint, borax, clay, feldspar, sand, acid, bailwoods, excelsior,
silicates, wire, chrome covers, wooden handles, knobs and oil board,
is used in the manu:facture of the finished products of the company,
95 per cerit of which is purchased from without the State of West
Virginia, :f. o. b. shipping point.
at least 90 per cent of the company's finished products is normally
shipped to destinations outside of the State of West Virginia, to
points in almost all of the States of the United Sates, all sales being
made f. o. b. Moundsville, West Virginia.
The shipments to and from the company are by freight, express,
trucks and boats of independent companies. The :following freight
figures covering shipments to and by the company over the Baltimore
& Ohio Railroad, representing likewise the approximate average for
express shipments, were picked at random by the agent for that
Railroad:
SHIPMENTS TO COMPANY
From States outside West V1rg101a

1935

Within State
or West
V1rgm1a

August ..• ---···---·······--······.......... 9 carloads ........•... ·--············-···-- None
September.•••...•.•.....•••.•••.•••.....•.. 7 carloads.··---······-----··-----··-·----- 1 carload.
October ••. ··-·········-·········-····-····· 7 carload':! •••••.•••• _.•• ___ -- •••• --···-···· None
SHIPMENTS FROM COMPANY

To States outside West V1rgm1a

.Aug 12.•••••••••.••••.•..•••.....••...•••••
Aug 13 .••. ·----·---···-··-·-·---·······-·-·
Sept 24.••••...•••••............••.•.•••••..
Sept 25...••••••••••••....•••••.••••.••••.•.
Oct 8.•.•••....•..•..•..••..•.•.••••.••.•...
Oct. 9................................. ......

Within State
of West
V1rg1ma

26 shipments ....•••.....••.••••.•••.••••.• l shipment.
49 shipments •••.•..•••••...••••...•••••.•• 1 shipment
43 sh1pments ••••••••••• ~ •••••••••••••••••• 1 shipment

30 shipments ..••.••..••••....•••••......•• None
28 shipments •••••.•...•••...•...•....••... 1 shipment.
16 shipments .•.. ··-·······-···---·-·····-· None.

3. In 1933, Local No. 18630 of the Porcelain Enamel Workers'
Union, a labor organization affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, was organized among the employees oi tp.e United
States Stamping Company. The Financial Secretary of the union

0
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testified that the paid-up membership of the union was 229 at the
time of the hearing.
During June of 1935 difficulties arose between the management
and the committee of the union ov~r the negotiation of a new collective agreement concerning wages, hours and conditions of work.
The management refused to deal with the committee on the ground
that the union did not represent a majority of the employees of
the company.
4. On August 17, 1935, the union held a meeting which was
open to all of the employees of the production and maintenance department of the company. At this meeting cards of identical tenor
were circulated among those present addressed to the National Labor
Relations Board, marked " ( Strictly Confidential) For Government
Use Only", designating the Porcelain Ennmel Workers' Union No.
18630 as the agency for collective bargaining with the company, "for
the purpose of negotiating an agreement on wages, hours and working conditions and for the purpose of other mutual aid and protection.'' 282 such cards were signe~ at the meetmg and subsequently,
and were then turned over to Ernest Dunbar, an Examiner of the
National Labor Relations Board. Dunbar ~rlvised Mr. F. S. Earnshaw, Secretary and Treasurer of the company, that the cards represented a majority of the production and' maintenance employees, but
IYir. Earnshaw still refused to meet the committee of the union ior
the reason that the union did not represent a majority 0£ the employees and for the further reason that he would, under no circumstances, deal with the representatives of a union, especially one affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, but would meet them
as representatives of the employees of the company.
5. Dunbar, with the consent of Earnshaw, compared the signatures on the cards with the signatures on cancelled checks of employees supplied by the comp.any. He :found the signatures on 242 of
the cards to be the same or identical with those on the cancelled
checks, 19 signatures on the cards to be doubtful, and 21 to be
impossible of location among the checks.
This would give the union a clear majority of the 411 production and maintenance employees whom the company employed dur ..
ing this period. However, the evidence presented by the cards is
entirely ew parte in character. Although the Board may of course
act on ew parte evidence and make findings of fact based thereon, we
feel that under all the circumstances of this case an election should
be held.
6. Failing to obtain recognition of the union for bargaining purposes after repeated unsuccessful attempts to settle the matter amicably, the employees o:f the company went out on strike on or about
November 6, 1935, causing a complete shutdown of the company's
0
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plant. The value of shipments from the company, which for the
period o:f two weeks prior to the date 0£ the strike amounted to
$50,000, over 90 per cent of which was interstate, dropped to $7,000
for the three days succeeding the strike, and then the shipments ceased
altogether except for desultory parcel post or express shipments. The
shipment of raw materials to the company, 95 per cent of which was
also interstate, must have been .correspondingly affected, although
no evidence on the point appears in the record.
7. As reported to the lVest Virginia Compensation Board, the
United States Stamping Company had a total o:f 460 employees as
of October 31, 1935, exclusive o:f officials of the company. Of this
number there were 27 employed on the office force, 15 were foremen and assistant foremen, and 7 have since been laid off, leaving
a total of 411 employed in production and maintenance.
The office force includes typists, clerks and the sales manager. In
general, it is clear that they constitute a group with functions sharply
distinguished from that of the employees engaged in actual processing operations, are paid on a salary basis as against piece-rate
and hour-rate bases governing the production and maintenance
group, are paid on the 15th and 30th of each month while the production and maintenance employees are paid on the 7th and 23rd
of each month, and are regarded by the latter and by themselves as a
distmct department. .A.t the hearing they made no claim to be recognized as an independent bargaining unit or to be included in a total
employer unit.
The foremen, and assistant foremen are paid respectively on a
salary and an hourly basis and ought also to be excluded as having
supervisory authority and duties that relate them more directly to
the management than to the workers.
The one umt clearly defined as to :function and interest in establishmg a mechanism for collective bargaining is the production and
maintenance unit engaged in the actual processing of enamelware
and mcident activities, and not the total number o:f employees of the
romp any as contended for by counsel for the company. The production and maintenance department was described in the testimony as
consisting of welding, press, enameling, dipping, spraying, beading,
baking, packing, shipping, pickling, maintenance, day laborers and
night watchmen.
C.0NCLUDING FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF

,LAW:

1. The United States Stamping Company is a corporation created
uncl existing under the laws of the State of vVest Virginia and has

its principal office, main plant and place of business in the City o:f
:Moundsville, County of :M~arshall and State of West Virginia. It is
engaged in the manufacture and sale of enamel cooking utensils. As
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of October 31, 1935 it ,employed 411 persons engaged in the product1 on and maintenance department.

2. A great variety of materials is used in the manu:facturing of
the finished products of the company, 95 per cent 0£ which is purchased from without the State of West Virginia, :f. o. b. shipping
point. At least 90 per cent of the company's finished products is
normally shipped to destinations outside of the State of West Virginia to points in almost all of the states of the United States, all
sales being made f. o. b. Moundsville, "\,Vest Virginia.
3. The Porcelain Enamel Workers' Union No. 18630 ·is a labor
organization organized in 1933 and affiliated with the American Federation of Labor, whose membership is composed of employees of
the company engaged in the production and maintenance department. The Financial Secretary of the union testified at the hearing
that the paid-up membership of the union was th.en 229. The evidence tends to indicate that 242 employees in the production and
maintenance department have designated the union as their representative for the purposes of collective bargaining.
4. The employees ,engaged in the production and maintenance department o:f the company constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining, within the meaning of Section 9 (b) of
the A.ct.
5. Repeated attempts have been made by the union to negotiate
with the management of the company as the authorized representative of the production and maintenance employees for the purpose
of collective bargaining. The company refused to deal with the
union as the r,epresentative of the employees o:f the company engaged
in the production and maintenance department for the purpose of
collective bargaining, for an alleged reason, inter aUa, that the union
did not represent a majority of the production and maintenance
employees of the company.
6. This controversy ·finally led on November 6, 1935 to a strike o:f
the employees of the company, precipitating a complete shutdown of
the production plant of the company and a cessation of production,
with a consequent interruption of commerce and the free flow of
commerce.
7. A question concerning representation has arisen among the production and maintenance employees of the company, within the
m,eaning of Section 9 (c) of the A.ct.
8. The question concerning representation which has arisen has
led and tends to lead to labor disputes burdening and obstructing
commerce and the free flow of commerce.
9. It is the conclusion of the National Labor Relations Board that
a question affecting commerce has arisen concerning the representa-
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tion o:f the production and maintenance employees of the United
States Stamping Company, within the meaning of Section 9 ( c) of
the Act, and that an election by secret ballot should be conducted
to ascertain who shall represent such employees.
[ SAME TITLE]

CERTIFICATION OF REPRESENTATIVES ·
FebniC11·y 11, 1936

A petition for certification of representatives having been duly
filed, an investigation and hearing having been duly authorized and
conducted, and an election by secret ballot having been conducted on
January 20, 1035 among the production and maintenance employees
of the United States Stamping Company, located at Moundsville,
,vest Virginia, pursuant to the National Labor Relations Board's
Direction for Election dated January 13, 1935, and an intermediate
report finding that Porcelain Enamel Workers' Union No. 18630 had
been selected by a majority of such employees having been prepared
by the Regional Director for the Sixth Region and served upon the
parties, and no substantial and material issue with respect to the
conduct of the ballot having been raised by the objections filed with
this Board by the Company, pu:rsuant to Article III, Section 9 of
National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series 1,
THEREFORE, by virtue of and pursuant to the power vested in the
National Labor Relations Board by Section 9 ( c) 0£ the National
Labor Relations Act, approved July 5, 1935, and pursuant to Article
III, Section 8 of National Labor Relations Board Rules and Regulations-Series 1,
IT 1s HEREBY CERTIFIED that Porcelain Enamel Workers' Union No .
18630 has been selected by a majority of the production and maintenance employees of the United States Stamping Company as their
representative for the purposes of collective bargaining and that
pursuant to the provisions of Section 9.. (a) of said A.ct, Porcelain
Enamel Workers' Union No. 18630 is the exclusive representative
of all the production and maintenance employees of the United
States Stamping Company for the purposes o:f collective bargaining
in respect to rates of pay, wages, hours o:f employment) and other
conditions of employment.

MR. SMITH took no part in the consideration of the above Certification of Representatives.
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Chs. 52~ 53, 54

[110)

LABOR
CHAPTER 5.2

S. B. No.!!.i•
. (Pnsscd February 4.

m:r;.)

um,.

In eftect Fcb1·tm1·y 1:i. tegistered letter duly addressed to the Utnh stnte

LABOR DISPUTES
DEPUTIZING EMPLOYEES
An .Act Providing

industrinl commission at Snit Lnke City, Utah:
(n) Name of person. ..·
.·
·
(b)

or

p:itrot,
·any other pe·ace. officer during· the
tirne such strike or lockout exists.

(c)

Section. 3. Etfective Dntc.
This· nc't shnU tnke effe~t upon npprovnl.
Approved Februnry Ifi, 1937.

CHAPTER 53
S. B. No. 27.
.
(P.nsscd F<!bt•unry. :;, lU!li. In effect Fchrun1•y 10,
10:r.~)

LABOR DISPUTES
REGISTERING EMPLOYEES DURING
STRII<E
An .Act Requirh;1g RegistrnUon With the Indu~-

or

trial Commission
Utah · Before Accepting
Employment During a faibor Strike.

.Be it enacted In, t.J,e, I..t[Ji:<ln.hu·r. of the Statn of

.

Nnme of person, firm or corporntion·for.

which he intends

to work.

( d)

Time when he .expects to commence

(e)

Nature of work to be performed.

~~

.

.

.

Section 3. Recorda Open ·to Inspection..
The snid industrinl commiasi.on .shnll keep a
record of the informntion hQrcin .required :md
the i~ecord shall be open for public ·inspection.
Section ,J. Violation a l\tisdcmennor~
. The violation of any ·of .the provisions of this

net shnll be co11sidered ns n misdemeanor.
Section a. Effective Dnte.
This net shall take effect upon approval.
Approved February 16, 1937.

Section 2. Penalty.
Any person who violate$ the pro,,fsions of thia
• net •Shall be guilty of n misdemeanor;

. Uta'li:

Pince. of residence during the five years

Thnt Sheriffs, Chief~ of immedl~tely preceding regif3tnition for work.

Pollcet Town 1\-Intshnls, Officers· of the
Highway Patrol~ or Other Peace orricerR
Shall Not D~puti7.e the Employees of a
Private Employer When a Strike, Lockout,
or r..nbor Dispute Exists Directly Concerning
Such· Employer.
Be it e11acttd by 11,e Lcoislat,we of the State of
Uta.Tu
Section 1. Stdkes or Lockouts, Peace O(ficera
.
Not to Deputize Employee~.
No employee of. any employer whose employees
arc on. sirike or lockout for arty renson shnU be
deputized for any purpose a.rising from or in
connection ,vith such strike by nriy sherHf; chief
police, town· marshal, officer of the· highway

of

giving to the .industr1nl commission the foll~,v~
ing informnUon, to be given . in person or by

CHAPTER 54
S. B. No. 34.
(Passed February 10,
:.m. 1037,)

rn:r..

ln effcc:t Fcbruarl-'

f.,ABOR DISPUTES-SETTI.,El\1ENT
An Act Amending Sc~tion 49-l-,'3t Revised
Stat~tes of Utah, 1933, ·nelating .to the Dutles

or the Industrial Commis.tdnn or Utah to
Ertcd Settlemenb1 or l,nbor Dispute~, nnd
Repealing Sections 49-l:-6 and 49-1-7, Revised Statutes of Utah, t933.

Be it c.11actcd bu f./io Legislaht1·e of tire Stata o.f
Ulali:
Section J. Section Amended..
Section 49-1;.3, Revised Statutes of Utah, 10831
is nmended to 1-etid as follows:
49-l--.1..

Duties of Industrinl C()mmission-

Endenvor to Effect Settlements. ·
A~ soon ns practicable alter 1·eceiv1ng such
application the commissfon shall request c11ch of
the parties to the dispute to rtg:ree upon a writtct1 statement of fncts relating to the controversy,

Section 1. Registration.
It is the duty of every person before commencing employment with any person, firm or corpora- and ~o submi_t the.anme-to ~t. When such agreetion. ,vhose employeca are out on labor strike ment cannot be 1·eachcd each of .the parties mny
called by a. national· recognfaed union to register s~pnrntely submit to the commlssfort n written
statement of' grievances. . Applications to the
with the industrial commission of Utah.
coinmfssion for adjustment must precede any
Section 2. Id. Information Required.
lockout on the part of employers and any strike
Such registratio~ shall be accomplished. by on the part of employees in the majority and
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shall include a promise to abide by the decisio~
of the commission and must be signed by the
employer on the one side and by a majority
of his employees on the other. As soon as practicable after receiving such application the commission shall proceed to n hearing and
determination. \Vhen it appears to the industrial
commission that an amicable settlement by conciliation or mediation may not be had the said
commission. shall request both pnrtics to tl1e
controversy to submit in writing a full statement
of its 1,rrievances to the 1;aid commission. A
mnjority of the employees, at n meeting cnUed
ror thnt purposo, mny appoint a committee to
prepare such statement on behalf of such employees. The industrial commission shnU at all
times use its office in nn effort to adjust the
matters in dispute and it may hold hearings
thereon nt whtcb each p~rty may submit evidence

in support of its cause. 'fhe said commission may
require the attendance of witnesses and may
issue subpoenas to assure their attendance. After
being fully advised iu the premises the said
commission shall make findings and recommendntions which shall be submitted to cnch of the
parties to the controversy and also to the gov..
et'nol-. In the event thnt the said parties, within
five dnys after having received a copy of such
findings and recommendations, fail to reach an
agreement, then, upon request of either party,
tho said findings nnd recommendations shaU be
published by the commission.

Chs. 54, 55
CHAPTER 55

H, B. No. 03.
(P:isscd Mnrch 11, 1037.

1037.)

In effect Mnrcl1 221

U1'AH LAilOU RELATIONS ACT
An Act Repealing Chapter 1, Title 1191 Revised
Statutes or Utnh, 1933, Creating the ••Lnbor
Relntions llonrdt" nud Designating the In..
dustrinl Commission or the Slate or Utnh
to Act as the '•Lnl>or Rc1atlons llonrd'';

Defining Tci·ms Used in the Act; Prescribing
the Powers nnd Duties or the "Labor Rclntiom1 llourd"; Giving J..nbor lhc Right to
llttrgllin CoUectively; Prescribing Certain
Rights nod Duti~s of Em1>loyces; Prohibit•
ing Unfair Labor Prncticc on the Part of
Employers; Providing for the lnvcstlgntion,
llenring, nnd Disposition of IAnbor Disputes
and Unfair Labor Practice by the "Lnbor
Relations Bonrd"; Authoriiing the 0 Lahor
Relations IJonrd" to Petition the Supreme
Court to Enforce the Orders of the ..Lnbor
Relations Board"; Providing the Aggrieve<l
Persons .l\lny Obtain Writs From the Supreme
Court to Review Orders of the 0 Lnbor
Relations Board'•; l\lann~r or hu1ulng Sub•
poenns nnd Enforcing Attendance of Wit,
ncsscs and Taking 'l'cstimony by the 0 Lnbor
Relations Ilonrd; Providing the ..Labor
Relations Iloar<l" 1\luy Obtain Datu From
Other State Bonrds; Providing Penalties for
Violntion or the Provisions of this Act;
Appropriating Funds to Put Into ECrect the
Provisions of This Act.

Scetion 2. Disobeying Subpoenncs-Contempt
Proceedings.
Be it enacted b11 tlrn Legislat1i1·c of (Ile State of
In the event of n person having been duly
Utali:
subpoenaed to appear before the commission in
Rnid hearings and wilfully fails to appear the Section l. Chn1>ter Rcpenled.
commission may file a petition with the district
Chnpter 1, 'fitle 49, Revised Statutes of Utah,
coui·t in the county where the hearing is being 1933, is repealed.
held, stating the fncts and praying for a citation
agail18t said person for contempt. Upon the filing of said petition, it shall be the duty of the Section 2. Declaration of Policy.
The deninJ by employers of the right of emcoul't to issue a citation requiring snch person
to appear nt a time nnd place certain nnd then ployees to orgnnize and the refusal by employers
and there show cause why he should not be pun• to accept the procedure of collective bargaining
fshed for contempt of court nnd, in the event lead to strikes and other forms of industriaJ
the court finds that such person has wilfully strife or unrest, which have the intent or the
di sobcyed the subpoena issued by the commis- necessary effect of burdening or obstructing
~ion, ft shall be the duty of the court to punish int1·nstate commerce by (a) impairing the cWciency, safety or opcrntion ot the insb•umentalisaid person for contempt.
tles of int1·nstnte commerce; (b) occm·ing in the
current of commerce; (c) matc1•ially affecting,
8ection 3. Sections Repealed.
restraining or cont1·0Uing the flow of raw
Sections 49•1·0 nnd 49-1-7, Revised Statutes of materials or manufactured or processed goods
Utah, 1933, are repealed.
from or into the channels of intrastate commerce,
or the pt•icca of such materials or goods in
Section 4. Effective Dnte.
inti-nstnte commerce; 01· ( d) causing diminution
This net shall take effect upon approval.
of employment nnd wages in such volume ns aubstnntially to impair or disrupt the market for
Approved February 20. 1937.
goods flowing from or into the channels of in-
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trastatc commerce and the <>rdcrly operation. of

[118]

regular nnd substnntinlly equ·ivalent employ-

ment, but ahnll not include any individual emindustry.
The inequality_ of bargaining power between ployed as .an ng1·icultural lnb.<>rer, or in the
employees who do not possess full freedom of domestic ·service of nn·y f~miJy or· person at his
asaocintfon or nctual liberty of cotitr~ct, and home, or any individual employer by his parent
etn"ployers who arc organized in the :cot·porate 01• spouse.
(4) The term "1·eprescntntives•• includes nny
or other forms of o~vnership nssociation substantially ·burdens_ ~nd n_f(e.cb.l the flow of com".' individual or lnbor organization.
( 5) The term "lal)ol" orgnnfantion" means
mercc, and .fonds to aggravate recurrent business dcl)ressioris, by depressing ,vn1;tc rates and nny 01·gnnization o:f any kind, or any agency o,r
·thep1.1rchnaing power of wage ·eo.rners in indus- employee representation: committee or plan)· In
try and by preventing the stabilizntion of ~om- wMch employees pnrtfolpnte nnd which ~xfsts
petitive wage rates and ,vorklng conditions for the purpose, in wholc. o~ in _part; _of denting
with erilployel's concerning grievances, labor
within and between industries.
Experience has pi·oved that protection by Ja,v disputes. wnges, 1,·atca of pny, hours of crnployof the right of .employees to organize and bar- nfont, or. conditions. of wprk.
(G) The te1~m "comrilercc';t mcnns trade,
gain caJlcf;tively anfegua1•ds commerce from
injury, impairment or i~te.rruption, ;ind pr<>• traffic, commercei transportation, or communf..
motes the flow of commerce by removing certain cation within the state of Utah ..
indµstrial strife nnd _un(7) The term "affecting ·commerce" means
recognized sources
rest, by encourngirig practices fundamental to in commerce, or burdc11ing or obstructing
the friendly ;1.dfustment of industrinl disputes mci•ce or the free flow of commerce, or hnving
arising out of differences ns to wages, hours or led 01• tending to lend to a labor dispute burdenother working conditions, and by rcstc,ring equal- ing or obstructing comi:rierce- or the free flow
ity of ba1·gaining po,ver behveen employers nnd of commerce within the stnte of Utnh.
employees.
(8) The term "unfnir_.l~bor 1>r;icticc" means
It is hereby declared to ·be ,the policy of the nny unfair labor prnctice _listed. i~ seetion 9.
state of Utah to eliminnte the' causes of· certain
(9) The term "labor dispute" includes any
substantial obstructions to the free operation of controversy concerning terms, tenure or con(ii• industi-y nnd to mitigate nnd: eliminate these tions of employm~nt, or concerning the asso-ob·sb:uctions when they· have occurred by en- cintion. or representation of persons in negocouraging the practice ni:id, procedure of collec- tinting, fixing, mnlntninlng, changing or seeking
tive bargaining and by protecting the exercise to arr:mge terms or' conditions of employment,
by· ,vorkers of full ireedom of association,_ sclf- regnrdl~s o_f whether the_ disputants stand in
orgnntzation, and designaUon of ·1•cpreaen~ativcs the proximnte relation :of employei; or employee.
of their o\vn choosing, for the purpose of- nego(10) The term ·111abor relations· bonrd" means
tiating the - terms and conditions of their em- the industrinl commission
Utah.
ployment or other mutunl aid. or protection.
Section 4.. Lnbor Relntions Board.
Section 3. Definitions.
(n) The industrial commission of Utah .is
When used in this aet-(1) The term designated as the labor relations board harein"person" bieludes ·one or mor~ indivldunls, part.. afte1• referred to aa the board.
nershfps, associationsi corporations, legal repra(b) A vncnncy in the board shall not impnii;
sentatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy 01• the r[ght of the remaining members to exercJse
receivers.
all the powers of tho bourd, ·nnd two members
·(2) The term '°'employer'' includes ariy person of the bonrd shall,. at all times, constitute a quoracting in the interest of nn employer, directly or um. The bonrd shall
official senl which
indirectly, but shall not .i~clude the United ~tntes, shall be judicially noticed.
any state or political subdivision thereof, 01·
( c) The board shall at the close of ·each
any ·person subject to Jhe. railway labor net, 8J! fiscal yenr make _a report ·in .writing to the
mncnded from time to time~ or nny labor organt- leg.ish1tu1·e .nnd .to the governor .stating in detail
zation (other than when noting as· an ernploY.cr). the cases .it hns hellrd, the- ,decisions it has
or anyone acting In tha cnpacity of officer or rendered, the nanics, salaries and duties of. nH
agent of.such labQr 01•gnniintion.
employees _and officers in the ·employ -or under
(8) The term "employ_~" shall i11clude nllY the supervision of the board, nnd an account

or

com-

of

nave an

or

employee, and shall ~ot ·be, limited to the employees of a particular employer, unless the net
explicitly states otherwise, .nnd shnU include

any· .fodividual

whose work, . hns ceased v.s a
consequence of, or .in conneetion with, any cur-

r.ent labor dispute or bc9D,use of any unfair labor
practice, 11nd who hns not obtained any other

of all moneys it has disbursed.

Section 5~ Emtaloyccs-Expenscs of Board.
(n) The bonrd. may employ· nn cxecutiv~ sec'!'
retnry, ailcl Rttcb attorneys, examiners, and may
employ such other: empJoyees with regard to
existing laws applicnble to the employment and
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CQtnpensntiQn of officf!ts and employees of the hibited from per~itting em.ployecs to ~onfer with
state of Ut~h as it mriy f'rom timo to time find him during. wo1•kiifg hours ,vithou~ loss of time
necessa.ry for th~ pr9per p~rf01-mµnce 9f its 01•pny.
{3) By d,i:scrjm~nntion in reg~(). tp hiro gr
duties. The bonrd mny -establish or. utilize suc.h
regional, "Jocai1 ·othcr.· agcnci~, and
such tcnu1·e of employment or any term or condition
voluntary ijrtq uncQmpensnted .services, ns mny of employment to encourage ·or discoufage mem:from time to time be needed. Attorneys employed persliip ih -~ny labor organ.~ntion i pi·o~i,jcd, that
under this section ·mny, nt .the direction of the nothing (n this act sh2lU preclude -~n em,ployer
boar<!, nppcnr·. fot and represent_ the boni~d in from making nn . ngreement with n labor orgnni~
«.l~Y cnse in .cQurt. ~othing iit tbis ~ct ahnll be zntion (no~ est:,.blished, maintn.h1etl or assisted
constr·ued to authorize the hon.rd to cmpioy indi- by any ~ctioiI ~efined in this act ns ~n unfair
viduals :Cor ·t11e purpose~of conciliation 01· medin.- hibo1• · p1icticc) .to i~equire as .a- _:co11dition
tfon (or ior statistical work) where· and if sucll employment, membe1:"3hip ther~in, if such "I~bor
serYice may be· obtained ft-oin the depnrtment of 01•ga11izntion is the rcprescntntive of the em:..
lnbor~
·
ployees ns m·ovided. in sectfo~ 10, (a)_, In the.
(b) All or the expensea of the):iontd, :inclu4- appro1>ri'.',tc collective. ~"Lrgainirig ·unit co~re~
i11g· tho necessai·y traveling_· expenses, incurred by by such agreement when ~~de~
( 4) ·To discharge or otherwise- dJscriininate
tho membc1·s or employees of. the. bonrd. unde-r
its orders, shnll be allowed nn4 paid on the pre• agninat·:m cmploye_e bec;,1.us_e ~e has filed charges
seufation of itcrilized votiehc1-s therefor ap.. oi•- given testimony tinder :tl~is .
(5J .To refuse to bnrgnin collectively with the
provcc,l by the board 01· by· any individual it
1·epl-esent.ntives of .hia employees, ilUbject to the
deslg~ntes for the purpose. ·
p1·ov~ions of section io (n).

or

utilize

of

~et.

Section o. orrices•.

The pl'incipal . offfoc of- the boa1·d shnU be at
tbc state capitol but it mny m.eet nnd exercise any

Section 10. C91lect,ive Bargaining ·--- R~pre~

or nll of its powers at any other place. The bo::u·d
mny, by one Qr mo1·e Qf. ita members or by
u~cnts or agcneica. ns it m_ay designate, prosecute

(a) Representatives designated oi' selected
fo1•· the ·purposes Qf collective ·bnrgnining' by. the.
m~jority of the employees in a unit ;tpproprillte
for, sttch 1mrposes, shall _be the exclusive r.ep·re•
~ent~tivcs of ,:ill the employees in ,such. unit :for
the purposes of ce>ll-acti\fe bargaining. in respect
to 1·a~es of pay, wages, hours of employment, or
otbe1• conditions of cmployroent; ·p1·011idcd, that
nny :individual ctnpl~yee or n, .g1•o~p of employees shnll' have the 1·ight at any lime to present grievances to their· employer•.

such

ilny

hi<(ufry necessary.

to 1ts functions

ln any

part or the st_,,te of Utnh. A member who pal'ticipatcs in ~uch inqui.ry _shall not be disqunllficd
from subsequently pnrtieipnting in n decision

of the board in the same crise~
Section 7. Rules and Regulations.

(a) The bonrdshall:hnve.nuthority £~om time
to time to xrtnke, amend ·and 1-escind such rules
nnd regulntions as mny b~ neccssar.y to cai-1.-y
out th~ provisions. of this·_.nct. Such rµles and
l'egulations shnll be eUeeti.ve ··upon· pubUcntion
In the m::mner whic}l the board· shall· prescribe.

r:ientntives.

ilpptoptiata Unit.
(b)

The board· !!hall decide . .in each.

case

wbcthet·> in order to h1su1·e to·~mployees the full
bcncf.it of thcfr right ·to sclf-orgnnJzntion and to
Section 8. Self-Organization
Collective collec_tive bnrgaining, and othe1·wiee. to efrec.·t-unte the· policfos of this. act, tlle unit appropriate
Bnrgaining.
Employee~ ahnU have the right to self-organl- for the pu1•poscs of collective bill'gaining shall
z:ition, to form, join, .or assist labor .01•griniza- be. tho ~mploycr uni~-, craft un_it; :plnnt unit., or
tions, to ba.1:gntn collectively through representa- subclivisiou ·thereof. ·
tives of thei_r ·own choosing. and to eng;lge 'in
Questlous A//ccti11g Int1·astate Com.mo1·cc.
concerted nctiv.ities, for the purpose -of coUeetivo
{e) Whenever a question affecting intrasiate
~a1·galning o~_othe1~ m-ut\tnl aid or 1n·oteetion.
commc1•ce or the ·01·del'ly operation of .industi,y
ni•isca concerning the tep1•oscntntfon of employ...
Section 9. Unfnir Lnbor P.rncUecs.
.It shn11. be an unfair fabor practice fi;>r an ocs, the bonrd may inv~stigata such con.troversy
employer-(!) to interfere with, tcst1·:dn- 01· :iµd ccr~ily to the _parti~, in writing, the ·name
coei-ce employees· in the e~er~ise of the ~•igbts or names or th_e 1•epresentntives thnf have been
designated or selected.· I~ nny such investigatfon,
guarru1toed in .section 8.
· (2) To dominate or intcl'ferc wlth .the -for- tho· board shall provide for an appropriate• hearmution 01· ndtninistration of any labo1~ orgnniza.; ing upon· due notlc~~ either in co1~j'i.rnction with
tion .or contribute iinnncial or other s~pport- to n p1·ocecdiug under :$cction 11 or- other,v"is~ and
it.; 1n·9-.:idc~, that subject. ·to 1·ules and regula- Jnny ~c a secirct bnUot of. en,iplQyqes, or utilize
tion~ mndc nnd pubUs~ed by the bonrd puJ;SuQ.nt any other. _suitable method to ascertain such
·
·
to section 7 (a) :m employer shall not be pro- representatives.·
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the opinion that any person named in the·_ comlet. Rcv.ic1u-T,-ci.1iso1'i'ot.
(d) Wh~ncver a!. v1.Jer of· the board mAde JJlaint has engaged in or is eng:,Lging in any
pursuant to section 11-· (c) .is based in whole or such unfair lnbor practice, then tl1e board shall
in Jlt.r.rt upon. facts certified following an·. inves.. .stntc its findings of fact nnd ·ahnll 'issue and
tigntion purstmnt to stibs~tiO.ri (c) oi ·this se<:- cause to. be served on sucb Pel'S·on., 1;1n order to
tion, nnd. the1~Js a_ petition for the enforcement cease and desist from such unfair labor p~or review of· at.ich order, such certification and tice, and ·to tnke such affirmntive ·action, includthe. record of such in 11estigntlon shrul be included ing reinstatement· of employees with or with9ut
in tile transcript of the entire record required back pay, as will- effectuate_ the policies of th_is
to be .tiled - undc1• subsections 11 (e) or 11 (f), net. Such order mAY rurtherrcquire such.person
and the1·eupon the decree of the court e11fo1·cing, to make. t~epol'ts from: time to time -showing the
mo,lifying, 01· setting aside iu wbole or i:n pn1~t extent to which it hns complied with the order.
the order.of tlle board shall be made and entered ·If upon· all the testimony taken the board shall
upou tl1c· pleadings, testb11ony nrid. proceedings be of the opinion thnt no :person named in the
complaint" hns engaged in or ls engaging in any
set io1-th in such transcript.
such.. unfair lnbo1• prnctice,. then the boo.rd shall
Section .U. Unf~ir Practices - Powers of state its findings of fnctand ~hnll .issue mt .order
Ilonrd to l 1 rcvent.
dismissing the said compl~int.
(a) The "oard is empowe1~cd, as hercimifte:r
Ti·inc i11, Wltic/1. Bo(l,rd May Afodi/1.1 Orders.
provided, to prc,•ent any person from engaging
(d) Until a. tr~nscrlpt of the record in n
in n)ly unraJ1· lnbor practice .(li_s~cd .in ,liection
9) affecting intr:lstntc co~crce or the orderly cusc shall Jlave been filed. in a .court, as herein..
operation or industry. Thi~ PO\Ver shall bC! ex- after provided,. the bonrd may nt any time, upon ,
chlsivc, and .s11:dl not be n.ffectcd by any other reasonable notice and jn such manner ns it may
~c~ns of adjtistinerit ·01· pi•evention t:h,at has deem proper. modify or set aside, in ,vhole or in
been. or may be cs~iblished by agreemen~ code, pni·t, any finding ·or order made or issued by it.

ln.w 01· othe1•wise.

•

Hearings~
(b) Whenever it is cha:•ged that any person
hns engaged in or is cngngej in any such unfair
labo1•· pi-acticc, the board, 01· an.y agent or agency
designated by Ute board for such purpo~es, shall
have power· io issue and cause to be served upon
such pe1·son a complnin't fJtati11g the charges in
that' respect,. :ind contnirung a notfce ot henring
before tl1e board or a member thereof, or before
~ dqgignuted · ngen,t or agency. nt n, place tber,in
fixed, ·not .less than five days after the serving
or· said· comphtint. .Any such complaint may be
amended by t11e membe1·, agent, or agency conducting the hearing 01· tlle boar~ in its diacretio11 nt any ·time prior to the issuance of till
order _ba.11cd the1·con. The pers·on so complained
of shall have the. right to file an answer to the
original or amended complaint nnd to nppcnr in
pe1:son or otherwise nn<l give tcst1mony at the
11lncc and time. fixed in the -complaint Iii ·the
discretion of the member·, ngel\t or agency conN
ducting the hearing or- tbe board, any other
person nmy be allowed to int<frveitc in the said
proceeding and to p1·escnt testimony. In any
sttch proceeding the 1·ules of evidence pi-evnfiing

fo courts of faw or ectnity shnU riot be coritroU•
in~
·
·
·

lcl. Repo1;t of l-Ica1·i11us-Or·dcrs of 'Board.
(c) Th(t testimony taken by such member,
agent, or ngency or the bom·d ehnll be reduced
~a ,vr.iting nrid filed with tho boni"d. Thet-enfter
in it.1 discx-ctio~, the_ b9ard. upon 11otice m~y take
further testi_mony pr he11r argument. If upon
nll. the testimony tnken the bonrd shall be of

Petitions to Suprema Coit:rt to ·E1iforce Otde,·s~
(c) The bonrd aho.11 have power to petition
the supreme coµrt of Utah (wherein the unfair
faboi· practice in question oooutred or wherein
such person resides or tr~nsncbJ ·business) fo1·
the enforcement of such ordel'.' and for appropri-·
ntc temporn1·y reli~f or restraining order.. and
shall certify· and ~ile in the .court a transcript
of the entire record. in the proceeding, including
the pleadings ·nnd testimony upon which such

order was entered and. the findi~gs

a.11~

order

of the board. Upon such filing, the court shall
cause notice thereof to be served
s·uc1i· per~on, an~ thereupon shrul have jurisdiction of the
proceeding nnd of the question determinf:!d therein, ai1d shall have power to.grant such temporary
i·cHei 01• restrnining order as it deems just and
propel', and to make nnd enter upon the.pleadings,
tcstfmony;, nnd proceedings set forth in ·such
transcript a decree enforcing, ,rnodtfy!ng, and
enforcing ns so modified, or setting aside in
whole or in part the order -of the board. No
objection that hns not been urged before the
hom·d, its mcmbcrt ngent or agency, shall be
comddercd ·by the court, unless · the fnilure or
neglect to urge such objection shnll be excused
bccnnse of extraordin:fry cl!'cuinstances. The
findingR of the bonr<l na to the. !ricts, if supported
by c\•idencc, Hhttll .be conclusive. If either pnrty
~hnll npply to the court for lcnve to adduce addi•

upon

tionnl f!viclcncc nnd 8lu:tll show to the sntisfaction
of the court that. such additional evidence is
material nnd thnt there we.re rcnscmabtc· grounds
fo1· the failure to ndduce such evidence in the
hearing· before the board, fts member, agent ot;
agency, the court may order such additional evi ...
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de·nce to be taken before the bonrd, its metnber.
agent ·Qr agency, and·· to be made pnrt of the
transcript. The. board mny modify its Jindb.1gs
ns to the facts, Qr ·malte n~w findi:ngs,.: by re~~on
of ndditlon~l <!Vidence so tuken and filed, and
it shnll file such .modified 01· .ne,,v _findinbrs,
which, U supported by ~vidence, shall be_ conclusive, and sludl file its .recommendations, If

any,_ tot the modification or..-:setting· _:aaide ot i~

originul 01•del\ Th~ ju~i~~iction of the_. sblte
gupr~me ~out~t sha~l be exclim.ive nnd its judgment nnd dec1·ee shall be final.

Persciils Au1Me.vcd, bv Orde~· of JJoanl-Rc·vie10.
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(C) Any pe1~son ngg1·ievcd by_ a final order,
the bo:ird grnnting 01· · denying in whol~. or in
pa1-t the relief •sought, may obtaJ~ a revfo,v. of
such or~~i• in the supreme cotfrt of Utah by
filing in: such court a writt<in petitio~ praying
th1lf the u1•der of the board ·be' modified or act
uside. A copy of such petition shaiJ ·be forth\Vith served ·U()()n the bo_rird, and thereupon the
ng1,.rrleved party shnll file in tJ1e co~rt a tran'."
script of· the cnth-e 'i-ecord. irt the: proceeding,
certirleo· by tbe board, :Including the plea~Hng
and ~timony ·up<m whJch the order corilplnin~d
of .was entered and the fh;idings and order o_f
the board. Upon such filing, the court shall
pro.ceed in th~ same manner as in t be cnse of an
application by the board ttilder subsec~i~n (e),
arid shall have the snme exclusive jurisdiction to
g1•nnt to the bonrd such temporary relief 01•
rcstmhllng orde1.· as it deems just and proper,
und in like manner to make nnd enter a .decree
enfol'cing, modifying and . enforcing as -so mo.dified, or setting aside in. whole
in pa1·t the
ordei• of the boat·d·; nnd the ·ffndings Qfthe board
as to .the facts. if supported ·by evidence, shall
i_n Uke mnnner be conclusive.

Any m~mber of 'the board shall have po,ver to
issue subpoenas 1•cqu·iring the attenda11ce an_<l
testhnony o'C wit~~ea_ n1.1d the IJtOd.u~t~on of. a.,ny
C\'idence thnt relates to any .matter· uride1• J_n~
vcstigntfon or in question, before the- bo;ird, its
member, __agent or. ~ge11cy co1,1~uctin1r the ~cni'-in!l
oi- fnvestfgntion. Any member of the ·board, or
.iny ngent or agency designated by -the board _for
such :Pllrposcs, may .~dniinister oaths and affirnuitions, examjne·witnesscs, und rcc~iye evidence.
Such llttcntlancc of··\v1tnesses and the production
of· ·sucl1 evidence may be req~li~e<i from nn.r·
place In the stnte of· Utah tlt any duly designated
place, hearing. .
.

of

Stibvocma_~, R.eb~ai to Obev.
(2) !ii case oi cantumney o~ refusal to obey
a ~n.Jl,i,oeua _issued to any person, a_ny distrt~t
court o! Utnh ,vlthln the jurisdiction of which
the· lnqu°fry is C4'il~_rted on or within the 3urisdic;;..:
tion of Which s~id_ llerao1_1 guilty _Q.f c<>ntum~y

>:e!usnl t~ olJQy is found or resides or trans'."'.
nct8 business ltpou application by the board shall
hnve .jui•isdiction to iss~e to such .persoll a.n or'.'
d~r re<1uiring such· perao~. to iippear before the.
board, its mcinbcri ··agent or agency, there to
lli•oduce evidence i:£. so order¢d, 01· there to give
testimony touching the ·matte1~ under investigation or. in que.stion; and nny :failure to obey
such- orde1· -of the cot.r.t mny .punished by said
court :is a contempt thereof.
01·

be

I,,imunitu.

:c 8)

N.o pe1~son. :sh_all be. excused from nttei\d-

ing and testifying

01·

from producing books,

rcco1•ds. corr~qp~nd~nce; documen~ or ~other evi-dcnccdn obedience to the subpoena of the-board,
or
on the ground thnt the testimo.µy or. evidence
>:equired of l:tim may· te~d to incriminate hint or,
suJ)ject hiI,n to a• penalty o.r forfeiture; 'put no
individual .shall be ,prosecuted or ·subjected. ~to
Pr,,ccedi,1(18 Not a Stay of Orde,·a~
any ~.natty or forfeiture for or on account of
(g) The comtne11cement of proceedings tinder :my · trnnsaction, matter or. thing concerningi
subsection (e) or (f) of this section &hall .not, ,,;hi~'h he .Is . con1pcdled aftc1· havl~g cl1dmed ·lii~
unless spe~i!icnlly ord~re.d by the coui-t, operate privilege agail}.":tt self-incrimination, ·to_ .testify
or proditce evidence. exeept .that such individnnl
asa sL~Y of the board's order.
so testifying shall not be-exe~pt fro~ ·pr~ecuPetil.fo,1:1 ttJ be Heard Wit1t.in Ten. Day~..
tion nnd 1mnishmerit. for perjury committed ·in
(h) f~titfon., filed undc·r this uct shall be· so testifying.
1uml·d ~"tpcdftiou~Jy. a~d if- possible within teu
· ·Sc1•vlce of Processes•
.day~ nfter they have been docketed.
(4) Complaints, 01~ders and ot_her processes
Section 12. Securing Evidence-Witnesses.
an<l papera of the bo~rd,. its membci•,. agent or
li'or thq ·.purpose of all henrings and h:avesti- .ugcncy; mny be S€!'rved either 1>ersolinl1;r or by
gntions,. which, in the _opinion of the- bonrd. are registered mail or by telegraph or by leaving ~
11eccssnry and· proper for the exercise of the _copy the1·eof at the prii1cipaJ offJee or· place of
poweJ-s ·vested fn it l)y sectfQn. 9 nnd section ti business or ·the ()el'son required to be served.
-( i) the board or its duly alitho·rized agents or The verified 1•(!tu1•n by the intlfvidttal so serving
agencies, slmll ri.t all rcnsonnble times have ac- thn sam~ setting forth the .manner of such servcess to, for -the _purpose oj _examination. and the ice sluill be pl'oor of the snrrie, :ind ,rct1.1rn post
rightto ·copy any evidence of any person being office. 1·eceipt or telegram receipt therefor when
hn·e$1tig~teg or p1·occeded against ·. tn~t -relates 1•eg~stcrcd nn~l m.~il~d 9r telC)gr.t1pbcc;l ~ ~fqreto any matter U!')der fnveatigAtion or Jn quc~tfon, !:mid shnll be proof of service of the saine._ WitDigitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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its member,

agent or agency, shall be paid the same fees
and milenge that are pnid witnesses in the courts
of. Utah and witnesses whose depositions are
taken nnd the persons taking the snme sh:tll

severally be entitled to the same fees na are
paid for like services in the courts of the state

CJIAPTER 5(i
S. B. No.

(Passed l1'ebrunry ,t1

w:rr.)

lo:rr.

In effect February

li'i,

REGISTUA'l'ION OF LAUOR
ORGANIZATIONS

of Utnh.

Sto.te Aoeucics Required ta Fm-,u·s1, Info,~ma.~
tio11.

28.

An Act Requiring the Roglstrution With the

The seve1·ul state depa1·tments and agencies of the state when directed by the governor
shall rumish the bo~rd, upon its request all
records, papers, and informntion In theil' possession l'elating to nu.y matter befol'e the board.
(5)

Section 13. WilCul InterCerence-Pennlly.
Any person who shall wilfully 1·esist, prevent,
impede or interfere with any member of the
board 01• nny of it~ agents 01· agencies in the
performance 0£ duties pm-sunnt to this act shall
be punished by n fine of not more than $5,000
.by imprisonment for not more than one year,
or both.
01·

Section 14. Right to Strike.
Nothing in this net ahnU be construed so as to
inter!ere with or impede 01~ diminish in any
way the right to strike.
Section 16. Pnrtinl Invalidity-Saving Clnuse.
If any proyision of this act, or the application
of .such provisions to any .person or circumstance1 shnll be held inv1\lidi the 1·emninder of
this act, or the application of such provision
to persons r;>r eh·cumstances other than t11osc

as to which it is held inv.nlid, shall not b,,. af.:.
fected thereby.
Section 16. Short Title.
This net mny be cited
Relations Act."

as the "Utah Labor

Section 17. Appropriation.
There Is he1-eby appropriated from tho general funds of the state or Utah, not otherwise
appropriated, the sum of $10,000 for the coming
biennium for the purpose of cnn·ying out the
provisions of this act.
Section 18.

E£Ccctive Date.
This act shnll take effect upon approvnl.

Approved March 22, 1937.

Industrial Commission of All Labor Orgnni:r.ntions or UnJons in the State of Utnh.

Be it euactcd by tJ,e Legislature of the State of
Utah:
Section l. Registration.
It ia the duty of every lnbo1· orgunizntiou or
lubor union ,vithin the state of Utah,
or be:.
fore si::i...-ty days afte1· this net becomea effective,
to register such labor organiz~tiou 01· union

on

with the industrial · commission of the state of
Utah.

Section 2. Id. Information Required.
Such registration shall be made by the presi-dent or scc1•etai-y giving to the said industrinl
('ommissfon in writing on Junuary 1st of e:ich
ycnr the !ollowing information:

(n)

The u~me nnd n<idrcss

or .,uch lribot• or--

ganizntion or union.
(b) The nnme.tt nnd uddresses of its local
officei•s.

(c) The name and address of the natiounl
or intc1·nntioonl oi•gnnizntion 01· union, if nny,
with which it is affiliated.

Sedion 3. Changes Reported.
Notice of nil changes in Ol·gtmfantiou, nddresscs or any of the infot·matfou required by
Rcction 1 of this act shall be reported to the
industriul commission within ten dnys after the

chnnge.q arc made.
Section •I. ViolationM n l\lisdemeanor.
The violation of any of the provisions

uct Rhnll be considered ns n misdemeanor.

or this

SccUon 5. Effcctive Dt}lc.
ThiM net shnll tuke effect upon a1>1n·ovul.

App2·ovcd Februm·y 15, 1987.
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Chs. 57, 58, 59

Ecction 5. Partinl lnvnlidlty-Snvlng Clause.
Should any part of tids act be declnred unS. B. No. ltl,
(Pnsscd Fcbrunry l:I, 1037. In effect February constitutional it shall not in nny way invalidate
the remainder of this act.
:.m. 1037.)
ASSIGNl\lENTS FOR BENEFIT OF LABOR Section G. Effective Dntc.
AND FARI\I ORGANIZs\TIONS
This net shall take effect upon npproval. ·
An Act l\lnking It the Duty of•'Employers and
.Appro\"cd Fcbrunry 20, 1937.
of Processors, or Dealers in•-:Farm Products
to Recognize Assignments of Their Em..
ployees ori of Producers Cor the Benefit or
CHAPTER 58
Labor Orgimizutions or Farm Organizations,
or Any Other Organbmtion (!f Employees or
H.B. No. o.
l•'armt!rs, nnd Providing a Pehalty for Drench
(Passed Februney :m, ma;. In cffoct Ma1·ch u,
lll3i,)
or Such Duty.

CHAPTER 57

IUGHT TO \VORIC FREE FROl\i

.lJc it cuacicd by the Lcgislalm·c of lite State of
Ulall:

INTERFERENCE

DISSUADING PA'fRONAGE OF BUSINESS
An Act Repealing Sections 49-2-J, •19-2-5,
Revised Statutes or Utah, 1933, Pertaining lo
Dissuading Patronage of a Business.

Section 1. Assignmenh1 to Labor Unions-Effect.
Whenever nn employee of nny person, firm,
school district, p1•ivnte or municipal corporntfon
within the state of Utah executes and delive1•s to Be it cu«cted by llle Lcg?°slatimJ of the State of
Uta.Ti:
hia entploye1· nn instrument in w1·iting whereby
such employer is directed to deduct n sum at the Section 1. Sections Repcnled.
rate not exceeding three pe1· cent per month,
Sections 49-2-4, 49-2-5, Revised Stntutetl of
from his wages and to pay the same to a labor Utah, 1933, are repenled.
organization or union 01· any other organization
of employees as assignee, It sh.ill be the duty Section 2. Effective Date.
This act shall tnke effect upon npp1'0vnl.
nf such employer to mnkc such deduction a11d to
pny the snme monthly 01• as designated by
Appro\'ed Mnt·ch 9, 1937·
employee to such assignee nnd to continue to do
so until otherwise directed QY the employee
through an instrument in writing.
Section 2. Assignments to Farm Organi7.n•
tions-Effect.
Whenever any producer of farm pl'oducts
within the state of Utah executes and delivers
to a denier or processor of farm products, either
aa a chluse in a snlcs ngreement 01· other in~tt•ument in w1·iting whereby such processor or
denle1· is directed to deduct a sum or a rate
not oxceedlng thre<: per cent of the price to be
paid for anY such produce, such processor or
dealer shnU deduct from the price to be paid fo1·
nny fiu,n product being sold by any such producer to any such processor or dealer~ the amount
so authorized and the product?r or dealer ahnll
pay the same to a farm orgnnfzntion as as•
signee.
Section 3. Failure to Comp))'. Penalty.
Any employer, dealer or processor who wilfully fni1s to comply with the duty here imposed
shnll be guilty of a misdemennor.
Section 4..

Exceptions From Act.

The provisions of this act shall not apply to
cnrricrs as that term is definetl in the railway
labor act, passed by the Congress of the United
States June 21, 1934, 48 Statutea 1189, U. S.
Code, Title 45,

Section 151.

CHAPTER 59
H.B. No. Ori.
(Passed Februn1-y

:m.

10:17.

In effect Mnrch 8,

Ul37.)

EIGHT-HOUR LAW
An Act Amending Scctlon 49-3-2, Revised
Statutes of Utah, 1933, Relating to the Period
or Employment of Working l\len in Undet•
ground l\tines or Workings and in Smelters
nnd All Other Institutions !or the Reduction
or Refining of Ores or l\Ietals, Providing
That the Period or Employment Cor Under•
ground l\lincs or Workings Shall Ile Eight

Hours Per Dny.
Do it enacted by the Legialatu1·c of tile Sta.to
Utali:

of

Section 1. Section Amended.
Section 49-3-2, Revised Statutes of Utuh, 1988,
is nmended to read ns follows:

-19-3-2. A Day's Work-l\lines and Smelters.
The pcrJod of employment of working men
in smelters and all other institutions for the
reduction or refining of ores 01• metals, shall be
eight hours per day, and the period of employment of wotking men in all undet•ground minee or
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workings shall be not more than eight hours per
dny, such eight hour period shnll be computed
from the time men go under ground until they
• Teturn to the surface, except in cases of emergency where life or property is iu Imminent
dnngel'; prnvidccl, lwwcver, when unde1· ground
oists or pumps ,u·e in continuous operation,
noistmen and pumpmen employed on such hoists
or pumps may be permitted to be underground
not to exceed eight hours and thirty minutes.
Any employer who violates any of the provisions
of this section is guflty of a misdemeanor.

[l2-l]

cintion, corporntion, receiver or othe1· officer of
u court of this state, and any agent or officer
of nny of the nbo,·c mentioned clnsses, employing
any pcr~on in this stnte.
<h) 0 \Va~cR~' shall menn all amounts nt which
the lnhor or service rendered is rer.ompensed,
wlwf h,•r the amount is fixed or ascertained on a
time. l:t~k, piece, commission basis or othet
method of calculating such amount.

Section 3. Rcgulnr Pay Dnys.
Evel'y employe1· sbalJ pay to his employees the
· wages earned semimonthly or twice during each
Section 2. Effective Date.
calendar month, on days to be designated in adThis net slmll take effect upon approval.
vance by the employer ns the regular pay dny;
Approved March 8, 1987.
1m1vided, thnt the cntployer shall pay for services
rendered during each semimonthly period within
ten dnys after the close of such period. WhenCHAPTER GO
eve1· the employe1· hires his employees .on a yearly
salary basis, then said employer mny pny the
H.B. No. ll.
employee on n monthly scnle, said wage shall be
(Pnsscd Mnrch n. tna,. In effect lrfo.y 11, 1037.)
paid by the seventh of the month following the
PAYMENT OF WAGES
month for which services were rendered. He
An .Act to Regulate the Pnyment of Wages or Aball pay such wages in full, in h.wful money of
Compensation for Lnbor or Service fn Private the United States, or checks on bnnl<s, convertible
Employments; Establishing Regulnr Pay into cash on demand at full face vnlue thereof.
Days. Providing That Notices as to Pay Days
l\fust Be [(cpt Posted by the Employer and Section 4. Notice as to Pay Dnys-Postlng.
(a) It shall be the duty of every employer to
1\-lnking Failure to Keep Such Notices Posted
Prima Fncic Evidence of Violation of the notify his employees at the time of hiring of the
Act; Providing Criminal Penalties for the day, and pince of pnymen~ of the rate of pny and
Violution of Its Provisions, Authorizing the of any change wUh respect to any of these items
Industrial Commission of Utnh to Enforce prior to the time of said change. Alternatively,
This Act; Defining the Duties or District however, every employer shall hnve the option of
Attorneys nnd County Attorneys Relative to giving such notification by posting the aforeIts Enforcement; Providing for the Collection mentioned facts. and keeping them posted, conof Certain Penalties by Civil Action nt the spicuously nt or near the plaee of work where
Direction of the Industrinl Commission of such posted notice can be seen by each employee
Utah for Failure to l\laintnin Regular Pay n~ he come.t.J 01· goes to his place of work.
Days nnd the Disposition of Penalties so
Abstract of Law Postecl--E:rP.nr,r,tions F,·o,n
Collected; Providing a Civil Penalty for
Act.
.
11,ailurc of th.c Employer to Pay Discharged
Employees or Employees Who Quit, and
(b) Every employer shall post and keep postPermitting Such Employees to Sue Directly ed, in a similar mnnner as pre~crlbed for the
or Through an Assignee for Such Penalties posting in paragraph (n) of this section, an
ns Well ns Permitting the Industrial Com- iibstract of this fu1·nished by the industrial commission of Utah to Sue for Su.me in Such mission; pmvidcd, liowevcr, thnt the provisions
Cases as They Atay Deem Proper, and Repeal- of pnrngrnph (b) of this section shall not apply
Ing Sections 49-9-2, 49-9-3, 49-9-4, 49-9--.'i, to domestic labor in private homes or agricul49-9-6, 49-9-7, 49-9-9, Revised Statutes of tural labor. None of the provisions of this act
Utah, 1933.
~hall npply to employers or employees engnged
in farm. dniry, ngricult,11."nl, viticulturnl or horliBe ii tmactcd l)JJ the Legi~laf.lu•r. of file State of
culturnl pursuits or to banks and mercantile
Ufalt:
houses, or to stock 01· poultry raising or to house..
hoJd domestic service.
Section 1. Sections Repealed.
Sections 49-9-2, 49-9-3, 119-9-4, 49-0-5, 49-9-6.
Faihu·e to Po.lit-Penalty.
4.9-9-7, 49-9-9, Revised Statutes of Utah, 1983, are
(c) Fnilure to post and to keep posted any
repealed.
notice or nbstract as weU as any failure to give
Section 2.. Definitions.
written notice M prescribed in this section shall
(a) Whenever used in this act, 0 cmployer" be dcemecl a misdemeanor, and punishable as
includes every person, firmJ partnership, asso- ~uch.
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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Section 5~ Employee Rem_oved From Pny Roll
-Failure to Pny-Pemdty.
(n) When.ever an employer separates nn ~m~
ployco fr~m th¢ pay roll the unpaid wngcs 9r
compcnsaiion of.. such employee sh{lll. become due·
frnmcdintely. and the employer: shall pay such

Ch. 60

pcnsaiion, at more frequent intervals. or in gr:aatot· amounts or in full when 01• before due~ bnt no
provisio~ <>f -t4i~ ae~ can. in l\J\Y '\Vay be contr~ve1'ed oi• set-aside by a mutual ugr~ement.

Section 8. EmpJoye1· Liable to Employees of
,,,ages .to· the employee within 24 hours ·Qf the
· Subcontractor.
time of sepnr~tfon nt th.e specified pl_ace 9f pay.(a) Whenever ~n employer shall contract
meut.
with. nnotlte1•. herein called the subcontractor,
In cnse of nny fm\ure to pay wages due au (01· _the performance .or the employer's work, then
~mployee wi~hi;n 24 hcura of a dem~nd 'therefor, -ft sh~ll be the dll~Y o( such an employer to p_rothe \\'Dges .of .such employee shall continue from vidc in su¢h contract that the employees ,of tile
th_e _date of scpnrntion until paid at the.same rate su~contrnctor shall be paid ace9r~ing to .the
whiclt said employee 1·eceived at the time of the pro\'isions of· th.is net; and in the _event that such
separnt'fon. The employee may. recover the pen- subcontractor shall fnil tq pay wages to his emalty thus accruing
him iQ n. civil net. s·aid ployees as. ~pccifie~ i~- this act,_ suc-.i employ~r
tl<:tion .must be _c9m '.'ltCJ.1CCd wJthin GQ days· f1•om shall become civilly li~ble to the· employ~ of the
the dnte. of scpa·rntion, providecl,· Jwiuevct, that subcontractor to the extent that such work la
any employee
hns ·riot made n· demand for perfo·r.nwd. under -such contract i~ the snm~ man~
1mymcnt shall not be entitled to ~ny su~h penalty llQl~ as it· said empl~yecs were dire_ctly employ~~
by such emplciyer.
under this p~rngraph.
·(l,) The pr0.vi;dons of pai-agraph- (a)' of this
E_1n1,fo_ycc Rcsign(ng, Pay·~n:rm.t of Wages.
section ~hnll likewise be deemed nppli~ble to itny
(b) Wheneyer an employee (.~o~ hav_ing a person, fii-m, p~dnership, . association or. corpowi-ittcn contract for a defiidte period) quits or l~tltion Who :11Qt being an employer, ·an~ hereinresib'11S his employment, the. Wnges rir compen~ ZJ..fter. l'efe1 red to in thia act· ns 'an •'indirect .emsntion earned shall become due and payable ·:not. pltiyc'i•," couti·acb! ,vith a subcontractor for the
Jntc..: thn11 72 pours th~reafter, unles~ such 1jcr,formance of his ,vork.
·
employee shnll have given ,Z:2 hours' previ_ous
notic~ of Ms. interiticm to quit, in which latt·er Scctlpn 9. Enforcetnent
·A.ct.
case such employee s:hnll _receive his .wages and
(i,.)
Jt
shall
ba
the
duty
of th~ industrial
compensation. at the specified pince of payment
comrrifasion
:t.o
·
ins_ure
compliance
with. the pl'Oyint the time of guitting.
sions of. this act, to . investigate as to any.violaS·1uip1niaioR of. Work a# Rc.mlt of Diavute. tions ofthis act, nnd ·to ·institute or· cause fo be
instituted actions :for pennltl~ ·anci f~rfeitures
iPaymeut of Wage.
( c) I.n the event of the suspension of ,vork as provided hereunder.· 'The industrial «..'Olnmfssion
the ·result
industdal dispute, the wuges rimy hold hearings ·to satisfy ibelf ~tJ° to. the
m;id compensation earned and u·npn-Jd at the time justice or. any clain,t•. and it shull c:ooperate with
of saftl suspension sb11ll be~~me
and pnyaple any e:µipfoyee in the enforccme~t of .a clatm
at the next regular Jlc1Y day.,_as provided in sec~ .agninst his' ·emploY,Cr or any "indirect nniployer''
tion 2 of this net, including, without abatement as defined in sectfon 'I, ·in any cas~, ~•,wever, 'in
or r~dtietion, nil am9unts due nU persons. whose his opinion, the claim is just nnd vnlf J.
:(b) It shnll bemnndatory upon all district
wo.rk ha~ been :suspencled .as n res11lt of .such
inclustdal dispute, togethe~• with ~ny .~eposit ntto1·.neys nnd county .attorneys of this state .tr,
or othet· guaranty held by the employer for the p1·osecutc nil cases both civilly and criminally
faithful performance of the duties of the em- wh.foh shall be referred by the industrlal cf,mmission to such offjcers.
t>loyment~
(c} lt shall be the duty of· all such officers
Seetion G. DispQte Over W11.g~Notice and to prosecute actions, b9th civil and criminal, for
Payment.
such violations of -this. act as come to their
In ·case of a _disput9 ov~r tvnges, the employer knowled_ge -tmd to enfo1·ce. the .provisions hereof°
shall give written t1.otice to the employee of the independently.
nmount of.wages whieh he concedes. tQ:he due and
shall pny such gmount ·wiiholit ~ondition within
the time set by tllis act; p1•ovldcd, that'..ncceptnnce Section 1_0. Records of Employers.
(lQ E,rery· employe1· .shall keep a true nnd
by the employee o( i:my payme.nt made here1,1nd~
Hhnll · not constitute n release· na to the. bnlnnce u<.'Citi•nte recoi-d of time worked and \Vnges pa: lei
euch pay period to ench em1>loyee. who is .en\•
or:.iiis claim.
ployed <m an hourly· or a daily bnsts in such fo:'ln
Section 7. Construction of Act.
ns inay be _prescdb,:d J.>y the industrial cqmm_~•
Nothing contained ht this act shall hi auy. way sion.. He shnil keep such records on. file for at
limit Ol' prohlbtt the payment of .\Yagee
com- least· <me yea.1• after the entry of the record.

to

,vho_

•

or

oi' nn .

duo

or
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Riglit of Visita.tio,i..
(b) .·The tndustrit4 comm1ss10~ and its
authorized representatives shall hnve the right
to. eriter any place of employment duJ."ing business hours for t~e purpose of inspecting such
records D;nd· seeing that all. provisions of this
act are complied ,vith; provided, Tio1ucvc1·, thnt
paragraphs· (n) nnd (b) 01 this section shall
not npply to domestic service in private homes,
no1· to agriculturnl labor.

Obst1•1tctfog

Commission

in

Pti•forniiug

Duties.

(c) Any effort or nn employer to ~bstruct
the lndustrinl commission nnd its authorited
1~eprescntatiV'(?S in the. pE!dormance .of their
duties shall be deemed a violation of this act and
puniahable as such~
.

Wihiesscs.
( d) The indtisti·ial commission and its
authorized representatives Rhall have power to
ndministcr ·oaths and examine ,vftnesses ·under
onth, issue subpoenas, compel the attendance
of .witnesses~ and the produetion of pnpers,
books, ~cc.ouµts, re~ords, p~y rolls, d9cwnents.:
and tc$timony, and to to.ke depositio11s and affidavits in any proceeding before snid industrial
commission.
R~/t.1sal to. Tcstif11~rmte11ipt Prnreedi,igs.
(e) In case of. failure of any person to· comply ,vith any subpoena lawfully issued, or Qn the
refusal of any witness tcr testify ·to any matter
regarding wMch he may be lnwfL:lly interrogatedt
it shall be the duty of tbe diahict court of any
county, or the judge ihcreo'f, on application by
the commission to compel obedience by· proceedings for contempt, as in the case of disobedience
of the rcqufrements of n subpoena issued from
sucli court or a refusal to testify therein.
Section 11.

[12~]
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Commission l'tfny imploy Assist-

ants,
The industr;nl commission, pursuant to the
lnw of. this stnte, may employ such clerical and
other. nssistnnts ns may be necessnry to cari-y out
the ··purposes Qf this act, and shall fix the· com~
pensntion of such employees n11d may nlso, to
cnr1•y out such purposes. incw· reasonable and
necessru.•y traveling expenses for the said commission, its deputies, and .nssistnnts.

Section 12. Failure to Comply With ActPcnulty.

(a) Any employer who shnll violate or fail
tQ comply ·with any of the provis,ions of this
act, shall forfeit $10 for each such violntion
or noncomptinncc.. Each day of failure to pay
wnges tlue such employees at the time specified
in ·this net shall 1·aise n separnte and distinct
forfeiture. AU such io1·!citures shall .be recovered
in an action
nnme of the state of
Utah~
. . of debt in the....

(b) Any crnploye1· who shuH violate, or fail
to comply with nny of tho provisions of this net
~hnll be guilty of a iniademennorJ ·nnd upon coll..
viction thcreof1 .~}lnll be<punishecl lJy a fine .of not
Jess ihnn $25 nor more than i50 for each sepnrnte offense.
{c) Any emplOl'Cr who, shall refuse to pay
the wages due and. ·payable when demanded, as
in this act provided,· or who shnll. falsely deny
the amount thereof., or that the snmc· i.s due, with
intent to secure for himself., .01· any• other person,
any discount upon such indebtedness, with intent
to nnnoy, hnrnss; oppress, hinder, delay or defraud. the person to whom such indebtedness
is due, or who hires ad.ditionnl employees with...
out advising ench of them of. every wage claim
du9 arid unpaid nnd of .every judgine~t that the
employer has failel:l to sat~sfy,. shnll in. addition
to any other penalty .imposed upori liim by this
11ct, be guilty of a misdemeanor, punishable by
n fine of not less than $50 and not exceeding

$100.
Section t3. A~signment of Wnge Claims.
PQ~vers or Commission.
The industrial commjssion sh~ll have power
und nu! horlty to take nssJgnmcnts oI ,vnge clnirris,
i•ights of action for penalties provided by section
4 of this net,. mechnnics' and other liens of
workers, not to exceed i200 i11 · the case of any
one clnim without being bound by any of the
technical rules with reference to the validity of
such assignments; nud shnff ·hnve power and
authority to prosecute actions for the colleetion
of such clnims which arc valid aud enforceable
in th~ courts. The commissio~ shall have po,ve1•
lo join Vnl'ious claimants in one preferred claim
or lien. and in case of r;uit to join them in one
cnuse of action.
·Section 14. ActioruJ by Commission as Ag ..

signee-Costs-JJonds.
(n) In nll actions brought by the industrial
commission ns assignee· Under section 12 or this
net, no court costs of any ·11atur~ .shnll. be rer,uired
to be. advnnced nor ahnll any bond. Qt' i\ther
sccul'ity thcrefo1· be 1·cquil'ed irom the said commission in connection with the same.
(b) Any ahe1•iff, · constable or· otller officer
requested by the saicl. commission to serve sum•
mon~, writa, compl~int.~, order~, including nny
gni-nfshment papers· and nil necessary nnd legal
papers. within his jurisdiction, shnll do so without requiring the comm~ssion to ndvancc the
fees or furnish any security or bontl thcrcior.
(c) Whenever the commission shall rcqtiirc
the aheriff, constnblo or other oCiiccr whose
duty it is to seize property 01• levy thereon in nny
uttachment proceedings to .satisfy nny ,vage
~lnim judgment to perfo~m any such duty, ~aid
officcl' shall do so without requiring the commission to furnish nily security or bond in such
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Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.8. 1 330 U.S. 485 (1947)
67 S.Ct. 789, 19 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2397, 91 L.Ed. 1040, 12 Lab.Cas. P 51,240
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KeyCite Red Flag- Severe Negative Treatment
Superseded by Statute as Stated in N.L.R.B. v. Town & Country Elec.,
Inc., U.S., November 28, 1995

67 S.Ct. 789
Supreme Court of the United States
PACKARD MOTOR CARCO.

v.
NATIONAL L-\BOR REIATIONS BOARD.
No. 658.

I
Argued Jan. 9, 1947.

I
Decided March 10, 1947.
Petition by the National Labor Relations Board to
enforce an order issued against the Packard Motor Car
Company, wherein the Foreman's League for Education
and Association and another intervened. To review a
judgment decreeing enforcement of the order, 6 Cir.,
157 F.2d 80, the Packard Motor Car Company brings
certiorari.
Affirmed.
Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, Mr. Chief Justice VINSON, Mr.
Justice BURTON, and Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER,
dissenting.
On writ of certioraii to the United States Circuit Court of
Appeals for the Sixth Circuit.

Attorneys and Law Firms
**790 *486 Mr. Louis F. Dahling, of Detroit, Mich.,
for petitioner.
Mr. Gerhard P. Van A.rkel, of Washington, D.C., for
respondent.

Opinion
Mr. Justice JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court.
The question presented by this case is whether foremen are
entitled as a class to **791 the rights of self-organization,
collective bargaining, and other concerted activities as
assured to employees generally by the National Labor

Relations Act. 29 U.S.C.A. s 151 et seq. The case grows
out of conditions of the automotive industry, and so far
as they are important to the legal issues here the facts are
simple.
*487 The Packard Motor Car Company employs
about 32,000 rank and file workmen. Since 1937
they have been represented by the United Automobile
Workers of America affiliated with the Congress of
Industrial Organizations. These employees are supervised
by approximately 1,100 employees of foremen rank
consisting of about 125 'general foremen,' 643 'foremen,'
273 'assistant foremen,' and 65 'special assignment men.'
Each general foreman is in charge of one or more
departments, and under him in authority are foremen
and their assistant foremen. Special assignment men are
described as 'trouble-shooters.'

The function of these foremen in general is typical of the
duties of foremen in mass production industry generally.
Foremen carry the responsibility for maintaining quantity
and quality of production, subject, of course, to the
overall control and supervision of the management.
Hiring is done by the labor relations department, as
is the discharging and laying off of employees. But
the foremen are provided with forms and with detailed
lists of penalties to be applied in cases of violations of
discipline, and initiate recommendations for promotion,
demotion and discipline. All such recommendations are
subject to the reviewing procedure concerning grievances
provided in the collectively-bargained agreement between
the Company and the rank and file union.
The foremen as a group are highly paid and, unlike
the workmen, are paid for justifiable absence and for
holidays, are not docked in pay when tardy, receive longer
paid vacations, and are given severance pay upon release
by the Company.
These foremen determined to organize as a unit of
the Foremen's Association of America, an unaffiliated
organization which represents supervisory employees
exclusively. Following the usual procedure, after the
Board had decided that 'all general foremen, foremen,
assistant foremen, *488 and special assignment men
employed by the Company at its plants in Detroit,
Michigan, constitute a unit appropriate for the purposes
of collective bargaining within the meaning of section 9(b)
of the Act,' 1 the Foremen's Association was certified as
the bargaining representative. The Company asserted that

WESTLAW G> 2016 Thomson Reure:-s. Na claim to original U.S. Gov0(n1·11e:1t \Nmks.
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Packard Motor Car Co. v. N.L.R.B., 330 U.S. 485 (1947)
67 S.Ct. 789, 19 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2397, 91 L.Ed. 1040, 12 Lab.Gas. P 51,240

foremen were not 'employees' entitled to the advantages
of the Labor Act, and refused to bargain with the
union. After hearing on charge of unfair labor practice,
the Board issued the usual cease and desist order. The
Company resisted and challenged validity of the order.
The judgment of the court below decreed its enforcement,
and we granted certiorari. 329 U.S. 707, 67 S.Ct. 357.
1

61 N.L.R.B. 26.

The issue of Jaw as to the power of the National Labor
Relations Board under the National Labor Relations Act
is simple and our only function is to determine \Vhether the
order of the Board is authorized by the statute.
[1]
[2] The privileges and benefits of the Act are
conferred upon employees, and s 2(3) of the Act, so far
as relevant, provides 'The term 'employee' shall include
any employee * * *.' 49 Stat. 450. The point that these
foremen are employees both in the most technical sense at
common law as well as in common acceptance of the term,
is too obvious to be labored. The Company, however,
turns to the Act's definition of employer, which it contends
reads foremen out of the employee class and into the class
of employers. Section 2(2) reads: 'The term 'employer'
includes any person acting in the interest of an employer,
directly or indirectly * * *.' 49 Stat. 450. The context of
the Act, we think, leaves no room for a construction of
this section to deny the organizational privilege **792 to
employees because they act in the interest of an employer.
Every employee, from the very fact of employment in
the master's business, is required to act in his interest.
He *489 owes to the employer faithful performance of
service in his interest, the protection of the employer's
property in his custody or control, and all employees may,
as to third parties, act in the interests of the employer to
such an extent that he is liable for their wrongful acts. A
familiar example would be that of a truck driver for whose
negligence the Company might have to answer.

The purpose of s 2(2) seems obviously to render employers
responsible in labor practices for acts of any persons
performed in their interests. It is an adaptation of the
ancient maxim of the common law, respondeat superior,
by which a principal is made liable for the tortious acts
of his agent and the master for the wrongful acts of his
servants. Even without special statutory provision, the
rule would apply to many relations. But Congress was
creating a new class of wrongful acts to be known as
unfair labor practices, and it could not be certain that the
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courts would apply the tort rule of respondeat supe1ior to
those derelictions. Even if it did, the problem of proof as
applied to this kind of wrongs might easily be complicated
by questions as to the scope of the actor's authority and
of variance between his apparent and his real authority.
Hence, it was provided that in administering this act
the employer, for its purposes, should be not merely the
individual or corporation which was the employing entity,
but also others. whether employee or not, who are ·acting
in the interest of an employer.'
Even those who act for the employer in some
matters, including the service of standing between
management and manual labor, still have interests of
their own as employees. Though the foreman is the
faithful representative of the employer in maintaining a
production schedule, his interest properly may be adverse
to that of the employer when it comes to fixing his own
wages, hours, seniority rights or working conditions. He
does not lose his right to serve himself in these respects
because he *490 serves his master in others. And we see
no basis in this Act whatever for holding that foremen
are forbidden the protection of the Act when they take
collective action to protect their collective interests.
[3] The company's argument is really addressed to the
undesirability of pennitting foremen to organize. It wants
selfless representatives of its interest. It fears that if
foremen combine to bargain advantages for themselves,
they will sometimes be governed by interests of their own
or of their fellow foremen, rather than by the company's
interest. There is nothing new in this argument. It is rooted
in the misconception that because the employer has the
right to wholehearted loyalty in the performance of the
contract of employment, the employee does not have the
right to protect his independent and adverse interest in the
terms of the contract itself and the conditions of work.
But the effect of the National Labor Relations Act is
otherwise, and it is for Congress, not for us, to create
exceptions or qualifications at odds with its plain terms.

Moreover, the company concedes that foremen have a
right to organize. What it denies is that the statute compels
it to recognize the union. In other words, it wants to be
free to fight the foremen's union in the way that companies
fought other unions before the Labor Act. But there is
nothing in the Act which indicates that Congress intended
to deny its benefits to foremen as employees, if they choose
to believe that their interests as employees would be better
served by organization than by individual competition.
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N.L.R.B. v. Skinner & Kennedy Stationery Co., 8 Cir.,
113 F.2d 667; see N.L.R.B. v. Armour & Co., 10 Cir., 154
F.2d 570, 574.
2
If a union of vice presidents, presidents or others of
like relationship to a corporation comes here claiming
rights under this Act, it will be time enough then
to point out the obvious and relevant differences
between the 1100 foremen of this company and
corporate officers elected by the board of directors.

**793 *491 (41
[51 There is no more reason to
conclude that the law prohibits foremen as a class from
constituting an appropriate bargaining unit than there
is for concluding that they are not within the Act at
all. Section 9(b) of the Act confers upon the Board a
broad discretion to determine appropriate units. It reads,
'The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order
to insure to employees the full benefit of their right
to self-organization and to collective bargaining, and
otherwise to effectuate the policies * * * of this act, the
unit appropriate for the purposes of collective bargaining
shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or
subdivision thereof.' 49 Stat. 453. Our power of review
also is circumscribed by the provision that findings of the
Board as to the facts, if supported by evidence, shall be
conclusive. s I0(e), 49 Stat. 454. So we have power only to
detennine whether there is substantial evidence to support
the Board, or its order oversteps the law. N .L.R.B. v.
Link-Belt Co., 311 U.S. 584, 61 S.Ct. 358, 85 L.Ed. 368;
Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. N.L.R.B., 313 U.S. 146, 61
S.Ct. 908, 85 L.Ed. 1251.

power, we are clear that *492 the decision in question
does not do so. That settled, our power is at an end.
(8] We are invited to make a lengthy examination of
views expressed in Congress while this and later legislation
was pending to show that exclusion of foremen was
intended. There is, however, no ambiguity in this Act to be
clarified by resort to legislative history, either of the Act
itself or of subsequent legislative proposals which failed to

become law.
[91 Counsel also would persuade us to make a contrary
interpretation by citing a long record of inaction,
vacilJation and division of the National Labor Relations
Board in applying this Act to foremen. Ifwe were obliged
to depend upon administrative interpretation for light in
finding the meaning of the statute, the inconsistency of

the Board's decisions would leave us in the dark. 3 But
there are difficult questions of policy involved in these
cases which, together with changes in Board membership,
account for the contradictory views that characterize their
history in the Board. Whatever special questions there are
in determining the appropriate bargaining unit for *493
foremen are for **794 the Board, and the history of the
issue in the Board shows the difficulty of the problem
committed to its discretion. We are not at liberty to be
governed by those policy considerations in deciding the
naked question of law whether the Board is now, in this
case, acting within the terms of the statute.
3

[6]

[71 There is clearly substantial evidence in support
of the detennination that foremen are an appropriate unit
by themselves and there is equal evidence that, while the
foremen included in this unit have different degrees of
responsibility and work at different levels of authority,
they have such a common relationship to the enterprise
and to other levels of workmen that inclusion of all such
grades of foremen in a single unit is appropriate. Hence
the order insofar as it depends on facts is beyond our
power of review. The issue as to what unit is appropriate
for bargaining is one for which no absolute rule of law
is laid do\l.'ll by statute, and none should be by decision.
It involves of necessity a large measure of informed
discretion and the decision of the Board, if not final,
is rarely to be disturbed. While we do not say that
a determination of a unit of representation cannot be
so unreasonable and arbitrary as to exceed the Board's

The Board had held that supervisory employees may
organize in an independent union, Union Collieries
Coal Co., 41 N.L.R.B. 961, 44 N.L.R.B. 165; and
in an affiliated union, Godchaux Sugars, Inc., 44
N.L.R.B. 874. Then it held that there was no
unit appropriate to the organization of supervisory
employees. Maryland Drydock Co., 49 N.L.R.B.
733; Boeing Aircraft Co., 51 N.L.R.B. 67; Murray
Corp. of America, 51 N.L.R.B. 94; General Motors
Corp., 51 N.L.R.B. 457; In this case, 61 N.L.R.B. 4,
64 N.L.R.B. 1212; in L. A. Young Spring & Wire
Corp., 65 N.L.R.B. 298; Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 386, 71 N.L.R.B. 1261; and in
California Packing Corp., 66 N.L.R.B. 1461, the
Board re-embraced its earlier conclusions with the
same progressive boldness it had shown in the Union
Collieries and Godchaux Sugars cases. In none of this
series of cases did the Board hold that supervisors
were not employees. See Soss Manufacturing Co., 56
N.L.R.B. 348.
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It is also urged upon us most seriously that unionization
of foremen is from many points bad industrial policy,
that it puts the union foreman in the position of serving
two masters, divides his loyalty and makes generally for
bad relations between management and labor. However
we might appraise the force of these arguments as a
policy matter, we are not authorized to base decision of a
question of law upon them. They concern the wisdom of
the legislation; they cannot alter the meaning of otherwise
plain provisions.
The judgment of enforcement is
Affirmed.

Mr. Justice DOUGLAS, with whom The CHIEF
JUSTICE and Mr. Justice BURTON concur, dissenting.
First. Over thirty years ago Mr. Justice Brandeis, while
still a private citizen, saw the need for narrowing the
gap between management and labor, for allowing labor
greater participation in policy decisions, for developing
an industiial system in which cooperation rather than
coercion was the dominant characteristic. 1 In his view,
these were *494 measures of therapeutic value in dealing
with problems of industrial unrest or inefficiency.
1
'The greater productivity of labor must not only be
attainable, but attainable under conditions consistent
with the conservation of health, the enjoyment
of work, and the development of the individual.
The facts in this regard have not been adequately
established. In the task of ascertaining whether
proposed conditions of work do conform to these
requirements, the laborer should take part. He is
indeed a necessary witness. Likewise in the task
of determining whether in the distribution of the
gain in productivity justice is being done to the
worker, the participation of representatives of labor
is indispensable for the inquiry which involves
essentially the exercise of judgment.' Brandeis,
Business-A Profession, pp. 52-53.

The present decision may be a step in that direction. It at
least tends to obliterate the line between management and
labor. It ends the sanctions of federal law to unionization
at all levels of the industrial hierarchy. It tends to
emphasize that the basic opposing forces in industry are
not management and labor but the operating group on
the one hand and the stockholder and bondholder group
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on the other. The industrial problem as so defined comes
down to a contest over a fair division of the gross receipts
of industry between these two groups. The struggle for
control or power between management and labor becomes
secondary to a growing unity in their common demands
on ownership.
I do not believe this is an exaggerated statement of the
basic policy questions which underly the present decision.
For if foremen are 'employees' within the meaning of
the National Labor Relations Act, so are vice-presidents,
managers, assistant managers, superintendents, assistant
superintendents-indeed, all who are on the payroll
of the company, including the president; all who are
commonly referred to as the management, with the
exception of the directors. If a union of vice-presidents
applied for recognition as a collective bargaining agency,
I do not see how we could deny it and yet allow the
present application. But once vice-presidents, managers,
superintendents, foremen all are unionized, management
and labor will become more of a solid phalanx than
separate factions in warring camps. Indeed, the thought
of some *495 labor leaders that if those in the hierarchy
above the workers are unionized, they will be more
sympathetic with the claims of those below them, is a
manifestation of the same idea. 2
2

The Foreman Abdicates, XXXII Fortune, No. 3, p.
150, 152; Levenstein, Labor Today and Tomorrow
( 1946) ch. VII.

I mention these matters to indicate what **795
tremendously important policy questions are involved
in the present decision. My purpose is to suggest
that if Congress, when it enacted the National Labor
Relations Act, had in mind such a basic change in
industrial philosophy, it would have left some clear and
unmistakable trace of that purpose. But I find none.
Second. "Employee' is defined to include ·any' employee.
s 2(3), 49 Stat. 449, 450, 29 U.S.C. s 152, 29 U.S.C.A. If
we stop there, foremen are included as are all employees
from the president on down. But we are not warranted in
stopping there. The term 'employee' must be considered in
the context of the Act. National Labor Relations Board v.
Hearst Publications, 322 U.S. 111, 124, 64 S.Ct. 851, 857,
88 L.Ed. 1170; Phelps Dodge Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 313 U.S. 177, 191, 61 S.Ct. 845,851, 85
L.Ed. 1271, 133 A.L.R. 1217. When it is so considered
it does not appear to be used in an all-embracing sense.
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Rather, it is used in opposition to the term 'employer'. An
'employer' is defined to include 'any person acting in the
interest of an employer'. s 2(2). The tem1 'employer' thus
includes some employees. And I find no evidence that one
personnel group may be both employers and employees
within the meaning of the Act. Rather, the Act on its face
seems to classify the operating group of industry into two
classes; what is included in one group is excluded from the
other.

It is not an answer to say that the two statutory groups
are not exclusive because every 'employee' while on
duty-whether driving a truck or stoking a furnace or
*496 operating a lathe-is 'acting in the interest' of
his employer and is then an 'employer' in the statutory
sense. The Act was not declaring a policy of vicarious
responsibility of industry. It was dealing solely with labor
relations. It put in the employer category all those who
acted for management not only in formulating but also in
executing its labor policies. 3
3
Daykin, The Status of Supervisory Employees under
the National Labor Relations Act, 29 Iowa L.Rev.
297; Rosenfarb, The National Labor Policy (1940)
pp. 54-56, 116-120; Twentieth Century Fund, How
Collective Bargaining Works (1942) pp. 512-514,
547,557-558,628, 780.

Foremost among the latter were foremen. Trade union
history shows that foremen were the aims and legs of
management in executing labor policies. In industrial
conflicts they were allied with management. Managenient
indeed commonly acted through them in the unfair
labor practices which the Act condemns. 4 When we
upheld the imposition of the sanctions of the Act against
management, we frequently relied on the acts of foremen
through whom management expressed its hostility to
trade unionism. 5
4
See cases collected in Daykin, op. cit. supra, note 3,
pp. 298-299.

5

International Association of Machinists, Tool and
Die Makers v. National Labor Relations Board, 311
U.S. 72, 79. 80, 61 S.ct. 83, 88, 85 L.Ed. 50; H.J.
Heinz Co. v. National Labor Relations Board, 311
U.S. 514,520,521, 61 S.Ct. 320, 323, 85 L.Ed. 309.

Third. The evil at which the Act was aimed was the failure
or refusal of industry to recognize the right of workingmen
to bargain collectively. In s 1 of the Act Congress noted

that such an attitude on the part of industry led 'to strikes
and other forms of industrial strife or unrest' so as to
burden or obstruct interstate commerce. We know from
the history of that decade that the frustrated efforts of
workingmen, of laborers, to organize led to strikes, strife,
and unrest. But we are pointed to no instances where
foremen were striking; nor *497 are we advised that
managers, superintendents, or vice-presidents were doing

so. 6

6

It is true that for many years some unions included
supervisory employees, Beatrice and Sydney Webb,
Industrial Democracy (1902) p. 546, fn. 2; Union
Membership and Collective Bargaining by Foremen,
U.S. Department of Labor Bull. No. 745 (1943);
Report of Panel of War Labor Board in Disputes
Involving Supervisors (1945) IX; Twentieth Century
Fund, op. cit. supra, note 3, pp. 67, 216; Northrup,
Unionization of Foremen, 21 Harv.Bus.Rev. 496.
But organization of foremen on a broad scale is a
development of the last few years. Daykin, op. cit.
supra, note 3, p. 314; Rosenfarb, Foremen on the
March, 7 Fed.Bar.J. 168; Note, 59 Harv.L.Rev. 606,
607; Comment, 55 Yale L.J. 754, 756; Foremen's
Unions, IX Advanced Management Quarterly J. 110.

Indeed, the problems of those in the supervisory categories
of management did **796 not seem to have been in
the consciousness of Congress. Section 1 of the Act
refers to 'wage rates', 'wage earners', 'workers'. There
is no phrase in the entire Act which is descriptive of
those doing supervisory work. Section 2(3) exempts from
laborer'. But if 'employee' includes a the term 'employee'
any 'agricultural foreman, it would be most strange to
find Congress exempting 'agricultural laborers', but not
'agricultural foremen'. The inference is strong that since it
exempted only agricultural 'laborers', it had no idea that
agricultural 'foremen' were under the Act.
If foremen were to be included as employees under
the Act, special problems would be raised-important
problems relating to the unit in which the foremen
might be represented. Foremen are also under the Act
as employers. That dual status creates serious problems.
An act of a foreman, if attributed to the management,
constitutes an unfair labor practice; the same act may
be part of the foreman's activity as an employee. In that
event the employer can only interfere at his peril. 7 The
complications *498 of dealing with the problems of
supervisory employees strongly suggest that if Congress
had planned to include them in its project, it would have
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made some special provision for them. But we find no
trace of a suggestion that when Congress came to consider
the units approp1iate for collective bargaining, 8 it was
aware that groups of employees might have conflicting
loyalties. Yet that would have been one of the most
important and conspicuous problems if foremen were
to be included. The failure of Congress to fommlatc a
policy respecting the peculiar and special problems of
foremen suggests an absence of purpose to bring them
under the Act. And the notion is hard to resist that the
very absence of a declaration by Congress of its policy
respecting foremen is the reason the Board has been so
much at large in the treatment of the problem under the
Act. See the cases collected in note 3 of the opinion of the
Court.

7

8

Cf. Jones and Laughlin Steel Corp. v. National Labor
Relations Board, 5 Cir., 146 F.2d 833; Comment, 55
Yale L.J. 754, 767-774; Rosenfarb, op. cit., supra,
note 6.
Section 9(b) of the Act provides: 'The Board shall
decide in each case whether, in order to insure
to employees the full benefit of their right to
self~organization and to collective bargaining, and
otherwise to effectuate the policies * * * of this act,
the unit appropriate for the purposes of collective
bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant
unit, or subdivision thereof.'

Fourth. When we turn from the Act to the legislative
history, we find no trace of Congressional concern with
the problems of supervisory personnel. The reports and
debates are barren of any reference to them, though they
are replete with references to the function of the legislation
in protecting the interests of 'laborers' and 'workers'. 9
9

See H. Rep. No. 969, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep.
No. 972, 74th Cong., 1st Sess.; H. Rep. No. 1147,
74th Cong., 1st Sess.; S. Rep. No. 573, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess., pp. 6-7; Hearings, Senate Comm. on Educ.
and Labor on S. 2926, 73d Cong., 2d Sess.; Hearings,
House Comm. on Labor on H.R. 6288, 74th Cong.,
1st Sess.; Hearings, Senate Comm. on Educ. and
Labor on S. 1958, 74th Cong., Ist Sess.; 79 Cong.Rec.
2371,7365, 7648, 7668,8537,9676,9713,9736,10720.

*499 Fifth. When we tum to other related legislation,

we find that when Congress desired to include managerial
officials or supervisory personnel in the category of
employees, it did so expressly. The Railway Labor Act of
1926, 44 Stat. 577, 45 U.S.C. s 151, 45 U.S.C.A. s 151,

defines 'employee' to include 'subordinate official'. The
Merchant Marine Act of 1936, 52 Stat. 953, 46 U.S.C. s
1101 et seq., 46 U.S.C.A. s 1101 et seq., which deals with
maritime labor relations as a supplement to the National
Labor Relations Act (see 46 U.S.C. s 1252, 46 U.S.C.A.
s 1252) defines 'employee' **797 to include 'subordinate
official'. 46 U.S.C. s 1253(c), 46 U.S.C.A. s 1253(c). And
the Social Security Act, 49 Stat. 620,647, 42 U.S.C. s 1301,
42 U.S.C.A. s 1301, includes an officer of a corporation
in the term employee. 10 The failure of Congress to do
the same when it wrote the National Labor Relations
Act has some significance, especially where the legislative
history is utterly devoid of any indication that Congress
was concerned with the collective bargaining problems of
supervisory employees.
10
Cf. Federal Employers Liability Act, 35 Stat. 65, as
amended, 45 U.S.C. s 51, 45 U.S.C.A. s 51, under
which the term 'any employee of a carrier' has been
applied to foremen. Owens v. Union Pac. R. Co., 319
U.S. 715, 63 S.Ct. 1271, 87 L.Ed. 1683; Ellis v. Union
Pac. R. Co., 329 U.S. 649, 67 S.Ct. 598.

Sixth. The truth of the matter is, I think, that when
Congress passed the National Labor Relations Act in
1935, it was legislating against the activities of foremen,
not on their behalf. Congress was intent on protecting the
right of free association-the right to bargain collectively
-by the great mass of workers, not by those who
were in authority over them and enforcing oppressive
industrial policies. Foremen were instrumentalities of
those industrial policies. They blocked the wage earners'
path to fair collective bargaining. To say twelve years later
that foremen were treated as the victims of that anti-labor
policy seems to me a distortion of history.
~1:

500 If we were to decide this case on the basis of policy,

much could be said to support the majority view. 11 But
I am convinced that Congress never faced those policy
issues when it enacted this legislation. I am sure that
those problems were not in the consciousness of Congress.
A decision of these policy matters cuts deep into our
industrial life. It has profound implications throughout
our economy. It involves a fundamental change in much of
the thinking of the nation on our industrial problems. The
question is so important that I cannot believe Congress
legislated unwittingly on it. Since what Congress wrote
is consistent with a restriction of the Act to workingmen
and laborers, I would leave its extension over supervisory
employees to Congress.
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11

Daykin, op. cit. supra, note 3, p. 313; Rosenfarb, op.
cit. supra, nole 6; Gartenhaus, The Foreman goes
Union, 113 New Republic 563: Comment 55 Yale L.J.
754; Hearings, House Comm. on Military Affairs on
Bills relating to the Full Utilization of Manpower,
78th Cong., 1st Sess., p. 299; Northrup, The
Foreman's Association of America, 23 Harv.Bus.Rev.
187; cf. American Management Association, Relation
Between Management and Foremen in American
Industry (1944); Id. The Foreman in Labor Relations
(1944); Id. Should Management be Unionized?
(1945).

I have used the terms foremen and supervisory employees
synonymously. But it is not the label which is important;
it is whether the employees in question represent or act for
management on labor policy matters. Thus one might be a
supervisory employee without representing management
in those respects. And those who are called foremen may
perform duties not substantially different from those of
skilled laborers.

law recognizes their right to do so. See American Steel
Foundries v. Tri-City Council, 257 U.S. 184,209, 42 S.Ct.
72, 78, 66 L.Ed. 189, 27 A.LR. 360; Texas & N.O.R. Co.
v. Brotherhood of Railway & Steamship Clerks, 281 U.S.
548, 570, 50 S.Ct. 427, 433, 74 L.Ed. 1034. And *501
some States have placed administrative machinery and
sanctions behind that right. 12 But as I read the federal
Act, Congress has not yet done so.
12
The state laws are discussed in Northrup, The
Foreman's Association of America, 23 Harv.Bus.Rev.
187, 199-200.

Mr. Justice FRANKFURTER agrees with this opinion
except the part marked •First' as to which he expresses no
view.

All Citations
330 U.S. 485, 67 S.Ct. 789, 91 L.Ed. 1040, 19 L.R.R.M.

(BNA) 2397, 12 Lab.Cas. P 51,240

What I have said does not mean that foremen have no
right to organize for collective bargaining. The general
End of Document
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[61 STAT.

[CHAPTER 114]
J'une 21. 1947
[ll. R.18741
[PabUc Law 100)

AN ACT
To a.mend the Act entitled "An Act to provide that the United St.Ates shall aid
the States in the construction of rural post roads, o.nd for other purposes",
approved July 11, 1916, as ameDded and supplcmented 1 and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by the Senate and House ()[ Re'f)'!'esentatives ()j the
United States of Ame1-ica i1t 0..vngre8s <U!&embled, That para~uph ( d)

of section 4 of the Federal_,Aid Highwil.J Act of 1944, Public Lnw 521,
Seventy-eighth Congress, npproved December 20, 1944, is hereby
amended by striking out the term ''one year" where it appe11rs in srua
paragrapl1 a.nd inserting in lieu thereof the term «two years".
Appro,red June 21, 1947.

58Stat.st0.

[CHAPTER 120)
J'tu18 :23, 1~7

{lI. R. 3020)
[Pabllc Lo.w 101)

AN ACT
To amend the Nations.I Labor Relatjons Act, to provide additional facilities for
the meclia.tion of labor disputes affecting commerce to equalize legal responsibilities of labor organizations and employetS, and for other purposes.

Be it enacted by th8 Sf/lW,te and House of Representatives of the
Umte<l Sta-tes of .Ame-ricain Congress assembled,
SUORT TITLE A.."m DECLARATION OF POLICY

SECTION 1. (a) This Act may be cited as the "Labor Management
Relations Act, 194:7,,.
(b) Indus~rialstrife which int~rferes wi~h the normalflow. o_f com-:
merce and with the full production of articles and. conunod1t1es for
commerce, can be avoided or substantially minimized if employers,
employees, nnd fabor organizations each recognize under law one
anothe1·'s legitimate rights in their relations with each other, and above
all recognize under law that neither party has any rig11t in its relations
with any other to enga~e in acts or practices which jeopardize the
public health, snfety, or interest.
·
It is the purpose and policy of this Act, in order to promote the full
flow o:f commerce1 to prescrioe the Jegjtimate rights of both employees
and employers in their re1at.ions affecting c_o_mmerce, to provide orderly
and peaceful procedures for preventing the interference by either with
the legitimate riq;hts of the other, to protect the rights of individual
employees in their relations with labor organizations whose activities
affect commerce, to define and proscribe practices on the part of labor
and management which affect commerce n.nd are inimical to the general
welfare; and to _protect the rights 0£ the public in connection with
lnbor disputes affecting commerce.

TITLE I-AMENDMENT OF NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT
,oetat.<140,
0 • s. 0 • IUol-

21>
100.

SEc. 101. The National Labor Relations Act is hereby amended to

read

as

follows:

''FINDINGS AND POLIOIES

"SECTION 1. The denial by some employers of the right of employees
to organize and the refusal by some employ-ers to accept tl1e procedure
of collective bargaimng lead to strikes and other for.ms 0£ industrial
strHe or unrest, which have the intent or the necessary efl'ect of burdening or obstructing commerce 1?, (a) impairing the efficiency, safety, or
operation of the instrumentalities of commerce; (b) occurring in the
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current of commerce; (c) materially affecting, rest-raining, or controllin~ the flow of raw mnterials or manufactured or processed goods from
or mto the. channels of commerce, or the prices of such materials or
goods in commerce; or (d) causing diminution of employment and
wages in such ·volume as substantially to impair or disrupt the market
for goods flowing from or into the cliannels of commerce.
"'l'he inequality of bargnining power between employees who do not
possess -full freedom of association or_ actual liberty of contract, and
employers who are organized in the corporate or other forms of owner&hip association substantially burdens and affects the flow of com1nerce,
and tends to agcrrava.te recurrent business depressions, b:v depressing
wage rates and the purchasing power of wage earners in industry and
bv Ereventing the stabilization of. competitive wage rates and ,•torking
conditions within and between •industries.
"Experience has proved that protection by faw of the right of
Pmployees to organize and bargain collectively safeguards commerce
from injurv. impnirme1it, or interruption, ana promotes the flO\v of
commerce bj~ removing certnin recognized sources of industrial strife
and unrest, b:y encouraging practices fundnmental to_ the friendly
adjustment of mdustrial disputes ari~ing out of differences as to wages2
hours, or other working conditions, and by restoring equality o:t
bargaining power between employers and employees.
"Experience has further demonstrated that certain practices by some
labor organizations, their officers, and members have the intent or the
necessilry effect of burdening or obstructing commerce by preventing
the free flow of goods in such commerce through strikes and other
forms of industrial unrest or through concerted activities which impair
the iutere.st of the public in the free flow of such commerce. The
elimination of such practices is a necessary condition to th~ a.ssurance
of the rights herein guaranteed.
. ''It is hereby declared to be the policy of the Unit.ed States to
eliminate the causes of certain substantial obstructions to the .free :Bow
of commerce and to mitigate and eliminate these obstructions when
they hn ve occurred by encouraging the practice and procedure of collective bargaini~g ~nd by protect!ng ~he exercise ~y workers of full freedom of assoc1at1oni seH-orgamzat1on, a·nd designation 0£ representatives of tl1eir own choosing, for the purpose of n:egotiating the terms
and condjtions of their" employment or other mutual aid or protect.ion.
"DEFINITIONS

"8:ec. 2. Wben used· in this Act" ( 1) The t.erm 'person: includEls one or more individuals, labor
organizations, partnerships, associations, corporations, legal representatives, trustees, trustees in bankruptcy, or receivers.
"(2) The term 'employer' includes any person acting as an agent of
an employer, directly or indirectly, but shall not include the United
States or an-;r wholly owned Government corporation, or any Federal
Reserve Bank, or nny Stntc or political subdivision thereof, or any
corporation or ·associatf:ion operating a hospital, if no part of the net
earnings inures to th~ benefit of any :private shareholder or individual,
or any person subjectto the Railway Labor ..Act~ as amended from time
to time, or any labor organization ( other tl1an when acting as an
employer), or anyone acting in the capacity of officer or agent of such
labor org11nization.
"(3). The term 'employee' shall hld1;1de a11y employee, and shall not
be lumted to the employees of a particular employer, unless the Act
explidtly stntes otherwise, und ~hall include any_ indi \·idual whose
work has ceased as a. consequence of, or in connection with, any current
labor dispute or bec:mse of any unfair labor practice, and who l1as not

l'olicy ot tl1c t:'nited

States.

Post, p. lGl.
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obtained any other regula.r and substantially equivalent employment,
bnt shall not include any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer, or in the domestic serviee of any £runily or person at Iris home,
or any individual ~mployed by his _parent or spouse, or ~ny individual
havi~ the status of an independent contractor, or any individual
employed as a supervisor, or any individual employed byait employer
subject to the Railway Labor Act, as amended :from time to time, or by
anzr other person who is not an employer as herein defined.
'(4) TJ1e term 'xepresenfatives' includes a.ny individual or labor

or§amzation.

(5} The term 'labor organization' means any organization of any
kind or any agency or employee rel?resentation committee or plan,· in
which employees participate and which exists for the purpose; in whole

o: in part, of d~ling with employers concerning grievan~, labo~

dis~utes, wages, rates of pay, hours of employment, or conditions of
work.
"(6) The term 'commerce' means trade, traffic, -commerce, transportation, or communication among the several States, or between the
District of Columbia or any Te1Titory of tjle United States and any

State or other Territory1 or between an1- £oreiW1 country and any
State, Territory, or the District of Columbia~ or within the District or
Columbia or any Territory, or between points in the ~ame State hut
tlu·ough any otlier Stat.e or any ·Territory or the District of Coltirilbia
or any foreign country.
" ( 7) The term 'a.ffecting commerce' means in commerce, or burden~
ing or obstructing commerc~ .or the free flow of commerc~ or having
led or rending to lead to a labor dispute burdening or obstructing

commerce or the free flow of commerce.
''(8) The term 'unfair labor practice" means any uirfair labor prae-

Post, p. 140.

tice iisted in section 8.

. · .

·

"(9) The_ term '~o~ dispute' includes any controv'?rsy concer~
terms, tenure or conditions of employment2 or coneerrung the assoc1a...
tion or representation <>f persons in negqtia.ting, fixing, maintaining,
changing, or see.Jrlng to arrange terms or conditions of employment,
regardless of whether the disputants stand in the proximate relation
of employer and empl~ee.
" ( 10) The term 'National Labor Relations Board' means the
N atlonal Labor Relations Board provided for in section 3 of this Act.
" ( 11) The term 'supervisor' means any individual hn.ving authority,
in the interest of the employer, to hire, transfer1 suspend, lay off, recall,
promot~l disch~ge, assign, rewardt or di5<?.iph~e ~ther employe~s, or
respons1l>ly to direct th~m, Oft? adJust th~r grlevances, or eff~ct1vely
to recommend such action, 1£ m connection with the foregomg the
exercise of such. authoiity is not of a merely routine or clerical na.tu.re,
but reg_uires the use_. of indepen.· d.·ent judgment.

''(12) The term 'professional employ~e' means" (a) any emP.loy~e engaged in work ( i) predomin~ntly intellectual and vaned m character as opposed to routine mental,
manual, mechanical, or physical work; (ii} involving the consistent exercise of discretion and judgment in its performance;
(ill) of such a character that the output J>roduced or the result
.accomplished cannot be standardized in relation to a given period
of time; (iv) requiring knowledge <>f an adva.nced type in a
field of science or learning customarily acquired by a prolonged
course of specialized .intellectual in$tr,uction a.ncl study in ·an
institution of higher learning or a hospital, as distj.ng!}islied from
a general academic education or from a.n apprenticeship or from
training in the performance of routine mental, manual, or physical

processes; or

..
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"(b) any employee, who ( i) has completed the courses o:f
ecia.lized intel_l.ectual instruction an. d study described in clause
v) of paragraph (a), and (ii) is performing related \Tork under
o supervision of a pro:fessionnl person to qualify himself to
bec-0me a professional employe;e_ as defined in par~graph (a).
"(13) In determining whether any person is acting as· an_'agent'
of another person so as. to make such other person responsible :for
his acts, the 41.!Cstion of ~hether the ;iPe-0ific acts performed "!ere
actually authorized or subsequently ratified shnll not be controlling.

g

''NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD

"SEC, 3. (a) The National Labor Relations Board (l1ereinafter
called tl1e 'Board~) ·created by this Act prior to its. amendment by the
Labor Management Relations Act,_ 1947, is hereby continued as an
agency of the United States, except that the Board sl1allconsist of five
instead 0£ three members, appointed by the President by and with
the adttice and consent of the Senate. Of the two additional members
so provided for, one sl1all be appointed for a term of five yen.rs and
the other for a term of two yeM'S~ Their successors,. and the successors
of the other.members, shall be appointed for terms, of five years each,
excepting that any individual chosen to fill a vacancy shall be appointed
only for the unexpired term o:f the member whom he shall ~ucceed.
The Pres,ident shall designate one member to serye as Chairman of
tl1e Board. Any member of the Board may be removed by the President, upon notice and henring, for neglect of dut.y or malfeasance in
office, but for no other cause.
'' ( b) The Board is at;lt11orized to delegate to :my group of three
or more members any or all of the powers which it may itself exercise.
A ,·acru1cv i11 the Bonrd shall not impair the right of the remaining
m~nbers to exercise all of the powers of the Boara, and three members
of the Board shall, ·a.t all times, constitute a quorum of the Boai•d,
except that two members shnll constitute a quorum of any group
designated pursunnt to the :first sentence }1ereof. The Board shall
hn.ve a.n officJal seal which shall be judicially notieed .
. "{c) _The Bonrd shall _at the close o~ each fisc~l ,~ar ma~e a report
m writing to Congress and to the President statmg m deta1l the cases
it has heard, the decisions it hos r~ndered, the no.mes, salaries, and
duties of nll employees and officers in tho employ or under the supervision of the Board, a.nd nn account of all moneys it has disbursed.
" ( d) There shall be a General Counsel of the Board who sha.11 be
appointed by the President, by and with the adYice and consent 0£ the
Senate, for a term of four years. The General Counsel of tl1e Board
shn.11 exercise general superyision over all n.tt.orneys employe.d by the
Board ( other than trial e.""tuminers and legal assistants to Board
members) and over the officers and employees in the regional offices.
He shall haye final authority, on behalf of the Board, in respect of the
investigation of chnrges and issuance of complaJuts under section· 10,
and in respect of the prosecution of such complaints before the Board,
and shall have such other duties as the Board may prescribe or as may
be Er'orided by law.
''SEC. ·4. (a) Each men1ber 0£ the Board and the General Counsel of
the Board ·shall receh c a snlary of $12,000 a year,sha.ll be eligible for
reappoiiltment, and shall not engttg~ in any other business, vocation,
or employment. The Board sha.ll apJ_Joint a~ executive·secretary, and
such attorneys, examiners, and re~1onal directors, and such other
em~loyees as it ma:y: from tjme to time find necessa:ry for the proper
performance of its cluties. The· Board may not employ any attorneys
for the purpose of re-viewing transcripts of hearings or preparing
drafts of opinions e~ccpt that any attorney employed for nssignment

Coutinawre.
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Revlew of trial c:t-

amlners report.

Use, etc., of other
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P$l'Inent or e:r-

penses.

Prmcipal office.

Rule.s and regulations,

as a legal assistant to any Board member may for such Boa.rd member
review such transcripts and prepare such drafts. No trial examiner's
report shall be reviewed, eitlier -before or after its publication, by any
person other than a member of the Board or his legal assistant, a,.nd no
trial examiner shall advise or consult with the Board with respect to
exceptions taken to his findings, rulings, or recommendations. The
Board may establish or utilize such regional, local, or other ageneies,
and utilize such voluntary and uncompensated services, as may from
time to time be needed. Attorneys appointed under this section may,
at the direction of the Board, ap)?ear for and represent the Board in
any case in court. Nothing in thlS Act shall be construed to authorize
the Board to appoint individuals for the purpose of conciliation or
mediation or for economic analysis.
"(b)
of the e.~penses of the Board, including all necessary travel- .
ing and subsistence expenses outside the District of Columbia mcurred
bJ the members or employees ot the Board under its orders, shall be
allowed and paid on the presentation of itemized vouchers therefor
ilpproved by the Boa.rd or by any individual it designates for that
purpose.
"SEO. 5. The principal office of the Board shall be in the District
of Columbia, but it may meet and exercise any or all of its powers at
any other place. The Board may, by one or more of its members or
by such agents or a~ncies as it may designat~ prosecute any inquiry
necessary to its functions in any {>art of the United States. A member
who p:;i;rticipates in such an inquiry shall not be disqualified from subseiucntly pnrticipating in a decision of the Board in the same case.
'SEo. a. The Board shall have authority from time to time to make,
amend, and rescind, in the manner prescribed by: the Administrative
Procedure .A.ct, such rules and regulations as may be necessary to carry
out t.he provisions of this Act.

Ah

"RIGHTS OF .EMFLOYEES

"SEC. 7. Employees shall ha-ve the right to self-organization, to
form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain collectively through
representatives of their own choosing, nnd to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid
or protection1 and shall also have the right to refrain from. any or all
of such activities except to the extent that sueh right may be a:ffected
by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 8 (a) (3).
"u:NF.AIR LABOR l"RAC'l70ES
Employer.

"SEo. 8. (a) It shall be an unfair lubor practice for an employer"(!) to interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in theexer•
cise
the rights guaranteed in section 7;
"(2) to dominate or interfere with the formation or administration of any labor organization or contribute financial or other
support to it: P,rovided, That subject to rules and regulations
made and published by the Bon.rd pursuant to section 6, an
employer sliall not be prohibited from permitting employees to
confer with him during working hours without loss of time or pay;
"(3) by discrimination in regard to hire or tenure of employment or any term or condition of employment to encourage or
discourage membership in any labor organization : Provided, That
nothing in this Act, or in any other statute of the United States,
shall preclude an employer from makiug an agreement with a labor
organization (not established, maintained, or assisted by any
action defined in section 8 (a) of this Act as an unfair labor

or
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practice) to require ns a condition of employment membership
therein 011 or aftei· the thirtieth .dav following the beginning of
such employment or the effective date of such :·a!!reement, whichever is the fater, (i) if such labor organizntion is the representative
of the employees as provided in section 9 (a), in the appropriate
collective-bargaining unit covered by such agreement when mnde;
n.nd {ii) H, following the most recent ~lection held as provi<.!ed~ in
section 9 {e) the Board shall have certified that at least a maJonty
of the employees eligible to vote in such election have voted to
authorize such ln.bor organization to make such an agreement:
P'l'o-vided f'(trt-hert That no employer shall justify any d1scrimimttion against an employee for nonmembership in a labor organiza.tion (:A.) if he has 1·ea.sonable grounds for believing that such
members~ip was not available.to the employee on the same ter~s
and cond1t1ons generally applicable to otl1er members, or {B) 1£
he has reusonable grounds for belie·ring that membership was
denied or terminated for reasons other than the fuilure of the
employee to tender the periodic dues and the initiation fees
uniformly required as a condition of acquiring or retaining
n1embershlp;
''(4) to discharge.or otherwise discriminate against an employee
because lie has :filed c11arges or given testimony under this Act;
" ( 5) to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives
of his employees, subject to the provisions of section 9 (a),
''(b) It shall be an unfair labor practice for a labor organization or

its agents-

141

Labor oma.nb:ation
or agents.

"(1) to restrain or coerce (A.) employees in the exercise of the
rights guaranteed in section 7: Provided, That this paragraph
shall uot impair the right of a labor organization to prescribe its
own rules with resJlect t-0 the acquisition or retention of membership therein; or (B) an employer in the selection of his representafiyes for the· purposes of collective bargaining or the adjustment o:f grievances;
"(2) to cause or attempt to cause an employer to discriminate
a~~inst .an employee in violation of subsection (a) (3) or to
discriminate against an employee with respect to whom membership in such organization has been denfod or terminated on some
ground other than his failure to tender theJ)eriodic dues and the
initiation fees uniformly required as a con ition of acquiri_ng or
retaining membership;
'~(3) to re:fuse to bargain collectively with an employer, provided it is the representntive o:f his employees subject to the
provisions of section 9 (a};
" (4) _to engage in, or to induc~ or encourage the employees of
any employer to engage m, a strike or a concerted refusal in the
course of their employment to use, manufacture, .Process, transport,
or otherwise handle or work on any goods, art1cles7 materials, or
commodities or to perform any services, where an obJect thereof is:
(A) forcing or requiring any employer
self-employed person
to 3oin any labor or employer organization or any employer or
other P.erson !o c~ase · using, se11ing, handling, transporth1g, or
otherwise dealing in the products of any other ptoducer, processor,
or manufacturer, or to cense doing business with any other person;
(B) forcing or requiring any otlier employer to recognize or_ bargain with a labor .organiz_a.tion as the representative of his
employees unless such labor organization has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the prm·isions of section 9;
( C). forcing or reguiring a.ny employer to recognize or oargain
with a particular labor organization as the representative of his

or
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employees if another labor organization, has been c-&tifi.ed a.s the
representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9;
(D) forcing or requiring any employer to assign parli<iul~ work
to employees in a. particular labor organiza.tion or in a particular
tradet era#, or class rather than to ~mployoos in a.not.her la.bar
or~iza,tion or in another tr~de, cta!t, or cla~.? .unless such
employer is fa~ to eonform to an order or eertincatfon of the
Board deter.miip.ng the bargaining representative for employees
performing such work: PrO'Vided, That nothing contained in this
subsection (b) sh.all be construed to make unla,dul a refusal by
any person to enter upon the premis~ of any emplo~r. ( other
than his own employer), if the employees of such emplo~r are
engaged in a strike ratified or approved by: a representative of such
employees whom such employer :is required to recognize under
this Act;
" ( 5) to req'ltlre of emrloyees covere4 by an agreetne.t1t authorized under subsection (a (3) thepa.yment, as a condition preced:.
ent to becoming a mem er o:f such organization, o:f a fee in an
amount which the Board finds excessive or discriminatory mider
all the circu:ms~1.nces. In making such a, finding, the Board shall
consider, amoni other relevant factors, the practices nnd customs
of labor org~zations in the particular industry, a.nd the w~o-es
currently paid to the~:rµployees aii'~ted; and
PaymeDt b; em•
"(6) to cause or attempt to cause an employer·to pay ot deliver
player Cor services not
or agre~ to pu.y or deliver- a.ny money or other thing 0£ value, in
~orm~.
the nature of n.n exaction, for services which are not performed
or notto be per:formed.
''(c) The expressing of a.ny yiews, argument, or opinion, or the
dissemination thereo£., whether in '!1'1tten, 1frinted, graphic, or vi~al
form, shall not constitute o:r be evidence of an unfair labor practice
under any o.f the provisions of this Ac½ if such expression contains no
threat of reprisal or force or promise of benefit.
"To bargain rolle.c"(d} For the purpose$ of this section, to bargain collectively is.the
tl,ely.'t
periormance of the. mutual ~bligation of the. employer and the represenitative of the ~ployees to meet at reasonable times and con:fer in
good faith with respect t() wages, hours, a.nd other terms and conditions
of employment, <;>r the ne_gotfatio:n of an agreement, or any question
arising thereunder, and tlie execution of a written coil.tract incorporating any agreement reached if requested by either party, but such
obligati~n does not coinp~l ~ither P!1rtY to agree to ~ propo5?-l .pr ~ire
the making of a concession: Pr()1Uided, That where there 'ls in effect a
collective-bargaining contra.ct covering -eI!}ployees in -an industry
affecting commerce the duty to bargain collectively shall also mean
t.ho.t no party to such contra.ct shall termi~te or modify such contract,
unless the party desiring such termination or modification,, ( 1) serves a written notice upon the other pa.tty to "the contract
of ti1e iroposed termination or modification sixty days prior to
the expiration date thereof, or in the event such contract contains
no expiration date, sixty day~ _prior to the time it is proposed to
make such termination or modincation;
··
"(2) offers to meet and oonfer with the other party :for the
purpose 9£ negotiating n. new contract or a contra.ct containing
the proposed modi.fic.at1ons;
'' (3} notifies the Federal Mediation and Conciliation Service
within thirty days after such notice of the exist.ence of a dispute,
and simultaneously therewith notifies any .State or Territorial
agency established to mediate and conciliate disputes within the
State or Territory where the dispute occurred, provided no agreementhas been reached by that time; and

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00799

61 STAT.)

143

80111 CONG., lsT SESS.-CR 120-JUNE 23, 1947

"(4) .continues in full force and effect, without resorting to
strike or lock-out, a.11 the terms and conditions of the existing
eontract for a period of sixty days after such notice is given or
until the expiration dnte of such contract, whichever occurs later:
The duties imposed upon employers, employee.s, and labor organizations
by paragraphs (2), (3), and (4) shall become inapplicable upQn an
interveni~·eertification of the Board, under which the labor orgmiiza.tion or indrvidual,which is a party to the contract, has been superseded
as or ceased to be the representative of the employees subject to the
provisions of section 9 (a), and the duties so imposed shall not be
construed ns requiring either _{>arty to discuss or agree to any modification of the terms and conditions contained in a contract for a fixed
period_, if such modification is to become effective before such terms and
conditions can be reopened under the prO\'isions of the contract. Any
employee who engages in a strike witliin the sixty-day period specified
in this s~bsection sl~all lose his s~tus as an employee of the employer
engaged 111 the particular labor <bspute, for the purposes of sections 8,
9, and 10 of this Act, as ru,uended, but such_ loss .of ~tatus for such
employee shall tennmate if and when he is reemployed by ·such
employer.

lnter.-eoing certifi•

catlcin of Board.

Loss of statue bY

ernplo~"te.

''REPRF..SENTATI\'ES .AND ELECTIONS

"SEC. 9•. ( a) ReP.r~sentatives d~ign~ted or selected for the _puryos~s
of colle~t1ve bnrga1mng by the maJor1ty of the employees m: a umt
appropriate for such purpo$es, shall be tlie exclusive representatives of
all the employees in such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining
in respect to rates 0£ pay, vrn.ges1 hours of emyloyme11ti or other conditions of employment: 1>-roviaea, That any mcli vidua employee or a
group of employees shall have th~ right at any-time to present ~ievances to their employer and to have such grievances adjusted, without
the intervention of the bargaining representative, a_s lon__ gas the adju. stment is not inconsistent with tl)e terms of a coll~ct1ve-bargaining
contract or agreement then in effect: Provided fwrther, That the bargaining representative hns been given opportunity to be present at
such adj ustroent.
"(b}. The Board shall decide in each case whether, in order to assure
to employees the fu]Iest freed~>1n in e.~ercising the rights gua_rn.nteed
by this Act, the umt approprmte for the purposes of collect-Ive bargaining shall be the employer unit, craft unit, plant unit, or subdivision
thereof: Pro1,ided, Thnt the Bonrd shall not (1) decide that any unit
is appropriate for such purposes if such unit includes both professional
employees and employees who are .not professional employees 'Qllless
a majority of such professional employee.s vote for inclusion in such
unit; or (2) decide tlmt any c~a!t unit i~ inap_propriate ~or such
purposes on the .ground that a different umt has been established by
a prior Board dctermfoation 7 unless a mnjor1tv of the employees in the
JJroposed craft unit vote ngamst separate representation or ( 3) decide
that any unit is appropriate for such purposes if it includes, together
with other employees, any individual einployed as a guard to enforce
against employees and other persons rules to protect proEerty of the
employer or t.o protect the safety of persons on the employer's premises;
but no labor organization shall be certified a.s the representative of
employees i~~ a baJ:'$Uini~g unit ?f guards _if ~uch or~nization a~its
to membershlp, o:r 1s affiba.t~d directly or md1rectly with an organization which admits to membership, employees other than guards.

Decision or Board
ret,'Brdlng appropriate
unit.
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"(e) (1) Whenever n. p~_tition shall have teen ·filed> in accordance
with such regulations ns may be prescribed by the Board" (A)· by nn einpfoyee or ~oup of emploiees or any individual
or la_bor organization acting m their behalf alleging that asubstantia.1 number of employees (i) ·wish to be.represented for collective
bargnirung and tliat their employer declines to recognize their
representative -as the representntive:defincd in section 9 (a), or
{ii) ·assert tl).at the individ~l or labor organization 2 which has
been certifie~ ?r is being curr~ntly recognized by their emP.loyer
as the bargaining reJJresentative, 1s no longer a representative as
defined in section 9 ( o.) ; or
''(B) by an employer, alleging that one or more individuals or
labor organizations have present.ed to him a claim t9 be recognized
ns the representative defined in section 9 (a} ;
the Board shall investi,gate such petition and H- it has reasonable cause
to believe that a question of 1·epresenta.tion affectina commerce exists
shall provide or. _an npQrop.ria_ te hearin_g. u_pon_ due _no_ ti_ ce._ S.uch
hearing may be conducted by an officer or-employee of the r~onal
office, who ~hall not make any recommendations with respect tliereto.
If the Board finds u~oil. the record of such hearing that such a question
of representation exists, it shall direct an election by sec1·et ballot and
shall certify the results thereof.
· "(2) In determinin~ whether or not a q_uestion of representation
nffect1ng COfOIDeree ~ts, the. so.m~ reg!,llabons and ~les of dec!s!on
shall apply 1rresP,ectlve of the 1d_ent1ty of the persons fili~ the petition
or the kmd of relief sought and m no case shall the Board deny a labor
organization a place on the ballot by ·reason of an order with respect
t-o $Uch fabor 01·ga.nization 9r its predecessor not issued in_ conf9rmity
with section 10 (c).
.
.
·
.·
"(3) No e]ection shall be directed in any bargaining_ unit onm:y
sul?division-within 'Yhich, inthe preceding twelve-month period·, a·valid
election shall have been held. EmEloyees on strike who are not
£_

Election by secret

ballot.

..

entitled to. reinstatement shn.11 not be eligible to vote. In any election
where none of the choices on the· ballot receives .a majority,. a run~o:fi
shall be conducted, the ballot providing for a selection .between th_e
two choices receiving the large.st and second largest number of valid
votes ca.st in the election.
" ( 4) Nothing in this section ·sluµl be construed to prohibit the. waiV'ing_· 0£ lrearin~ by sti_p. ulatio.n £_or· the purp_ose of a. conse.nt efoction in
conformity with regu.lati_ons and rules of decjsion of the Board..
"(5) In determining whether a unit is appropriate for.the purposes
speci:ffod in subsection (b) the extent to which the employees have
or~ized shall not be controlling.
'(d) Whenever an order of the Board made pursuant to section
J, 0 (c ). is ~ased in whole or _in p~ u:pon facts. c~rt~ed following 8!1
invesb_gation pursuant to subsection ( c) of. this section and there lS
it petition :for the enforcement or review of such order, such c~rtification
nnd the record 0£ such investigation shall be included in the transcript
of the entire record required to be filed under -section 10 (e) or 10 ( f),
an_d ~e~upon the !3ecree of the court enforcing, modifying, or setting
aside m whole or m part the. order of the Board shall be made and
e,ntered upon ~he pleadings, testimony, and proceedings set forth in

Pntltion to n,.nkt,

agreement with employer.

such transcr~pt.

"(e) (1) Upon the filing with the Board by a labor organization,

which is the r_epresent.ative of employees_ aspro_. vid.ed in section_9 (a_),
of a petition all~ing that 30 per ccntum or more of the employees
withiii a unit cfa1i:nea to be ap~ropriate for such purposes d~sire to
-authorize such labor organization to make. an agreement with the
employer of such employees requiring membership in such labor organ~
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ization as n condition uf employment in such unit, upon an appropriate
showing thereof the Board sluiH, if no question of 1·epresentation exists,
take a secret ballot of such employees, a.nd shnll certify the results
thereof to such labor organizatjon and to the employer.
"(2) Upon the filing with the Board, by 30 per centum or more of
the employees in a barrraining unit covered bv an ngreement between
their _eiµpl9yer and a t1.b<>r orgauization mnde pursuant to section 8
(a) (3). (ii),- of a. petition nlle 0-ing tl1ey desire that such authori~y
be rescmded, the Board slmll to.kc a secret ballot of the employees lll
such unitt and shall certify the results tl1ereof to sucl1 labor organization
and to the employer.
"(3) No election shall be conducted pursuant to this subsection in
any bargainiilg·unit or nny subdh•ision within which, in.tho preceding
twelve-month period, a valid electi1;>n shall have been held.
~'(f) No investigation sh.nll be made by the. Board o:f any ques~ion
afiectmg commerce concerning th~ representation of employees, ro.ised
by a labor organization under subsection ( c) of this section, no petition
unde1· section 9 (e) (1) shrill be entertained, and no complaint shall be
issued pursuant to a chnrge made by a labor organizution under sub-section (b) of section 10~ unless such labor organization and any
national or internatiom1UnbQr orgnnizntion of w·hich such labor organization is an affiliate or co11stituent unit (A) shall have prior tl1ereto
filed with the Secretary of Labor copies of its coustitution and b.ylaws
and a report, in such form as the Secretary may prescribe. shomng" ( 1) the name of $Uch I~bor organization and the address of
its principal place of business;
"(2) the names, titles, and compensation and i111owances of its
three principal officers and 0£ nny of its other officers or agents
~hose aggregate compensn.tion rtnd nllown.nces for the preceding
year exceeded $5,000, and the amount of the compensation and
allowances paid to each such officer or agent during such :vear;
" ( 3) the manner in which the. officers. and a.gents referred" to in
clause (2) were elected, appointed,orothenviseselected; ·
" ( 4) the initiation fee or fees which new members are required
to p~tY on becoming members of such labor organization;
" ( 5) the regular dues or fees which members nre required to
pay in order to remain members in good standing of such labor
oro-anization ;

145

Filing or consLitutloc.~ ~tc., prior to
action by Boe..rd.

8 (6} a. detailed statement of, or reference to provisions of its

constitution and bylaws showing the procedure followed with
respect to, (a) qun..1ification for or restrictions. on membership,
(b) election of officers a11d stewards, (c) calling of regu.lar and
special meetings; {d) leYyirig of assessments, (e) imposition of
fines, ( £) nuthorizntion for bargaining demands, -(g) ratification
of contract terms, (h) authorization for strikes, (i) authorization
for disbursement of uniori :funds, (j) !ludit of union financial
transactions, (k} participntion in insurance or other benefit plans,
and (1) expulsion of members and the groui1ds therefor;
and (B) can show that prior thereto it has" (1) filed with tl1e. Sect-etn.ry of La.bar, in such form as the
Secretary may prescribet a report showing all of (a) its receipts
of any kind nnd the sources of such receipts, (b) its total assets
and liabilities as 0£ the end of its last fiscal year, (c) the disburse~
ments ~ade by it during such fiscal year, including the purposes
for wluch made; and
"(2) furnished to nll of the members of such labor organization
copies of the financial report required by paragraph (1) hereof
to befi1ed with the Secretary of Labor.

Rtport showing re·
oolpts, etc.

953~7°---48-pt.1-10
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i'(g) It shall be the obligation of all labor or~tioDS ro tile
ennuitlly with the Secretary o:f Labor, in such fQrm us the .Secretary
of L~bor may presc~be,.xepo1¥ p~ingii:g up to date ~e.information
re<JUired_ to be supplied 1~ the 1mt1al fi.liilg b:y subsection (f)_ {A) !)f
this section, and to file with the Secretary of Labor and :furmsh to its

members annually financial re_port.s in. the fol'ril nndmrum.er p_.rescl'ibed
in subsection ff} (B). No 19.bor organization _shall be eligible for
certification under thjg section as the 1,epresentative of any ~ployees,
no :petition under section 9 (e) ( 1) shall be entertained, and no com~
plamt shall issue under section 10 with respect to a eh~rge filed by
a labor organization .unless it can show that it and any national or
international labor organization of, which it is an affiliate or constitue_nt
unit h~ complied with its obligation unde~ this subsection~
"(h) No investigation ~all oe made by the Board of any question
nffecting commerce con~rning the representation of employees, raised
by a_ labor .organization under subseetio~ {c) of this section, :10 petition
undel' section 9 ( e) (1} shall be enterta.me4, an<i no com_pla.mt shall be
issued pursuant to a charge made. by a labor -0rga.nizatiol) under subsection: (b) of section 10, unless tliere is pn_ file with th~ Board an.
affidavit executed contemporaneously or within the preceding twelve~
month period by each officer of such labor organization and the officers
of any natfonal
international labor organization of which i~ is an
affiliate or· constituent unit that he is not a member of the Communist
Party or affiliated with such party, and that he does not believe in1 and
is not a member of or supports any organization that believes m 01~
teaches, the overthrow of the United States Government by force or by
any illegn.l or llhconstitutional methods. The provisions of sectipn
3!{ ..A. or the Criminal Code .shall be applicable in respect to such

or

affidavits.

' ~ ~ O N OF tn-TFAIR LABOR PRACTICES
Powers or Board.

lssuanco ol ~m.

plaint, etc.

"SEC. 10. ( a) The Boa.rd is empowered, as 11oreinaftei· provided, to
}?teven.t any per.soA from engaging in ~ny unfair labor practice (listed
m section 8) affecting commerce~· Th1s power shall nqt b~ a:ffected by
any other means of actjustmerit or prevention that.has been or may be
established by agreement, Jaw, or otherwise: Provideit, That the
Boa.rd is empowered by agreement. with any agency of ariy State or
Territory to cede to such :agency jurisdictfon over any cases in any
industry (other than mining, manufacturing1 oommun.ications, a.nd
transportation except _where predom}nail.tly loca~ in character) even
though such-0ases maymvolvelabor disputes aifect1n~ commerce, unless
th~ pr9'rlsion of the State or Terr,itorial ~~tute a.t>phcabl~ t,o the deternunat1on of such cases by such agency ·1s mconsJstent with the co:r;-re.,.
s:pond.ing provision· of this A.ct or has. rec~ived a, construction inconSistent theremth.

''(b) Whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in or is
engaging in any such unfair labor practice, the Board, or any a.gent
or agency designated by the Board for such purposes, sho.Irhave power
to issue al).d cause to be served upon such p~rson a. complaint stating
the charges in that respect, and containing a notice oi hearing before
the Boara or a member thereof~ or before a designated agent.or ag~cy,
at a place therein fixed, not le.ss than five da.ys after the serving of said
complaint: Provided, That· no complaint :shall issue based upon any
unfair labo:r practice occurring more than. six months prior to the filing
of the charge with the Boa.rd and the service of a copy thereof upon
the l'erson against who~ ~uch charge _is made, unle~ the person
aggrieved thereby was prevented from :filing such charge by reason of

.service in the armed :forces, in. which event the six-month period shall
b.e computed from the dny of his discharge. Any such complaint may

be amended by the member, agent, or agency conducting the hearing
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or the Board in its discretion at any time prior to the issuance of an
order based thereon. The person so complamed of s11nl1 have the right
!o .file an answer to !he origj!1al or. ~mended complaint and tp appear
m person or otherwise and give testimony at the place and time fixed
fo the complaint In tbe discretiou of the member, agent, or ~ency
conducting the hearing or the Board, any other person may be allowed
to intervene in the said proceeding and to present testimony. Any
such proceeding shall, so far as practicable, be conducted in accordance
with the rules of evideuce applicable in the district courts of the
United.St;Ltes under tberulf!S of dvil procedure for the district courts
of the United States. adopted by the Supreme Court of theUnited
States pursuant to tbe Act of June 19, 1934 (U. S. C., title 28, secs.
723-B, 723-0).
;'{c) The testimony taken by such member, agent, or agency or the
Board shall be reduced to writing._ and filed with the Bou·d. Thereafter, in its discretion, the Board upon notice may take :further testimony or l1car ar~ment. If _upon the p.repondemnce of the testimony
taken the Board shall be of the opinion tliat any person named in the
comp!ahlt has engnged in or is· e11~ag:ing_ in any such unfn:ir l_abor
practice, then the Boo.rd shall state its findm_w; of fact and shall issue
and cnuse to be served 011 such person nn orcter r~u1ring such person
to cease and desist from such unfair labor practice, .and to take such
affirmative ac~ion including l'einstatement of employees with or without
back pay, as will effectuate the policies of this Act: Provided, That
where an order directs reinstatement of an employee, back pay may
be required of the employer or labor or£anizatiou, as the case may be,
responsible for the discrimination sunered by him: And pro-i1ded,
fu:rfhe-r.,_ That in d~termining whethei· ~ com.plaint shall iss_ue all~g!ng
a v10lat1on of sed1on 8 (a) (1) or.section 8 (a) (2), and m deciding
such cases, the so.me regulations und rules of decision shall apply
irrespective of w hetller or not the fabor organiza:tion tdiected is affiliated with a labor organization national or international in scope.
Such order may :further require such ~erson to make reports :from
time to time showing the extent to which 1t has complied with the order.
If. upon the prcpondem1ice of the testimony taken. the Board shaU not
be of the opinion that the person uamed in the complaint has engaged
in or is engaging in nnv ~uch unfair labor practice, then the Board
shall state its findings o} fact and shnll issue an order dismissing the
said complaint. No order of the Board shall require the ieinstntement
of any indh·idual as an employee who has been suspended or discharged> or the payment to him of any buck pay, ii such individual
was suspended or discharged for cause. In case th~ evidence is pre~ented before a meml?e1· of the Board, or before an exami!1er or exam"
mers thereof, such member, or such exwuner or examiners, as the
case may be, shall issue and cause to be SL:1"'7ed on the parties to the
proceedmg n proposed report, together with a recommended order,
which shall be filed with tl1e Board, and if no exceptions are filed
within twenty days after service thereof UJ?OD such parties, or within
·such further period as the Board may authorize, such recommended
order sl1all become the order of the Board nnd become effective as
therein prescribed.
"(d) Unti1 a transcript o:£ the record in a case shall have been
£led in a court, as hereinafter provided, the Board may at any time,
upon reasonable notice and in such manner as jt shall deem proper,
modifI or set aside, in whole or in part, anv finding or order made or
issued by it.
~
i'(e) The Board sha.Ulrn:ve power to petition any circuit court of
appeals of the United Stat.es (including the United States Court of
Appeals for the District of Columbia), or if all the circuit courts of
appeals to which application may be made are in vacation, any district

48 Stat. 1064.
28 v. S. C.Ui23b,

7~c.
'l'estl.t:rooy.

ApolfoabiHll" of

rules oC decI:;ion. etc.

Order dismissh1g
cor:rplainl, etc.

Modification. etc.,
by Board o! finding or
order.

Petition to court !or

cnforccmecL o! order,
etc.
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court of the United States (including the rnstrict Court o-f the United
States for the District of Columbia), within any circuit or district,
respectively., wherein the m1fair labor practice in question occurred or
wherein sucn person resides or transacts business, for the enforcement
o:f such order and for appropriate temporary relief or restrailllllg order,
and shall certify and file in the court a transcript of the entire reco.rd
in the proceedings, including the pleadings and testimony upon which
such order was entered and the findings and order of the Board. Upon
such filing, the court shall cause notice thereof to be served u~on such
person, and thereupon shall have jurisdiction of the proceeding and
of the question determined therein, and shall have power to grant
such temporary relief or restraini~ order as it deems just and proper,
and to make and enter upon the pleadings, testimony, and proceed!]lgs
set forth in such transcript a decree enforcing, modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole or in _part the order of
the Board. No objection that has not been urged before the Board, its
member, agent, or agency, shall be considered by the cour~ unless
the failure or neglect to urge such objection shall be excused because
of extraordinary circumstances. The .findings of the Board with
respect to questions of ftiet if supported by substantial evidence on the
record considered as a whole shall be conclusive. If either party shall
apply to the court for leave to adduce additional evidence and shall
show to the satisfaction of the court that such additional evidence :is
material and that there were reasonable grounds for the failure to
adduce such evidence in the hearing before the Boa.rd, its member,
agent, or agency, the court may order such additional evidence to be
taken before the Board, its members, agent, or a~nc;y, and to be made
a part o:f the transcript. The Board may modify its .findings as to
the facts, or make new findings, by reason of additional evidence so
ta.ken and filed, and it shall file such modified or new findings, which
findings with respect to questions of fact if supported by stibstantial
evidence on the record considered as a whole shall be conclusive, and
shall file it.s recommendations, if any, for the modification or setting
aside of its original order. The jurisdiction of the court shall be exclu~
sive and its judgment and decree shall be final, except that the same
shall be subject to review b;y the appropriate circuit court of appeals
if application was made to the district court as hereina.bove provid~
and by the Supreme Court of the United States lWOn writ of certioran
or certification as Erovided in sections 239 and 240 of the Judicial
Code, as amended ( U. S. C., title 28, secs. 346 and 347).
" ( f) Any person ng~ieved by a final order of the Board granting
or denying in whole or in part the :relief sought may obtain a review
of such oraer in any circuit court of appeals of the United Stafos in
the circuit wherein the unfair labor practice in question was alleged
to have been enga~d in or wherein such person resides or transacts
business, or in the United StlJ.te.s Court of Appeals for the District of
Columbia, by .filing in such court a written petition praying that the
order of the Board be modified or set aside. A copy of such petition
shall be forthwith served upon the Board, and thereupon the aggrieved
party shall file in the court a transcript of the entire record in the
proceeding, certified by the Boa.rd, including the pleading and testi..
mony upon which the order complained of was entered, and the findin~
and order of the Board. Upon such filing, the court shall proceed m
the same manner as in the case of an application by the Board under
subsection (e), and shall ha vs the same exclusive jurisdiction to ~ant
to the Board such temporary relief or restraining order as it <1eems
just and proper, and in like manner to make and enter a decree enforc.
ing1 modifying, and enforcing as so modified, or setting aside in whole
or m part the order of the Board; the findings of the Board with

~-
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respect to questions of fact if supported by substantial evidence on
the record co11sidercd as a whole shall in like manner be conclusive.
"(g) The commencement of proceedings under subsection ( ~) or ( f)
of this section shall not, unless specifically ordered by the court, operate
as a stav of the Board's order.
''(h) .,When wanting appropriate temporary relief or a. restraining
order, or maki11g- and entering. a decree enforcing, modifying, and
enforcing as so modified·, or setth1g aside in whole or in part an order
on the Boar9-t as provided in this section, the jurisdiction of courts
sitting in equity shall not be limited by the Act entitled 'An Act to
amend the Jud1cia] Code and to define and limit the jurisdiction. of
courts sitting in equity, and for other purposes', approved March 23,
47 St11t. 'l'O,
1932 (U. S~ c~, Supp. VII~·title 29, secs.101-115).
20 U. S, C. H 101us.
"(i) Petit.ions filed. unct~r this Act sl1all be heard e;x;peditiously, and
if Rossible within ten days after they have been docketed.
Petition to court for
~(j) The ]3oard shall ha-ve power, upon issuance of a complaint as temporary
relief, ~tc.
provided in subsection (b) charging that any person has enga.ged in
or is engngincr in an unfair laoor practice. to petition any district
C'ourt of tl1e lfnited States {including the Distrct Court of tho United
States for the District of Columbia), within any district wherein the
unfnir labor practice in question is alleged to have occurred or wherein
such person res~des or trnnsacts business, £or nJ?propriate temvorary
relief or restraining order. Upon the filing of any such petition the
court shall cause notice thereof to be served upon sucl1 pel'Son, and
thereupon shall have jurisdiction to grant to the Board such temporary
relief or restraining order nsit deemsJjust and proper.
:Po~cr or Board ta
"{k) ·whenever it is charged that any person has engaged in an detetmJne
dispuce.
unfair labor pr-'1ctice within the me~ning of paragraph ( 4) (D) of
section 8 ( b), the Board is empowered and directed to hear and determine the dispute out of which such un:fair ]abor practice shall have
arisen, unless, :within tt3n days nfter noti.ce that such charge has been
filed, the parties to such dispute submit to the Board satisfactory
e:vidence that they ha.ve adjusted, or agreed upon methods for. the
voluntary adjustment.of. the dispute. Upon compliance 'by the parties
to the dispute with the clecision of ·the Board or upon such voluntary
adjur:.-tment of the di~pute1 such charge shall be dismissed.
'"(l) Whenever it is charged t.hat any person has engaged in an Preliminary in.-estf•
unfair labor practice within the meaning of paragraph {4) (A.), (B), cation or C?barge.
or (C) of section 8 (b), the preliminary investigation of such charge
shall be made forthwith und given pdority over nll other cas~ except
eases of like character ill the office where it is filed or :to which it is
1.·eferred. If, after such investigation, the officer or regional attorney Petition for injuncto whom the matter may .be referred has reasonable cause to believe tive relief,
such charge is true and thnt n compla.int should issue, he shnll, on bclinl£
of the Board, petition any district court of the United States (includ~
ing the District Court of the United Shi.tes for the District of Colmhbia) within any district where. the unf~ir labor practice in question
has occurred, is alleged fo have occurred. or wherein such person resides
or transacts business, for appropriate· injunctive relief pending the
final adjudication of the Board with respect to sucl1 ma.tter. Upon
the filing of any such petition the district court shnll hu;ye jurisdiction
to grnnt such injunctive relief or temporary restraining or~er a,s it
deems j'ust and proper, notwithstanding any other pronsion of law:
Pro11id~ furtlie·r Thnt no temporary restraming order shall be issued
without notice uJess a petition alleges that. substantial and irreparable
injury to the charging party will be unavoidable and such temporary
1·estraining ord~ shnlJ be effectiye £or no longer than five days and will
become void at the ex__piration of such period. Upon filing of any such
petition the courts sha.11 cause notice thereof to be sen·ed upon any
person involved in the charge and such person, including the chnrgjng
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party, shall be given an opportunity to appear by counsel and present
any··relevant testimQny: Provided /'Wf'thffr.,. That for the J.)ttrpOSes of
this subsection district courts sha.11 be deemed to have jurisdiction of
a la.bor or~nfaation (1) in the district in which such orga.n.ization
maintain~ 1ts__prineipal office) or (2) in any district in which its duly
authorized officers or agents are engaged m promoting or protecting
the interests of ·employee members. The service of legal process upon
such officer or agent shall constitute service upon the labor organization
and make such organization. a. pa.rty to the· suit. In situations where
such relief is appropriate the proce_dure ~cified herein shall a.pply
to charges with respect t.o section 8 (b) ( 4) {u).

Ank,p, 142.

:ecnv:ERS
"SEO. 11. For the purpose of all l1earings and investigations, which,
in the opinion 0£ the Board, are necessary and proper for the exercise
of the powers vested in. it by section 9.and section 10- •
"(1) The Bon.rd, or 1t.s duly authorized agents or agencies, shall at
all reasonable times have access t-0, for the purpose-of examination,
and the right to copy any evidence of any person being investiiated or
proceeded ~ainst that relates to any matter under investi~t10n or in
question. The Boaro., or a~y menilier ~ei:eof, shall upon application
of any _party to such _proceedings, forthwith issue to sucli party subpenas
requiring the attendance a.ncl testimony of witnesses or the produ~tion
of any evidence in such proceeding or investi~ation requested in such
application. Within five days after the service of a subpena on any
person requiring the Pl'Odueti~n of any evidence in his posse~on or
un:der his conttol, such person may petition the Boa.rd to 1·evcike, and
the. Boarg. sh~l reyoke, s1:1ch subperut if. in it;s opinion the evidenc~
whose production 1s reqmred does not relate to any mattm· under
¥1V~~gation, or any matter in questfo!1 in ~ch pro~edings).. or if_ in
its op1mon such subpena does not describe with sufficient particularity
the evidence whose production is required. Any member of the Board,
or Dlly D.1Jent or agency des~gnated by the l3oard for such purposes,
xnay ~dminister oaths and affirmations, e::samine witnesses, and receive
evidence. Such attendance of witnesses and the__ _prpduction of such
evidence may be required from any place in the United· States or any
Territory or possession thereof, at any desi~ted place of hearing.
"(2) In case. o:f contumacy or refusal ii<> o~ey a subpena ~ued to
any person, a.n:r dist1ict court of the United States or the United States
courts.. of any _Territo!jl' or possession, or the Di~trict .Court. of the
United States for the District of Columbia,. within the jurisdiction of
which the inquiry is carried on or withln the jurisdiction of·which said
person gu_ilty of contumacy or refusal to ol:iey is :found or resides or
transacts business, upon application by the Bo·ard shall have jurisdic-tion to issue to such person an order requiring such person to appear
before the Board, its member, agent, or a~ncy, there to produce evidence if so ordered, or there to give testimony touching the matter
under investigation or in question; and any failure t.o obey such order
of the court m_ay be punished_.· by' said co'urt as a conteinp.t· the.reof.
"(3) No person sliall be excused from attendin_g and testi£yina- or
from producing books, records, correspondence, docwnent:s, or other
evi<,lenc~ _in obedienc~ to the ~ub:pena of ~e, Boardt on the ~oup~ that •
the test1mony or evidence reqmred of him may t0nd to mcrrmms.te
him or subject him to a penalty or forfeiture; but no individual shall
be prosecuted or subjected to any penalty or forfeiture for or on
account of any transaction, matter, or thing concerning which he is
"IJ.\~STIGATORY

...wit, p. w.
.A.cool!a to evidence.

Jssu11nce of sub.
penas.

:A.dndn.lstmtlon of

oaths,etc.

lterasal to_obcy sub-

pen11, CLC.
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compelled, ~fter having cla.i'~ned his privilege ngn.hl~t s~l~-incriminntion, to testify or produce·ev1dence, except th:tt such mdn·!clual so tes-

tifyina shtdl not be ~~empt from prosecution and punishment for
perjuty comm.iited in so testifying.
" ( 4) Complaints, orders, and other process and pa_pers of the Board,
its ?.1-~mber, a~ent, or age~cy, may be serv~d eitlier personally or by
reQ1stered mail or by telegrnph or by leavmg a copy thereof nt the
i:>_r!ncipaJ office or p. face of bu.sin_ess o_f the. person required to be s~rved.
The verified. return by tl1e individual so serving the snme setting forth
the manner of suc.h service shall be proof of tfie same, and the return
post office rece.ipt or telegraph receipt therefor when registered and
mailed or telegraphed as aforesaid sho.Jl be proof of service of the
same. Witnesses summoned before the Board, its 1ne1n.ber, agent, or
~gency, sba.11 be paid t~e same fees and 11:ilcage that are pnid :w1tnesses
1n the courts of the United States~ and witnesses wl1ose depositions ure
taken and t.he persons taking the same sh~ll severally be entitled to the
same fees as are paid for like services in the courts of the U 1rited

Senice of com•
order$; ct.c.

-plllinls,

Payti1ent of wi~

nesses.

States.

"(5) A}l process of any court. to whi:h :1J?Plic~tio~ may be~ma.de
ttnder this Act may be served m the ]Ud1c1al d1str1ot wherem the
defendant or other person required to be served resides or may be found.
" ( 6) The several departments and agencies of the Government when
directed by the President, shall furnisli the Board, upon its request, all
records1 . papers., and information in their possession relating to any
mutter before the Board.
"SEC. 12. Any person who shall willfully resist1 prevent, impede, or
interfere with any member of the Board or any.of its agents or agencies
in the performance of duties pursuant to this Act shall be punished
by a fine of not more thail $5,000 or bj~ imprisonment for not more than

Records of dcpa.-t.
ments,etc.

J?cnalt;r.

one year, or both.

"LTMITATIONS.

"Sro. 13. Nothing in this Act, except. as spe.cifically proYided fot·
herein, shall be construed so ns either to inter£ere with or impede or
diminish in any way the right to strike, or to ttfi'ect the limitation$ or
qualifications on that right.
.°SEo. 14. (a) Nothino- herein shall prohibit any individual em•
ployed as a. supervisor irom becoming or remaining a member o:f a
labor .or~nization, but no em plover subject to thls Act shall be compelled to deem individual.s defined herein as supervisors as employees
tor the purpose of any law, either national or local, relating to collective bargaining.
"(b) Nothing in this Act shall be construed as authorizing the
execution or application of agreements requiring membership_ in a
labor or~nfan.tion as condition of employment in any St,at-e or Territory in which such execution or application is prohioited by Sta.te or
Territorial law.
"SEc. 15. Wherever the application of the provisions of section 212
of chapter 10 of the Act entitled 'An Act to establish a uniform system
of bankruptcy throughout the United States', approved July 1: 1898,
and Acts amendatory thereof and supplementary thereto (U~ S. C.,
title 11, sec. 672), conflicts with th~ application of the provisions of
this Act, this Act shall .:prevail : Pr01Jided, That in any situation
~h~re the provisions of this .A.ct ca~o~ be yalidly enforced, the proV1S10ns of such other Acts shall remrun m fuU force and effect.
"SEC. 16. If any provision of this Act, or the application of such
provi_sion to any person_ or eirc~ta;11ces, shall be. h~l~ invalid, the
rem~mder of thls Act, or the application o~ su~11 .Provis1~n to parsons
or c1roumstances other tl1an those as to wl11ch 1t 1s held mvalid, shall
not be affected thereby.

a

l?lgbt. to stri.ko,

8upcrvfsots,

Execution or agreements requiring membership, etc.

Conflict v;Jth otber
laws.

tiZ Stat. 00!.

SeparabUity or prorlsioos.
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"SEo. 17. This Act may be cited as the '.National Labor Relations

ShQrt titJe.

Act'."
EFFECTIVE DATE OF CEB.'l'AlN .CHANGES
Unfair lebor proo,

tice.

Ant.e, pp. HO, Ml.

Certification of rcp,-

rc:;e11t.isLl vcs. etc.

49 Stat. 453,

20 u. s. o. I "9.
Ante, p. 143~

Sro. 102. No provision o:f this title shall be deemed to make an
unfair labor practice any act which was performed ptior to the date
of the enactment of this Act which did not constitute an unfair labor
practice prior thereto, and the provisio~ of sootion 8 (a) (3) and
se~tio~ 8 (b) (2) of the National. Labor Relati?ns Act as amended by
this title shall not make an unfair labor Eractice the performance of
any obligation under a colleetive:-barga~11~ agre~~nt entere~ into
prior t-0 the date of the enactment of this Act, o:i;- (m the case. of an
agreement for a period of not more than o_ne year) entered into on or
a.ft.er. such date of enactment, but pr.io,r to_ tlle effective date o~ this
title, i.f the per:forman~e of such obligation would not hav~ constituted
an umair labor practice ll.Ilder s.ection 8 (3) of the National Labor
.Relations Act prior to the effective date of this title, unless such agreement. was renewed or extended subsequent thereto.
SEc. 103. No provisions of this title shall affect any certification of
representatives or any determination as to
appropriate·collectivebargaining unit, which was made under section 9 of the National Labor
Relations Act prior to the effective date 0£ this title until one year
after the date of sud1 certification. or if, in respect of any such certification, a collective-°Qa.rgainin~ cQntra.ct was entered into prior to the
effective date of this title, until the end of the contract period or until
one:year after such dat.e whichever first occurs.
$Eo~ 104. The amendments mnde by this title shall take effect sixty
dais after the date of the enactment of tlus .A.ct, except that the
authority of the President to appoint certain officers conferr~d upon
him by_: section 3 of the National Labor Relations Act as amended by
this title may be exereised forth~ith.

the

TITLE II-CONCILI.A.TION OF LABOR DISPUTES IN INDUSTRIES AFFECTING COMMERCE·;. NATIONAL EMERGENCIES

SEo. 201. That it is the policy of the United States that(a.) sound and stable industrial peace and the adv~ncement of
the general welfare, health, and safety of the Nation and .of the
best mterests of employers ~d employ~ can most satisf~ctoril:y
be secured by the settlement of issues between employers .and
employees through the_proce.sses of confet·ence and collective bargaining between empfoyers and the representatives of their

employees;

(b) the settlement" of issues between employers and employees
throu~h collective_bargaining may be·adv~~d.·by :ma.king_av__ailable run and adequate governmental. :facilities for conciha.tion,
media:tion, and voluntary arbitration to aid and encourage employers and the representatives of their employees 'to reach and
main~~in agreements concerning rates of.pay, hours1 anq. ~oi:~
conditions, nnd to make all reasonable efforts to settle their differences l;>y mutual agreement reached through conferences and
~ollective ~tgaining or by such methods us may be .provided for
many applicable agreement for the settlement of disputes; and
{c) certain. controversies which arise between p~i~ t'9
collective-bargaining agreements may be avoided or minimized by
makini. available full and. adeql.11).te governmental :facilities for
furnisning assistance memplQyers and the representatives of their
employees in formulating for inclusion within such· agreements
p1·ovision for: adequate notice of any proposed changes in the
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terms of such agreements, .for the final adjustment of grievances
ot· questions regarding the applicntion or interpretation of such
agrf.!enumts, ana other provisions designed to prevent the subsequent arising of such controvers.ies.
SEc. 202.. {a} There is h~re~y- created an. i?~~pcnden~ agency ~o
be known as the Federal Mediation nnd Conciliation Service {herem
referred to as the ''Service'', except that for sixty days aiter the date
of the enactment of this Act such. term shn 11 refer t.o the Conciliation
Service of the Department of Labor). The Service shall be under
the direction of a Federal Mediation and Conciliation Director (hereinafter referred to as the "Director"), "ho shall be appointed by tJ1e
President by n.nd with the advice and consent of the Senate. ·Tbe
Director shall receive compensation rit the rate of $12,000 per annum.
The Directpl' shn11 not engage in any other busines.<;, vocation, or
emplovment.
(b) ~-The Director is authorized, subject to the civil-service laws, to
appoint such clerical a~d other perso1mel as may be necessary for the
execution of the :functions of the Service, nnd shnll fix their compensation in ncco:rda.nce with tl1e·Clnssification Act of 1~23. as amended, and
may, without regard to the provisions of the civi.1-ser,·iee Jaws and the
Classification Ad- of 1923, as amended: appoint and fix the compensation of such conciliators and mediators as may be necessary to carry
out the functions of the Service. The Director is authorized to make
such expenditnres for ~upplies, facilities, and services as he deems
necessary. Such expenditures shall be allowed and paid upon presentation of itemized vouchers therefor approved by the Director or by
any emp loyce designated by him for that purpose.
(c) The principal office· of the Sen-ice slmll be in the District of
Columbia, but the Director may establish regional offices convcnie;p.t
to localities in which labor controversies are likely to .arise. The
Director may by order,.subject to revocation at any time. delegate any
aut~ority Ji-Hd discretion conferred upon him by this Ac_t to any
regional director, or other officer or employee of the Service. The
Director may estabHsh suitable procedures for cooperation with State
and local mediation agencies. The Director shall make an annual
rep_ort in writing to C.ollgress at the end of th_e nsc:il Jear.
( d) All mediation and conciliation functions of the Secretary o:f
Lnbor or the United States Conciliation Se1·vice under section 8 o:f the
Act entitled "An Act to create. a Department of Labor'\ approved
l\Inrch 4, 1913 {U. S. C., title 29, sec. 51), n.nd all functions of the
United States Conciliation Service under any other ]aw are. hereby
transferred to the Federal l'!ediation and Conciliation Service,
together with the Ecrsonnel ·and records of the United States Conciliation Service. Such transfer shall take effect upon the sixtieth
day nfter the date of enactm~nt of this Act. Such. trnrisfer shall not
affect uny proceedings pending before the United States Conciliation
Service or any certification, order, rule, or r~<TUlation theretofore made
by it•or bv the Secretary of L~bor~ The Director and the Service shall
not besnbject in uny way.to the ju!-'i~diction or authority of the Secretary of Labor or any official or d1v1s1on. of the Department o:f Labor.

Foderal Mediation

and Concilfntl.00 SIUV•
fee.

Po:st,p.6111.

Director.

.4..ppolntmont. etc..

or porsonnel,

42 Stat.. t488.
& u. s. C H 661-G7i.

Expenditures.

Prlnclpel ofllc&. eto.
Delegation or
tborlty.

BU·

Report to Con..~
Transfer

Uon.s,etc.

or

tune•

37 Stat. i.38.

FtnlCI'IONS OF TIIE SERVICE

&o. 203. (n) It shall be the duty of the Service, in order to prevent or minimize interruptions of the free flow of commerce growing
out of fo.bor disputes, to nssist parties to labor disputes in inaustries
affecting commerce to settle such disputes through conciliation and
mediation.
(b) The Service may proffer its services in any labor dispute in any
industry affecting commerce, either upon its owu motion or upon the

Ooncllie.tion. and

aiodlatlou.

Proffer or services.
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request of one or more of the parties to the dispute, wlienever in its
judgment such dispute threatens to cause a substantial interruption of
commerce. The Director and the Service are directed to avoid attempting to mediate disputes which would have only a minor effect on
interstate commerce if State or other conciliation services are available
to the parties. Whenever the Service does proffe-r its services in any
dispute, it shall be the duty of the Service promptly to put itself in
communication with the parties and to use its best efforts, by mediation
and conciliation, to bring them to agreement.
( c) If the Director is not able to bring the parties to agreement by
conciliation within a reasonable timet he s110.ll seek to induce the parties
voluntariljl' to seek other means of settling the dispute without resort
to striket lock-out, or other coercion, includin§ submission to the
employees in the bargaining unit of the employer s last offer of settlement for approval or rejection in a secret ballot. The failure ori·efusal
of either party to agree to any p1·ocedure suggested by the Director
sh!l-11 not be deemed a. violation of any duty or obligation imposed by
thl.S .A.ct.
(d) Final adjustment by a method a~eed upon by the parties is
hereby d~lared to be the desirable method for settlement of grievn.noo
disputes arising over the application or interpretation of an existi~
collective-bargainin~. agreement. 1'he Service is directed to make its
conciliation and mectiation services ava.ilahle in the settlement of such
grievance disputes only as a last resort and in exceptio11al cases.
SEc. 204. (a) In order to prevent or minimize interruptions of the
:free flow of commerce growing out of labor disputes, employers and
emplo~es and their representatives, in any industry affecting com..
merce, sha.11(1) exert every reasonable eifort to make and maintain agreements concerning- rates of pay, hours, and working conditions,
including proviSion for adequate notice of any proposed change

in the terms of such agreements;
{2) whenever a dispute arises over the terms or application of
a collective-bargaining agreement a:nd a oonference is requested by
a party or prospective party thereto, arrange promptly for such
a conference to be held and endeavor in such conference to settle

National LaborMsnagemcmt POllel.
P0tl, p. 616.

such dispute expeditiously; and
( 3) in case such dispute is not settled by conference, participate
fully and promptly in such meetings 8.S may be undertaken by
the Service under this Act for the purpose of .aiding in a. settlement
o:f the dispute.
SEC. 205. (a) There is hereby created a National Labor-Management Panel which shall be composed of twelve members appointed by

the President, six of whom shall be selected from among persons outstanding in the .field of management and six of whom sliall be selected
from among persons outstandip.g in the field o:f labor. Each member
shall hold office for a term of three years, except that any member
a.ppointed to fill a vacancy occu1Ting prior to the expiration of the
term for which his predeces...QOr was appointed shall be appointed for
the remaindei· of such term, and the terms of office of the members
first taking office shall expire, as designated by the President at the
time of appointment, four at the end of the first year, four at the end
of the second year1.. ,nd four at the end of the third year after the date
of appointment. Members of the panel, when serv~ on business of
the panel, shall be pa.id comyensation at the rate of $25 per day, and
shall also be entitled to receive an allowance for actual and necessag
travel and subsistence expenses while so serving away from the~
Duty.

places of residence.

(b) It shall be the duty of the panel, at the request of the Director,
to advise in the avoidance of industrial controversies and the manner
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in which mediation nnd voluntary adjustment shn11 be administered,
particularly with reference to controversies affecting the general ~·el~
fare of the country.
NATION.AL EMERG&''WIES

Sro. 20G. "\'.\,''1u~never in the opinion of the President of the United

States, a threatened or actual sh'jke or Jock-out affecting an e11tire

industry or a substantial part thereof el1gagecl in tracle, commerce,
transportation, tra11sm1ssion, or communication among the se,•eral
Suifos or with forei~1 nntio1;1s, or engaged in the pro.ducti~n of ~oods
for commerce, will, 1f perm1tted t_o occur o:r to contwue, 1mper1l the
!}ational l1ealth !}r safetv,. he may ~ppoint a board of inquir; to inquir~
mto the issues mvolvecI m the dispute and to make a written report
to him within such time as he shall pre.scribe. Such· report shall
include a statement of the facts wjth respect to tl1e dispute, inclucling
each party's statement of jts position but shall not contain rny r.ecommendnt1ons. The President shall file a copy of such report with the
Service and shall make its t:ontents av,dlablc to. the public.
SEc~ 207. (a) A board of inquiry shall be composed of a chairman
nna such other memb~rs as the Pr~sident shall det~rmine, and shall
have power to sit and act in any place ,vithin the United States and
to conduct such henrings either m public or in private, as it mny deem
necessary or proper, to ascertain the facts with respect to the causes
and circumstances of the dispute~
(b ), Members. of a board of inquiry shall receive compensation at
the rate of $50 for each day actually spent b:v them in tl1c work of the
board, togethe1· wi ih necessary trn.vel and subsistence expenses.
(c) For the pui-pose of any hearing or inquil'y conducted by any
board appointea under this title, the pro~isions 0£ sections 9 and 10
{relating to the nt-tendnnce of witnesses and the production of books,
papen'$1 n11d docmn~nts) of the Federal Trnde Commission Act of
Sept.ember 161 1914, as amended (U 7 S. C. 19, t.itle 15, secs. 49 and 50,
as amended), are hereby made applicable to the powers and duties
of such board.
S'.ec. 208. (a) Upon receiving a report from a. boa.rd of inquiry the
President. mny direct the AttQrney General to petition any district
court of _the United States having jurisdiction of tJ1e )?.arties to enjoin
such strike or lock-out or the continuing there.of, and 1£ the court finds
that such threatened or actual strike or 1ock-out( i) aff':cts an entire industry or a su~t.antial pa1:t, ~:reof
engaged in tl'ade, commerce, transportation, transmission, or
com.mnnfontion among the se,1ernl States or with foreign nations,
or engaged in the production of goods for commerce; and
(ii} if permitted to occur or to continue1 will imperjl the
national health or safety, it shall have jurisdiction to enjofa any
such strike or lock-out, or the COI}tinuing thereof, and to make such
other orders ns may 1:,e appropr1nte.
(b) In any case, tlie provisions of the Act of March 23t 1932,
entitled "An Act to amend the Judicid Code and to define and limit
the ju:risdictiori of courts sitting in equityi nncl for other purposes",
shall not be a ~plicable.
( c) The oraer or orders of the court s113]1 ba subject to review hy
the appropriate circuit c.ourt of appcaJs and by the Supxe.me Court
upon writ of certiorari or certification as provided in sections 239
and 240 of the Juclicial Code, as a.mended (U.S. C., title 29, secs. 346
and347).
S:ec. 209. (a1 Whene,Ter a district court has issued an order under
section 208. enJoining acts Qr practic~ which imperil or threaten to
imperil the national health or safety, it. shall be the duty of the ea.rties
to the lnbor dispute giving rise to such order to make every effort to

Board or .inquiry.
JJot.t;.p. GJ5.

Report.

Pay and expens~s.

AUcndonce of wiL•

llela~i ctl!,

3.'3 Stat, i22, ;23.

~njoinillir c,C striko,

-47 Stat. 70,

29 l,1. S. D.
115.
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adjust and settle their differences, with the assistance of rt.he Service
created by this Act. Neither parcy shall be under any duty to accept,
in whole or in part, any _proposal of settlement made by tbe Service.
Reoon vening ol
(b) Upon the issuance of such order, the President shn.Il reconvene
board of inquiry.
the board of inquiry which has prevf_onslJ reported w.ith.respect to
the dispute. At the end of a sixty-day period (·unless the dispute has
been settled by that time), the board of inquiry shall report to the
President the current position of the parties ~nd the eifort~_which have
been made £or settlement, and shall inelude a statement by each party
of its position 311d a statement ofth~ employer's last offer of settlement.
Secret ballot or em- The President shall make such report available. to the ~ublic~ The_
ployees.
National Labor ~elations Boa.rd, within the· succeeding fifteen da~,
~hall t~~ a sec~t _ballot o~ th~ em.Lployees af ea~_h employer volved
m the dispute on the question of whetlier they WJSh to accept the final
offer of settlement made by their employer as stated by him and shaU
certify the results thereof to the Attorney Genera.I within five days
thereafter.
·
l)i.sctisrge or inJunoSEc.
210.
Upon
the
certificatic;m
of
the
results
of such baUot or upon
tlona settlement '6eing reached, whichever happens sooner, the Attorney
in
. _

Rop0rt to CoD8?'CS5.

General shall move the co"Urt to _discharge the injunction, which motion

shall then be granted nnd the injunction discharged. When such
motion is m-anted, the President shaU submit to. the Congress a full
and comprehensive report of the proceed~as, including the findings
of the board o:f inquiry and the ballot taken by the National Labor
Relations Board, together ·with such 1·ecommendations as he may see
fit to make for <:ionsideration and appropriate aetion.
COMPILATXO~ OF COLL~CTIVE BARG:AININ<l AGREEMENTS, E'rO.

SEc. 211. ( a) For the guidance and information of interested representatives of employers, employees, and the ~neral public, the Bureau
of Labor Statjstics of the :Oe:partment of Labor !:lhall maintain a file
of copies of all ·availt).ble collective bargaining agreements and other
ayailible agreem~ts and actions thereunder settling Ol' adjusting ln.bor
disputes. Such file shall be open to inspection u11de:r appropriate eonditions pre.scribedby the Secretary of Labor, except that
specific
information submitted in confidence shall be disclosed.
··
(b) The Bureau of Labor Statistics in· th~ Department of Labor
is 'authorized to fupiish upon reque~ of th.e 'Service, or employers
employees, or their° representatives, all available data and £actual
faformation which. may aid in the settl~en_t of any labor <iisp_ute,
except that no specific information· submitted 1n confidence shall be
disclosed.

no

:EXEMPTION OF R.AILWAY LA.BOB Ad.r

11 W~1i°3:

163, lSl-188.

SEo•. 212. The provisions of this title shall not be applicable with
respect to any matter which is subject to the provjsions of the Railway
H m- Laoor Act, as amended from time to time.

TITLE III
su.rrs BY AND
VfoJation

tmcts.

Acts

or

or agents.

co~-

AGAINST LABOR ORG.A'N:rZATIONS

SEc. 301. (a) Suits for violfltion of contracts between an. employer
and a labor organization representing employees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any such labor organizations, may be . brought in any district court of the United Sta.tea
having jurisdict~on of the parties, wit~out r':Spect to the ~ount in
controversy or without regard to th& e1tizensh1p of the parties.
(b) Any labor organization which represents employees in a.n
industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act and any employer

00813
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whose act.ivities affect commerce as defined in this Act shall be bound
by the acts of its agents. Any such labor organization may sue or
be sued as an entity and in behalf of the employees wh<Jm it represents
in the courts of tlie United States. Any money judgl]lent against .a
Jabor organization in a district court of the Uiuted States shall be
enforceaole only against the organizatioli; as an en!ity_ n;1d again~t its
assets, and shall not be enforceable against any mdividual member
or his assets.
(c) For the purposes of actions and proceedings by or a~ainst
labor organizations in the district courts of the United States, district
courts shall be deemed to have jurisdiction of a labor organizati9n
(l) in the district in which such organization maintains its principal
office, or (2) in any district fo which its duly authorized officers or
a.gents are engaged in representing or acting for employee members~
( d) The service of summons, subpena, or other legal process of any
court of the United States upon nn officer or agent of a labor org:in1:.
zation, in his capacity as such, shall constitute service upon the labor
organization.
( e) For the .purposes. of this section, in determining whether any
person is acting as. a~ ~'agent)' ~f another person. so as to make such
other person responsible for his acts, the question 0£ whether the
specific acts perform~d were actually authorized or subsequently rati~
fied shall not be controlling.

Jurlsdh:tlon

trict ~urts.

of

dis-

Service of summons

up011 sgCJlt, etc.

JlESTRIOI'IONS ON PAYME.'lli[TS TO EMPLOY.EE BEPRESENTA'ITVES

302.. ( a) It shall be unlawful for any employer to pay or
deli:ver, or to agree to :eay or deliver, any money or other thing of
value. to any repre~ntat1ve of any of his employees who are employed
in an mdustry affectmg commerce.
(b) It shall be unlawful for any representative of any employees
who are' employed jn an industry affecting cominerce to receive or
accept, or to agree to ~ceive or acce:p~ from the employer of such
employees any money or other thing of value.
(c) The provisions o.f this section shall not be a-eplicable (1) with
respect to any mo~ey or ot~er thing of value paynole by an employer
to any representat1Ye who 1s an employee or former employee of such
employer, as compensation for, or by reason of; his services as an
employee of such employer; (2) with respect to the payment or delivery
of any money or other thing of value in satisfaction of a judgment of
any court or a deGision or award of an arbitrator or impartial chairman or in comproniise, adjustment, Settlement or release of any claim,
complaint, grievance, or dispute in the absence of fraud or duress;
(3) with r~pect to the S.'l.le or purchase of an art-icle or commodity
at the prevailing market price in the regular course of business; ( 4)
with respect to money deducted from the wages of- employees in payment o:f membership dues in a labor orga11ization: Provided, That the
employer has received £roni each employee, on whose account such
deductions are made, a written assignment which shall not be irrevocable for a period of more than one year, or beyond the termination
date of the applicable collective agreement, whichever occurs sooner;
or ( 5) with respect to money or other thing of valne paid to a trust
fund established by such representative, for the sole: and exclusive
benefit of the employees of such employer, and their families and
SEO.

Payment, etc., by

employer.

.AcceptaDce, etc., by
represeDlative.

Nonapplicability or
section. ·

Written BSSignment
Crom cmplo}'ce.

dependents ( or of such employees, families, and dependents jointly
with the employees of other employers making similar payments, and
thek families and dependents): Pro~ti.ded, That (A) such pa~ents
are held in trust for the purpose of paying, either from prmcipal
or income or both, for t.he benefit pf en1ploy~, their. families and
dependents, £or medical or hospital care, pensions on retirem~t or

l'nrme.u.ts Mld In
trust (or benefit of
employlle$, ~c.
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death of employees, compensation for injuries or illness resulting from

occupationul activity or insurance to provide any of the :foregoing,
or unemployment benefits or life insurnnce, disability and sickness

insurance, or accident insurance; (B) the detailed basis on· which suc-.h
payments are to. be mad~ is specified in a written agreement with t~e
employer, and employees .and employers are equally represented m
the administration of such fund, together with sucli neutral persons
as the representatives the employers and the reP-resentn.tives oftl,ie
employees may agree upon aJ.?-d _in th~ eventthe employer and employee
groups deadlock on the administration o:f su.c~ ftgld and ~here ar~ no
neutral persons empowered to break such deadlock, such agreemen~
provides that the two group~. shaU agree on an impartial ilmP,ire to
decide su.c11 dispute, or in event .of their failure to ag1-ee mthin a
-reasonable length of time, an impartial umpire to decide such dispute
shall, on petition of either grou~, be appom~d by the clistrict court
of the United States fo:rthe district where the trust fund has.its principal office, and shall n.1$0 contain provisions for an a.i:uuia.1 audit of
the trust fund: a statement of the results of :which shall be available
for inspection o:y interested persons at the principal office of the tl"Ust
ft.md and at such other places as may be designated in such written
agreement; and (C) such paJ1ll!ents as are intended to be used for
tlie purpose of providing pensions or annuitie.$ for employees a.re
made to a separate trust wliich provides that the fundsheld therein
cannot be used for ·any purpose other than paying $1lch pensions or
annuities.
( d) · Any person who willfully violates any of the pro'1isions of this
seclio1! shall, upon convi~tion thereof, be guilty ~f a n:i~demeanor and
be subJect to a. fine of l)ot more than $10,000 or to llllpnsonment for not
more than one year, or both.

or

Penalty.

(e) The district.co~rts of the Unit~d Stat-es and t~~ "f!ni~q.Sfates

courts of the Terr1tones and possessions sht:t11 haveJunsdiet1on, for
cause shown, a.nd subject to the prov:islons Q:t section 17 (reJatmg to
notice t<i opposite party) of the A.ct entitled "An Act to supplement

existing laws .against. unlawful res_trainis and mc;mopolies, and

regri.;d

3SStat."m.

38 Stat. 731, 73S.

t7 Stat. 70.

Nonappllcability of

~Uon.·

Contrlbutloas to

µiist funds.

for

other purposes''; approved October 15, 1914, as amended (U. S. O.
title 28, see. 381), to restrt1in violations of this sect.io~ without
to the provisions of sections 6 anq 20 of such Act ofuct;olJer 15~ 1914,
as amended (U.S. C., title·.15, sec. 171 and title 29, sec. 5.2),.and the

provisions of the Act· entitled. "An .A.ct to amend the judicial Code
and to define and limit the jurisdiction of courts sittino- in equity, and
for other purposes", approved March 23, 1932 (U. S. 6., title 29, secs.
101~110).
( f) This section shall not ~pply t.o any contract in force on the date
of ei;iactment 0£ ·this Act, µntirthe expiration of such contract, or until
July 1, 1948, whichever :.first occurs.
(g) Compliance with the restrictions contained in subsection (c)
(5) (B) u_pon contributions wtrust fund~, otp.erwise lawful, shall not
be applicable to contributions to such trust funds established by eollecti ve agreement prior to Janl.la.ry 1, 1946, nor shall subsection (c) (5)
(.A.) be construed as prohibiting contributions to such trust funds if
prior ·to January 1, 1947, such funds contained provisions for pooled
vacation benefits.
BOYCOTTS AND OTHER U.NtA.WFut. CQMBIN.A.TIONS

SEC: 3()3. {a) I~ shall be 1!11!awfub f~rthe purposes of this section

only, m an industry or activity a.ffectmg commerce, £or any labor
organization 'to engage in, or to induce .or encourage the employees of
any erilployei: to engage in, a strike or a co:ncert~d refus~l in the
course .of theu· employment to use, manufacture, process, transport,
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or otherwise handle or work on any goods~ articles, materials, or commodities or to perfonn ~ny services, where an object thereof is(1) forcing or rcquirmg any employer or self-employed person
to join any labor or employer organization or any employer or
other person to cease usin~; seHing, .handling, transporting, .or
otherwise dealing in the proa.ucts of any other producer, processor,
01· manufacturer, or t9 cease doing 9usiness with any other pers9n;
(2) forcing or requiring any other employer to recognize or
bargain with a In.bot organization as the representative of his
emp1oyecs unless such labor organization has been certified as the
:repre.sentn.ti ve of such employees under the provisions of section 9
of the N ationnl Labor Relations Act;
(3) £arcing or requiring ariv employer to recognize or bargain
with a .particular labor organfaatio1i as the representative of his
employees if anotherlabor orgunizntion has been certified as the
representative of such employees under the provisions of section 9
of the N utional Labor 'Relations A.ct ;
( 4) forcin~ or requiring nuy employer~ a~sign p:irticular. ·work
to emplo~esm a part1cµhu· la.bor orgnmzntion or ma particular
trade·, craft, or clnss mtl1e:r thn.n to employees in another labor
organization .or in another trade, craft, or class unless such
employer is failing to conform to an order or certification of the
N ationn.l Labor Relations Board determining the bar~ining representative for employees performing such work. Nothing contained in this subsection shall be construed tc; muke unlawful a
re£us3.l by any person to e~1ter upo11 the premises of any employer
{other than his own employer), if tl1e employees of such employer
are engaged in a strike ratified or approved by a representative
of such empl~yecs ,rhom such ~mployer is required to recognize
under the Nat1onal Ln.bor Relnt10.ns Act.
(b) Whoever shall be injured in his business or property by reason
or any violation of subsection ( a) may sue therefor in any district oomt
of the-Unite.d States subject to the limitations and provisions of section
301 hereo:£ without respect to the amo~t in controversy, or in a11y other
court h1tvi11g jurisdiction· 0£ the parties, and shall recover the damages
by him sustained and the cost of the suit.

Anlc,p. l~

Anlc,p.l~.

Antc,p.131i.

RESTRIGrlON ON POLITlOAL CONTRIBUTIONS

8Ec. 304.. Sectjon 313 of the Federal Corrupt Practices Act, 1925
(U. S. C., 1940. c~ition, title 2, sec. 251; Supp. V, title 50; App.~ sec.
1509), as amended, is amended to read as follows:
·
"SEC. 313. It is unlawful for any national bank, or any corporation
organized by authority of any law of Congress: to make n contribution
9.r expenditure in connection with auy electio1i to nriy political office,
or in connection with any primary election or politicnI convention or
caucus held t.o select cnndidates
any political office, or for any corporation whatever, or any lnbor organizntion to make n contribution
or expenditure in coimection with auy election nt which Presidential
nnd Vice Presidential electors or a Se1u1tor or R~presentative in, or a
Delegate or Resident Commissioner to Congress are to be voted for,
or in. connection with any primary election or political convention or
caucus held to select caudidates for any of tlie foregoing offices, or
for any .candidate, political committee, or other person to accept or
receive any contribution prohibited by this section. Every corpo1-ation or ls,ibor organization which makes any contribution or expenditure in violation of this section shnU be fined not more th11n $5,000;
and every officer or dh-cctor of a.ny corporation, or officer of any labo1;
organizntion, who consents to any contribution or expenditure by the
corporation or labor orgnnizat.ion, as the case mny be, in violation of

43 Stat. 107t.

for

Penalty.
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"Lnbor orcilnizil~

tion.''

[61 STAT.

this section shall be_ fined 11ot m.ore than $1,000 or im~risoned for not
more than one year, or both. For the. purposes of th1s section 'labor
organization' means any organization of ani kind, or any agency 01·
employee representation committee or plan, in which employees partie1pate and which exists for the. :eurpose, in whole or in part, of dealing with employers concepiing grievances, lal:i_or disputes, wages, rates
of pay, hours of employment, or conditions

of work."

STlUXES BY GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES

SEc. 305. It shaJl be unlawful for any individual employed by the
United States or any agency thereof including wholly owned Govemnient corporations to participate in. any strike. Any individual
employed by the United States or by any sueh agency who strikes shall
be discharged immediately from his employment; and shall forreit his
civil service status, if
and shall not be .eligible for reemployment
.for three years by the United Sta.tes or any such agency.
·

an,,

TITLE IV
CREATION OF JOINT COM!tfi'ITEE TO· STUD'!'.' AND l?EPORT ON BASIC PROBLEMS
.AF.FEOI'ING FRIENDLY MBOK RELATIONS AND PRODUCTIVITY

Joint .Committm on
Labor,;.Management
RoJatiom.

SEo. 401. There is hereby established a joint congressional committee to be known as the Joint Committee on Labor<Man~gement Rela•
tions (herea.fte1· referred to as the committee) and to be composed oi
seven Members of the Senate Committee on Labor and ·Public Welfare,
to be appointed by the President pro temppre of the Senate, and
seven l\tiembers of the House of Representatives Committee on Education and Labor,
be :ipp<>inted by the Speaker of the House of
Representatives. .A vacancy in membership of the committee shill
not affect the powers o:f the 1·emaining members to execute the func~
tions of the committee, and shall be fill~d in the same· manner as the
oriipna.l selection. The coriim.ittee shall select a chairman and a vice
chairman from among its IQemb~rs..
S.oo. 402. The committee, acting as a whole or by subcommittee,
shall conduct a thoroug~ study and !nvestigation ?f }'he ®tire field of
labor-management relations, mcluding but not !united~
(1) f.he means by which permanent friendly cooperation
betwee_n employerl:i and em_.pl.oy_~ a!ld ~ability of labor relations
ma7- be secured throughout th~ Uruted States;
(2) the means by which the Jndividu~ employee may achieve a
greater productivity and hi~her· wages, including plansfor guar- .
ant.eed annual wages; incentive profit-sharing and bonus systems;
(3) the internal organization and administration of labor
umons, with special attention t-0 the impact on individuals of
collootive agreements requiring membership in unions as a condition of employment;
(4). the labor relations policies and practices of employers and
associatiom~ of employers;
·( 5) the desirability o:f we1£are funds for the benefit 0£ employees
and their relation to the social-security system;
(6) the methods and procedures for best. carrying out the
collective-ba.r~g processes, with special attention to the eifects
of industry-wide or regional bargaining upon the national
economy;
(7) the administration and operation of existing Federal la.ws
relat~ to labor relations; and
(8) such other problems and subjects in the field of labormanagement relations as the committee deems appropriate.
8Eo. 403. The committ.ee shall report to the Senate and the House

to

Study e.nd lnvesti•

gntion,

&port_ to Concress.
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of R~presentatives not later than March 15, 1948, the results of its
study and in.vest!gation, together with such rec~mmend_ations as. to
.necessary legislation an:d such other recommendations as it may deem
advisable, and shall make its final report not later than January 2,
1949.
SEC. 404. The committee shall have the power, without regard to
the civil-service laws and the Classi.6.cation Act of 1923, as amended,
to employ and fix t-he compensation of such officers, experts, and
employees as it deems necessary for t.he performance of its duties,
includin~ consultant_s "·ho. shall rcceh·e compe.nsation at a rate not
to exceea. $35 for each dn,y actually spent by them in the work o.f the
committee, together with their necessary travel and subsistence
ex-penses. The committee is further authorized, with the consent of
the head of the depa.rtment or agency concerned, to utili~e the services,
information, :facilities, and personnel of all agencies in the executive
branch of the Government and may request the governments of the
sev~ral States, representatives of business, indu.stry, finance, and labor,
and such other persons, agencies, organizntions, and inst-rumentalities
as it deems approprinte to nttend its hearings and to give nnd present
information, ad vice, and recommendo.tions.
SEc. 405. The committee, or any subcominittee thereof, is authorized
to hold sm:h hearings; to sit and act ntsuch times and plac:es during the
sessions, recesses, and adjourned periods of the Eightieth Congress;
to require by subpena. or· otherwise the attendance of such witnesses
and the _production of such books, pa!)ers, and documents: to admin~
istcr oaths; t-0 take such testimony; to hnve such printing and binding
done; and to make such expenciitures within the amount appropriated
therefor; RS it deems tidvisable. The cost of stenor'~nphfo services in
report.ing such hearings shall not be in excess o 25 cents IX?r one
hundred words. Subpenas shall be issued under the signature of the
chairman or vice chairman of the committee and shall be served by any
person designated bv them.
.
.
SEc. 406 •. The members of the commit.f.ee shall be reimbursed for
truel,. subsistence, and other necessary expenses incurred by them in
t~e performance of th~ duties vested in the committee, ·other than
~xpenses in connection with meetings of the committee I1eld in the
District of Colt1,mbia during such times as the Congress is in session.
SEO. 407. There is hereby authorized to be appropriated the sum
of $150,000, or so much thereof as mav be necessary, to carry out the
provisions of _this tit.I~, to be ~isbursecf by the Secretary of the Senate
<>n vouchers s1gned hy the ch1t.rrnrnn.

Powers.
42 Stat. 1488,
5U. S. C.§f061--G74.

Rclmbarscmeat Cor

expenses.

t-h!Yf:cf.Prfatioa nuP~t, p. 611,

TITLE V
D.EF.INITIONS

.A.nu. p._131.

501. When used in this Act(I) The term "industry affecting commerce'' means any industry
or activity in commerce or in which a labor dispute would burden or
obstruct commerce or t-end to burden or obstruct commerce or the free
fiow oi commerce.
(2) The term "st.rike" includes any strike or other concerted stoppage of work by employees (including a stoppage by reason 0£ the
expiration of a collec-tive~bnrgaining agreement) and any concerted
slow-down or other _conc-erted interruption.of oper:utions by employees.
(3) Tl!e terms •'c?mll?er~e'', "fabor d1sputes'·, "emoloyer'\ "em...
ployee", '•lnbor or"amzatmn'', "representative", "person\ and "supervisor:" shall have.the $~une meaning as when used in the Nationa1 Labor
Relnt.ions Act as amended by this .A.ct.

Ants. p. 136.

SEO.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00818

163

fil STAT.] 80TH CO!ITG., lsT SESS.---OHS. 12~ 124, 125-JUJ:\'"E 23t 25, 194'1

[CHAPT:ER. 121]

AN ACT

J'lltlO 23,

To provide for emergency flood-coi:itrol work made necessary PY recent floods,
and for other purposes.
·

Be it ert,O,Cted by the Senate d:nd House of Representati'lJeB of th6
United State.~ of· America in Oo·11grcss a.ssemblca, Thn.t the sum 0£
$15>000,000 is hereby authorized to be appropriated as an emergency
fund to be expended under the direction of the Secretary orWar
and the $Upervision of the Chief of Engineers for the repair restoration, and strengthening of levees n.nd other flood-control worb which
have· been tbrentened or destroyed by recent floods, or which may be
threatened or destroyed .by lnter floods: Pro .l:i<l,ed, That pending the
appropdation of said sum, the Secretary of ,va.r may allot, from

11147

{II. :R.:J70!l)
(Public Law 102)

Approprla.tit!ll
Uiorlzed.

au-

PD~1P,187.

A. llotments from
exbUng appropr.la•

tions.

ex1&'ting .flood-c!>ntrol appropriations, such sums ~s mny be.necessn.ry
:for the immediate prosecut10n of the· work herem authorized, such
appropriations to be reirnbursed from the appropriation herein
authorized when mnde: Provided furtl1,.et, Thnt funds nllottecl under
this nuthQrit.Y shall nqt be diverted from the unobligat~d f-µnds _from

ihe appropriation ''Flood control, genera.I", made availabJe in War
Department Civil Functions Appropriation Acts for specific _Hurposes.
S:m 2. The provisfons of section 1 shall be deemed to. be ailditiona.l
and sup:plem~ntal ~' n.nd not in lieu of, eristing ge11era.l legishition
author1zmg nllocnt1on of flood-control funds for restoration of ftoodC<mfrol works threatened or dostroyed. by flood.
Approved June 23, 1947.
[CHAPTER 124]

·
AN ACT

To ii.mend the Act entitled "An Act to pro\•ide for a .permanent Census Office",
sppr·oved. Ma:rcb 6, l 902t.,tis .a.mc.nded (the <=9llection .and pliblfoa.tion or sui.tis•
tics.I information·by the J.1lireau of the Census).

Be it ~1lacted by tl1,e Senate and Hott.se of Representatives of tlte
United,~ta.te8. of Am.erica:in 007:grc.ys assembled, That section 7 of the
Act ent1tlecl "An Act to provide for a permnnent Census Office,,,
approved March 6, 1902, ns amended (U. S. C., title 13, sec. 111), is
amended by ndding•lLt the end of.the first sentence thereof the words~
·"P·1·ovided, That where the doctrine, tenchi;ng, o:r discipline of any
religious denomination or church prohibits the disclosure of information reltit.ive to membership, such information shall not be .required."
Approved June 25, 1947.

Juna2S.J947

[8.t114}
[Publio Lew 103}

3iS~t.m..

[CHAPTE~ 125]

AN ACT
To regulate the marketing of economic poiaons and devices, and for o.ther
purposes.

June~ 1947
(ll. R.. 1237}
{.Publio Law JO¼)

Be it enacte.d by th~ Senate and Hause of Re.presimtati1Jes of the
llnited States of America i:n Congress ¢8scm1Jled,
TITLE

8Ec1.·10N

1. This Act mn.y be cited

as

Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act1'.

the "Federal Insecticide,

DEFINITIONS

SEO. 2. For the purposes of this .Acta. The term '~eoonomic poison 1 ' means any substance or mixture
of s,ubstanoe~ intended for preven~ing, destroying, :repelling, or initigatmg any insects, rodents, fungi, weeds, and other forms of plant

"EQ:)11t)Jlt)C po~"
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HOUSE REPORT NO. 245 ON H. R. 3020

80TH CoN_ oREss

1st Session

l
f

HOUSE OF REPRESEN'f ATIVES

J

l

Ru.o.e.-r

No. 245

LABOR-MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT, 1947

APRn. 11. 1047.-Committed to t~e Committee of the Whole House on the State
of the Union nnd ordered to be printed

Mr. H,.nTLEY, from the l ,ommittee on Educa.tion aud Labor, st1bmitted
the £ollowh1g

REPORT
I ro

aC(:1J1opnns H. R

ao201

The Commit tee on Education n.11d Labor, to whom wus referred the
bill (H. R. 3020} to prescribe fair and equitable rules of conduct to be
observed by lnbor anti management in tl1eir relations with one nnother

which nfi'ect commerce, to protect the rights of individual wprkers in
their relations ,vith labor organizations whose activities Mfect commerce, to .recognize tbe paramount public iuterest in lnb01· disputes
affecting commerce thnt end,mger the public health, sdety, 01· welfare,
and for othel" purposes: having considered the snme? reports .favoru.bly
thereon with nmendments nn(l recommends thnt tl1e bill as so nmendeci
do pass.
'l'he amendments ~1re ns follows:
Page 4, }jne 20., before "labor dispute" insert "current".
Page 5, in pnr.igraph ( 5) before '1den.ling", strike ont "or" and
insert "of".
Pnge 9, line 20, st.rike out "1>rocednres nnd practices relating to".
Pnge 11, line 7, after "who", insert "by the nnture of his duties':.
Pnfte 15, line 15,sti•ike out ''$15,000" and insert''$12,ooo:l.
Pngc 16, line 24, strike out "$15:000" and insert ''$12,000,,.
Pag~ 19, before t.he period at the eud of section 7 (a), insert the
followmg:
:ind shall nlso huve th~ right to refritin from nny m· all c,f such acth·ities: Provided. Thnt nothing Ju~r~in sh:lll preclude nu employe1· from 1u:1k.ing and currying
out nn ngree~nent with n labor org:miz3tion ns mithorizecl in section 8 (d) (4).

P.,ge 21, in subsection (b), strike out "the1:cof" where it first appears

n.nd inset·t "of n representntive~'.
Pnge 2:l,sti·ike out "2 (ii),,nnd insert in lieu .thereof "2 ( 11) ".

Pnge 24: after ,:the overthrow of the Umted Stntes Government
by force", insert "or by a11y illegal or unconstitntionnl methods" ..
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Page 25, oJter "to direct. pr call o stri~e'\ insert '~or make any
request to the Administrator under section 2 ( 11) for a strike
ballot."; and in the same p.1irag1:ap~ strike 01:1t ''~ri:ke'1 where it
appe~rs. the second time and msert m h~u th~r~of u_a.ct,on''·
Page 25, nt ~he beginning of subsection {d), strike out ''The'' and
insert. in lieu thereof ''NotwithstandinJ? any other provision of thia
section.. the''.
.
Page 29, strike out''(~)" at the beginni_n~ of the subsection designated n(c)" andinsert in lieu the1·eof "(e)''..
Pa.3e 33,_in the. p~tase ''thatbeli~ve i~ or ten.clies'~ strike orit "beheve,· trn·d msert m heu thereof "behev~a"..
Page .33, ~fter -"Unite~ '.S~ates (.fovernm~11t by forc;e''-•. insert ''or
by any 1lle~a.l or unconstitutional methods''.
Puge 42, in the phrase .ecertificntio_n cpmplained of was entered
nnd the. 6ndi'ngs and order on certification of the Board,,. strike out
'~on,. and fosert ~'or".
Pnge 44. in the-· phrase '*at nny designated place o~ hearing" strike
out l•or:' and insert in lieu thereof "of'~.
·
•
Page 46, strike9~t: the paragraph design?ted as paragraph (6).
Pnge 49, o.fter subsection (e), insert a. new section readmg as
follows:
·

..SEC, ·13. Nothing In this Act sbnll be construed to lnva.lidnte a11y Stute Jnw or.
c,i.nstitntional prQ\~isfon whtch rfl.sfrlcts tbE." rlgbt of :in employer to ninke agreements with Jnl)nr organizations requiring as n condition or emtJl~yment membe.r-.
si.ip ln sucb lub~r orJ?flnizntion. and DU such ~greement~. in~far ns they purport
tu lmPose such. reqi1fre10ersts confrary to_Jhe p,:ovir.lous .of tlie law or consti'tuUon
vf any ~tate. are herl,!by dlvP.st~. gf their ch111-nct~t as n subJec_t ,of regu_lntion b.Y
Corigr~ss under ·tts p11.w¢r tc::, regulate commea·ce n1:11ong the several -~Jute$ nnd
\\:1th foreign rjnUoos, t(,I the extent that such agreements .shall,. In odditfon to•
beJng subject to-any applicable preventi"e prov.istons'of this A.ct. be subject to tbe
operation and effec:t of such Stare laws nnd consntutloMJ pro,·lslons us well

, : Pige· 50, renumber sectior1s 13 and 14 as sections 14 o.nd 15, respoo-

tivr/;ectfon 201

(c) strike out ''t and utilize the facilities and per~
son.:nel of such agencies whth1 ndeqt1ate nnd when imiHnble without
cost".

· :rn section 204 (u)

strike <>ut ''Uilitcd States Conrilhltion Service
of the Department of Labor,' u11d inst?1-t in lien thereof ''Director of
Cond)intion'~.
In .section 204 {b) strike. out' ''Nu tionn) Lnboi• Relations Board"
wherev_er appearing thel'ei_n ~ncl ih$ert in ljeu thereof "A.dininistrator
of the NationnJ Labor Relations Act".
In sect'ion 204 (c) sti-ike out '"Se.cretai·y of Labol',,_nrnl insert in
lieu tl1ereof "Director of Crmciliation1'.
After the finii ·sentence in sel'ticin 204 .(c) insert n new se1itence
re,;iding as follow~:
lt tor nny r~nsan lhe Chlr.f Justjct:? fs .unuble to serve hn sbull appoint nnother
judge of the, United _State~ C:nurt rJf Ap~ls for the Di~trict of Columbln to
nc( In his place.and s:tr.nd.
·
·
·

In ~section 204 ( cl) strike out '~N atfonn.) Labor RehLtions Bonrd"
and insert .in lieu thereof '~Administrator Qf the Nutiona) L11.bor Rela;..
tions Act'-'.
Aftei· sectiou 205 insert ll new sectim\ 1·en.ding a.r; fol1ows_:
~~c. 206. OntU the• transfer ·. of functions under sedlnri 20l (eJ be:<,"t,mes eitee•
U~e. _the functions· of the Director

of

ConciHntlori under .s.ectJon 204 shall be
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perforwed by the Sectetory of Lnbot\

UurlJ tbe Aduihiistrutor of the ~ationnl
Labor Relntlons Act first appointed qunlifies nnd t~kes office, his functl()ns under
seetlon 204 shall he performe<l by the Nntional Lnbo1· Ut!latious llonrd.

In section 803 (a) strike out ''thirty" where,,.er appearing therein
and insert in lieu thereof "sixty", n.nd before "every fobor orgnnizntion" insert "the principal officers of".
In section 303. (n) (2), bdore"the name nnd address of the organization~' insert "a detailed financia] report including a balance· sheet and
ar, operating stntein~rtt and showin,:".
At the end of section 303 (a.) msert a new sentence 1·eading as
fol1QWS.:
In the case of n tepo.rt.requlred. and~1· this s~t't_lon P.rlo.t• to the f;!~t>frntio~ of orw

ot this Acr. if nny of the 1•equh·ed lnformatfon Is not il,1,•nilnble·nn iinswer ''no·lnformritipn" shnll be suftkieil.t.
In section.304 strike out "19:}5'' and insert in lieu "thereof "1925'\
The committee's recommendation stems from an exhaustive investigation mnde by the committee of the cnnses and effects of industrial
!-=t.rife~ In the hen1fogs before the conuuittee,_exteudiu_g over a periO(l
of more than 0: we~Jcs, .i.37 wittwsses appenred. They l·ame fr,,m uH
parts of tht". <·ountry!' from many w:1 lks of life, nnd represented 11ll
points view.
.
.
The c·1muuittC!e m·lrnowllltlgw, tla• rnst amount of wm·k done on tht?
year tr.orn tbe dat~ of the ennctment

of

~nbject b_y the miu1y Afoubers of Cougt·e:lS. who prepared ttnd intro~
tlm:eu bi lJs fol' coiisitforat ion by the committee. They. us well llS
countless ptfrHte ci_t izens bv correspondenc{' with mem_b:.!1'$ of the
committ~e, ha.w mntle contributions of iuesthnuble value to the formulntion of the lJillherewith repprt~d. "
The committee nlso hnu the benefit of the stii<lies of ronuuittees·of
previous Congresses-anti purticuhir1y thnt of tJ1e Spe~iaJ Committee
T.o Investignte the National Lnbor Ut'httions Bo11t·d, (!reated iu the
Seventy-sixth Co1igressJ mitny of whose i-ccommcndations ii.re included
in the bill"here\vith t-eported.
NEcESSl'n' .E·oa LEGISLATION

Dm·iug the Inst few yen1·s, the effects of iudustrin1 strife Im.vent.times
brought · our country to the brink_ of generul. economic parnly!:lis.
E1111~1hyt•cs hnn~ sufl'l•red, t•mployut·s have su:ffcred-1m<l above all. the

pubhc. hn~ snfft\1-ed.
The cH!\t•ttuc•ut :·of C(lmp1·rheusive legh,Iation to c.ll•fine clearly the
1egitimnl«.• rights of_ Plllf>loyt•.rs umlempJoye~s in_ their inc.Ju_ st_rinl relations. u1 ket•phig with t 1e protet•tion of the paramount public inteJ'est,
is imper11t iw.
Tht:' bill herewith reporwl doesjt'1st thnt. It presct·ibcs the.rip:hts ot
all ptt:rties linving, :t stnke in h;1rmo11ious industrial telutfons, aml
requirt•s Urnt each pui-ty rL'spect the l'ights of tl1e others.
.
The conunittee bl•liews th:_tt the t~IrnetnH?nt of the bill ,yill h:n-e the
f.'fl'et·.t of hringiu,u widt•i-;t>l't•ad imlustl-inl istrife to au emL uml thi~t employers tlll<l e111ploy~t'li frill onC"c again l!O forward together ns u ten·1n
m1it~d to nchi<.•ve for their mutunl benefit nutl for the wulfnte of tll<~
Nation_ the hi~la-~t sl:1mlal'd of li\'illg yet known in the hh,tory of
thl~ wodd.

.

_During the··Oyrm·:; l)l'Ct'C<iing the.enactment uf tJ1e Natimutl Indus;..
trml Rel'overy Act of 1033, the Urnted Stnte.s hml an u\.·t•rn~c of 75;3
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strikes a year, hivolving llll average of 297,000 \Vorkets; during t-he
next 6 years 2,5•0 strikes per y~'l.r involving- an average of 1,181,000

wo~kers; a~d. du.ring the next 5 years-that. is, through 1944-3,514
strikes· n year m'V'o lvmg nn _a v~:rSlge of .1,508,000 workers•

.In 1945 aP.proxirriately 3._~1000,q_~0--11;1,m-da.y~ of labc,r. were lost as a
result. of strikes. Aud that totnl wns trebled m 1946. when there ·were
UG;000,000 innn-dnys lost and the number of strikes hit n. new ~high of
4,985. The .r~sulting loss in national wealth is staggering.
The above 6g:i.n·es do not take into a~count t-he mnil-qays lost a$ o.
result of the indirect effects of these-stdites~
In the .face of this record there nre. fe"' wlw would have the
temerity to &$serf thnt· l.nbor relations in the· United St;a~es are today
satisfnctory. Th.e American people; · and their representatives ()f
both parties in Congr.ess., nr~ insistent that some means be found by
lt:~isl{!.tkm tC? r.~Yerse this ulnrrning trend and to bring about indnstrinl pence. .
.
In approachfog the problem of general fa~r legi_sla.ti?n., .the com~ittee was impressed by the ab~olute neC!essity of steenng a course·
whi'ch would recognize the~ rights of all interested pnrties in labor
relations and which "9ould be scrupulously fnir .to each-the employerj the emplo.yees, a_nd the public. While -the ri~ht of the pul;>_lic:
must, m the last analrs1s,. be treated ns pnrnm.ount, .1t was the belief
the commj~t~e1 th~t, except
extraor«iinary._ circumstances,= the
r1gl~t of the pubhc will be adequately pt·otected tf m turn -adequate
protection is afforded to employers and employees in the exer.cise ·.of

of

in

their legitimate rights~
Aecordingly the. bill herewith reported has been 1orinulated as a
bill of rights·po~h for A:meriqan workingmen ~n~ for_t~e!r employe~~
.For the last 14 years, ~s a result. of laoor laws 1ll-conce1ved ana dis:,.
astrously executetti the American ·workingman h0$ been deprived of
his dignity as an mclividuo.l. H~ has been cajoled, coei-ced, intimidated~ and. <>n tn_any Q~?asions beaten up,._in the name of th~ splend~d
aims set forth m sechcm 1 of the N at1onal Labor Relations. Act.
~is whole economic life has been sub,ject to the complete domin~tioi:.
and ~o.ntr<?l o,t unrE:gulated monop(!hsts. He has on many_ occasions
had to pay them tr1&ute to ~et & 30b. He has been forced into labor
organizations against his w1IL At oth~r times whet) h~ has desire¢!
to Join a particular lab?r. organization he has beeri prevented from
doln~ so and forced to JOm a!1other one. H.e hns b~en co~pelled to
contribute to causes and candxdates for pubhc office to which he was
oppo_sed~ He h.t!,S been prohibited· from expressing his. own mind on
public issues. He hns oeen denied any voice in a.rrn.ngini? tl1e ternis
of hi$ own cn1ployment. . H~ has- frequently agninst. his wi]l been
called._ou_t o_ n .st.rikes_ whi_c_ h. ha.ve.res.ul.ted in•·. )v~g.e _los_ ses re. presenti. n.g·
years of his savings. In many cases bis economi9 life has been ruled
by Communists and other subversive influence~. In short, his mind,
his soul,:and his very life ha.v~ been subject to a tyranny more despoti'c
than one ~ouldJhink J?OSSibl~ in. a free cou:r1try.
The employer's plight hu.s likewise not been., happy•. He has w.itpessed the prptluctive ·e.fficiency in his plants .sink to n.lam1in~ly lbw
levels. · He l1as: been 1·equired lo employ ·or· reinstate indiridtfals· ,i~ho
have destroyed his propeity and n.c;sanlted other employees. When he
has tried to discharge Communi'sts he has been prevented from: doing

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

00824

296.

HOCSE REPORT XO. 245 OX H. R. 3020

so by a bonrd which c~1led tliis ya1ic1 reason for the cli~charge a.n1ere
pretext•. He hns seen the loyalty of his superviso,·s undermined by the
compulsory unionistn imposed upon them by the National Labo·r Rela~
tit.ms Board. He has bee~ requirect by law to l:l.1.1·guin over matter$ ro
which it was economicaliy impossible f~r. him foacce~e,. nnd _when. ]1e
refused to accede has been accused of fmlmg to bal'gam m good faith.
H~ has·b~n compell~d to bargain with the same union that bargains
with his conipetitors ai1d thus to reveal to his competitors the secrets of
his business. He.has ha.cl to stand helplessly by while employees desir•
ii~g_to_enterhis plant to work_h~ve been obstructed by violenc~) m~,ss
p1cketmg, and general rowdyism.. He has had to stand mute wlule
irreRponsib1e detractorsslnndered,:ahused, and vilified him.
His business oii occnsioris has been virtually brought to n standstm
by disputes to which he himself was not n pttrty: and in whlch he.himself had no inte1·est. And finn11y; he has been compe1Ied by. the faws
of. tl1e ~reatest democratic coui1try in the world-or ·nt lenst by their
n<lministrat01·s-t~ treat his employees as if they belonged to a different class or caste of society.
This'sordid story wns 1111fo]ded before the committee in its hearings.
Th•se heaJ-iugs demonstrate- the· need for nction by Congress~and

itction now..
The. bO] attacks the problem in n comprehensive-not in a piecemeul-fashion. It is neither drastic, oppressive, nor punitive. It
rloes not 1·esfrict or in any mannei· interfere with employees' rights
to organize and to bargain coBectively when they w:fah' to do so.· It
Joes Ul)t restrict in anj· way employees' rights to engage in lnwful
strikes. It do~s not take awuy ;my rights guaranteed by the existing
Nutional Labor Relations Art.
It. :c1oes, however, go to the root of the evils :rnd provides a fail',
wofkable~ nnd Jong-overdue sohtti.on of the problem. In: brief outline, the bill accomplishes the followina:
(1) It abolishes the existing discre<lited Nntionnl Labor Relntions
8oarc.1, nnd creates in lieu the1~eof u uew board of fair-minded members. to exercise qtmsi-judicinl fnnctious only.
(2) It establishes .1 new official to exercise the \1 arious prosecuting
und m\·estiguth·e functio11s under the Natioi1nl Labor ReJat-ions Act_,
to be entfrely independent of the Board.
(3) I~ requires tl!e B,onl'cl to aet only upon the weight of credible
legal e,·1dence, nnrl 1t gffes t-0 the courts of the United St;ites a real,
1·athe1~ -than n fictitious, power to review decisions of the Board.
{4) l.t outlaws th(> clo~ed shop and monopolistic indust-ry..:wide
bargaining.
(fl} It exempts sn_pe1·visol's from the compulsory features of the

Nntionn_l Lnbor Refations Act.

·

(6) It imposes· on both pnrties to lnbor disputes the duty of bargaining and requires thnt. the employees themselves be given n ,•oice
in the bnrg11inin~ urran~entents_ through the <leYice of ptovicliug for a
secret ballot of tne em1>loyees on their employer1s· Inst offer of $ettlement of the cli~putE'.
·( 1) It prote<:ts the existem·e of labor oi•gilllizations whid1 ui-e not
affilfoted with one of the nntion.rl ·federations.
·
(8) It prohibits ('Cl'ti.fication by the Board of lnLor organiz.nions
ha.\·in~ Cofrimunist sub,~ersh·e offkers.

or
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(9) It prescribes the rights whid1 nn .individual member of a labor
?r~r1mizat101.1 cnn justly ~lalm of his union, uid gives him protection
m th~ exe.rc.ise of those r1gllts..
.
(10) It outlnws sympathy strikes, jurisdictional strikes, illegal
boycotts, collusive strikes bf ernployees of competing employers; as·
. well as sit.;;down ·strikes ·and other concerted work interferences. conducted by remaining on the employer's pt~mises.
q1) It Qutln.~s ~r!kes tq reruecly pr~ctices for wl1ich .an a~minis~rat!ve. remedy I$ ava1JabT~ und.er the ~1U or to compel a11 employer
to vmlate the Jaw.
(12) It outla\VS mn$S picketing arid other· forms o.f violence de~
sig1,eq to prevent, individual~- from entering or leaving. a place of
employm.ent.
. . .
.
. .
·
(13) It outlaws "picketing of n place of business where the proprietor is: not irivolv~d in a Jnbor disput.e with.his _e~ployees.
(14) For unhrn-ful concerted activities it giyes fhe person injurecl.
the.rebv a right .to sue civilly any perscni responsible, therefor.
(15) _It pi-escribes :unfair labor practices on the part of employees
~nd their represent;1,t1ves ns weU ns·by em_ployers.
( 16) It creates n. ne,v and independent conciliation agency.
(17) It remo~•.es the exemption of labqr organiza.~ions from the
antitrust Jaws when such organizations. acting· either alone or in collusion with employers, eng:ige in unlawfu:l restraints· offrad~.
. ( 18) It µinkes, l~b.~r ,S1:g~nizntions ~qu_n11y res_pon.sib_le w.ith ~mployers for contract v1ohl.hons ~nd provides ·for .suit by either agamst
the other in the United States district courts.
.·
(i~) It prc>vides a menns for ~topping strikes which imperi1 or
threaten to irilperil the p·ublic health, safety, or interest.
•
(29) It guara1.,te!!s t.o .employees, t!' empl9ye1:5. nnd to the~r respect1 ve. repre~ntat1 ves, ~he Ju] I exerc~~e of ~the r1~h~· o~. free .spe.ec~.
All of the abo,r.e prov1s1ons at'.e explnmed m detni1 m the uAna]ys1s
of Pr<wisions'' portion of this report. Some of them mny well be
elaborated upon here with the reasons which the committee had for
including tbem.

OLD

BO.\.JU>

AnousHf'J>

The committee found that, \\·bi1e there ·n.re n numbe1· of iu~portant

defects in the National Labor Relations Act itself, there ni"e e,~en more
in the way the Nutional Ls.bor Relations Board has ndministered it,.
The bill therefore nbolishes ·the.existing Nntionai' Labor Relations
Board. and creates- in its plnc~ ·a new .b~pnrtisu·1) Bourd of three fnir
nnd impartial p~rsons. Unlike the old 801ml. rt
not uct as
prosecutor. j1~dge. and ju1·y•. Its sole !m1ct_io~1 will be to decide cases.
A ·new and mcl~pendimt officer, tile Adm1111stmtor of the new uct
Will •invest!~nte cu~s an~ present tl1~ e~frlence to~ tr.e nc;\,. ~on?·cl, and
the new Honr<l mu.<;t <lec~de the cases~ not ·accorcltng to preJu<.hce and
caprice. ns the o.ld. Bonr<l so often has·clone.. but acc:01:tliug to th" facts~
Be$ide~ rtb_olishing the old Bonrdtthe bill 13re,·ents the new Bo~r.d
froin rej)el!ttn~ th~ ol<l Bonrd's m1Etal£e:;. The new Board, unb,k~
tl1e
will. be. unable to condone strike!;l .to compel employers to
dcrrive .employt'ef; of their :rights un<lcf the net~ i.llegnl boycotts,
vic>JeJJ~e~ ioass picketing, in<lustry-~id.e ~a.rgairiing, .stnkes ag~inst
public health and !m·fety, ancl dictatorial control of workel's 15y uusc1;npulomf union leaders~
·

will

01,,.
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The bil1 does not undeJtake to punish anyone-employers, employees; or union~for evils thnt h,ive nrisen ·under the old act ..
Rather .,it un<1ert:1~es ~o q~fi.ne the rights of those, who ;tr~ ccmc~ned
in the broad and. important field of labor relations, and to protect
the rights of ench from interference by· nny ·other. · The bill thus
seeks to reduce strife and ill will by getting rid of many of their .
cause5; but without impairing just rights.
RtGHTS OF WORKERS

Important among the provisions of the bill nre those that really
assure to wQrkers freeiiom in their org:mizit1g and bargaining activi~
ties. The old act purported to do this, but in the Board's hands it
often had the oppo$ite ·effect.
•
The bill prescribes mles for the new Bon.rd to follow in setting up
units for collective bargaining nnd in holding elections to d,eterriliM
\\"'hether- or not employees wi$h labor unions tQ bargain for them.
These rules do away with practires of the old Board by which it has
subjected literally ·1hi1Jions of workers to control by ]abor unions notwithsta.~din~ thnt the•employees did.not wish the unions to rt1prescnt
thern and voted agninst the unions in the Ilonrd's elections. Similar1y
the l;,ill prevents the new Board from continuing. the p~st prnctice.of
dt?p1fring workers of the right fo designnte rn·dependent u·nions ns
their barguining agents merely been.use .they happened to be independent.
Whcil wOl·kers ,,•ish n union to. i•epresent them. tl1e bill enal,)Jes the
worlmrs t.o keet> greater control of the union's nfi'nirs ·than, in many
<.·as<'.S, ~they hnye .e1)joyc.d in !he pnr;t. They will bP. prot~cted. :i~ainst
exccss1,•e n<linis.'?1on fees, fines. dut•s, nnd m::sessments. Tlwy mil have
a voice in deciJinµ. .npon importnut questions, and .will be ·nssured of
the right to spenK freely ~n .maHers that conc·ern them. to vote in
eJecti<>ns of umon officers, and to Yote on 'the matter of striking. The
.<·ommittc() hM do11e tl1is iu response to ple:,s of 1nauy sitwere union
people who 1·~gn17-<1 dum~r.ic·y in unious us.indispe_rtsnhle t.o t~e het1!thy
growth of uniomsm. On the other hand, the bill recognizes tl1e right
of the union to m:iintnin tliscipline in the rnnlcs, and to"expel members
who nrc disloyal to the union or who net in \\'ays that bring il into

diH1·c1>11te.
The hill further ndd~ t() the frcccfom of workers by perlllittinf! them
not ,only to present g1·i~v1mct•S to their employers, a~ the old Doard
hcr~tofc>rc. lrns per1nitt<'cl th<-m to (lo, but :1)~0 to sr.Ulc the gt~ievaiices
'K'hcn .dnin~ so does not violate t11c t~rms of a co11ective-Largnining
acrrccment. which the lfo:ii·tl h;,!=. m>t ;1lJcjwcd.
.
rThe bill nlso requires tlmt nnkms that undertnkt' to. bargain col]~ctivcly for work,ws nmst :l<'.tmtll.v perform this_ itupm·tunt duly~ a~1d
m:1kcs it :in unfoir· lnbi>i· pr:trf in• fui· unicm~. ns wt>Jl-i1s foi• c-niploYe.r:S.
to refm;c to lmrgnin t•flll<'cl h;t,Jy. At th~? R:tlll(' time. th~ bill tle.fin~S
the prorednrc of collet·tiv<'. bargniniug. and by st,tting forth the
mutters on whic·h <>IIP ~idt• m;iy n'quil·<:t the otltN· t-0 b;1rgnin, limits
bnrg:tinint! lo ni;rtlel-s of i11(t-t~PHt to thC! t:'mployer n1id_to th{? imlh-ichtnl
ma11 nt work.
lly ,1~.11ing w·ith imhtstry-widf' b:trgaining, th.e bill enui>lcs the
wcwlit•1-s t<> ln•~•p clos-.•1: ~·0!1trol r;f ~the b:tr~tiinin~ in th~ir b~hnlf. Al•
(hougli the bill permits mternahonitl oflil·e1-s, executive bc>:trds, and
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other ,Qffi.ci~Is far removed from the shops to advise. a11d guide th_e
workers, it does not subject the workers to control by die union's
central office, as the evidence before the ·tommittee h~s shown so
frequently to hue ~n the ca~
F'HEE SPEE.CH

·_Although the oJd Labor .~oard pr~tests it does not ·limit f~
speech, it is _apparent from decisions of the Board -itself that what
~rsoris ~ay in the e~,er~ise of .!heir right. o.f fret, s~~h has~ ~n
used agamst them Th~ bill prov1desthnUhe.new _Board 1s proh1b1ted
from using asetidenc;e against an employer, nn emplQyee.; or a union
any statement · that by its own terms does not threaten force or
ecqnomic reprisal.
·
RtoHTS_ OF EM1•to-rtn:-

~sin the Case bill, whi~h pa~d the House by a vote of 1nore than
2 to 1 last ,·ear•. the bill forbids the Boai•d to ·regard as employees:
foremen aud other representath•es· of management who act for employers in their dealings with employees and their unions, The evF
fience· before tpe committe_e showed conclusively thq.t ~-c::a11ed
inqependent unions of for_emen 'a1·e not
fact independent: but th~t
the unions of men the foretilen su1>ervist(actually control thern. _The
eV'ident~e further shqws·'that management must. have ·in the plants
agent$ who are entirely Joya,, just. a~ reprtisentutiv..s of the workers
must be undivided in their loyalty to the :wQtkers..

in

EQuAt R•:."-POS!-iimuTY BEFoRt. THE

·L.,w

When employe·rs violate :i·ights that ·the Lubor Att-giv~s to em,.
ploy~es.or to union~, the Board can issue orden; against them. When
emplc,yers vfoJn.te rights of employees or of unions m,<l~r other l~ws;
they 1iiust answer in court for what they do. Uiuler the bill, ,vhen
unfons and their members violate rights gh·en to, employers and to
employees', the new Board ~nn issl!e orders.protecting ;the empt!>_yers
and the employees~ Thus, 1f a umon. refuses to bargam roUect1vely,
if it intimidates worke~, if it extorts unJa wfuJ payments from its
members, or refuses to conduct its aff'ni'rs · fairly and according to
democratic practices,. it commits nn un·fah- labor practice and the
Board can issue an order against it. The bill nlso lists acts for which,
under existing laws, union$;· nnd their leaders and members often
escape liability·but for which all o.ther citizens must m1sw~r in court.
These act.c-; include violating collective-bargaining contracts, violen~
in _strikes., mass picketing, strikes to fo~e empl(!yers to violate
the Lah9r· Act or tJther Jaws~ They also include 1llegaJ boycotts;
sympa.tby strikes, jurisdictional strikes.. feather~d~iilg, and agreement&. by winch umons nnd employers .Sef'k to restram trn.de contrary
~othe antitn.-st laws. For all tl1ese. acts,and others Jil<e them, unio.ns
nnd their members will be equa1ly respo11sible with othei· persons
under'la'w.

·
bnt:HTRY--W nic B.\ HO.\IN n;o

The bili is tbe first ·serious attempt to 4eal with one c>f our ~:mintry's
greate$t, ai;id more pre.ssing pro9Jems, indust~y-wide bargaining ancl
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industry-wide sti-ikes tha,t paralyze our economy nnd that imperil
the health ·rind safety of our people.
The oon1mittee ha~ dealt with this problem in t,vo ways:
First, by ;unending the Nationn1 Labor Relations Act, the .l:>ill
forbids the Board to certify one union as the bargaining agent for
employees of tw(1 oi· more competing employers, and also forbids
employees of two or more competing employers to conspire: together
to. ~trike nt the same time. The1;e are two ·exceptions to these r:tiles.
One union cnn r~preseiit less than 190 empl()yees of eac}:i of several
competing employers if the employers' plants are not more than 50
miles apart· This pennits .smnll groups of employees to bargain.
together atid permits small employers to bargain together, but limits
the kind of bitrgairiing that so· often leads t() price fixing and other
mon_opolistic practices; The seconq. exception permits unions that
represent employees of competi1ig employers to aflilmte or associate
, together if their bargaining, striki!lft and other concerted activities are
not subject to common control. · under this exception, national and
international unions would be nble to perform for local unions fu11c'.'.".
~ions like those thnt trJ\de associations perform for member companies
now, but _would not be able to dictate to them~.
Second, the bill arms th~ President with the authority to seek
injunctions against strikes that irn~ril the public health and ~afety,
and authorizes courts to issue injunctions in such cases without regard
to the N Ol'ris-LaGuardia Act.
·
CoMPULSORY UNIONISM

The bill bans the closed shop. Under carefully drawn regulations
it permits an employer and a union volunt.ariJy to enter into an
agreement requiring employees to become and remain members of
tl,e union n month _or more after the employer hires them or after
the agreement .is si.gned. Such agreements are lawful, however,
only if the employees by secret ballot have selecte_d the union as their
bargaining agent, and if the m,ljority of all the employees, by a
scp11.rate secret. .ballot; authorize the union to enter into the agreement, and if the agreement b not prohibited by State Jaw. .A.n employee may be expelled from the union and thus forced to leave his
job only i£ the expulsion is by reason of his failing to pay fees and
dues impose~ upon_ el!1ployees generally. Under 'this clause, employers may select their own employees. Employees have 80 days
to decide whether or not to joil1 the union. Unions may not cail?e.
the discharge of employees by .discrimiuatin~ against them. The
agreement must be voluntary. Unions may· not st.rike. to compel
employers to enter into such agreements. They are subject to loss
of bargaining rights if they do so.
CoNCILIAnoN

The bill takes the United 'states Conciliation Service out of the
Depa~tment of L1.bor. which Department is how cliarged hI statute
with the conflicting duties of -r~presenting lnbo.r and, at the same
time, trying to serve. as a mediator. This bill transfers such conciliatiqn and mediation functions to an impartial agency under a
Director of Conciliation_, and defines his duties! ·
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lftscEil..ANEOUS

Besides these major reforms, the hill permits employees, employers,
and.unions·that lose in,the Bonrd'selections to ap.peal from the Board}s
n:lings. Utlder the present ··act. a$ the Board administers it.. only.employei-s can appeal. and then .onlv in cumb,ersome prqc~dings ~nd at
the risk of being branded. ''unfair" by the. Board.. The hill. hQ''"~'·er,
permits employers to nsk for elections when they are in doubt as to the
l~l?nJity of n union's claim to repr~ntation ... ·
Finally the bHl pro\·ides that t'he new Board shall n·ot certify as
bi.1rgnining ag~nts foJ:' work,ei'.S uniot}s whose officers ar~ Con1munists
m· fo1fow the "partv line."· nnd thnr union:-: mny expel from membe.rship Communlsts nntl fellO\~· trn,·elers.
.
A ::s-A,~..~sis PY Pn,w1s 1oss

The bill is dh•icled into thl'e~ title$. T-itle .I ~meml$ the Nntiomtl
Labor J?elations Act to achie,·e the purposes;-beretnfoi·e t~ferred to.
Title:n creates n ne,r independent Offire of C011dlintitin to wbich nre
trnnsferrecl .th~ existing condlintiou funttfons.of the Depo.rtm.ent of
Lnbor. Title II also contains J~ro\·i~i~ns ntm~nF. ~he Pr.esiclent witp
the ppwer necessnrv to deal with .st1·1kt-s wh1Cm ni1per1J the pubhc:
hen1th. safetv. or interest•. Title Ill nmencls the Clayton Ac:t to limit
the exemptions of .labot organizations lnwful activities thereof. It
also cot:)tains pro,·isions mnki:ng lnhor or:z,'\11izations sun\)Je like a.11
other person·s for -contpct_ violation~. pfo,·i.sions requirinG _fhmncial
reports by labor orgamznt19ns to tl1e1r members~ irnd pronsmns cont1nuing the existing p1·ohihitions on political contributions,. etc.1 by
laboi· org:1nizatio·ns~

to

TITLE I-AuE~1>S1£:xT 0FX.\1·m-x.\1. L.\B(tB. RELATiu.Ns

Ac-r

Section 1•...;_;.The present preamble of the L~bor A<'t. b~c;ides refle~ting. n highly prejµdiced approach tn the problems with wh,ich the act
littempted to deul. contains· rertnin as.-;ertion~. that ~eem no.t to have
beei1 foi-rect when the bill \\"ns passed ancl thnt. .experience und(.'r the
net certainly shows not. t.o be-true now~ The net did not reduce indust riaJ strife. Under th.e act str_ikes incre.ased and, up to the , 1 ery time
this Congress met, they c-ontnmecl to increase. The effect was .to
impede comme1;ce. 1,ot to promote it~ flow as the net uiulertook to do.
'Section l ofthe net as p1·oposed to be nmended doe~ not nbuse anyone.
I.t does not contain asse1·tio11s of fa(:t~ not proved. It ·dt'le.tes iuatters
of this, kind that a_ppear .in the first tliref-pnr11graph~ of section. 1 of
t11e old, act. ·tt the11 declares.,as does·the ]astp:1ragraph Qf that .sect_iou. that ir_is the policy of Cqngress, in .the exerl'i:;e of its con..c;titut1onnl funct1on~
to elhninntE' the causes of certnli1 substnnrinl o~truc1ions to tlie tree flow of
et.•m1m.•~ a~tl to mitigute .and tHilnin,1re th~ .obsrructi.ons '\\·hen tbey have

·t,ccurred.

Accordin1? to its terms. the old nd u.ndertook to acc-omplish tts purpose .(1) .by ue~cotira~ju~ the prnctice ;and procedure rif c-oUective
ba1·~nh1ing~·nrid (21 b~•·'•prote('tin~ the exerche by 'l'orkers"" of their
et1·1[nnh:ing and bargainin#i· rip:hts. Cong·ress ·denrl_\· intended thi$ to
m.enn t11at w.orkers should be p,rotected ~n e:-te1·cising the$e rights1 but.
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only when they wislu~d to do so. The Lab9r Board, however~ appears
to have tnken this ltin:ruage ns a mandate to it to forre employt'es to
bli.r~nin cull~ctively, ~ven a:rainst their will. It also rippc:irs to buve

assumed thnt wheri Con~ress snid jt wished to protect the rights. of
'-,\"orkers" it rrieant to prote"t hlbor or:rnniz:itions ( at l~'ist those
o:-ganhmd into nntionnl nnd in.ternntionnl federations), ~,·en when
the labor organiza.tions cxpk,ited the. worker~ or en~a$!ccl in other
attivitie~ that were inconsistent with the int(?rests of workers. To the
Hoard. the interests of the, unions.. not those of the \vorkers. seem to
have beei1 of pn1·nmoui1t importunce. The Board has had little J!~nrd
.ior tlie ri~hts of ~mployees. and its misconception of its duties do~btles.~.lms increased indllstrfal strife.
Consistently with _later clauses .. section 1 of the net, as pr,pposed to
be am~nded. statt?s i~s..purpose to promote the flow of commerce by
protecth1g the rights· not only of emplo·yees, but also of those of emplovers :uid those of labor orgnnizntions. nnd to prevent any of these
pctr-~ies fron~ ncti~g ·upfe.ir)ytownrd the othe~. It protects·ernployees
agarnst abuses by their unions~- 11s well as ~gnmst abuses. by-employers.
H pr·otec~s unimis_ ngn.inst ::ibuses by employers, by employe~t and. by
other unions. It protects employers agn.mst abuses by umons :i.nd
their members.
_DEFINiTIO:N'S

Serti~n £.-This section in the old act defines 11 terms. In the bill
it defines 16 terms. 8 of which appeared in section 2 of the old .act
and 8 of which are 11ew. The h~rms defined, and cbn.nges in the definitions, nre as follows:
( l) ·''Person!': A~though in . most cases fobor or~amzations are
'Las.~ccintions:, or "corporations'\ both. of which are mduded in the
de.fin.ition of "person':, it ~ms deemed desirnble, in the interest of
clarity.to in~lude them in the definition specifically.
(2) "Employer'': There ·are three ch~mp;es in the definition of this
term:: .
.
(A) The old net illdude.d in the defi1,ition of "employer'' ''any
person acting in the interest of an employer1'. Under this la11gu~1ge
the Board frequently "imputed'' to empfoyers nnything that· anyon~
connec(ed with nn employer, no matter how remotely. said or did_!
notwithstnndirig that the employer had not auth~rized what "\Vtis said
or done~ and in many ~ascs even had prohibi~ed it. By such ruling!$~
the Board often was able to punish emp1oyers for things they did ·not
do, did .not uutl1orize, and had trie_d to prevent. . (See ..~atter of
American Steel .$c1•aper Co.! 29· N. L. }:l. n. 9.:19: '!ii atter of .Shult
• Trailers, Inc.. 28 N. L. R. B .. 975~ 993.: Matter of Jolm cf: Ollie1•£1~graving Co., 24 N. L. R. B. 896: 1.1/atter of B_phwrrr~t Kler:fric Co~, 16
N. L. R. B.-246; Jllatte.r of Swift &
15 N. L. _R. B. 992; A[<!.tter of
American Oil Oo.Jnc.,. 11.N. L. R. B. 990; Matter of Fro.r;t RubbeT

·oo.,

Work$, 2:-\ N. L. R B. 1071; :llatter of (',tli/rmtia 1Valm1t G1·m.vers
AsRn .• 18 N. L. R. B. 49il.) .

The bill, by defining ?,S .an. <'employer" "any person acting .as a~
emp1oyer" niakes emplovers responsible for what people
say or.do on]y when it is within the qr.tual or apparent scope of their
~utl:lorjty ~ a9.d thereby· make~ the ordinary rules of ~he law. of agency
equally applicable to employers and to umons.

agent of

an
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(B) Under the old act, the term "employer" does not include the
United States. The same exemption that appJies to the Govemment
should o.pply :eqilally to instrumentnlities of the Go\:erl'.lm~nt. The
bill therefore excJudes.!'the Unit~d SU.ltes 9r any instrun_1entality there~
of" from the definition of l'employer". Up to 1iow, the. Doa1·d, apparently ~as ~ot applied .the ·a..ct to any o_f ~he many· inst_rumentn.Iities
of the United States, ~ut whether or not 1t should do so, Congress, not

the Board, should .decide.,_

·

·

( C} C~urche~, h9spitals, -s~h~ls. college~, and societies !or t~e ~a~e
of the needy are not engaged m "commerce'' and certainly not m
interstate commei-ce·. These institutions. freque.ntly assist :local gov.ermnents in carryillg out ~ieir essential funct1o~s, and for this reasori
sh-Ould be snbj-ect to e~c]usive local jurisdiction. The bill the1·efore
excludes from thedefinitioll_Qf "employer,, institutip~sthat qua_lify as
charities under our ta·x laws~ fo this respect, the bill is co11sistent
with similar laws in a number. of Stat~, notably New York, Perinsy)nnia, and Wisconsin. The bill does not exclurle from tl1e definition
institutions organized for :P.ro.fit or those a substantial part of whose
activities is carrying on ·propaganda or attempting to influence
legislation. .
· ..
.
.
(S) "Employee": The changes in the definition of this term are ns
folJows:
(A) The old act provides that uh einploy~ _shall not lose his
status·as n.n employee under the net, even though his ~ork has ceased
''as a.co11sequence. of, or in com1ection with any ~u1Tent labor dispute"
if the emplovee "11as not obtained substantially equivalent employment''. The ·n~'"" net w~lf like.wise provid~ th3t an employee remai~s
an emplQyee under the act 1fotwithstnnding that his•."work has ceased
as a ~onsequ~nce of a eurl'ent h1.bor dispute')•. The phrase-in the
present nct-"or in connection with'' is vague and indefinite. The purpose of the whole clause is t<> pre,·ent a ma.n's losing his job when he
ei1gaaes in n Jnwfot·strike. The clause accomplishes its purpose withQUt-t&i$ vague and inQeij~1ite phrnse. No case in wlljch the Boa1·d has
had to use the· plu·nse to j)rotect the rights of employees h.'ls come .to
the attention .·of the committee. The bill therefore deletes .the phrase.
The Bonrd llOW sµ.ys that an employer ir-ay repln.ce an "economic"
Striker~ one who $trikes for higher l)BY or other changes in working
-conditions. The biU wr~tes this ruleinto the act, sayi11g tbnt a striker
~mains an· "en1ployee" :'unless such indiv.idµ:l) has been replaced by··a
regular rep1acei11ent='; arid, at: the end of the subsection, it defines a
"replacement" as being an m.d.ividual -who-replaces a :striker "if the
duration
his employment is -not to be determjned with reference- to
the existerice or- duratton of such labor disp.ut_e!'.. Thus, "strikebreakers" may not be regarded ns "replacements".
As ttrider the pi·esent act, a striker. ·under the bill, ·would lose his
status as n11 "employeen if he·obtnined "other regular a:nd substantinlly
equin1lent employmeuf' trhile.the strike·wns in progress.
A few Sh1tes pay.strikers:nfter the fiftb~.sixth, or seventh week of a
Strike. '):'his Clear.Iv is :i perYersion of the purpo_ses of the Stlcinlsecurity la~Ys!· which Congi-e~s inte~d~d tQ _pr~,~ide for unemployment
compensation for those out of .work m,ohmtarrly nnd throueb no f~~tlt
ofth~fr ,Q\,·n. We therefore haX"e ·pr,frided tlu1t a: striker~ status ns
au~ "~mp_loJee'' stops. when.I~~ ~tnrts rec.ei,~itl$? unemploymen~ compen,-;..

of
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sation from any State. He may receive relief from his union, from
focal welfare funds, or from charity withC\Ut losing that status.
{B) The next significant chan"'e in section 2. (3) concerns "supervisors',. The bill, by exclurling foremen and other supervisorydersonnel from the definition of "employee", deprives the Boar .. of
jurisdiction over them.
The eYicle11cc before the committee showed this to be one .of the
most importnnt and most criticnl problems. 'When Congress pnssed
the Labor Act, we wE>re concerned, ns we snid in its preamble, with
the welfar~ of "workers,, and "wngc earners'\ not of the boss. It
was to proteC't workers and their unions against foremen, not to
unionizt• fol'l'men, that CongrPSS paS$ed the act. In few trades, ·and
iu uoue of the grent mnss-proclucrn~ in<lustries~ were foremen
unionized. It was n<>t until about 7 years aftel' Congress pnssed the
Labor Act th8t nnyone · asked the Labor Board to estabhsh n unit
~umposed of snpe1·,·1sors. Notwithstam.ling thut in the act Congress
had clefined ns an "employer" "nny person acting in the interest of
an employer'\ the Bonr<l Jwld, in t.he first ~11ch case, that supervisors
in coal mines are ''Pmployees", ancl it certified as the bilrgainin~ ngcnt
of supervisors of Umon Collieries Coal Co. a union tho.t claimed to
be '"indepernlent" bnt that turne<l ont t.o be a stnlldng horse for the
United ~line Workers of Ame1·icn. and that now is pnrt of the catchall District 50 of that.union {1J/atte1· of Union Collieries Ooal Oom71t1:J1J/. 4 I ~. L. R. B. 06 ( l!J42)). A Jitt le Inter the Bon.rd certified. ns
the bnrgaming agent of foremen of Godchaux Sugars, Inc., the union
of r:111k a11<l file workt1rs wlmm tJ,~ for<'IHC!n were suppose<I to supervise ( 44 N. L. R. B. 874 ( 1942)).
.
As n r(>sult of the Board's certifying unions of foremen in the
Union Collieries nncl Godchaux Sugnrs case~ there was introduced
in Congress u hill tnkh1g foremen out of the Labor Act {H. R. 2239,
78th Cong.). While the bill was /)ending in the Military Affairs
Committee of the House, the Boar<, on May 10, 1943, in Matter of
Ma1•11la·nd Drydock Oompany (.49 N. L. ~- B. 733), reversed itseli,
hokling thnt, except in trn<les ·where ioremen organized in 1935, it
would not find uuits of supervisors appropriate for the purposes of
collective bargaining under the Wngner Act. The Military Affairs
Committee then dropped H. R. 2239.
1)1 deciding the Mnrylnnd Drydock case; the Board pointed out
that unionizing for~m~n un<lerthe Labor Act would be bad for output,
which the act wus intended to promotei bad for the rnnk and file,
n several cases, the Board
und bn<l for the foremen themselves.
coufomed its decision in the Maryland Drydock case (Mattcr of Boei-ny Aircraft Oompany, .51 N. L. R. B. 66; Matter of M·urray Oorporalion of A?Tu:rica (Ecorse Plant), 51 N. L. R. B: 94; Matter of
General 1.lfotrnw Oor7101·aUon (Detroit Diesel Engine Division), 51
N~ L. R. B. 457). Then, in Matter of Packard Motor Oar 00111.pany
(61 N. L. R. B. 4 (1945)), the Board chann-ed its mind nrrnin, certifyinir ns the bargaiuin~ agent of five ranfcs of Packard9s foremen
the Foremen's Association of Americ:i., which it had held it ol!ght
not' t6 certify ns the bU;rgnining agent for foremen of BeneraJ Motors) :Murray Corp., nn'd ot11er companies. Later the Board certifie<l a division of District 50 of the United Mine Workers of America
u~ tlw bargaining agent of supcrYisors in the mines. an<l subj~ted
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· ~hem to the discipline'and control of the United Mine Workers and

its leaders.

.

A.s a. result of the Board's ruling in the Packard case, both Houses
of Congress, by overwhelming majorities, passeJ the so-¢nlled Case
bill, e~empting s.upervisors from the ope1~ti~n of the Labor Act. The
President \'etoed the bill, nnd the Boui-d continued· to unio11ize foremen at an accelerated pnce~
The evidem;:e before _the committee ·shows dearly ·that unionizing
&upervism~ under the Lnbor. Act is inco11sistenJ ,,~ith the purpose: of
the net to m·cr¢~1.$e output of g<>0ds. that move 1u ,th~ str~nm of corn~
r.uer~e, and thus to inc1~'1S7 itsfi<>w~ It is inconsiste_~f,t}th the poliqy
of Congress to assure to workers freedom from donunat1on
control
~Y. their ~upervi~ors in. the-it orgamzing nnd ~nrgnining acthiities; It
1s. mco. 11.s_1ste_n_t w1_. tl_1 our_ pol!CY to.prote_ ct the_ r. 1ghts o1_ e.m~.lo~_'ers ;: they_,
as well ilS workers,
ent~~le~ to Joyal. repre,se!1tat1ves m t!1e·_p1ants,
but \\"hen th~ for~men umomze1 even m ·a un.1011 that danns to be

or

nre

1

:lindependent "

of

the union of the ran~ nnd_ file, t:heY.. nr~subject. ~o

mfluence. and con~rol by th~ 1·a•tk nnd file umon, and~ msteacl of their
bossing the ruilk ,and file. the. rimk and file bosses them~ The evidence
~bo,ts that_ rnnk and fiJe unions ha_ve .do11e ~.1;1ch of the nctual Ol"J!}lt:iiz,ng of fore~~!1 even when ·th~ foreJ?e!1 ·s umon · pro.fesses to. be "mde-·
p~ndent". W·1tbout any question~ this 1s why the imJ.ons seek tQ organize the foremen.

One of the ~11ost impo1;tant. iternsof evidehl•efo this question cnme to

Jightifter the committee concluded the heai-in~ In N<:>,·embet 1942,.
Ford Motor·()~~ recognized the Foremnn~s Associatio1~ of Amel'ic-n u.s
the rep.resentative of several l'anks of supe1•~1 isor~. In 19441 the Ford
Co. mad~ a full collective-bargnining agreement with the a~ociatio11.
In testifying before our comn1ittee, the preside:1it of ·t11e associntion
urged. ~.he i·elntfon between F(!rd and the associatiori ns grqund
umom~mij foremen .. qther endenee showed~ h~we,·er: that after Foi-d
rec<:>gmzect the nssocrntlon, there were: 111ore, strikes nnd stoppages by
foremen ut fot~d•s tha,p in uny othercompt~ny. Alt!1ou~h the pre~ident
of_ t1_1e. nssociat_mn ~ln_ nned tba·t-productrn1ty ,_~~.n_ s 111,rh 1.11 °})_b·t•11Js i_tbnd
Qr~uized, w~ had quoted to us statements by Mr. Henry Ford II-that.
productivity declined after· the fore111en o·rgai1ized. nnd th is e,·idence
was supp·orted by eYid~nc.~ frQm othe_r comp~mies.
On April 8, 1947.. Mr... John.-S~--Bugos, vke Pl'.esident aud dirertor <>f
industrial relations .nt Fo1·d's, ·teii'ninnted ~..ord's ~0~1t_1~h~t with the
ForeJnan's Assodation. His letter to the_ n~socindon constitutes the
clearest evidence that sti"pervisors nre not:properly subject to the Lnbor

for

Act:

This. ls to ad,·ise you of ..the d('cislonof.'the F0.rd Moto1· Co. to t~riuii1nte th~
present ·ngreemenr betwPen th~ Fo1·erunri·s .\ssodatlun nutl the Femi lfotor Co~
As-you k1iow. under t11e terms of the ngt'.l:'<?JUe~t it mi1y b_,, termimttt·d i,n llnj,
9, 19-17. PtOYided .either you1· uss~·llulon M the coillpnny gh·Qs 30 d:i~·$· nntke.
It .ls the purpose of this letter t<> gin• !!im·h uotkeOur µresenrngre,i>ment with. yon wns ent~1-ed into ,·otnnrnrHy tlU ll:1;\· fl. UY-l.
At .tlUH tlme we touk _the llOSitlou thnr. Whethe.r o.r' not. Wl• b(')h•\"t.>1.IJh:t f r,wemt-~1·s
u11!oi1~:or .n~odution$ wl!re Stlnnd. :we w.1,til~ unclertnke a p1~m;th•nl t,•st. l'his
,~ in· line. wi.th o,~r policy elf nhvnys seeking worknl.>lt) ~o!ut1~••1s·h1 uttt· Imm:m
l'ehttJous p1·oblelll:S· -h~t~ nt .Ford..· . At' you ffl'e (l W:tTl', H1h1_ l'\llllllHll;\', iu 1-e:.d,iug
the 1944 u~reeroent wi.th yon, took n 11.osi(i~lll not $Ullllfll't~1l hy tlil' i;r:-m~1·,i1
opiuiou of i ndtisn·y.

763795-48-VOt... I - 2 3
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At lhnt time, repr~e11tntfres of .your associntJon argued that recogil[tlon of
a fol'.emnu's union would result in mnking foremen more effectively a part of
mnnngement than before. .
.
.
..
.. . .
.
After. 3 ye.nrs· esper•en~a, period' .\Vtiich .seems· to us ample 101· a. .test-It
ls our conclusion thnt. the results hnve b~ the. opposite of what we bnve hoped
for. Rather thn·n exerting its efforts to drow foremen into closer reJatlonsbip
With the rest ot m.anniement, your nssocin1inu bn.s worked ln the 01,posite din-ction. We feel that your a.s,so<.-iution under the ngreemenc bas fniled to me~r the
test ot practice.
·
As. re~~ntly ns Jnst Sntilrd~y-AprU 5, 1947~ foremen. all except .8' ·frt:im
the RQuge. rolling mm. wnlked off the job wlthout v.ermisslon, and contrary to
spedill" lastrucrious to rerna_In. They stnyed off the job about !! 1h hours, utrend•
lng n ni~eting-of. the nssorfatioo; . This unuurbodz~d nbseuce ln,•ol'!ed grave
risks to out- emJtloyees. In the rolling mUl. The fact that no damage c11me to
· men or property was -fortunate, but lt ls something which tbe nbseut iuembe11; of
your _nssociadori could not guarantee. .
Efforts were mnde-we are ~l3d to sny unsuccessfully---:-to tnduce foremen ln
the open hearth depo.1·rment to leave their jobs at the snmetlme. Thel'_e Is no need
t<.(point out the risk to men and property Jo Iea•.ing opeo benrtb furnaces un;.
attended.
Your association i·ecentty instructed its members not to comply wtth company
requirements thrit ·1bey · check employee~ 11ntler th~i.r supervislo11 ttt. •;'a1ions
lucati.ons am.1y from the job where thi>y ·were felt to be. loitering. Spokesmen for
yoar association did not agree wltb the· company ns to the· proper ra·hulque for
lu1odling nn odmittedly bnd situntioll. lt is deudy the t·esponsibiUty of the t.-oml)flny. nnd not -of your nssoeintion, ro <.letermine tbe p1·ocedure in such situurtons.
Severnl months a~o we proposed :i nnmber nf consrrncth·e amendments dP.signed
ft; Jmpro?'e our rehtti,onsbips, ro dt-fiile n:iore cle.:rdy our s~purnte nrl!ns of 1·es11on•
sibillty, nnd to close the ~ulf between f~remen.~~d othf?r u1embers ut our mn11agenient t~am wblcb we feel has been <'rented by the present _ugret-meur. lo s-ev_eral
l!lOntfis of nf'gotiatiou. your. negotiating committee hns 11ot agreed to n sfngl_e
n1njor proposal. Yuur c,ommittee has ntso failed to produce nny cuimterproposal
wblch would l~nd to these goals.
The Ford ~Iotor Co. hns the pre.sent' and Jong-term nbjecth·e of buil_ding nn
ext>eptlonnl organiznlfoo of the nblest pl:!Opl_e. We cannot rcnch thi~ objt>rtive
unles.s we develop whbio the orgnnizotion the finest nnd best-trnlned foremen In
the eountry~ The nt-sociatlon is not helpin~ t1s to ndn1nee-· towurd this objerti\·e.
Tbe.essentlnl cho.rlieteristic of mnnngement is r{l_sponsibillty. It foUo'lo\'~ ,th.at
the chn_racterlstie wblch dlsringuishes· n foreman fs n sense- of .responsibility.
It is our ot,servntlon tb:i~ the ncrivitJes of your asspcintion under onr n~reement
bas tended to fend our foretnen away frorn mnru1gi.•ment responsibility, and bns
lu fnet oppnS<!d eftot·ts.of the eompnny 'in this dirt~tion.
W~ :tre glY!ng you th.ls notice of t~rmiriation of our ng1·eement fo1· tbc prAeticnt
reaso1J th:H It bo.s not worked under test.

be

If mnnagement is to ·free to mann~e American industry ns in the
past nnd tci produce the goods on which depends our strength in war
n.nd our standard of livin~ i\lwnys, then CongrctiS must exclude furenicnff0111. the operation of the Labtir Act1 not only when. tl1.ey-orga11izc
into v:ni{)n$ of tl,.e 1•ank ar,.d -P,te and ,into union.1 affiliated with t/1.ose
of tne rank anrl fi,le; but also when they organi.ze into unions that claim
fo lJP. independent of t l,c union.I( of th.e rcrn/1: 11"f!.d file.
The committee received in ev:dence about 200 letters thnt tlte Foremnn 's A.ssocin.tion hnd exchrmged'.' w.ith ti..nions ·of the rank nncl file.

Thc.•y showfd n closer :md mqre intimate rcla:tion between the assoda-

tion :rnd the unio_ns of me_n the forenum ~npcrvise than one ?I~din:u:ily
6nds·hetween unions affilrnted top;ether m the ~·ame fe<lernt1on, nncl n.
!-iUbservience of the ni=:sncintion to unions of the runk a.nd file tbnt is
rare nmong unions.
The evklence ~hows that fornmen's nnio11~aret an<l 11111st be. whCllly
dependent upon rnnk-'und-file unions and under const:int oblig:Ltion to
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them. l'he for~meu .cnnnot strike without fhe support oi Uie rimk
arid file and its agreement not to do the work of striking foremen ..
The ns!iocia.tion admits thnt it has such trn agreement with the. CIO.
The association ha~ adopted a rormal "policyn f01·bidding its meinbers~
when the rank-and-file unions strike, to erite1; the strt1ck plants 11.nd
protect ·and maintain them without the consent of the rank-and-file
unions.
.
The evidence further shows that rauk-nnd-file unions teil the fore::rn.~n's union when· ~lie t~r¢men may strike.
when they may not,.
what duties the foremen may do and what ones tJiey may not, whafl
plants the foremnn>s· union may organiie tl.lld what ones it may not.•
I~ shows thnt rank-and~file unions hnve helped· foren1en's u1iions, not
for th~ ben~fit of the ~oreJnep 1 bllt for the bene(it of the rank rtnd file,
~t ~he e:,:pense· of the fore~an's fid_e1ity in doing his duties. The
.chnnman of n rank-and-file pit comm1ttee summed the matter up when
he said:
· ·

and

Well, we nre trying to J?et tllelll (tbe ~upe1~vi:,;01-s) to jotn tl::i~ unJon, the bosses
to Jotn the union. aod then we'll' be their bosst'S. We'll lie tbeir bosses.

·Tbnt roost foremen themselves see the· impropriety .of. theh· u1iiooiziug, and its danger for their .o:w,n status, is clear from the fa.ct that,
11Ithough tl1e Foreman's .Assodation of America is the. largest union
of foremen, only about 1 pei•cent of the foremen have joined it.
1tla11ageme11.t,· Ulce l,a.1:,or, must have Jaith.ful agents_-:.;.I:f we are to
· produce goods competitively nnd in such large. quantities
ca1\ buy them. ·at low cost, then, just as there nre pe()ple o.n labors
s.ide to say what workers w:a11; and have a1•ightto e:xpect,there must
be in mnnagement and loyal to 'it persons ·not subject to influence or.
co.utrql of unions, not only to assign people to their w.ork, to see that
they l_teep a_ t their work_. an_. d d? it w~ll, _t_o co_ ~~~t the_m when they are
at fault, and tQ settle fheir complnmts and gr1evanc.es·, but to 9-eter':'
mine how· much work employ~es should doi what p11y tl1ey should
re.ceive for it, and to carry oil the whole of nl;ior relatipns.
Labor relations people )'.legotfaf:e labor agreements and handle dis;..
putes not settled in the shops. Employment and personnel people hire
workers, and sometime~ assign then1 to their departments~ Plant
policemen and gual'ds prevent disorders and t·eport m.isco'riduct of
e'mployees and of unions and their rnem~rs. Time-:study men help
to fix the pace at which employ~. work and to determine- the number
of men the work. cnlls for •. ·Doctors, nnrses, sai~ty engineers, nnd
adjusters handle claims for disability ·benefits 'nnd investigute alleged
haz~t1·ds 'to safety n.ntt health.
Ot,1er eµip!oy~~ lumdle_ i_ntiroate details of th~ business that _fre.•
q~entlv .nre Iughly confidenti_~l. So~e affect. the.employer's. relat10,ns
with labor. Others. affect 1ts· re]ntions mth 1ts coii1pet1tors. In
· neither case should the employee!s loyalty be divided. Thnt which
afects the company's relations with its competitors certninly ought nQt
to be open to members .of a union that. dei:tls: also with. the firm's
cqmpetitors.
.
·supervisors are management people. Thev hnve distinguished
r.hemselv~. in t11eir work. They hnYe demonst1·~ted t~1eir apility to
tnke care ~f the:mselves without dependfog upon the pi·e:35ure of coll~tive 11.ct10µ. lfo 9ne forced them to become $t1perv1.~01~ . They
abandoned the "collective security'' of the rank nnd file voluntarily,

that. manz
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hec~rnse-they belieyed the opportu1iities tl1us opened to r.bem to 'be
more. vn1ua.ble to. t.hem tha.n such "security" It seems wrong, ,and .it
is wrong, to subject people of this kincl, 'Y'ho bav~ demonstratecl their
initfative, their 3:m~ition n?td th~ir ability to get a.!1ea~~ to thelev~lling
processei:- of semor1ty, uiufonmty and stanoard1zation that the Supreme Court recognizes as: being. fund~m~tnl principles of unionism.
(J. J. Oase Oo. v. National Labo1• Relations Board. 321 U. S. 332
(1944).) It is wrong for the foremen, for it discou1·ages the things
in them that made tI1em foremen .in .the first P.lnce. For th~ sam~
reason, that it discoura&'85 those best qualified to get ahead, it is wrong.
for industry, andpart1cularly for the future ~trength and produc•
tivity _of our country.
So, by this bill, Congress makes clea1: once 1i1ore whnt.:it tried to
make clear when, in passing the act, it defined as an "employer," not
an "e.rripfoyee,,, any· person nacting in the interest of an employer,,;
what it again made clear-in taking up H. R. 2-239 in 1943 and in dropping it when the Board decided the Mnryland Drydock case,.and what,
for a third time, it.~a.de clear last year in passing the Case:--bill by a
majority of about .2 to 1 aud in barely .falling short of enough votes Jo
override the President's veto of that bill.
The bill does not forbid anyone to organize. .· It does not forbid any
employer to rec_ogrifae n uni~n of foremen. Employers who, in the
pnst, hn·ve bnrgained collectively with supervisors mny continue to do
so. Wh~t the bill ~:loes is to say w1int the law always has said untiJ.
the Labor Board~_in the exercise of what it modestly calls its "expertness," changed the law: That 119 one,. whether ~mployer or.emploree,
need. h~ve as his agent <;>n~ who 1s 9bhgated to those on the other side,
or .one \V horn, for any :reason, he does not trust.
( C) "Agri_cultural labor~rs": The pre.sent act excludes from the definition of "employee" ''any individual employed as an agricultural
laborer," but it does not say w.h? are n~ricultural !~bo~ers nnd wl:o
n-r.e not •. Congress has defined this term m other legislation.. The bill
adopts the definition of agricultural laborer set forth in the Internal
Revenue Code, section 1426 {h). namely:
The term "agrkulturn.l labor'' inclutles all sel'vict!S performedll) On R fa.rm, in the emplo.r of nn:r 11erson, in· conn~tfon with f!.ulU.,·nting
the· ~oil, or in connecti<:m _wtth. rnlsing. ()r lu~n·estin~ nnr ngL·tcultural 01· horticultural corumodlty, lncltulin~ the l'll.isin,;, shettriu~. feeilin~. curing tnr. tr.ilnlng, nnd mnnngeinent of livestock. bees, poultry, .nnd fur-bearing animals and
wildlife.
.
·
(2) In the ~mploy of the owner, or ten:lflt or other opera.tor of a ftum, in
connection ,viUt the opei-ntlon. mnnugement, ·conservntion., improwment. oirunlntennnce of such farm nnd its tools and equipment. or .in snlvaging timl.Jer
or clearing lnnd <lf b.rn::th nnd other debi•is left by n hurrlenne, if tl1e mnjor Jlart
of such. se.rvke ls pe1·tormed on n farm.
(3) In connel•tlon with the 11roduction or harvesting of mnple slrn1l or mnple
sngnr or any commQdlty. <lefine<l ns mi agrlcnltural commodity _in section 1141j
(g) of title 12, ns nmen.cled, or in connectfon with the raising or hnr,·e:;tfn;t of
mushrooms, or In connection with the hatching ot poultry, or in <>onnection with
th~ ginning of cotto11, 01· in com1ection· with th~ operntlon 01'. nmlut.eu.:m~ or
ditches,. cnnnl~, rese1·,·olrs, or wnterwnys used exclusively for su11plyin;.! au,1
storing \"\'a ter for fnrming purposes~
·
H) rn handliT1g, planting, clrying, pttckjng. pnclcnsing, :proce.rssing, f1•eE>7.ing.
grading. storing. or de1h·ering to stor11.i:e or to m~rket 9r to :t (':lrrier fm• rr.m~
portatlon to mnrket, nn1~. ngrtculturnl or hol'ticulturnl commotlity; but only it such
s~r,·ice Js performetl ~s nn incident t() ordinary fn.l'IJling opernti~ns. ~r, ·in tht'
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cwsc nf fruits nn<l Ye~etJlbl~s, ~s
lncilleut to ·th~ preput'lit1~1n ot tiueh fniit.t1
or vegetables .fo1• rnui•ket, T.he provisions of I his-1l:11•ngrn11b ij~l.alr 11ot hi! cl~unH~ll
to be 11p1>lfo11ble with respt.-ct t() ser,·ice perfo1:me.d iu L·o!,f1ec.1ici11 w~ll• c1>m•
tnercial cmmlng or. cvmmercin,l treeziug or ln colmectfou with nnr 11,;1·1culhu·nl
<•r hortlcultu_~l commodity nf~~r Jts delh•eJ·y to a terminnl mtu·kct for distribution for <.·mus,mlplion~ · .
· .
· ··

·Ai{ i1sed ln. HliS subsection,. the term "fRrlll" ln<!lud()S st<l('k, .d1tlry, poultry,
fruit, fnr-btmrlng nnlmnl, un_d. irµck ful'ms, plnututi{)n!5, r1111chcs~ uu1-stn·i~s,
r:i11~cs. gn-eu_hu;1~~ or other siruih1r ~ti·uctu~~ Ul:i~tl 1•rinuti-lly for the rui:Jihg

or ngrlculturnl o·r hortkulttu-a.l com_mQdltie~. nn4 prclmrds.
(D) An nemployee'', n.ccordmg to: ull srai1dard dictionttries, nc•
cord 11ig tQ th~. law ;aa ·t be courts hn ve stat~d i_t, ~~net .ncc01·<l i11g to the
understanding o:f almost e\·~rycme; with the exception. of memQ~rs
of ·the ·Nntional Labor Relations Doard .. rifo:rns sonicone who "'orks
ior another for hire. :But in _the case oi National. Labor Relati(Jn8
Board v._Hearst Publications:; Inc. (822 U. $. 111 (1944) )~ the Boa.rd
~pan:ded the definition- of th~ te1·rn "employef·, beycmd q.nything

that it ever ·had in~luded _before, and the S.u-preme Court, relying

upon 'the tlieoretic _'lexpe·rt~ess" of th~ l?oarct·, upheld the Ilonrd. · In

tnis ca!5e the Board held rndepe1~dent merchants who bought _news•
pnpers from the publisher nnd hfred people.: to sell the1·n to be. •·employees',. The. people tile· me1·chantH hirfd. .t.o ·sell the papct·s were
"~mploy~es'' of the_ merchant$;. but holdin:.r the ~w:11·chnnts_ to _b.e· ''cmpJoyees" of the publisher or t11e pnp4:i·s was must far read1iug. lt
nJrist be presumeq thnt •when Congress enssed the Lnb9r Act ..it
intended word~ it used to have ·the .me!uiiligs th11t they had wiw1i
Co11gi'ess pnssed the ·,1t:t1 not tiew 11u~n1i"rn~s that. ll yenrs lnfor, th!'
Labor Board .might think tt_p. fo th~ hnv_; ,twn~ ·11lwi,ys· hn~ be<!tl :1.
<hiTerence, and n ~ig d!fferencet between· ~'employees". nu~l "indc-:pen<lent contmctor$·'. '~EmP.loyees" work for wages or snlnr1es under
rlh·~ct. super,•isfon. "'Independent co1it1;act01:s" unde1'ti1kc tQ do· n
job for a price _dec.·.ide how; the \vork ~vil! be doiie,usunliy hire othet~
to .do the wm•iq caud. de.pend for their mcome not opo11 wngrs, but
upon the di1f~1·cnce. betw~·eu whnt they pny for goo1ls, mntt'1·iiils, :and
f:Jbor nnd whnt th~y rec~ive fot· the end 1-esolt. thnt is, upon profits.
It is.incQnceiynbJe thut Congi·vss, ,vhen it pass(\() the act, uuthprizcd
the Bmu·d fo give tn e,very v.·ord in_ th~ ;\rt whatever menning it
wished. On· th~ ;controry, Congress h-i"t~ndcd then, a_nd it intei1ds
now, that the Dc,nrd give to wo.rds not far-fetehetl. n1eanin::rs but
ot'tliil.m·y m~anings. To l~OlTect whnt the· 13oard hns done, nnd whnt
rhe Suprem¢ Court, putting misplnct--cl rcifance upon tht:~ Hoard's
<'Xpc1ifues.", !ms;nppron~d. :tl1~ bill exclud~s uhult ~_ude11t contractors"
from the <Miriitiotl of ''ernplo)~ee~'.
The definitions app('.'na·in~ in S('c-tion 2 -of th~ p1't'~.Emt net of thc1

t~rms '4:t't"pl'.CSeutn.tiye" (4)~ ''lnb~>r 01"1,!Jllihmtion,, (i>). --''c-<JllUUN'('l',,
( G) ,. "''affecting commt'l'('l''~ ( 7) :- :mtl ''unfa h· lnbnl' 1n·m·ti<"c'' ( 8) 1·r-

mni11 m1ch2'n:,red.. :t,1thou~h, il~ i-:~~tion ij~ the ''unfair lnb01 priH'tict'::i,:
thl!mselves nre dmnged ~tthl:itnntit,lly.
~<,ction e ("0) of the prr..st~1it nrt. ,\·hi<-11 cl"fhm:.."lnhor ,li~put<•", is
ouutt.ed. The te11n docs. not .app(mr onywl•es-c m the pre~c.•nt nd

1•xr.t.~pt in the ,fofiriitions~ It do(•~ nppt•nr ·j11 the bjl), but it:-: UlPaninc,
is denr from the context nml from th<' hil I ns n whole mal ,lc.w.i- 11(~
lll'~cl drfiniug..
nny. ~v~11t.: the oM t}pfi111tion woul<i bl' "in:11>pi·o- .,
p1·1ate m thr .nm(lndrd ri<•t hPC'_nn~~ H:-' t hl' Lnh<li' Dt1a ~·d hu~-N>m-:tr,it~d
ih:1: uct. n "Jnbor clisput(~•,_ r~ist~--wht~m•,·t'1· .IJ union di_!,:n:rr<1l•:: ·with m1

In
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SENATE REPORT NO. l 05 ON S. 1126

Calendar No. 104
80rH

SENATE

CoNGBESS }

JatSesaion

{

REJ.101lr

No. 105

FEDERAL LABOR RELATIONS ACT OF 1947

APB.IL

17 Oegislative day..

MABCH

24), 1947.-0rdered to be printed

Mr. TA.Fl', from the Committee on Labor and Public W elfa.re,
submitted

the following

·REPORT
[To accompany S. 1126]

together with the

INDIVIDUAL VIEWS OF MR. THOMAS OF UT.AH, AND THE
SUPPLEMENTAL VIEWS OF MR. TAFT, MR. BALL, MR.
DONNELL; AND MR. JENNER, AND THE CONCURRING
VIEWS, WITH RESERVATIONS~ OF MR.·SMITH, THEREIN
The Committee on Labor and Public W elfa.re report an original
bill (S. 1126) to amend the National Labor Relations Act, to provirle
addit.ionn.l facilities for the ml;'diation of labor disputes nffecting commerr.r, to t•qualizr lrgal respons_ibilitil'S of labor organizations and
employt•rs, and for other purpost•s, and recommends that the bill do
PThe problem of the inadequacy of existing laws on industrial relations is om,. of gro.vC' national concern. The bu.sic Federal law on this ·
subject is conto.inrd in two stat.ut-l's-the N orris-Ln.Guardia Act of 1932
and the National Labor RC'lations. Act of 1935. Enacted at the time
when millions of p~l'SOUS l\"C'rC' miemployc-d and labor organizations
were 1·~lat.iv<'ly WC'nk a.ncl inC'fiectrvC', thvsc statutr.s, despite their
C'Xprrim(\ntn.l cluirnet(lr,• lmv(' not ,brNl chnngC'd in o.ny res·pect since
their original rno.ctment.
While the committc.e does not belic,re that social gains which industrial employ<.'<'S hM•c received bv n,ason of these statutes should be
impaired in any drgree, we do feel that to the extent that such statutes,
toget-h~r.witb. t.he 1·~.gula.tions issut'd under them, o..nd decisions rega.rdin~ ~hc.m, hayc produrcd specific types of injustice, or clear inequities
bctwc.~cu employers and employees, Congress should remedy the situation by precise and C'a.rP.fully drawn legislation.
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The need for congressional action has become partipularly acute as
a result of increased industrial· strife. In 1945 this occasioned the
loss of approximately 38,000,000 man-days of labor through strikce.
This total was trebled in 1946 when there wero 116,000,000 man-days
lost and the number of strikes reached the unprecedented figure of
41985.

This bill, formulated by the committee, in an· attempt to ·solve
some of the more pressing difficulties with which the Nation is confronted'-- represents the results of numerous hearings before the com-·
mittee extending over a period of more than 5 weeks. The committee
heard 83 witnesses representing not only management, labol' organi. zations, and the Government but also the general public. The actual
drafting of the bill was done in executive sessions of the conimittee
during the la.st 4 weeks, in which almost daily meeti~s were held. M
aq indication of the interest in the subject matter, the entire membership or the committee was present a.t the meetings in which tho
draft we.s perfected. VirtuaJly every Senator. on the committee madt'
an important contribution to its provisions.
.
The committee bill is predicated upon our belief that a .fair and
equitable labor policy can best be achieved by equalizing existing
laws in a manner which will encourage free collective bargaining.
Government, decisions should not be substituted for free agreement,
but both siaes-management and orga.n.ize.d labor-must recognize
that the rights of the general public are paramount.
The need for such leg!sla.tion is ur1;ent. Supreme Court interpretations of the Norris-LaGua.rdia. Anti-injunction Act and the Clayton
Act seem to have placed union activities, no matter how destructive
to the rights of the individual workers and employers who a.re coµforming to the National Lo.bor Relations Act, beyond the pal~ of
Federal law. ·Moreover, the a.dministra.tion of the National Labor
Relations Act itself has tended to destroy the equality of bargaining
power necessary to mainta.in industri9il peace. This is due in pa.rt to
the one-sided character of the act itself, which, while affording relief
to employees and labor organizations for certain undesirable practices
on the part of management, denies. to management an;y redress for
equally undesirable actions on the pa.rt of labor organizat1Qns. More...
over, as a result of certain administrative pra.etices which developed
in the early period of the o.ct, the Boa.rd he.a acquired a reputation for
partisanship, which the committee bill seeks to over.come·, by insisting
upon certain procedural reforms.
In the course of its deliberp,tions, the committee· considered many
other proposals, such as restricting alleged moudpolistic practices by
unions, the formulation of a code o( rights for individual members .of
trade unions, and a clarification of the problem of union-welfare funds.
In excluding these matters from the purview of the bill, the majority ·
of the committee should not be understood as regarding sueh proposals
e.s unsound or unworkable, bu.t rather that the problems involved
should receive more extended study by a special Joint congressional
committee for which the committee bill specifically provides. In other
words, the committee in this bill attempted to embody reforms which
are lo~ overdue o.nd with respect to which the record of the hearin~
revealea widespread agreement on the part of informed and impartial
persons.
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'fhe bill is divided into foul' titles: Title I amends the National
Labor Relations Act .to· achieve the purposes to whi'ch reference has
been ma.de. TiCle· II creates a new Feder~! Mediation Service, which.
tra.nsfers the funrt-ions .of the_ Department of u,bor in the field of
corieiliatfon, nlong with the property and personnel of the present·
Service. It also provides special procedur.es•for the Attorney General
and the President to utilize in national emergencies. Title III give.s
labor unions the right to sue and be sued as legal entities for breach
of con~ract in the Federal cour~. Title IY estab~shes e. joint Committee of the Congress to make a long-range study of certain aspects
of labor relations, concerning which _further information was thought
desirable by ·the committee. ·Title V con.ta.ins definitions.
The major chru1ges which the bill would make in the Nat-ions.I Labor
Relations Act may be'.s~nunarized as follows:
·1. It. eliminates the genuine supervisor from the coverage of the act
asan employee and makes.it clear that he.should be dP,emed a pa.rt of
management.
·
. .
·2. It abolishes the closed shop but permits -voluntary ·agreements·
for requiring such fo~~ of CO?Jpulsory membership f!S ~he union shop
or mamtenance· of membership; proy1ded that a ma.Jority of the employees authorize their rep1·es~ntatives to make such contracts. It
al~o prot:ects empfoyees ag~inst discharg_e, if unions deny or t~ate
the_ir membership. for caprici<:>us reasons ..
3. It gives t!-mployers and individual employees rights to.. invoke the
processes of the Board against w1ion$· which engaged in certain
enumerate~ unfair labor practices, including secondary boycot-ts and
jmisdictional strikes, which may result in the Board itself applying
for restraining .Qrders in certain c~es.
.
·
4. _It i-eorga.ni_zes the central structu.re of the. National Labor Rela..
tions Boo.rd not only by providing for tho o.ddition offour new members
to thQ pre£e.n~ Board pf three1 but by placing' upon the. members indi;..
vi<lual responsibility in performing their judicial functions. This
would be a.ccQm_plished by .eliminating the review section 0£ the legal
·st.mi and the reviewing personnel of the '!'rial Examining Division.
·5: In the interests of nssurintr complete freedom of choice to em- ,
ployces who do not wish to be represented collectively as well as those.
who do, it requires :the :Uoard. to enlarge the ri~hts of petition in
repres·eritation cases and to give {?ieater attention to the special
problems ·of- cra.ftsmen and professional employees in the determination of bargaining units.
6. It prevents the Board from continuing to accord e.ffiliated unions
special advantages at the expense of independent le.'bor organizations,.
by requiring ihat1 under identical circumstances, the Board fa com~
plaint cases refrain from any disparity of treatment.
SUPERVISORY- PERSONNEL

A. recent development. which probably more than any other singl.e
fac•tor has upset any real balance of power in the collectiv:e-ba.rgaining
process ha$ been the successful efforts of labor organizations to invoke
the Wagner Act for covering supervisor, personnel, traditionally
regru·dcd as. p~t. of management; i~to .orga.ruzatiQn5 composed of or
subservient·to the unions of the very men they we-re hired to super,~ise. It ,vas riot until 1945, after several changes in position, that the
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Nati()nal Labor.Relations Bo~rd its~lf by divided vote finally decided
that supervisory emplQyees were covered by the N a.tional Lo.QOr
Relati(!DS Act. Tb.hi constructi()n was rec~tly: upheld in the Supreme
Court m- the Packard Molor Car cas~ (decided March 10, 1947). 'It
should be noted that the majority of the Court .in. this case did not
approve. the policy. of the. Board ~s. doctrine but, in ·the absence of any
specific. limitation 11;poil the ~ord "employe_e'' in the Wagner Act,
merely _held tb.&t ihe Board had power to reach such a conclusion.
This .means, &9 Mr. ..Justice Douglas pointed o.ut in ~- dissenting
opinion-and as Board COUllSel conceded in argument.-that ·unless
Congress amends the act in this resper.t its processes can be used .to
unionize even vice presidents since they are not specifically exempted
from the category of "etiploye~."
.·
·
'l'he .Board has. pla.ced the issu~ squ.arely up to the Congress by
stating in one of its recent decislons:·
,·
·
. So long all the Coogress ot the United ~~tes imposes no limitation on their

•choiet?, it is not tor us to do so (J onu d: Laughlin Sled Corp., 71 N. L. R. B. 1261)•

. The f<>lly of permitting a continuation of·this :policy is dramatically
illustrated by what-has happened in· the capijve mines of the Jones· &
Lauf?hlin Steel Corp. since supervisory employees w~e organized by
the t.Tnited Mine W9rkers under the protection of the act. . Disciplinary slips issued by the und.erp-ound _s11pervisors .in these mines. have
iallen off by two-thirds and the.accid,ent rate in each mirie has doubled.
(See testimony-_ of H. Parker Sh~rp,. hearings on S. 55 and S. J. Res. 22;
vol. l, p·. 3E39, Ile J<>iies and Laughlin &e_el (!orp. 1 71 N. L, Jl~ ~- J,26_l.)
In diawmg an amendment to meet this s1tuati:on, the comnuttee has
not been unmindful of the fact ~i cer~a.in employees: with minor
~uperviso:ry_ duties have proble~.-~hi~ may justify their inclusio;n
m tba~ act._ It has· therefore <listmguished .between straw bosses,

leadlnen, set-up nien,· and other minor supervisory employees, ~n the

one hand, a.nd the supervisor vested with sucb.·:genuine .management
preroga.ti.v~ ~ the'J.ight to hlre or.fire, <Ji~cipline, ·or m~ke_.effective
recommendations with respect to such aot1on. In other words the
committee.
adopted the test which the Board itself has m~de Jn
numerous ~es w.lien it has permitted certain categories of supervisory employees to be• included· in the same bargainini unit with the
rank a.nd file.. (Bethlehem Steel, Oompa,ny, SpaN40W8 Poi~ Division, 65

has

N; L._'R. B. 2&4 (~xpediters); Pitu!ru,rgh Egji,U4bl.e Meur O-Ompany, 61
N. L. R. B. 880 (group l~ders.with a~~nority to give.instructions an_d
to lay ~ut the work); Ruhards Olumical Works, 65 N. L. R. B. H
(supel'Vi.sors who are m~e conduits for transmittiilg orders); Endicottc.
Jolfrtson1 67 N. L. R. B.1342, 1347- (persons having the title.rif foreman

and assistant (oreman but wit4 .no authority other than .to keep
production mo!ll18') .) .
• .. . . •
.
.
Before formule.tmg· this defirut1on, the committee considered e. proJ>O$al1 occasionally. advanced, which would have limited the prote~tihn
. of foremen to joining or organizing unions. whose membership was
confined to supervisory personne.l and not affiliated with eithe1 of the
mafor labo:r federations. After c<?~siderable discussion, the- coIIllll!,t~
decided that any suro. co:inproin.Jse. would be CQmple.tely unrealistic.
There is· iioihi,!lg ·in· 'tlie record developed. before this co~ttee. to
justify the oonclusic>n that there is such a. thing as a really independent
foremen's ..otganization.
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It is true the.t the Foremen's Association of America. is nominally
independent, but its president admitted in testifying before us that it
was the practice of his union to. confer with reptesento.tives of various
CIO and AFL unions to work out a. common policy in the event of a.
strike. (See testimony of Robert H. Keys,. ict., vol. 3, pp. 232""'."233.)
A number of Boa.rd cases a.re studded with evidmce showing collaboration both in the or~e.nizingsta.ge and in concert0d activity between
the Foremen>s Association and affiliated unions. .(See Re Chrysler
Oorp_ .. 69 N. L.R. B. 182; Re B. F. Goodrich, 65 N. L. R. B. 294; and

Re L.A. Young Spring Wire, 65 N. L. R. B. 298.) It also appeared

that i.he only major company in mass-production industry which has
had n. coll~ctive agreement with the Foremen's Association is the
Ford Motor Co. :Although this wa.s cited by the Foremen's Association as refuting industry's fears that productivity would suffer if
it entered into collective relations with supervisors, it is si~nifi.ee.nt
that within the past week this very company he.s s~rved notice of its
termination of its agreement with the a.ssocia.tion. The termination
wo.s accompanied with a statement of the company thatAfter 3 years• experience * • * the results have been the opposite of what

•we have hoped for~ Rs.ther than exerting its efforts to bring foremen into closer
relationship with management, your association has worked in the opposite direction.

It is natural to expect that unless this Congress takes action, management will be deprived of the undivided loyalty of its foremen.:
There is an inherent tendency to subordinate their interests wherever
· they conflict with those of the rank and file:. As one witness put it,
"Two groups of people working on parallel lines eventually find a
parallel interest." (See testimony of ,James D. Francis, id., vol. 1,
p. 23~.)
In recommending the adoption of this amendment, the committee is
trying to make clear what Congress attempted to demonstrate last
yes.r when it adopted the Case. l>ill. By drawing a mor~- definite line
between management, o.nd labor we believe the proposed lo.ngu~e has
fully met some of the technical criticisms to the corresponding section
referred to in the President's veto of that bill. It should be noted
the.tall that the bill does is to leave foremen in the same position in
which they were until the Labor Board reversed the position it had
originally taken in 1943 in the Maryf,a,nd Drydock case (49 N. L. R. B.
733). In other words, the bill does not prevent anyone from organizing
nor does it prohibit any employer from recognizing a union of foremen.
It merely relieves employers who are subject to the na.tiono.1 act free
from any compulsion by this N ationo.l Board or any loco.I agency to
accord to the front line of ·management the anomalous status of
employees.
·
COMPULSORY UNION MEMBERSHIP

A controversial issue to which the committee has devoted the most
mature deliberation has been the problem posed by compulsory union
membership. It should be noted that when the railway workers were
given the protection of the Railway Labor Act, Congress thought tho.t
the provisions which prevented discrimination against union membership and provided for the certification of bo.rge.ining representatives
obviated the justification for closed-shop or union-shop arrangements.
That statute specifically forbids n.ny kind. of compulsory unionism.
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